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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the development of the CPA's ideology and practice during the 
period from 1928 to mid-1935. It concentrates on the party's trade union activities in 
Queensland, following the various changes in the communist party line, as they were 
dictated by the Comintern. 
It seeks to understand why the CPA changed from a party that, in the 1920s, 
advocated the revolutionary overthrow of Australian capitalism by the working class 
to one that, later, sought merely a more equitable distribution of the nation's wealth 
to the working class within a democratic, capitalist framework. 
This thesis argues that central to the shift in its revolutionary ideology was the 
increasing domination of the CPA by Moscow and the subordination of the party's 
interests to the demands of Soviet foreign policy. Consequently, programmes such as 
the Third Period Line and the Popular Front, which were enthusiastically adopted by 
the CPA, bore little relationship to the circumstances faced by the party in Australia. 
Rather, these programmes arose from national and international policy considerations 
of Stalin's ruling bureaucracy. 
Easing the process of subordination to the Comintern was the increasing internal 
bureaucratism of the party which acted as a restraint on free debate and discussion of 
the Comintern and party policy. Dissent was met with ostracism, denunciation and 
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expulsion. 
As trade union work had always been central to the CPA's su-ategy of building 
influence within the working class, it provides some of the clearest illustrations of 
how the party's work was coloured by its control by Moscow. The Third Period line, 
with its emphasis on creating a militant rank and file movement in the unions, 
allowed the party to rebuild a network of shop floor militants and to re-establish a 
degree of job conu-ol which had been almost eliminated by the series of union 
defeats in the early years of the depression. 
The success of the CPA in its rank and file work allowed them to capture official 
positions within the trade union bureaucracy at a time when the party was discarding 
the Third Period line for the more moderate Popular Front. Co-incidentally, pressures 
exerted on communist union officials led them to temper their militancy somewhat. 
This, as well as the adoption of the Popular Front, reinforced and accelerated the 
conservatising trends on the party's ideology. 
This thesis concentrates on the Third Period (1928-1935) as it was during this era 
that the transition within the party took place. However, it should be stressed that 
those who joined the party during this period were not consciously aware of the 
significance of the changes taking place within the party. Rather, their loyalty to 
what they believed was a socialist regime, and to Stalin whom they believed to be 
the foremost leader of the international proletariat enabled them to rationalise away 
many of the inconsistencies in CPA and Comintern pronouncements and policies. In 
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fact, their persistent activity in the workplace and amongst the unemployed, despite 
continual harassment from the state, the employing class, the media and even 
conservative elements in the ALP and union bureaucracy, kept alive the ideal of a 
society based on equality and freedom. 
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INTRODUCTION 
RELEVANCE OF THE THIRD PERIOD 
Much has been written about the Communist Party of Australia [CPA] yet few 
authors have dealt in depth with the era in the party's history known as the Third Period 
(1928-1935).' This neglect occurred perhaps because the period immediately following -
that is, the Popular Front - saw the party's size and influence within the labour 
movement grow significantly,^ making the pre-Popular Front era a less interesting 
subject of study. The CPA itself has neglected this period in its written histories,' 
possibly for the same reason, or perhaps because the party preferred to put behind it the 
extremism of the Third Period which contrasted starkly with the more mainstream 
Popular Front and post-Popular Front politics. 
Nevertheless the Third Period deserves attention. According to Soviet analysis. 
^ See for instance Alistair Davidson, The Communist Party of 
Australia: A Short History (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 
1969) and Robin Gollan, Revolutionaries and Reformists; Communism 
in the Australian Labour Movement 1920-1955 (ANU Press: Canberra, 
1975). The exceptions are Frank Farrell, International Socialism 
and Australian Labour: The Left in Australia 1919-39 (Hale and 
Iremonger: Sydney, 1981) and Tom O'Lincoln, Into the Mainstream: 
The Decline of Australian Communism (Stained Wattle Press: 
Sydney, 1985) . 
^ By 1945 CPA membership was 16,000. O'Lincoln, ibid., p. 
52. In the same year 40% of unionised workers were "led or 
influenced by Communist officials". Craig Johnston, "The 
Comimunist Party and Labour Unity: 1939-1945", Labour History, May 
1983, p. 77. 
' L.L. Sharkey, The Australian Communist Party: An Outline 
History (CPA: Sydney, 1944); R. Dixon, "CPA in the '30s", 
Australian Left Review, no. 49, 1976; R. Dixon, "Industrial 
Policy in the 30s", Australian Left Review, October-Novemiber 
1970; and E.W. Campbell, History of the Australian Labor 
Movement: A Marxist Interpretation (Current Book Distributors: 
Sydney, 1945) . 
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post-World War I history was divided into three distinct periods: 1917-24 was the "first 
period" and was distinguished by a series of revolutionary upsurges; 1925-8 was the 
"second period" which was one of capitalist stabilisation; 1928 onwards was the "third 
period" which would be capitalism's last and was one of crises and renewed 
revolutionary upsurges. The Third Period warrants study because it is a period of 
transition for the CPA which saw it evolve from the organisation which, when founded 
in 1920, advocated the overthrow of Australian capitalism by the working class, to one 
which, by 1941, claimed to be the only true defenders and guardians of the Australian 
nation. 
During the Third Period militant unionists, unemployed workers, and a handful 
of middle class professionals joined the CPA because of its revolutionary activity. 
Locating capitalism as the source of workers' growing poverty the party was almost 
alone in organising resistance to the austerity measures of federal and state governments 
during the 1930s depression. Communists led strikes in the pastoral, mining, timber, and 
agricultural industries against savage wage cuts - incurring the wrath of the government, 
media, and employing class as well as the Australian Labor Party [ALP] and much of 
the trade union officialdom. Amongst the unemployed the CPA built a large, militant 
organisation - the Unemployed Workers Movement [UWM] - which fought evictions of 
working class families and led struggles amongst the unemployed for permanent shelters 
and better wages and working conditions on government sponsored relief projects. On 
broader political issues the party headed progressive struggles against imperialism, war, 
fascism, racism and the White Australia Policy, as well as struggles for democratic 
rights and freedom of speech and assembly. 
But the CPA was not a free agent. Its fate was intimately connected with the fate 
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of the Russian revolution, the gains of which had been eroded by the late 1920s. The 
years of the Third Period were ones which saw Joseph Stalin's domination of Soviet 
politics secured and all internal opposition from both the left and right ruthlessly 
crushed. Communist parties affiliated to the Third Communist International [Comintern] 
began to reproduce the bureaucratic structures and dictatorial methods of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU]. Not once were the many theoretical zig-zags 
emanating from Moscow questioned by the CPA whose loyalty to the USSR was 
absolute. 
Austrahan communist leaders accepted Moscow's political analysis of the nature 
of the period in which the party operated, even its assessment of the class struggle in 
Australia and the possibilities for revolutionary upheaval - none of which were actually 
based on an independent appraisal of Australian conditions. Rather, they reflected the 
machinations and foreign policy considerations of the USSR. Of most importance was 
the Comintern's quiet abandonment of organising for proletarian revolutions in the west 
and its replacement with pragmatic alliances between the USSR and western capitalist 
governments as the Soviet bureaucracy attempted to build "Socialism in One Country". 
So while party recruitment during the Third Period was based on the CPA's 
revolutionary oratory and militant activity, under the direction of the Comintern it 
unwittingly retreated from its revolutionary goals. 
In the post-Third Period days, particularly in the 1940s, party recruitment 
reflected this transformation. While membership had once been predominantly from 
workers and unemployed, during the Popular Front recruitment came more from the 
middle class.'* A more important indication of the CPA's shift can be seen in its vision 
O ' L i n c o l n , o p . c i t . , p . 62 
4 
of what the future held for Australian workers. In 1921 the party stated its immediate 
objective to be the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat: based on a system of Workmen's 
Councils".^ By 1944 party leader, E. Thornton, criticised the Arbitration Court for 
encouraging strikes, then went on to explain that his vision for post-war Australia was 
not revolution but better wage rates. Thornton said: "I am attempting to prepare the way 
now for a just method of fixing wages after the war, which will give the workers some 
hope of post-war prosperity and consequently more enthusiasm for the war effort now".^ 
The shifts in the CPA's theory and practice were made easier by the party's 
internal regime. Bureaucratisation, the iron control of debate and the suppression of 
internal opposition and dissent became established practice in the Third Period. Genuine 
discussion and disagreements were stifled and obedience to the party's leading body, the 
Central Committee, and to Moscow were promoted. To question Moscow's policies was 
to risk ostracism, denunciation, and expulsion from the party. Consequently, the 
U"ansition was accomplished with as little resistance from the membership as possible. 
^ Communist, vol. 1, no. 24 (8 June 1921), p. 
^ Queensland Guardian, 24 November 1944, p. 3 
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However, since this process of transition was not overtly perceptible to party 
members at the time, and the horrors of the Stalinist regime were not accepted by many 
Australian communists until the 1950s,^ it would be mistaken to conclude that 
communists were the sinister figures portrayed by conservative elements. On the 
contrary most were dedicated militants struggling for a better world. Tragically, their 
intense loyalty was to a regime which spoke of equality, liberation, peace and freedom 
while in reahty maintained inequalities between the privileged bureaucratic elite headed 
by Stalin, and the mass of workers and peasants; suppressed national minorities within 
the USSR; armed itself for war; and enslaved millions in forced labour camps. 
As the Third Period was one of transition it contained within it both the elements 
of the new period as well as the old. While this can be seen in many aspects of the 
CPA's work I have chosen to examine the party's trade union activity since, at the 
CPA's founding congress in October 1920, unions were seen as the key organisations 
through which workers would organise the revolutionary overthrow of Australian 
capitalism. One of the criteria for admission into the Comintern was trade union work. 
It was insisted: 
Communist cells should be formed in the trade unions, and, by their 
sustained and unflagging work, win the unions over to the communist 
cause. In every phase of their day-to-day activity these cells must unmask 
the treachery of the social-patriots and the vacillation of the "Centrists". 
The cells must be completely subordinate to the party as a whole.^ 
•' Prior to Nikita Khrushchev's "secret speech" reports of 
mass murder and oppression within the USSR were dismissed as 
capitalist propaganda. 
® V.I. Lenin, Lenin on Trade Unions (Progress Publishers: 
Moscow, 1976),' p. 363. 
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By the mid-1940s, with 400,000 trade unionists under communist influence,'' the party 
came closest to achieving its goal of winning the unions to communism. Yet, the CPA 
did not use this influence to promote proletarian revolution. Instead, communist union 
officials supported a wages' freeze and increases in workers' productivity to boost the 
war effort - that is, the military defence of Australian capitalism. Communist President 
of the Miners Federation, Harold Wells, urged workers to "fight for production" with 
the militancy and vigour they exhibited in their pre-war struggles for better wages and 
working conditions.'*^ Communist officials even opposed strikes of their rank and file 
in the metal industries, mines, textile industries and on the wharves." 
In the 1920s the party called for the democratisation of unions to enhance the 
power of the rank and file over their elected officials. By the 1950s, however, the 
attitude of communist union officials' toward their rank and file was often dictatorial. 
Communist leaders of the Seamen's Union of Australia [SUA], for instance, said of 
those unionists objecting to the compulsory levy for the "Out Menzies" Fund that 
"opposition must be smashed at once...Those, who refuse to pay must be attacked as 
"^ J.E. Henry, "Communist Strategy in Australia, 1920-1957", 
Quadrant. vol. 4, no. 1, 1957, p. 59. 
°^ Andrew Metcalfe, "Communist Leadership on the NSW 
Coalfields", Arena, no. 78, 1987, p. 60. 
" See Craig Johnston, "The 'Leading War Party': Communists 
and World War 2", Labour History, no. 39, Novemiber 1980; L. 
Finch, "Could 'Winnie the War Winner' Organise Women? Problems 
of CPA Women During World War II", Hecate, vol. 10, no. 1, 1984; 
Daphne Gollan, "The Balmain Ironworkers Strike of 1945", Labour 
History, nos. 22-23, May and November 1972; Nick (Origlass) "The 
Second Imperialist War and the CPA", International, April 1971; 
and O'Lincoln, op.cit. 
scabs, [and] if necessary, thrown out of the union". 12 
THE TRADE UNION QUESTION 
The trade union question - that is, the relationship between the revolutionary 
party "which represents the proletariat as it should be" and the unions "which represent 
the proletariat as it is" - was described by Leon Trotsky as "the most fundamental 
question of revolutionary Marxism"" and has been debated for well over a century. In 
the 1840s Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels stood against the majority of British Utopian 
socialists and left wing chartists who initially dismissed unions as a "fallacy" which 
"disU"acted workers from revolutionary struggle".'"* On the contrary, Engels argued, 
unions united workers at the point of production, the very heart of the capitahst system. 
The "workingmen cannot attack the bourgeoisie, and with it the whole existing order of 
society, at any sorer point" than this, he claimed.'^ Unions were a vital component of 
the revolutionary struggle, training workers for their ultimate battle with the capitalist 
order. Engels described them as "the military school of the working men in which they 
prepare themselves for the great struggle which cannot be avoided" - the proletarian 
revolution.'^ Like Engels, Marx saw unions as the "bulwarks for the workers in their 
^^  Strictly Confidential memo to communist cells in the SUA. 
Undated. N38/1231. Archives of Business and Labour, (hereafter 
ABL), ANU. 
" Leon Trotsky, Marxism and the Trade Unions (New Park: 
London, 1972), p. 47. 
" This was said by left wing Chartist Ernest Jones. Quoted 
in Chris Banbery, "Marx and Engels and the Unions", International 
Socialism, vol. 2, no. 26, Spring 1988, p. 68. 
'^  Quoted in ibid. , p. 69 
" Quoted in ibid., p.69. 
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stniggles with the employers"'^ and strikes as the means by which workers' 
consciousness would be transformed and developed. Marx explained: 
In order to rightly appreciate the value of strikes and combinations, we 
must not allow ourselves to be blinded by the apparent insignificance of 
their economic results but hold...in view their moral and political 
consequences. Without...the constant warfare between masters and 
men...the working classes of Great Britain, and all Europe, would be 
heart-broken, a weak-minded, a worn out unresisting mass, whose self-
emancipation would prove as impossible as that of the slaves of Ancient 
Greece and Rome.'^ 
However, the union movement in Britain underwent changes between 1844-47 
and 1865-71.''^ As economic slump gave way to expansion, workers' militant struggles 
declined. In this era, claimed Beatrice and Sidney Webb,^° unions lay aside 
...all projects of the Social Revolution, they set themselves resolutely to 
resist the worst of the legal and industrial oppressions from which they 
suffered, and slowly built up for this purpose organisations which have 
become integral parts of the structure of a modern industrial state}^ 
These events compelled Marx to re-evaluate the role of trade unions. By 1865 
he emphasised, not the revolutionary potential of unions, but their limitations. Rather 
than fighting to end capitalism, unions fought for better conditions for workers within 
the existing system. Marx admonished the unions, insisting they: 
...ought not to forget that they are fighting with effects, but not the causes 
of those effects...They ought, therefore, not to be exclusively absorbed in 
'^' Quoted in ibid. , p. 70. 
^^  Quoted in ibid., pp. 75-76. 
^^  Sidney and Beatrice Webb call this period "The New Spirit 
and the New Mood". The History of Trade Unionism (Longmans: 
London, 1911), chapter four. 
°^ Beatrice Webb (1858-1943) along with her husband Sidney 
Webb (1859-1947) disliked the Bolsheviks but admired Stalinist 
Russia of the 1930s. Sidney Webb was a founding member of the 
Fabian Society. 
21 Webb, op.cit., p. 162. Emphasis added 
these unavoidable guerrilla fights incessantly springing up from the 
never-ceasing encroachments of capital or changes in the market...Instead 
of the conservative motto, "A fair day's wage for a fair day's work" they 
ought to inscribe on their banner the revolutionaiy watchword, "Abolition 
of the wages system".^^ 
In this period of economic expansion and declining workers' struggle employers 
became more accepting of unions as an inevitable institution of capitalism as did the 
Liberal Party who were wanted to attract workers' votes."' Engels lamented that as a 
consequence unions were "petted and patronised as perfectly legitimate institutions and 
as useful means of spreading sound economic doctrines amongst the workers".^" Of 
most concern to Marx and Engels was the emergence and domination in this period of 
a conservative union bureaucracy which cautioned its members against strike acUon.^ ^ 
The Central Committee of the Stonemasons Union warned against "the dangerous 
practice of striking", while the Flint Glass Makers' Magazine claimed "strikes are the 
bane of Trade Unions".^ *^ By 1881 Engels was accusing these union officials of having 
been "bought by, or at least paid by, the bourgeoisie".^^ Instead, he looked to those 
unskilled workers who remained outside the British union movement and whose income 
and standard of living was much lower than the unionised craft workers. When struggles 
of these workers erupted in the late-1880s and unskilled workers like match workers, gas 
^^  Quoted in Banbery, op.cit., p. 74. 
" Draper, op.cit., p. 109. 
^^  Quoted in Hal Draper, Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution, 
vol II: The Politics of Social Classes (Monthly Review Press: New 
York, 1978), p. 109. 
" Webb, op.cit., pp. 180-183. 
^^  Quoted in ibid., p. 183. 
^^  Quoted in V.I. Lenin, Imperialism, The Highest Stage of 
Capitalism (Foreign Press: Peking, 1970), p. 129. 
10 
workers, and dockers (waterside workers) established new unions, Engels wrote: 
These new Trades Unions of unskilled men and women are totally 
different from the old organisations of the working-class aristocracy and 
cannot fall into the same conservative ways...^^ 
...the masses, whose adhesion gave them strength, were rough, neglected, 
looked down upon by the working-class aristocracy; but they had this 
immense advantage, that their minds were virgin soil, entirely free from 
the inherited "respectable" bourgeois prejudices which hampered the 
brains of the better situated "old" Unionists.^'' 
Engels believed a "labour aristocracy" had developed amongst the better organised 
workers which served as a conservative bloc within the working class movement.'" 
Engels' explanation was that the leaders of the craft unions had been "bought 
off by the employers. Other contemporary observers of the changing union movement 
in Britain believed differently. The conservatism of the union officials was not, 
according to Beatrice and Sidney Webb, a product of bribery by the capitalists. Rather, 
the social position of the officials led imperceptibly to their conservatisation. The Webbs 
described how: 
Nowadays the salaried officer of a great Union is courted and flattered 
by the middle class. He is asked to dine with them...He goes to hve in 
a little villa in a lower middle-class suburb. The move leads to his 
dropping his workmen friends... With the habits of his new neighbours 
he insensibly adopts more and more of their ideas.'' 
^^  Quoted in Draper, op.cit., p. Ill 
^^  Quoted in ibid. , p. 112 
'° ibid. , p. 107 
'^  Webb, op.cit., pp. 456-457. 
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Removed from the conditions of work in the factory, mine, or mill, the official 
is unaffected by the unemployment, wage cuts and stressful working conditions which 
dominate the lives of the rank and file. Consequently he or she gradually becomes 
insensitive to the grievances of ordinary workers. When industrial disputes erupt the 
official may not approach them with the same conviction and intensity of feeling as 
those workers immediately involved. The Webbs continued: 
Whilst the points at issue no longer affect his own earnings or conditions 
of employment, any disputes between his members and their employers 
increase his work and add to his worry. The former vivid sense of the 
privations...gradually fades from his mind; and he begins more and more 
to regard all complaints as perverse and unreasonable...he finds himself 
in small sympathy with the men's demands, and eventually arranges a 
compromise on terms distasteful to a large section of his members. The 
gathering storm-cloud now breaks. At his next appearance before a 
general meeting cries of "treachery" and "bribery" are raised. Alas! it is 
not bribery. Not his morality but his intellect is corrupted.'^ 
It should be noted that the Webbs approved of the formation of this bureaucracy 
in the unions. They also abhorred industrial action. Beau-ice Webb described the general 
strike in Britain in 1927 as "a proletarian distemper which had to run its course and like 
other distempers it is well to have it over and done with at the cost of a lengthy 
convalescence"." While the Webbs were not marxists, their insight into the behaviour 
of union officials - that it was a product of their altered social position - seems more 
appropriate than the contemporary marxist theory that union officials were "bought off 
by the employing class. 
It was the contradiction between the conservative outlook of the entrenched union 
officials and the revolutionary potential of the worker members which was to confound 
32 ibid., pp. 456-457. 
" Quoted in Christopher Farman, May 192 6: The General 
Strike, Britain's Aborted Revolution? (Panther: London, 1972), 
p. 321. 
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Marxists and set the parameters of the debate on the trade union question well into the 
twentieth century. 
Another factor which confused debate on the trade union issue was that, being 
dynamic organisations, they reflected the advances and retreats of the working class 
movement in its constant struggle with the government and employers. Consequently, 
the image projected by unions altered with the nature of the period. In times of 
industrial upheaval, when more conservative officials were often replaced by militant 
ones, the political left was often enthralled by the revolutionary potential of unions 
which Marx and Engels noticed in the 1840s. Yet, when these periods gave way to ones 
whose features were etched by a downturn in workers' struggles, when, often, 
conservatives became dominant, when the ties between the union bureaucracy and the 
state were strengthened, and union membership fell, Engels's assertion that the union 
officials were in the pay of the employing class was appealing to the left. 
That these issues were never fully resolved is seen in the CPA's trade union 
strategy which was to win the rank and tile to communist policies and to replace the 
existing officials with their own members. However, this may have been too simplistic 
as communists were not immune from the process of conservatisation of union officials 
described by the Webbs which, itself, was to play a role in the transition of the CPA. 
As the party won more and more positions within the union bureaucracy towards the end 
of the Third Period, its leadership became more cautious. Feeding into this process and 
reinforcing it was the shift in politics of the Comintern to the Popular Front which 
legitimised the moderate union pohcies of the CPA. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
TRADE UNIONS AND THE FORMATION OF THE CPA 
THE GREAT WAR AND TRADE UNIONS 
Marxist inquiry into the political conservatism of union officials was further 
stimulated by their activities during the Great War (1914-1918). The vast majority of 
officials in all belligerent countries sided with their respective ruling classes, promoting 
"industrial peace" on the homefront to support their nation's war effort. In Australia, at 
the outbreak of war, the Victorian Public Service Association promised its "thorough 
loyalty to the empire" and tendered its services to the government "in any capacity 
required".' The NSW Boilermakers Union suspended all industrial awards in the 
defence department as far as overtime was concerned^ and the NSW State Council of 
the Australasian Society of Engineers [ASE] pledged itself "to assist the Government in 
maintaining industrial peace".' On the waterfront the Waterside Workers Federation 
[WWF] consented to a 'no strike' clause in its award of 1915. 
Similar situations occurred in Europe. Russian Marxist, Vladimir Lenin, shocked 
by these events, concluded that union officials had been bribed or "bought off by the 
super profits which western imperialist nations extracted from their colonies. Echoing 
Engels' supposition of the 1880s, Lenin said: 
This su-atum of bourgeoisified workers or "labour aristocracy", who have 
become completely petty-bourgeois in their mode of life, in the amount 
of their earnings, and in their point of view, serve as the...principal social 
^ Quoted in J. Normington-Rawling, "The Trade Unions and 
War, 1914-1935", Communist Review, January 1936, p. 43. 
^ ibid., p. 44 
Quoted in ibid., p. 45. 
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(not military) support of the bourgeoisie. They are the real agents of the 
bourgeoisie in the labour movement, the labour lieutenants of the 
capitalist class, the real carriers of reformism and chauvinism.^ 
In Australia, as the war dragged on and the initial surge of patriotic fervour 
abated, the union officials who were firmly committed to the war effort found their 
influence over the rank and file dwindling. Workers became increasingly bitter about the 
level of sacrifice expected of them, in particular, the rising cost of living,^ the fall in 
average real wages,'' rising unemployment,^ the export of food at a time of increasing 
shortages,^ the immense loss of life at the front, and the obvious class distinctions 
highlighted by the 1915 War Census which showed that as few as 15,000 people owned 
a quarter of the nation's wealth.^ 
From 1916 a wave of strikes, initiated by the rank and file of the unions, 
shattered the "industrial peace" promised by their officials. The most important strikers 
^ L e n i n , o p . c i t . , p . 10 . 
^ Average Real Wages Indices, 1913-1918 
Year 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 
Aust 975 952 862 894 950 952 
Qld 1060 1045 912 991 1078 1083 
Doug Hunt, "History of the Labour Movement in North Queensland: 
Trade Unionism, Politics and Industrial Conflict, 1900-1920", 
Ph.D. Thesis, James Cook University, 1979, p. 249. 
^ Between 1914 and 1918 retail prices in Queensland rose 
60%, compared to the national average of 47%. Raymond Evans, The 
Red Flag Riots: A Study of Intolerance (University of Queensland 
Press: St Lucia, 1988), p. 15. 
^ The unemployment rate in Queensland rose to 9.2% by 1918. 
ibid., p. 15. 
® Ross Fitzgerald and Harold Thornton, Labor in Queensland: 
From the 1880s to 1988 (University of Queensland Press: St. 
Lucia, 1989), p. 93 says when CSR tried to sell the entire 1914-
15 sugar crop overseas to exploit the high world market price, 
they were stopped by the Federal Government which was "concerned 
at the political unrest the shortage of a staple such as sugar 
could cause". 
^ Communist, no. 73 (28 July 1922), p. 4. 
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included the Melbourne waterside workers. Broken Hill miners, NSW miners on the 
southern coal field, and shearers in Queensland and NSW. In each case the union 
officials - whether moderates from the Australian Workers' Union [AWU] and WWF 
or left wing officials like those from the Amalgamated Miners' Association [AMA] -
tried to rein in their members' struggles. Ian Turner claimed that in this period there 
existed a "wide gap between rank and file militants and even the most mihtant of 
leaders".'° Then, in 1917, Australia experienced an unprecedented general strike of 
100,000 workers against the introduction of the Taylor system in the NSW railways and 
U-amways." Like the previous strikes, this, too, was the product of rank and file 
spontaneity and was not initiated by the union officials, although, as in the other strikes, 
the officials subsequently gained control of the dispute. 
Queensland reflected the national pattern. Enlistments in the army fell from 3,890 
in January 1916 to only 280 by January 1918. Correspondingly, industrial disputes in 
Queensland increased from 17 strikes involving 2,000 workers in 1915, to 84 strikes 
involving 11,000 workers by 1918.'^ Within the trade unions the gap between the rank 
and file and their leadership widened as some conservative officials attempted to stifle 
industrial action. The most graphic illustration of this was the 1916 shearers' strike 
where opposition from AWU leaders sparked a small rebellion amongst more left wing 
minor AWU officials. 
°^ Ian Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics: The Labour 
Movement in Eastern Australia, 1900-1921 (ANU Press: Canberra, 
1965), p. 91. 
^^  Farrell, op.cit. , p. 24. 
^^  Evans, op.cit., p. 13. Also see Ray Evans, Loyalty and 
Disloyalty: Social Conflict on the Queensland Homefront, 1914-18 
(Allen & Unwin: Sydney, 1987), p. 138. 
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Following the shearers' strike, north Queensland railway workers struck over 
wage differentials in August 1917. In the same month waterside workers in Mackay 
refused to load sugar or to discharge coal to ships headed for the strike bound cities of 
Sydney and Melbourne. Soon ports at Bowen and Townsville were involved and the 
dispute spread to additional north Queensland ports as strike-breakers were employed 
to move the cargo. Prime Minister William Hughes - only recently expelled as President 
of the WWF - succeeded in using the War Precautions Act to cancel union preference 
to the WWF - that is, it was no longer the case that union members would get employed 
in preference to non-union labour -in Mackay, Bowen, Sydney, Melbourne, and 
Fremantle. However, he failed in his attempt to deregister the union.'' 
In August, September and October 1918 north Queensland sugar workers and 
Townsville sanitary workers withheld their labour, demanding higher wages.'"^ Then in 
June 1919, the Australian Meat Industries Employees Union [AMIEU], in a bitter 
dispute in Townsville to defend union preference, saw its left wing officials. Pierce 
Carney and Michael Kelly, arrested and nine strikers shot by police. In breaking the 
strike Labor Premier T.J. Ryan hired non-union engine drivers to replace those stood 
down for refusing to transport additional police to Townsville.'^ 
Frightened by the growing militancy of north Queensland workers, the Military 
^^  Hunt , op . c i t . , p p . 3 2 5 - 3 6 . 
•^^  Sanitary workers demanded a wage rise from £4/5/- to £6 
and the reinstatement of two men dismissed for being "trouble 
makers". Allan A. Morrison, "Militant Labour in Queensland, 1912-
1927", Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society, vol. 
28, part 3, 1952, p. 212. 
^^  Fitzgerald and Thornton, op.cit., pp. 33-34. Also see 
Dough Hunt, "The Townsville Meatworkers' Strike, 1919", in Denis 
Murphy (ed.), The Big Strikes: Queensland 1889-1965 (University 
of Queensland Press: St. Lucia, 1983). 
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Intelligence Section, which had been established under the War Precautions Act, warned 
the authorities of the "likelihood of a general upheaval here shortly".'^' Silencing the 
left wing union officials like Michael Kelly (Townsville Industrial Council), Pierce 
Carney (AMIEU), E. Eastcrab (Railways Union), J. Durkin (AWU),'^ Ransey 
(Industrial Workers of the Worid - IWW)"^ and G. Bellamy (AWU), was the only way 
to avert this, it believed. The Intelligence Section advised the government to issue an 
order under the War Precautions Act to bring "harmony and peace to the unions here, 
which at present are a seething mass of discontent".'^ 
In this atmosphere the popularity of the ALP federal government under Hughes 
plummeted. Two attempts to introduce conscription split the Labor government and 
polarised society. In Brisbane Hughes was unable to finish a recruiting speech as the 
crowd "counted him out" '^' while in Warwick, in late 1917, his pro-conscription speech 
was cut short when an unsympathetic audience pelted him with eggs. The conscription 
^^  Captain, Intelligence Section, General Staff to Captain 
Wood, Victoria Barracks, Brisbane, 30 October 1918, p. 1. BP4/1, 
66/5/115, Part 1. AA (Brisbane). 
" Durkin bought his first AWU ticket in 1894 at the age of 
14 during a shearers strike at Moree. He was Western District 
Secretary (AWU) from 1921-26 but fell out with the bureaucracy 
for his left wing stance. 
^^  This was probably Norman Rancie former editor of IWW 
newspaper. Direct Action, who was working at the Ross River 
meatworks at the time. He joined the CPA only to lead a numiber 
of ex-IWW members out of the party with Tom Glynn in the early 
years. Rancie was a WWF delegate in the 1928 strike and stood for 
the position of General Secretary of the union in 1931 as a CPA 
supported candidate. 
•'^  Captain, Intelligence Section, General Staff to Captain 
Wood, Victoria Barracks, Brisbane, 30 October 1918, p. 2. BP4/1, 
66/5/115, Part 1. 7VA (Brisbane). 
°^ Dick Surplus interviewed by Jim Beatson, no date. Held at 
Undergraduate Library, University of Queensland. 
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issue also caused a rift between the federal and Queensland state governments. This was 
exacerbated when an armed raid of the State Government Printing Office took place to 
confiscate all copies of Hansard Proof Number 37, containing speeches of Labor 
parliamentarians outlawed by the censor.^' 
The resurgence of rank and file militancy during a period when Labor had 
proved itself unpopular shifted the political climate. Left wing officials "captured union 
after union"^^ and challenges were even mounted against the officials in the AWU 
when, in 1916, an IWW nominee "polled surprisingly well" against the powerful W.G. 
Spence.^' In NSW, under John Smith (Jock) Garden, the left captured the Trades Hall 
Council and dominated the ALP from 1916-1919, their hold only being finally broken 
by an alliance between the AWU and Labor parhamentarians. 
Interestingly, in the struggle against the left officials' domination of the NSW 
ALP, a pamphlet. The Pommy Takes Control, was circulated. Its major criucism was that 
many left union officials were not Australian-bom.^'* At times of heightened working 
class unrest it became a common cry of the conservatives that foreign-bom agitators 
were inciting Australian workers. During the 1919 seamen's strike. Arbitration Court 
Judge, Higgins, suggested the dispute was caused by "the teachings of overseas 
theorists" - referring to the SUA's left wing official, Tom Walsh, who was born in 
21 Morrison, op. cit . , p. 211 
^^  Mick Armstrong, "The Industrial Workers of the World in 
Australia", Socialist Review, (Australia), Issue 2, Winter 1990, 
p. 71. 
^^  Turner, op. cit. , p. 90. 
^^  V.G. Childe, How Labour Governs: A Study of Workers 
Representation in Australia (Labour Publishing Company: London, 
1923), p. 65. 
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Britain." No-one was spared this accusation. Even the moderate officials of the AWU 
were themselves denounced as "Pommies" when they opposed wage cuts in 1921.^'' 
In the years from 1916 to 1919 Australian unions had undergone a perceptible 
change. The left officials frightened the employing class and government while thrilling 
the rank and file with their revolutionary pronouncements. At the national Trade Union 
Congress in June 1921, Miners' Union Secretary, A.C. Willis, insisted it was impossible 
to gain political power without resorting to violence: "it is no good asking people to 
vote. Instead...we should be here discussing...the formation of a Red Amiy", he 
proclaimed." The increasing combativeness of the rank and file and the successes of 
the left wing officials in capturing the leading positions, transformed the unions into 
institutions which resembled the earlier revolutionary ones in which Marx and Engels 
had placed so much hope. 
The new mood of rank and file militancy also saw a shift in the fortunes of 
Austraha's political left wing. The popularity of the IWW, attacked, isolated and 
persecuted in 1914, increased until, in 1916, its members were able to sell 15,000 copies 
per issue of its paper. Direct Action.^ In 1915 IWW members captured the Australian 
Building Industry Employees' Union from the Brisbane Industrial Council's Building 
" Turner, op.cit., p. 196. Walsh attended the founding 
meeting of the CPA with his wife Adela Pankhurst, sister of 
Sylvia Pankhurst, the British socialist and feminist. He and 
Pankhurst met while Adela was hiding from the authorities for her 
anti-conscription stance during WWl. Edgar Ross, Of Storm and 
Struggle: Page From Labour History (New Age Publishers: Sydney, 
1982), p. 21. 
^^  Communist, vol. 1, no. 25 (17 June 1921), p. 7. 
" Quoted in Turner, op.cit., p. 221. 
®^ Davidson, op.cit., p. 5. 
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Trade Group,^ *' the next year they heavily influenced the Broken Hill miners' strike^'' 
and in 1917 they attracted 12,000 to an open air meeting in Melbourne to hear their 
speaker, Norman Jeffery.^' 
As an indication of how seriously the Federal Government viewed the IWW, 
twelve leading members were arrested and tried on treason charges in the midst of the 
first national referendum on conscription in October 1916.^ ^ Then, in December, 
Hughes introduced the Unlawful Associations Act, banning the IWW and making 
membership in the organisation a criminal offence punishable by six months gaol." 
Thirteen IWW activists, most notably Tom Baker, were deported,^ others, like 
Queenslander A.H. Gibson, described by the Intelligence Section as "a dangerous man", 
were put under surveillance," while over 100 people including Eva Lynch, mother of 
^^  J.B. Armstrong, "Closer Unity in the Queensland Trade 
Union Movement: 1900-1922", MA, University of Queensland, 1975, 
pp. 207-210. 
°^ Turner, op .cit. , p. 88. 
^^  Frank Cain, "The Industrial Workers of the World: Aspects 
of its Suppression in Australia 1916-19", Labour History, no. 42, 
May 1982, p. 55. 
•^^  Their prosecutor, Ernest Lamb, later joined the neo-
fascist New Guard in 1931-32. Ian Turner, Sydney's Burning: An 
Australian Political Conspiracy (Alpha Books: Sydney, 19 69), p. 
36. Their Judge, Pring, was renowned for his anti-unionism. In 
1909 he had presided over the trial of Tom Mann, British labour 
leader and founder of the Victorian Socialist Party, who had led 
a strike in Broken Hill. ibid., p. 63. 
33 Mick Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 71-72. 
"^^  Cain, op. cit. , p. 54. B.M. Martin was deported from north 
Queensland in October 1916 for being "guilty of seditious 
conduct". Raymond Evans, "Radical Departures: Paul Freeman and 
Political Deportation From Australia Following World War One", 
Labour History, no. 57, November 1989, p. 19. 
•^^  Captain, Intelligence Section, General Staff to 
Intelligence Officer, Third Military District, Melbourne, 28 
February 1919. BP4/1, 66/5/115, Part 2. AA (Brisbane). 
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three, were gaoled for six months for being members of the organisation.^ *^ 
Support for the IWW extended beyond their own ranks. The Military Intelligence 
Section reported that prominent union leaders Eastcrab, Kelly and Carney demanded the 
freeing of the "IWW 12" at a Townsville public meeting in 1918." Even in the remote 
north Queensland mining town of Dobbyn meetings in defence of the "IWW 12" were 
held. Amongst the speakers were John O'Brien (AWU) and Paul Freeman who, 
according to the authorifies, "preaches the old IWW doctrines and has been responsible 
for many industrial troubles".^ ** Sought by the authorities for his anti-conscription 
activity. Freeman hid at one time in the home of Victor, Jack and Alice Cogan and their 
brother-in-law Patrick Lamb.'^ Lamb, a Broken Hill miner, was himself described by 
the government as a "dangerous communist,"'*" and became involved in the Comintern 
in its early years. 
Freeman was arrested at Dobbyn and deported to the United States in late 1919-
early 1920. Refused admission into America, he was sent back to Australia. Taken to 
America for a second time, and again refused entry. Freeman was shipped back to 
36 Cain, op.cit., pp. 57-5i 
" Captain, Intelligence Section, General Staff to Captain 
Wood, Victoria Barracks, Brisbane, 30 October 1918, p. 1. BP4/1, 
66/5/115, Part 1. AA (Brisbane). 
"*® Captain Intelligence Section (General Staff) to Captain 
Wood, Intelligence Officer, Brisbane. 25 November 1918. BP4/1, 
66/5/115, Part 1. AA (Brisbane). Evans, "Radical Departures", 
op.cit•. pp. 23-24, suggests Freeman was denounced by W.H. 
Corbould, Australian General Manager of the Mt Elliot Mining 
Company which controlled the Dobbyn mine. Corbould later became 
Director and General Manager of Mt Isa Mines Ltd. 
^^  Edgar Ross, These Things Shall Be!: Bob Ross, Socialist 
Pioneer - His Life and Times (Mulavon Publishing: West Ryde, 
1988), p. 127. Lamb was born 23 July 1876 at Ballarat. 
^° Item No. CIB 501, Series CRSC 320. AA (Sydney). 
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AusU-alia where he went on a hunger strike for his release. Despite demonstrations in 
his support. Freeman was eventually deported to Europe and from there found his way 
to Russia."" Even in 1921 the Home and Territories Department issued photographs and 
a description of Freeman to Customs officials to foil his suspected re-entry into the 
country.''^ Actually, Freeman returned to Australia in eariy 1921, disguised as a Mr 
Miller, to recruit delegates for the founding conference of the Red IntemaUonal of 
Labour Unions [RILU].^^ 
Intersecting with the growing militancy of the working class were the 
revolutionary events which transformed Tsarist Russia in 1917. In October"" Bolshevik-
led insurrections in Moscow, Petrograd, and other cities overthrew the Provisional 
Government, replacing it with Soviet power, or workers councils. These exhilarating 
events profoundly affected and reshaped the dominant ideology of the radical left around 
the world, including in Australia. 
In 1918 long-time Australian socialist R.S. Ross wrote that at no time before 
"had a revolution [received] such close scrutiny, such deep study...from all angles, from 
all viewpoints, the inquiry proceeds"."^ Throughout the country street meetings and 
''^  Letter to James Vance Marshall from Jack Kilburn with 
information supplied by Norman Jeffery, p. 1. ML Document 724, 
Mitchell Library, Sydney. 
^^  Home and Territories Department circular to Acting 
Collector of Customs, All States, 17 March 1921. Al/1, 21/14767. 
AA (Canberra). 
"^^  J. Normington-Rawling, "Foundation of the Communist Party 
of Australia", Quadrant, vol. 9, no. 37, September-October 1965, 
p. 76. 
"^^  November in the Gregorian (Western) calendar. 
^^  Quoted in Edgar Ross, The Russian Revolution - Its Impact 
on Australia (SPA: Sydney, 1972), p. 29. 
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talks on the significance of the revolution abounded. Future leader of the CPA, J.B. 
Miles, claimed that Brisbane 
...was a militant centre in those days, with a long record of socialist 
propaganda work. At the three open air meetings on the Sunday after the 
news came..-there was unanimous and enthusiasfic acceptance of our 
estimate of the Petrograd events as signalising the socialist revolution.'*^ 
To the consternation of authorities, pro-Bolshevik sentiments found an audience 
amongst Queensland radicals. In 1918 police reported that speakers in the Brisbane 
Domain were calling Bolsheviks and German socialists (Australia was still a war with 
Germany) their comrades'*^ and expressed hopes of seeing Bolshevism "spread 
throughout the world".''^  The Queensland censor warned that "Every second man in the 
street will prophesy trouble...some talk as if revolution is a certainty"."^ In Cairns a Mr 
O'Callaghan worried authorities with his fiery speeches, saying: 
You have heard of the Spanish 'flu and the devastation that it has caused 
amongst the working class, but there is another 'flu which is sweeping 
right throughout the world - the Russian 'flu, and that is what we want 
here.^ ° 
Russian activist, Peter Utkin, and others who sailed out of Brisbane in June 1917, 
were fare welled by Cannon Hill meatworkers who "assembled on the wharf with red 
46 Quoted in ibid., pp. 8-9. 
"^  Constable Davies to Commonwealth Police, 10 February 
1918. BP203/4, Box 1, Series 4, Folder (1). AA (Brisbane), 
^^  Sergeant of Police to Commonwealth Police Sydney, 10 
November 1918. BP203/4, Box 1, Series 4, folder (1). AA 
(Brisbane) . 
''^  Quoted in Evans, Red Flag Riots, op. cit. , p. 83. 
°^ Captain Intelligence Section (General Staff) to Captain 
Wood, Victoria Barracks, Brisbane, 20 January 1919. BP4/1, 
66/5/115, Part 2. AA (Brisbane). 
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flags... singing revolutionary songs".^' By the end of the war organised labour "was at 
iLs most radical, and the extreme socialist doctrines, which had in pre-war years posed 
little danger, were no longer aired only to the converted fcw".^' In 1919 the AMIEU 
sent fraternal greetings to Russians "wishing them all success in their efforts to hold 
what they have won". To facilitate this the union vowed to do everything in its power 
"to prevent interference by British or other capitalist governments" in die affairs of 
Soviet Russia." At the 1920 Labor-in-Politics convention, ALP branches from the 
Bowen coalfields and Townsville called for "workers' control on a Soviet model in the 
State Enterprises".^'' The national Trade Union Congress in June the next year adopted 
as its objective the socialisation of industry, production, distribution and exchange. 
However, when this was raised for endorsement at the federal ALP conference held in 
Brisbane in September 1921, the objective was diluted by insisfing it be achieved 
through constitutional methods." 
SYNDICALISM AND THE FORMATION OF THE CPA 
It was during this period of radicalisation that steps were taken to establish a 
^^  Quoted in Raymond Evans, "'Agitation, Ceaseless 
Agitation': Russian Radicals in Australia and the Red Flag 
Riots", in John McNair and Thomas Poole (eds.), Russia and the 
Fifth Continent: Aspects of Russian-Australian Relations 
(University of Queensland Press: St. Lucia, 1992), p. 127. 
52 
53 
Farrell, op.cit., p. 2. 
Quoted in Mary Murnane, "The Workers' Educational 
Association of Queensland, 1913-1939", MA Qualifying Thesis, 
January 1969, University of Queensland, p. 42. 
^^  Fitzgerald and Thornton, op.cit . , p. 30; 
55 Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, op.cit., p. 224 
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Communist Party, modelled on the Russian Bolshcviks, '^^  although, overwhelmingly, 
the founders of the CPA were influenced more by syndicalism than by Marxism. At the 
historic meeting on 20 October 1920, where the CPA was established, were members 
of the Australian Socialist Party [ASP]", the outlawed IWW, and left wing union 
officials. The membership of the provisional executive reflected this. It comprised Tom 
Glynn, one of the "IWW 12"; W.P. Earsman, IWW and Amalgamated Engineering 
Union; Jock Garden, Secretary of the NSW Labor Council; C. Hook, on the Executive 
of the NSW Labor Council; Arthur Thomas, on State Council of ARU; R. Webster, 
official of the Miscellaneous Workers Union; Tom Walsh, General Secretary of the 
Seamens Union; Adela Pankhurst; S. Zanders, Russian Workers Association; Christian 
Jollie-Smith, lawyer; and Carl Baker, Victorian Socialist Party. 
In Australia the IWW was the embodiment of syndicalism, believing that the 
working class and capitalist class had nothing in common. Peace would not be possible 
"so long as hunger and want are found among millions of working people and the few, 
who make up the employing class, have all the good things in life". The class struggle 
would continue "until the workers of the world organise as a class, take possession of 
the earth and the machinery of production, and abolish the wage system".^^ 
For the IWW, unions were the key. By establishing industrial unions covering 
'^^  Lance Sharkey claimed the establishment of the party was 
"one of the historical milestones on the road of the Australian 
working class toward its liberation". L. Harry Gould (ed.), 
Sharkey Writings: Theory, Politics, Polemics (Quality Press: 
1941), pp. 32-33. 
'^' Gollan, op. cit. , says that though the ASP were familiar 
with Marxist theory they "had few contacts with the mass labour 
movement", p. 7 . 
®^ Quoted in Mick Armstrong, op.cit., pp. 65-66. 
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all the important trades, linked together into a powerful class organisation - the One Big 
Union [OBU] - a national general strike could be organised to usher in the new era of 
workers' control. The OBU would also be the organisation through which the socialist 
society would be administered. They claimed: 
The army of production must be organised not only for the everyday 
struggle with capitalism but also to carry on production when capitalism 
shall have been overthrown. By organising industrially we are forming 
the sU'ucture of the new society within the shell of the old. '^' 
While Austrahan communists agreed with this, Russian Bolsheviks did not. 
Firstly, the Russian communists argued, the working class could not take power without 
setting up the proletarian state as an organ to break the resistance of the bourgeoisie. Yet 
syndicalist doctrine was as hostile to the idea of a proletarian state as it was to a 
bourgeois state. Secondly, the Bolsheviks maintained, "the running of economic life is 
neither a thing that every trade union can sort out for itself, nor is it a thing that can be 
regulated by free agreement between the trades unions".'^ Unions saw things from the 
standpoint of one branch of industry and not from the point of view of the entu-e 
working class via the proletarian state. Workers' councils (soviets), rather than unions, 
would manage society, the Russians contended. They went on to argue: 
The economic plan and its execution must be forcibly subjected to the 
pressure of the interests of the whole of the proletariat. For this 
reason...the regulative side of the state organisations has taken the form 
predominantly of Soviets...*'' 
The extent to which syndicalism influenced the CPA is indicated by the 
statements of Jock Garden, a Scot who arrived in Australia in 1900 at the age of 18. 
" Quoted in Childe, op.cit., p. 141. 
°^ Second Congress of the Comintern: Minutes and Proceedings 
vol. 2 (New Park Publishers: London, 1977), pp. 161-162. 
" ibid., p. 162. 
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Garden was Secretary of the NSW Trades Hall Council and Secretary of the OBU 
Committee established to organise existing unions into a revolutionary compact. Openly 
acknowledging the syndicalism behind the OBU scheme. Garden described it as "the 
cream of the thought of men like Debs, De Leon and Trautmann, adapted to Australian 
conditions" - these men were leading American syndicalists, although Debs was also a 
socialist.^^ 
The OBU scheme foundered, however, not because of Bolshevik disapproval, but 
as a result of obstruction from the moderate leadership of the AWU.*'^  In Brisbane the 
OBU was down-played when the Brisbane Industrial Council came under control of 
moderate union officials in 1919.^ 
The Brisbane branch of the CPA, established when J.B. Miles and Jerry Cahill 
"got a small group together", was encouraged by Russian activist, Peter Simonoff, to 
join up with the Sydney group.**^  Brisbane also reflected the same composition and 
syndicalist influences as the Sydney group. Its inaugural meeting comprised ex-IWW 
^^  Quoted in Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, 
op.cit., p. 184. In 1918 the Intelligence Section also believed 
the "aims and doctrines" of the One Big Union movement were "one 
and the same as the ex-I.W.W.". Captain Intelligence Section 
(General Staff), to Captain Wood, Victoria Barracks, Brisbane, 
9 December 1918. BP4/1, 66/5/115, Part 1. AA (Brisbane). 
^^  Many rank and file members of the AWU either supported 
the OBU proposal or insisted, unsuccessfully, that the officials 
hold a union-wide plebiscite to determine the AWU's position. 
Knowledge and Unity, vol. 44, (24 January 1920), no page number, 
records the resolutions of the rank and file. 
64 
65 
Evans, Loyalty and Disloyalty, op.cit., p. 168. 
Letter from J.B. Miles to A.T.B., 21 May 1921, p 
N57/270, (ABL) ANU, 
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members - Dick Surplus, Jack Burke, Jack Roche and the Cahill brothers, Ned and 
Jerry.''^  Many of these were also union offlcials. Roche (Storcmen and Packers Union) 
was Organiser for the TLC's OBU Committee. Cahill was also on the OBU Committee. 
Jack Burke, described by the authorities as "the worst type of man to contend with", was 
accused of having been "responsible for a great amount of the distribution of 
Revolutionary matter". The Commandant of the 1st Military District "strongly" 
recommended to the Department of Defence "that Burke's name be included in the 
Deportation List".^ ^ Later, one of the "IWW 12", Bob Besant, and his wife Jean, joined 
the Brisbane branch. From the ASP came J.B. Miles, Secretary of the Brisbane Building 
Trades Council, who was also at the inaugural meeting of the CPA in Sydney.*^ ^ 
However, unlike the Sydney group, the Brisbane branch included another element in its 
early days - mihtant Russians emigres. 
Many Russians fled political persecution of the Czarist state after the failed 1905 
revolution. Their escape route led them to Harbin via the Trans-Siberian Railway where 
"Japanese steamers offered inexpensive passages to Australia with Brisbane as the first 
port of call".^^ These political exiles "were not only activists in theory but dynamic 
" Win, Dick and Dave Surplus, "Notes on the Party", p. 1. 
Typewritten notes in the possession of Jim Henderson. Only Miles 
and Dick Surplus remained long term members of the CPA. ibid., 
p. 1. 
''^ Brigadier-General, Commandant, 1st Military District to 
Secretary, Department of Defence, Melbourne, 2 April 1919. BP4/1, 
66/5/115, Part 3. AA (Brisbane). 
^^  J. Normington-Rawling says one of the Cahills from 
Brisbane was also at the inaugural meeting in Sydney. "Foundation 
of the Comimunist Party", op.cit. , p. 77. 
^^  Boris Christa, "Great Bear and the Southern Cross: The 
Russian Presence in Australia", in McNair and Poole (eds.), op. 
cit., p. 94. 
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personalities and able leaders".™ Russians working in northern cane fields and the 
Townsville meat works became militant union members,^' arriving in Queensland as 
the economy began to pick up and unionism began to revive after the devastating defeats 
of the 1890s. 
In this period Queensland union membership rose from a low 4,500 in 1901 to 
55,580 by 1914,^ ^ amalgamations of smaller unions took place, and the era of the 
professional officials like Edward Theodore and William McCormack (Amalgamated 
Workers Association) had arrived. J.B. Armstrong argued that these officials brought 
"greater strength, greater stability, but yet greater conservatism to the union 
movement".^^ On this phenomena, Ernest Lane commented that by the beginning of 
the Great War the militancy of the AWU "became submerged by moderates...who 
worshipped at the political shrine and bowed to Arbitration Courts".^ '* 
One of the most dynamic Russian activists before the war was Fedor Andreevich 
Sergeyev [Artem]. Sergeyev, an early member of the Russian Bolsheviks, was "a trusted 
associate of Lenin whom he first met in Paris in 1903"." Arrested at sixteen for anti-
70 i b i d . , p . 94 
''^ Christa, op. cit. , p. 95. Also see Dianne Menghetti, The 
Red North: The Popular Front in North Queensland (James Cook 
University: Townsville, 1981), p. 10. 
^^  Hunt, "History of the Labour Movement", op.cit., p. 120. 
" Armstrong J.B., op.cit., p. 54. 
•^^  Quoted in Viv Daddow, The Puffing Pioneers and 
Queensland's Railway Builders (University of Queensland Press: 
St. Lucia, 1975), p. 127. 
^^  Christa, op.cit. , p. 95. Another close associate of Lenin 
was Victor Kurnatovsky "who, according to Trotsky, was the real 
pioneer of the revolutionary movement in Tiflis, not Stalin" . He 
escaped following the 1905 revolution, made his way to Australia, 
then died in Paris in 1912. Normington-Rawling, "Foundation of 
the Communist Party", op.cit., p. 73. 
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Czarist activity, then exiled to Siberia at twenty-one, he escaped after the 1905 
revolution "to get away from the bloodhounds & Tzar's Terror".^ '^ Making his way to 
Brisbane, Sergeyev became prominent in trade union affairs as an active member of the 
WWF and AMIEU." During the 1912 general strike he was reputed to have convinced 
fellow Russians to stop work in support of the striking tramway men. By then, Sergeyev 
had transformed Brisbane's Russian cultural club into a political organisation, the Union 
of Russian Emigrants (later renamed the Union of Russian Workers - URW). Along with 
other Russians, Sergeyev became active in the ASP and helped establish a Russian 
branch of the party.^ * Militant Russians were also involved in the IWW, forming a 
number of locals or branches.^^ In 1917, at a Townsville IWW meeting of 150 
supporters, police reported a large percentage of the audience comprised Russians or 
Danes.'° 
By 1916 the URW had extended its influence to Broken Hill. Its Secretary, Peter 
Simonoff, was to become famous as the first Soviet Consul to Austraha (1918-1921) -
although his credentials were never recognised by the Federal government.^' Simonoff, 
born at Novaya Yablanka in 1883, arrived in Australia in 1912 after being forced to 
leave Russia because of his socialist convictions. Like many other Russians, Simonoff 
^^ Letter to James Vance Marshall, op.cit., p. 2. 
" Christa, op.cit., p. 95. 
'^^  Eric Fried, "The First Consul: Peter Simonoff and the 
Formation of the Australian Communist Party", in McNair and 
Poole, op.cit., p. 111. 
" ibid., p. 111. 
®° Hunt, "History of the Labour Movement", op.cit., p. 296. 
^^  Fried, op.cit., p. 111. 
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laboured in the north Queensland sugar industry.**- During the war he joined the Labour 
Volunteer Army - an anti-conscriptionist organisation - then, in 1917, he left Broken Hill 
to return to Brisbane where, as URW Secretary, he regrouped the left into the One Big 
Union Propaganda League, the successor of the IWW.^' Founding members of the 
League included the Cahills, Gordon Brown, Jim Quinton (ASP representative at the 
Comintern Congress in 1921), Nicholas Lagutin (later member of the CPA), and 
Alexander Zuzenko (deported from Brisbane after the Red Flag Riots). 
In September 1919 the federal Government used the Aliens Restriction Act to 
prevent Simonoff from speaking publicly in Queensland. The authorities then gaoled him 
from November 1918 to July 1919 under the War Precautions Act. As part of the anti-
Bolshevik campaign, federal authorities prevented a meeting being held in Brisbane to 
celebrate the first anniversary of the Russian Revolution.^ Then, from September 1918, 
Prime Minister Hughes also banned the flying of the red flag. One of the victims of this 
decree was Brisbane's politically moderate Trades Hall Board which, in June 1918, had 
responded positively to an AMIEU call to "procure a red flag and fly same on top of 
the Trades Hall".^ ^ After some bickering between the Trades Hall Board and the 
^^  Peter Simonoff to Secretary, Department of External 
Affairs Melbourne, 16 June 1915; Secretary, External Affairs to 
Peter Simonoff, 3 December 1915; Under Secretary, Chief 
Secretary's Office (Brisbane) to Secretary, Department External 
Affairs, 19 June 1915. Al/1, 1915/20956, AA (Canberra). And 
Normington-Rawling, "Foundation of the Communist Party", op.cit., 
p. 75. 
®-^  The OBUPL was the name under which the now outlawed IWW 
operated. Dick Surplus interviewed by Beatson. 
^^  BP4/1, 66/4/3289. Chief of General Staff to Commandant, 
1st Military District, 8 Novemiber 1918. AA (Brisbane). 
^^  Minutes of the Trades Hall Board of Management, 28 June 
1919 p. 31 and p. 34. 
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government, the Prime Ministers Department's insistence that it be taken down 
eventually won out.^ ^ 
The use of the War Precautions Act against Simonoff after the war had finished, 
the banning of the red flag, and raids by military authorities on homes of Queensland 
activists sparked demonstrations in Brisbane in January and March 1919. At the second 
demonstration, the unfurling of the outlawed red flag by Herman Bykov, Ipswich 
Secretary of the URW, and Zuzenko ignited the famous Red Rag Riots where armed 
ultra-conservatives swept through areas of Brisbane in which they believed Bolsheviks 
operated. Of those arrested during the riots the severest sentences were metered out to 
the left wing elements including Norman Jeffery who defiantly claimed that the red flag 
was "the only one worth fighting for, every other flag should be trampled under foot".^ ^ 
Jeffery, bom in Footscray, Victoria, in 1894, was a member of the IWW and was to 
become a leading member of the CPA.^ Deportation orders were served on Bykov, 
Zuzenko, his father-in-law Michael Rosenberg,^^ and Simonoff. Tragically Zuzenko, 
Rosenberg, and Simonoff were to fall victims to Stalin's purges in the 1930s.^ 
For many Russian emigres, revolutionary events in their homeland were too 
compelling for them to remain in political exile, and so they returned to Russia as soon 
^^  ibid., 30 August 1919, p. 41; 27 September 1918, pp. 46-
47, 31 January 1919, p. 57. 
•^^  Intelligence Section General Staff, 25 February 1919. 
BP4/1, 66/5/115, Part 4. AA (Brisbane). 
®^ Director-General, Memo for [censored], 31 August 1953. 
A6119XR1, 175. AA (Canberra). 
^^ Zuzenko's wife, Civa, edited Knowledge and Unity in 1919. 
°^ Evans, "'Agitation, Ceaseless Agitation'", op.cit., p. 
162. Many Australian Russians who defended Soviet power during 
the Russian Civil War (1918-1921) "were subsequently shot in 
Stalin's purges". Christa, op.cit., p. 97. 
33 
as possible. In 1917 all the members of the All-Russian IWW local in Cairns returned 
home.*" Sergeyev, too, after the February revolution returned to Russia where he 
subsequendy became a member of Uie Bolshevik's Central Committee and was involved 
in planning the October insurrection.^^ However, Sergeyev, along with Paul Freeman, 
was killed in a rail accident in Russia in 1921 while his fehow passenger, Patrick Lamb, 
was badly injured. 
Of those who remained in Queensland many of the political activists joined the 
CPA. "Two thirds of the Townsville Russian families had joined the Aush'alian 
Communist Party, although most of them spoke little English...Each family pledged the 
astonishing sum of fifty pounds, in some cases a third of their annual income. The 
money was sent to America where it purchased a tractor for a Soviet commune".^^ In 
March 1921 the URW's paper. Knowledge and Unity, was handed over to the Brisbane 
branch of the CPA, confirming the Russians' support for the newly formed party. 
Initially Knowledge and Unity mirrored the syndicalist politics of the IWW, 
stressing the OBU as the vehicle through which workers would seize social, economic 
and political power. In 1919 it asserted the OBU would "settle the conflict between 
^^  Evans, "'Agitation, Ceaseless Agitation'", op.cit., p. 
127. 
"^^ Normington-Rawling, "Foundation of the Comimunist Party", 
op.cit•, p. 74. According to Anne Bone (trans.). The Bolsheviks 
and the October Revolution: Minutes of the Central Committee of 
the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party [Bolsheviksl, August 
1917-February 1918 (Pluto Press: London, 1974), Sergeyev attended 
C.C. meetings in 1917 on August 4 [17], August 5 [18], September 
20 [October 3], September 21 [October 4], September 23 [October 
6]; and in 1918 on January 9 [22], January 11 [24], and January 
19 [February 1]. 
93 Menghetti, o p . c i t . , p . 16 
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Capital and Labour on the industrial field. It is the only thing that can and will^...The 
One Big Union is the means whereby the workers can win their emancipation".'^ 
However, by the end of 1919 the editor had become aware of the disagreements 
between syndicalists and Soviet communists. Although still favouring industrial 
unionism over craft unionism, Knowledge and Unity no longer looked to the unions as 
the vehicle for socialism. In an abrupt about-face the paper asserted that "revolutionary 
expectations from the trade unions are absolutely futile"."* Instead, workers' power 
would come through the actions of the Communist Party in conjunction with Soviets, or 
factory based workers' councils. 
One of the most active Russians in the CPA was Nicholas Lagutin who, in 1919, 
six years after arriving in AusU"alia, had his home in Esk raided, possessions confiscated 
and his deportation recommended by the Commandant of 1st Military District.'^ Like 
the Australian authorities, Soviet communist leader Leon Trotsky recognised Lagutin's 
abilities by first proposing him as Consul General to Australia - although this post was 
finally given to Peter Simonoff.'^ Lagutin, general leader of the Russian Language 
Groups within the CPA in 1925,^ along with Jack Roche, C. Galchenko and A. Jenkin, 
was assigned the important task of unifying the two Ipswich communist groups in the 
'^'^ Knowledge and Unity, no. 25 (20 January 1919), p. 1. 
^^  ibid., no. 26 (3 February 1919), p. 1. 
^^  ibid. , no. 39 (15 December 1919), no page numiber. 
'^  8 October 1919 letter from Brigadier-General, Commandant, 
1st Military District to Chief of the General Staff, Department 
of Defence, Melbourne. BP4/1, 66/4/3557. AA (Brisbane). 
^^ Fried, op.cit., p. 114. 
^^  19 March 1925, Letter from E.M. Higgins to N. Lagutin. 
BP230/1-15, Box 1, Series 4, folder (3). AA (Brisbane). 
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eady 1920s - the Communist Party Organisation [CPO] and the CPA. 
The CPO was established by Nicholas Tuppicoff"^ and A. Lubinoff, members 
of the Ipswich URW. Combining the two organisations was made difficult by the 
attitude of Brisbane communists. They believed Tuppicoff and Lubinoff were "corrupters 
and stumbling blocks" to unity.'°' Even after amalgamation of the two groups 
animosity toward Tuppicoff remained. Accused of using his posiUon as Ipswich delegate 
to the CPA's 1924 congress to criticise the Brisbane District Group, he was subsequently 
labelled "a bad egg" and a "black sheep" by some party members.'"^ 
Russian emigre involvement in the CPA was, however, short lived. In January 
1926 communist leader, Herbert Moxon, wrote to eleven Russian members of the 
Brisbane branch, including Lagutin, inviting them to attend meetings or at least notify 
the committee in writing if they could not attend.'°^ We may, perhaps, conclude from 
Moxon's actions that the activity of Brisbane's Russian members had decreased. 
Although slow to grow, by late 1921 the Brisbane branch was firmly established 
with J.B. Miles as Secretary.'^ Further branches were established in Cairns and 
°^° Tuppicoff was born in Samara in 1893 and arrived via 
Japan in 1912. A returned soldier, he was naturalised in 1922 and 
lived with his wife Alexandra and son Richard at a soldier 
settlement at Cominya. Al/1, 1922/10129, AA (Canberra). 
°^^  8 March 1925 Report to Executive Brisbane District Group 
on N. Tuppicoff. BP230/1-15, BP203/4, folder 3. AA (Brisbane). 
°^^  Report on Tuppicoff, p. 6. BP230/1-13, BP203/4, folder 
3. AA (Brisbane). 
^" BP230/1-15. BP230/5. AA (Brisbane). 
°^^  Australian Communist, vol. 1, no. 11 (4 March 1921), p. 
5. The Brisbane branch was slower to grow than its Sydney 
counterpart. By October 1922 Sydney was claiming a membership of 
200. However, there were complaints that not all members were 
active. Minutes of Branch Executive, 16 October, 1922, p. 148. 
ML MSS.2389, BOX 1 (8). Mitchell Library, Sydney. 
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Townsville in 1922,'°'^  while the party received enquires from far away rural centres 
like Winton.'°^ At Queensland's first stale congress in 1921, delegates came from 
Brisbane, Cairns and Innisfail. The elected executive included Herbert Huggett, J.B. 
Miles, A. Rees, L. Wilson, Nicholas Lagutin, and A. Mecrs.'"^ Congress reports 
showed Brisbane was "a good healthy Branch ...slowly making headway and getting new 
members". Cairns was "doing good propaganda work but had not yet got the Branch into 
full working order". Despite this, one comrade, who had recently visited Cairns, went 
so far as to describe it as "the best branch in the party". While Innisfail had no branch, 
"it was a very fine centre for distributing literature, and a lot of money had been spent 
in that direction".'°^ In August that year CPA newspaper sales were doing well in 
Queensland. Brisbane branch was selling fifteen dozen copies per week; Innisfail ten 
dozen; and Cairns twenty dozen.'°^ 
THE COMINTERN AND THE TRADE UNION QUESTION 
Although the enthusiasm of the Russian emigres for the CPA waned, the party 
continued to seek guidance from the Bolshevik dominated Comintern. Established in 
1919, the Comintern set as its ultimate goal the victory of proletarian revolutions 
°^^  I. Moles, "'The Fiery Cross Will Go Forth': Working-Class 
Radicalism and Municipal Socialism in Townsville During the 1930s 
and 1940s", Lecture Notes on North Oueensland History, 1978, p. 
102. 
"^"^  Minutes, CPA Executive meeting, 13 Decemiber 1920, noted 
the receipt of letter from Winton. 
°^'' Menghetti, op. cit. , p. 13. 
^°^ Minutes of CPA Annual Conference 1921. 
°^^  Australian Communist, vol. 1, no. 35 (19 August 1921), 
p. 7. 
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internationally, placing the trade union question at the centre of debate. One of the first 
controversies within the Comintern revolved around the attitude toward existing unions. 
Many of the young European communists, appalled by union officials' pro-war stance 
in 1914, wanted to leave the established unions and create independent red unions. In 
his pamphlet, Leftwing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, Lenin described this as 
"ridiculous and childish nonsense","" insisting instead that communists work inside 
the existing structures to "guide and educate the trade unions".'" To leave the unions 
would mean "leaving the insufficiently developed backward masses of workers under 
the influences of the reactionary leaders, the agents of the bourgeoisie, the labour 
aristocrats"."^ The task facing communists, he said, was to propagandise and agitate 
amongst workers, "not to fence themselves off from them with artificial and childishly 
'Left' slogans"."^ 
A copy of Leftwing Communism was presented to every delegate at the Second 
Congress of the Comintern (July-August 1920). It was at this Congress that a lengthy 
discussion on the trade union question proceeded. Speaking for the Bolsheviks, Karl 
Radek,""* declared that the trade union question was "the most serious, most important 
•^ °^ Vladimir Lenin, Leftwing Comimunism, An Infantile Disorder 
(Progress Publishers: Moscow, 1975), pp. 34-35. 
'" ibid., p. 36. 
^^2 ibid. , p. 38. 
'" ibid., p. 39. 
"^  Karl Radek (1885-1939) was a close friend of Rosa 
Luxemburg and leading member of the Russia, Polish and German 
social democratic parties prior to the Great War. He became 
secretary of the Comintern in 1920 but his support for the 
Opposition caused his dismissal from all Comintern bodies. 
Expelled from the Communist Party and deported after the 
Fifteenth party congress, he recanted in 1929. 
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question facing our movement"."^ With the crisis of capitalism deepening, workers 
in advanced countries like Germany and the United States were unable to make their 
wages stretch to meet their basic needs. This would compel them to struggle over 
economic issues such as increased wages, and this would raise "the question of the 
practical possibility of transforming the reactionary trades union into institufions of the 
revolution". Radek insisted that communists replace reformist leaders in the unions. Only 
in this way "will the communists be able to take the lead in the trade union movement 
and make of it an organ of the revoludonary struggle for communism"."^ Communist 
influence in unions was to be fostered through revolutionary committees of the rank and 
file. Radek held up the British Shop Stewards Movement and the factory committees in 
Germany as examples to follow. He said: 
...where the trade union bureaucracy has conU^ol, the communists have the 
duty to support the struggle of the factory committees and all similar 
organisations for their own independent existence. The communists will 
only be able to succeed in gaining control of the trades unions if they 
turn these factory organisations in the plant into the germs of the new 
trades unions of their communist factory organisations."^ 
Clearly, if Engels and Lenin's analysis of the union officialdom being bought off 
by the employers was correct, then a revolutionary opposition which captured the 
leadership of the unions would not behave in the same manner. If, however, the Webbs 
were correct - that the conservatisation of the officials arose from their social position -
changes were needed in the Comintern's trade union strategy and tactics. 
These doubts were raised by British communists who had established the Shop 
^^^ Second Congress of the Comintern, op. cit. , p. 62. 
^'^ ibid. , p. 280. 
117 ibid., p. 160 
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Stewards Movement. Outlining the dilemma, William Gallacher"^ explained: 
It is simply nonsense and ridiculous to talk of conquering the old u-ades 
unions with their ossified bureaucracy...We have been active in the 
British trades unions for 25 years without ever having succeeded in 
revolutionising the trades unions from inside. Every time we succeeded 
in making one of our own comrades an official of the trades unions, it 
turned out that then, instead of a change of tactics taking place, the trades 
unions corrupted our own comrades too. We have often made our 
comrades into big trades union officials, but we have seen that nothing 
can be achieved for communism and the revolution through such 
work."^ 
Bolshevik leader, Grigory Zinoviev,'^° dismissed this concern. However, it 
became apparent that Zinoviev underestimated the strength of the established union 
officialdom in the west when he insisted that it would be easy for American communists 
to usurp conservative President of the American Federation of Labor, Samuel Gompers. 
He boasted that Gompers teeth were "already rotten" and his last teeth "we can knock 
out without the benefit of surgical instruments".'^' American communists were to find 
out, however, this would not be as easy as Zinoviev thought. 
The Comintern's Theses on the Trade Union Question reflected the exaggerated 
optimism of the Soviets. On the transformation of union leaders, from the advocates of 
"industrial peace" in 1914 to the leaders of mass agitation by 1920, the Comintern 
^^® William Gallacher, born in Paisley, Scotland, 1881, was 
leader of the Clyde Workers Comimittee during the Great War and 
became a founding memiber of the Comimunist Party of Great Britain 
in 1920. From 1935 to 1950 he was Communist MP for West Fife. 
119 Second Congress of the Comintern, op.cit., p. 167 
^^° Grigory Zinoviev (1883-1936) was one of Lenin's early 
collaborators and was first President of the Comintern. He allied 
himself with Stalin against Trotsky from 1922, but by late 1925 
had fallen out with Stalin and worked with Trotsky. Expelled from 
the Communist Party in 1928, he recanted in 1929 and was finally 
executed by Stalin after a show trial in 1936. 
121 Second Congress of the Comintern, op.cit., p. 168 
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commented that "unions which during the war had been organs of compulsion over the 
working masses" were now "organs for the annihilation of capitalism".'^^ This 
contradicted one of the important points Lenin made in Left Wing Communism. 
Repeating Marx's eariier assertion that unions existed solely to combat employers' 
offensives against workers' living standards, Lenin contended that unions could never 
go beyond mediating between these two classes within capitalism. However, he insisted 
the task of communists was to work within the unions to expose their limitations, and 
to eventually lead workers' struggles to the higher class-wide organisation, Soviets. 
Conceivably, the Soviets transposed their experience of Russian trade unions onto 
the western situation - which may explain some of the often naive conceptions about the 
fragility of the union officialdom. Yet, the history and development of Russian unions, 
was vastly different from those in the west. Suppressed after the defeated 1905 
revolution, they slowly rebuilt only to be repressed again at the outbreak of the Great 
War. By 1917 "labour leaders faced the enormous task of constructing a trade-union 
movement more or less from scratch".'^^ This was the state of the union movement 
when the revolutions broke out in February and October 1917. In the hot-house 
atmosphere of the revolution, unions and factory committees flourished. After the 
revolution, the trade union question for Soviet communists took on an entirely different 
slant. The major questions were whether factory committees should be subordinated to 
the unions; whether unions should be used for die militarisation of labour during the 
Civil War; whether unions should lose control over industry during the New Economic 
122 ibid., p. 278. 
"^ S.A. Smith, Red Petrograd: Revolution in the Factories, 
1917-18 (Cambridge University Press: London, 1983), p. 103. 
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Policy; whether unions should see their major function as defending workers conditions 
or implementing stale policies in the factories, and so on. Of all the issues the Bolshevik 
leadership had to grapple with and understand during these vital months, an entrenched, 
conservatised union bureaucracy was not one.'^ "* 
The unique experience of the Bolsheviks and the belief that revolutions in the 
west were imminent, led the Soviets to call on western communists to establish the sort 
of factory committees which arose spontaneously in the revolutionary events in Russia. 
The factory committees, they claimed, would replace the union bureaucracy, "leaving 
only the most necessary functions to the centre", that is, the union officials would be 
concerned with only minor bureaucratic details.'" The committees would "soon be 
faced with the question of workers' control over whole branches of industry...(and)...the 
struggle for workers' control over production must lead to the struggle for a seizure of 
power by the working class".'^ *' While this expectadon may have panned out during 
the Russian revolution, in the circumstances of the west at the time it was Utopian. 
THE CPA AND ITS TRADE UNION LEADERS 
Irrespective of Comintern pronouncements, litUe could be achieved by Australian 
communists as major political differences rent the party into two warring factions for 
the first two years of the CPA's existence. The split between the ASP and a faction led 
by Jock Garden saw both groups appeal to the Comintern for recognition as the only 
true Communist Party in Australia. At the Comintern's Third Congress in 1921, 
^^^ ibid. , see section on trade unions. 
^^^ Second Congress of the Comintern, op. cit. , p. 280. 
'^^ ibid. , p. 283. 
42 
representatives of both groups attended. W.P. Earsman, CPA secretary and Garden 
supporter, enlisted the support of Leon TroLsky to appeal against being given only a 
consultative vote. 
I saw Comrade Radek, Chairman of the Credentials Committee but got 
little satisfaction from him. In fact we had some very hot words...Back 
I went to Trotsky who then accompanied me to see Radek, and on my 
behalf demanded why 1 was being treated in this manner. Radek made 
me some very weak reply which Trotsky would not accept but it finished 
by Radek promising to have the matter rectified, which was within 2 
hours. I got my decisive vote which meant full recognition of our 
party.'" 
Disturbed by the rift in the Australian party, the Comintern attempted to resolve 
the dispute at a special meeting chaired by Mikhail Borodin'^^ where it was resolved 
that, as there were "no difference in principles, program or tactics, except differences 
arising out of local troubles...immediate unity of the two parties" take place before the 
end of January 1922. A "general conference representing the two parties" was to be 
arranged to facilitate this.'^'' 
Even after Comintern intervention both factions were reluctant to resolve dieir 
^^^ Confidential letter to Central Committee CPA, Hancock 
Papers, Mitchell Library, p. 69. 
^^^ Mikhail Borodin (1884-1953) left Russia after the 1905 
revolution and returned from America after the 1917 revolution. 
He became the Comintern representative in China during the 
revolution (1925-1927) with the task of preventing the Chinese 
Communist Party from severing its alliance with the petty-
bourgeois Koumintang. 
^^^ ibid., p. 79. J.B. Miles admitted many years later that 
the split was "mainly personal". That small theoretical problems 
"were magnified and led to sectarian groupings". Communist 
Review, vol. 2. no. 10 (October 1935), p. 43. Just prior to the 
Third Congress Paul Freeman, in Australia under the name of 
Miller, had tried unsuccessfully to unify the groups. Normington-
Rawling, "Foundation of the Communist Party", op.cit., p. 77. 
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differences and the two were never reconciled.'^" Finally, a majority of the Sydney 
ASP joined the Garden-led CPA en masse. At a special ASP meeting in May 1922 
Lionel Leece,'^' Herbert Moxon, J. Terry, and others in the ASP insisted that the 
increasing attacks on the workers' wages and hours demanded unity on the left. After 
much debate a motion was passed sixteen to seven in favour of ASP members joining 
the Garden-led CPA.'"*^  In August 1922 Garden's CPA received a cable from the 
Comintern accepting its application for membership.'^^ 
Within three years the party was to suffer another crisis as the working class 
struggle declined, the political climate shifted back to the right, and communist union 
officials became isolated within the ALP and the union movement. 
^^ ° O'Lincoln, op.cit. , attributes the failure to the 
sectarianism of the ASP which refused to attend unity 
conferences. However letters from members of the Garden group 
also reveal a stubborn resistance to unification. 
"^ Lionel Leece, a member of the Clothing Trades Union, 
joined the United CPA around 1922-23 but left to join the ALP 
about 1929-1930. Letter from Norman Jeffery to Jack Kilburn, 
1962, p. 1. ML Document 724. Mitchell Library, Sydney. 
^^^ Minutes of Sydney Branch Meeting held 15 June 1922, p. 
83. ML MSS.2389, BOX 1 (8). Mitchell Library, Sydney. 
'" Minutes of Sydney Branch of the Communist Party of 
Australia, held 22 August 1923 at 8 pm, p. 115. ML MSS.2389, BOX 
1 (8). Mitchell Library, Sydney. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
EARLY YEARS OF THE PARTY 1920-1925 
POST-WAR BOOM AFFECTS WORKING CLASS MILITANCY 
By the time the dispute had been resolved between the ASP and the 
communist union officials, the post-war working class upsurge had begun to ebb. 
After a short-lived economic crisis in 1921, the Australian economy started to 
expand. From 1920-1925 the value of manufacturing plant and building increased by 
over 10% per year. Competition was high, manufacturing output increased, the 
national sheep flock grew, and sugar production expanded, increasing the total value 
of production by over £94,000,000 from 1918-1923.' 
The CPA argued, however, that the working class did not benefit greatiy 
from the economic expansion. The Workers Weekly claimed that from 1911-1923 the 
wages bill expanded by only £29,000,000^ - a fraction of the increased value of 
production - creating a gap between wage rates and the national wealth produced. In 
no state was the gap wider than in Queensland. In 1923, based on the production per 
worker, wages relative to the total value produced per state were 16.89% in 
Queensland, 18.59% in NSW, 20.17% in Victoria, and 25.09% in WA.' This 
compared with profit rates of 20.67% in Queensland, 17.93% in Tasmania, 16.08% in 
^ A.G.L. Shaw, The Economic Development of Australia 
(Longman: Hongkong, 1972), pp. 140-142. Also see Workers 
Weekly, no. 2 (29 June 1923), p. 1. 
^ ibid., p. 1. 
^ ibid., no. 22 (16 November 1923), p. 3 
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Victoria, and 10.79% in SA."* The CPA declared that Australian workers were 
"losing ground, that exploitation is being intensified, and that the robber class has 
become wealthy out of the labour of the workers".^ Yet, this did not translate into 
industrial action. In fact, strike levels declined. Days lost in su-ikes fell to 859,000 by 
1922.*^  This significantly affected the fortunes of the CPA. As the Australian 
Communist noted in 1921, "one of the conditions for the development of Communist 
thought is the intensification of the class struggle in all its forms".^ Yet the class 
struggle was declining. 
By 1922 the strategy of establishing revolutionary factory committees had 
been abandoned. As Lance Sharkey said, "The Left wing movement was at a low ebb 
at this time".^ Nonetheless, communists continued focusing on the rank and file 
recruitment. J.B. Miles contributed Industrial Notes to the paper "which helped to 
keep before the Party the tremendous importance of work in the trade union sphere", 
said communist E.W. Campbell.'' The Brisbane branch in 1923 instructed Jack 
Roche to get "names and addresses of militant workers", presumably for communists 
to contact.'" But trade union work mainly proceeded through the channels of the 
p. 3 
^ ibid., p. 3. 
^ ibid., no. 2 (29 June 1923), p. 1. 
^ O'Lincoln, op.cit., p. 29. 
^ Australian Communist, vol. 1, no. 6 (28 January 1921), 
® L.L. Sharkey, The Trade Unions: Communist Theory and 
Practice (Current Book Distributors: Sydney, 1961), p. 19. 
- ^  Campbell, op.cit., p. 115. 
°^ Notes from CPA meetings. BP230/6, folder (1). AA 
(Brisbane). 
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union bureaucracy as the branch, like the rest of the party, was dominated by union 
officials. In 1921 thirty delegates to the NSW Labour Council were CPA members, 
the Secretary of the Newcastie TLC was a communist, the party had members on the 
Labour Councils of Victoria and South Australia, while 15% of delegates to the 1921 
Trade Union Conference were in the CPA." Leading Brisbane communists were 
union officials as well - Jack Roche, TLC Vice-President (1919); Jerry Cahill, TLC 
Secretary (1920) and TLC President (1922); J.B. Miles, Secretary Brisbane Branch 
AMIEU (1922); and Mr Millard, Secretary Bakers Union (1923).'^ Miles was also 
appointed to the TLC Library Committee in 1923, attended meetings of the Trades 
Hall Board of Management and the TLC, was on the TLC Industrial Committee 
(chaired by Roche),'^ and the TLC Research Committee in the 1920s.''* 
In 1923 it was proposed that new members of the Brisbane CPA branch be 
asked a series of questions on their union activity and knowledge such as: 
• What unions they had been members of. 
• What their activity in the unions had been. 
• What influence they had in the union. 
• Was there a left wing in their union. 
• What was the membership of their union. 
• Were their officials left or right wing.''^  
11 Davidson, op.cit., p. 27 
'^  In the early 1920s the Brisbane branch trade union 
group comprised Roche, Williams, Burke, Miles, Rees, Meers, 
Anderson, Conway, Shepherd, Jenkins, Richardson, Millard, J. 
Taylor, and Macgee. BP230/5. AA (Brisbane). 
^^  See Minutes, TLC and Trades Hall Board of Management. 
The Industrial Committee was later renamed the Disputes 
Committee. 
^^  Party Notes, 16 January 1924. BP4/1, 66/4/3557. AA 
(Brisbane). 
^^  Notebook - undated, no page numbers, no author. 
BP230/6, folder (1). AA (Brisbane). 
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Unfortunately, the leadership was experiencing difficulties encouraging its 
membership to engage in union work. One problem encountered by the branch 
executive was that communists were not financial in dieir unions and many did not 
participate in their union meetings."' Brisbane branch's trade union group even 
discussed ways of compelling CPA members to attend their respective union 
meetings.'^ 
THE COMINTERN RETREATS 
While the unified CPA was struggling to implement its trade union work, 
events in the USSR were foreshadowing a change in the Comintern line. 
By 1924 the post-war revolutionary upsurge had subsided, sobering the 
triumphalist attitude of most Politburo members. Following Lenin's death in January 
1924, the struggle for leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
[CPSU] was resolved in favour of the triumvirate of Joseph Stahn, Grigory Zinoviev 
and Lev Kamenev.'^ At the thirteenth CPSU Congress in May 1924, Leon Trotsky 
and the Left Opposition were decisively defeated - stifling left wing opinion in the 
" CPA, Brisbane District, Trade Union Group Report, 23 
January 1923. Millard said communists in his union had not 
kept their dues up to date. BP4/1, 66/4/3557. AA (Brisbane). 
•^^  BP230/6, folder (1) . AA (Brisbane) . Sydney branch 
experienced similar problems. Their executive (September 1922) 
moved that memibers "be instructed to take a more active part 
in trade union affairs and that members announce at Party 
meetings any special business in their respective unions". 
Minutes of Branch Executive of CPA (Sydney), 4 September 1922, 
p. 121. ML MSS.2389, Box 1 (8). 
^^  Lev Kamenev (1833-1936) was expelled from the party in 
1927 for siding with Trotsky. He recanted and was readmitted 
only to be expelled again in 1932. After a show trial in 1936 
Stalin had him executed. 
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CPSU and, subsequendy, in the Comintern.''' 
The next month delegates to the Fifth Congress of the Comintern met and, 
under Zinoviev's tutelage, proceeded to further complicate the trade union question. 
In 1923 Zinoviev steered the Comintern into a short lived period of ultra-left 
militancy, which saw the Communist Party of Germany [KPD] proclaim a 
revolutionary uprising, only to cancel it at the last moment.^° 
In an attempt to conceal his mistakes over the German rising, Zinoviev 
blamed the fiasco on the KPD leadership, in particular on Heinrich Brandler. 
Compounding this, Zinoviev then institutionalised the practice of purging those who, 
by faithfully following Comintern guidehnes, led their parties to disaster. Delegates 
to the Fifth Congress, having viewed Lenin's embalmed corpse, were exhorted by 
Zinoviev to purge their parties of oppositionists - that is, members critical of the 
Comintern line. This became known as "Bolshevisation".^' Ominously, Ruth 
Fischer^ ^ of the KPD "called for a monolithic International, modelled on the 
Russian party, from which dissent and contest of opinion would be banished"." 
With "Bolshevisation" the process was set in train by which Fischer's calls would 
'^  Carr E.H., Socialism in One Country: 1924-1926, 
(Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1970), vol. 2, p. 11. 
°^ Hamiburg, unfortunately, was not aware of this, rose up 
in isolation from the rest of Germany, and was quickly 
defeated. 
^^ Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Unarmed: Trotsky, 1921-
1929 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1987), p. 150. 
^^  Ruth Fischer (1895-1961) was a leader of the German 
Communist Party in the 1920s. Expelled from the party in 1927, 
she established the Leninbund which collaborated with 
Trotsky's Left Opposition until 1938. 
23 Deutscher, op.cit., p. 146. 
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eventually be realised. Over the next few years independent minded leaders, both left 
and right wing, of the international communist parties were replaced by more 
acquiescent communists - Fischer herself fell victim to "Bolshevisation". 
Previously, Lenin had bitterly criticised such practices, arguing that "if you 
drive away all not particularly amenable, but intelligent, people and leave yourselves 
only obedient fools, you will surely destroy the party".^ "^  Likewise, Trotsky 
denounced this "inadmissible system which only seeks to maintain the infallibility of 
the central leadership"." 
With the German fiasco and die decline in international struggles, the 
triumvirate began to lose faidi in world revolution. '^^  Since the revolution in October 
1917, it had been axiomatic that socialism could not be built in isolated Soviet 
Russia. Revolutions in advanced countries were essential to liberate the new regime 
from its economic and social backwardness since human liberation, marxists 
believed, was contingent upon economic abundance. Therefore, when, in 1918, Lenin 
said that the "final victory of socialism in a single country is of course 
impossible"," no-one objected. Even Engels had declared as far back as 1847 that 
socialism in one country was absurd. The world market "has already brought all the 
people's of the earth...into such close relation with one another that none is 
'^' Quoted in Duncan Hallas, The Comintern (Bookmarks: 
London, 1985), p. 109. 
^^  Quoted in Tony Cliff, Lenin: The Bolsheviks and World 
Revolution vol. 4, (Pluto Press: London, 1978), p. 186. 
^^  Carr, op.cit. , p. 48. 
" Quoted in Cliff, op.cit., p. 2. 
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independent of what happens to the others", he said.^ ^ These once common notions 
were, however, dispensed wiUi as the idea of "Socialism in One Country" became 
more and more popular amongst leading circles of die Soviet bureaucracy. 
By the time of the Fifth Comintern Congress Zinoviev's ultra-left period had 
given way to one in which alliances with non-revolutionary forces were raised to 
such a height that the communists' new allies were falsely endowed with 
revolutionary potential. Zinoviev, impressed with the radical rhetoric of Britain's left 
wing union officials, intimated that a mass revolutionary party could develop around 
the left officials rather than around the small Communist Party of Great Britain.^^ 
The Politburo endorsed this in May 1925 through the formation of the Anglo-Soviet 
Trade Union Committee.^" The formal alliance between the unions of the USSR and 
the left-dominated British Trade Union Congress conferred upon union officials the 
potential to lead revolutionary struggles against capitalism. This led to a further 
confusion over the trade union question in the west. If left wing union officials 
could, in the case of Britain, lead revolutionary struggles against the system, what 
would be the role of communists in the trade unions? Previously, they had been 
urged by the Comintern to establish revolutionary factory committees and to win 
positions within the union bureaucracy. Now communists were being urged to be the 
junior partner of left officials. 
The only voice of dissent within the Comintern came from Leon Trotsky who 
®^ F. Engels, Principles of Communism (Pluto Press: 
London, 1973), p. 15. 
^^  Tony Cliff, Trotsky: Fighting the Rising Stalinist 
Bureaucracy: 1923-1927 (Bookmarks: London, 1991), p. 169. 
°^ Deutscher, op.cit., p. 217. 
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noted the contradictory nature of these officials who admired Soviet Russia yet were 
hostile to British communists and wanted to preserve the existing British political 
structures. 
They are in favour of the October Revolution, the Soviet system, the 
Soviet trade unions, and even a rapprochement with the Comintern, 
but under die perpetual condition that the British constitution, the 
parliamentary system, and the system of the Labour Party are not 
abandoned." 
Trotsky further cautioned diat: "if in the course of events power got into their hands 
[left union officials], they would hasten to hand it over to their elder brothers on 
their right".'^ However, being isolated within the Comintern, his advice was not 
given any credibility. 
This strategy was compounded when the U-iumvirate split. During 1925 
Zinoviev and Kamenev, who had allied with Stalin to defeat Trotsky, came into 
opposition against Stalin and his new ally, Nikolai Bukharin." Although Zinoviev 
was officially head of the Comintern until 1926, in reality Bukharin assumed 
leadership of this body in 1925. Under him the Comintern zealously pursued 
Zinoviev's policies of forging alliances with non-revolutionary bodies, in particular 
^^  Leon Trotsky, Leon Trotsky on Britain (Pathfinder: New 
York, 1973), p. 166. 
^^  ibid., 162-163. Trotsky believed these alliances were 
later to be responsible for the defeats of the British general 
strike (1926) and the Chinese revolution (1925-27). See ibid.; 
Leon Trotsky, The Third International After Lenin (Pathfinder: 
New York, 1982) ; and Leon Trotsky, Trotsky on China (Monad: 
New York, 1978) . 
" Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin (1889-1938) joined the 
Bolsheviks in 1906 at the age of 17. Arrested by the Czarist 
police in 1909, he was exiled from 1911-1917. Later he became 
editor of Pravda and head of the Comintern after 1926. He 
later opposed Stalin and after a show trial, was killed in 
1938. 
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with left wing union officials. This policy had disastrous consequences for 
communist parties during the Chinese revolutions from 1927-1927 and the British 
general strike of 1926.^ 
CPA LEADERSHIP RETREATS 
Just as the revolutionary ebb isolated the USSR and created a conservative 
tide in the Politburo and Comintern, the downturn in class struggle in Australia had a 
similar effect on the CPA. Communist influence in the labour movement declined, 
especially in the powerful Seamens Union of Australia [SUA] and the Australian 
Railways Union.^ ^ Affiliation to die communist-dominated NSW Labour Council 
fell from ninety-two unions in 1920 to sixty-three by 1922.^ ^ The right wing of the 
ALP consolidated itself and dealt "blows to the young revolutionary movement"," 
removing CPA leaders Jock Garden and J. Howie from the NSW ALP Executive, 
expelhng the CPA from the NSW branch in 1923,^' from the Federal ALP in 1924 
and the Queensland branch in 1925 despite protests from many rank and file Labor 
Party members and u-ade unions. 
•'' For an excellent account of the Chinese revolution see 
Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (Stanford 
University Press: Stanford, 1961). Tony Cliff and Donny 
Gluckstein, Marxism and Trade Union Struggle: The General 
Strike of 1926 (Bookmarks: London, 1986) deal m detail with 
the British communist party's involvement in the 1926 general 
strike. 
^^  Farrell, op.cit., pp. 63-64. 
^^  Davidson, op . cit . , p. 28. 
37 Sharkey, Trade Unions, op.cit., p. 33. 
^^ In NSW Labor Premier John Thomas (Jack) Lang threatened 
to disaffiliate from the ALP any union which remained 
affiliated to the CPA-dominated Labor Council. 
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As many of the left union officials submitted to the ALP hierarchy, the 
Workers Weekly noted the discrepancy between their radical anti-capitalist 
phraseology and their deeds: 
The pale red thunders that at intervals emanate from some Trades 
Halls leave Capitalism unscathed because they are not carried in an 
organised way right into the ranks of die toiling masses.^^ 
To combat the retreat of the union officials and working class, as well as the 
growing isolation of the communist officials in the labour movement. Garden 
attempted to establish a "Left Wing Movement" amongst the unions' rank and file in 
1924. However, although two conferences were called in NSW, a rank and file 
movement never evolved."*" 
Garden also proposed at the party's conference in December 1924 that 
communists stay in the ALP but keep their CPA membership secret to avoid their 
expulsion. However, he was not able to carry conference on this issue, instead it was 
proposed that communists in the ALP publicise dieir CPA membership, defying the 
Labor leadership to expel them. Unfortunately for the party leadership, many 
communists faced with the choice between the two organisations opted to remain in 
the ALP, dropping, instead, dieir membership of the CPA."*' 
Finally, the party stood candidates in the 1925 NSW state elections believing 
that once the CPA won seats, the Labor Party would be forced to work with it."^  
39 Workers Weekly, no. 60 (15 August 1924), p. 4 
°^ Tom O'Lincoln, The Militant Minority: Organising the 
Rank and File Workers (Socialist Action: 1986), p. 3. 
41 Davidson, op.cit., pp. 33-34 
^^  Workers Weekly, 9 January 1925, p. 1. The CPA 
candidates were Pat Drew (Sheet Metal Workers Union) and Jock 
Garden for Sydney; H.L. Denford (Federated Ironworkers) and 
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Although they urged workers; "Don't Be a Traitor on Election Day!","^ very few 
voted communist. All CPA candidates lost their deposits and Garden who, in 1922, 
proclaimed at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern that the CPA was able to direct 
almost 400,000 workers through its leadership of trade union bodies,"" got a 
derisory vote of 371 .^^ 
OUEENSLAND ALP ISOLATES LEFT WING OFFICIALS 
Queensland, too, experienced a shift in the political climate with a decline in 
strikes and the strengthening of the right wing inside the state branch of the ALP. 
Early in the post-war period the Queensland Labor government took a firm stand 
against militant labour while it attempted to govern without the benefits of substantial 
overseas loans. 
The crisis was precipitated in 1920 when Edward Theodore, representing the 
Queensland Labor government, went to London to arrange bank loans."*^  Queensland 
pastoralists, objecting to the Land Act Amendment Act (February 1920) which they 
Nelle Rickie (Theatrical Employees) for Botany; Lionel Leece 
(Federated Clothing Trades) and Tom Ryan (Clerical 
Association) for Balmain. 
43 ibid., 29 May 1925, p. 4. 
^^  Farrell, op.cit., p. 61. A report issued by the Fourth 
Congress of RILU claimed 130,000 Australian trade unionrsts, 
while not in unions affiliated to the RILU maintained 
relations with it. E.H. Carr, Foundations of a Planned 
Economy. 1926-1929 (Macmillan: London, 1978), vol. 3:1, p. 
192. 
45 Farrell, op.cit., p. 65. 
^^  Edward Theodore was Premier of Queensland from 1919-
1925. 
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claimed increased rents on Crown land, sent their own delegation to London."*^  Here 
the pastoralists enlisted the aid of British banks and the loan was refused until the 
Queensland government drastically modified its policy: withdrew the Pastoral Rents 
Act and the Unemployed Workers' Bill; altered its insurance legislation and the 
Tramway Act "to suit Brisbane Tramways Co.", according to Theodore; and amended 
the Succession Duties Act to appease British companies.'*^ 
Although the ALP had previously adopted the radical policy of the 
"socialisation of industry" as its goal, Theodore's response to the loans crisis was not 
to expropriate the employing class through nationalisations. Rather, to the disgust of 
the left wing officials and communists. Labor responded by implementing austerity 
measures which included a 5/- reduction in the basic wage, retrenchment of public 
servants and delaying the introduction of the shorter working week - a plank in 
Labor's platform. Between January 1921 and June 1922 1,120 public servants were 
reU"enched. By the end of the first quarter of 1921 unemployment in Queensland was 
21.8%. By the end of 1922 it was four times that of South Australia or Tasmania."^ 
''^  Pastoral holdings and runs amounted to more than half 
the total area of Queensland by 1916. Yet the annual rental 
was an average of 16/7 per square mile. E.M. Higgins, "The 
Queensland Labour Governments, 1915-1929", MA Thesis, 
Melbourne University, 1954, p. 21. The Act was only passed 
after the Labor government "swamped" the upper house - the 
Legislative Council - and, in February 1920, had it abolished 
to prevent the conservatives' obstruction tactics. 
''^  Bernie Schedvin, "E.G. Theodore and the London Pastoral 
Lobby", Politics, vol. 6, no. 1, May 1971, pp. 32-34. By 1924 
Theodore was able to negotiate loans from Britain only after 
compromising with the pastoralists. The Times commented that 
this was "calculated to restore Queensland's credit more 
completely than any other" act. Quoted in ibid. , p. 38. While 
the Brisbane Courier crowed that "Socialism probably has been 
taught a lesson", the left was appalled at Theodore's 
capitulation. Higgins, op.cit., pp. 57-58. 
49 ibid., p. 48 . 
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Investment in Queensland fell 43% in 1921-22 while nationally it grew on average 
27%.'" 
Since 1922, when the Arbitration Court reduced the basic wage, the left wing 
officials of the ARU had pursued every avenue available within the ALP to reverse 
the wage cut. Not even the Government Employees' Anti-Reduction Committee 
comprising twenty-nine unions could budge Theodore. Nor could the Queensland 
Central Executive [QCE] - theoretically Labor's highest body - pressure its 
parliamentary wing. Even the 1923 Labor-in-Politics Convention could not induce the 
party's politicians to rescind their decision on the basic wage.'' The ARU 
unsuccessfully died to break the hold of the parliamentary wing over the ALP by 
moving that the QCE be given power to impose its will on the politicians.'^ 
However, the parliamentary wing and its ally, the AWU, was too powerful. They 
refused even to have a QCE observer at Cabinet meetings as this was "interfering" in 
Cabinet affairs." 
The failure of the union officials' strategy stood in stark contrast to the way 
in which the 5/- basic wage reduction was finally reversed. Boilermakers at the 
Ipswich railway workshops were locked-out on 19 August 1925 for holding a stop-
work meeting over the Arbitration Court's latest refusal to restore the 5/-. When 
news of the lockout spread, other railway workers protested with spontaneous walk-
°^ Tom Cochrane, Blockade: The Oueensland Loans Affair, 
1920-1924 (University of Queensland Press: St. Lucia, 1989), 
p. 53. 
•^^  These triennial conventions established the policy of 
the Labor Party. 
" Morrison, op. cit. , p. 220. 
^^  Quoted in ibid. , p. 220. 
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offs. By 27 August officials of the ARU, the Australian Federated Union of 
Locomotive Enginemen [AFULE], and other railway unions were compelled by rank 
and file activity to call out on strike the entire 18,000 railway workers. The 
Advocate, newspaper of the ARU, explained that at the moment when Labor Premier 
William Gillies'^ offered concessions, "the northern and central employees had 
declared a general strike. This was followed by the Ipswich and southern employees 
falling into line. The Stiike Council had no option but to authorise die Strike 
officially from that date"." The spontaneous strike of the rank and file pulled the 
left wing officials into industrial activity. 
With die economy held up. Gillies, who had told a union delegation in 
August, "any attempt to fix wages by Parliament would be disastrous and would be 
striking a fatal blow at Arbitration",'^ succumbed to the workers' demands within a 
week. The effect on the morale of railway workers was tremendous. ARU 
membership rose to an all-time high of 11,000.'^ Workers' confidence was such diat 
the first train leaving Tweed Heads after the strike carried a sign: "Workers of the 
World Unite - keep the Red Flag Flying"; while during the strike a sign at 
Rockhampton station declared: "Rockhampton Mail Will Not Run - said the 
Workers".'^ 
The railway workers' victory had the opposite effect on Queensland 
•^^  William Gillies was Premier for only a few months 
between Theodore and William McCormack. 
" The Advocate, vol. 6, no. 9 (Septemiber 1925), p. 2. 
^^  Quoted in Higgins, op.cit., p. 89. 
^^  Fitzgerald and Thornton, op.cit., pp. 36-38. 
^^  Quoted in Daddow, op.cit., p. 145. 
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employers. Following the strike the conservative opposition launched a stinging 
attack on the Labor Government. Leader of the opposition, Arthur Moore, accused 
Gillies of cowardly capitulation. The Brisbane Courier declared that never before in 
the British Empire "has a Government made such an abject surrender".'"^ 
After surviving a two day debate over a no-confidence motion in Parliament, 
Gillies rushed through the Basic Wage Bill on 16 September 1925 to restore the 5/-, 
while at the same time he proceeded to discipline militant state employees. One of 
these was communist school teacher, Gordon Crane, who in 1923, with the 
agreement of the Department of Public Instruction, was appointed as tutor-organiser 
for die Workers Educational Association [WEA].*^ During the basic wage dispute 
both he and fellow communist university graduate, F.W. Paterson, supported the 
strikers, placing "die whole of their fine educational ability and natural talents at the 
disposal of railway workmen in their trouble".^' 
Appalled by the stance of these educators paid through the public purse, the 
Labor government had Crane transferred to a one teacher school at Djuon on the 
Darling Downs and refused to renew his free rail pass. J.S. Collings, ALP Organiser, 
insisted that Crane and Paterson, by "taking a partisan attitude in party politics", 
jeopardised the government grant to WEA.*^ ^ The University of Queensland also 
^^  Quoted in Anne Smith, "The Railway Strike 1925", in 
Denis Murphy (ed.). The Big Strikes, op.cit., p. 17 0. 
°^ Murnane, op.cit., p. 96. WEA was linked to the 
Queensland University, the Department of Public Instruction, 
and the trade unions and attempted to raise the educational 
level of adult workers. 
'^ ibid., quote from Advocate 15 December 1936, p. 98. 
2^ ibid. , p. 98. 
59 
took steps to discipline WEA, tightening control until it was forced to abandon 
Crane, one of its most successful tutors.^^ Under him counu-y membership had risen 
from 117 in 1922 to 837 in 1925. F.W. Nolan, a railway clerk, who had established a 
viable branch of WEA at Rockhampton, claimed that of the fifty-four study circles 
and classes in Queensland in 1924, thirty-eight were conducted or supervised by 
Gordon Crane in die Central and Mackay districts.*^ 
The victory of the railway workers hardened the attitude of the right wing 
inside the ALP against industrial militants in general, and the left wing officials of 
the ARU, in particular. Their resolve to impose "industrial peace" in the factories, 
wharves and railway yards of Queensland was evident during the next labour dispute 
in Queensland involving the WWF. In July 1925 a conference of north Queensland 
sub-branches of the WWF called for indusU"ial action to impose the rotary system on 
the state's wharves. The rotary system attempted to equalise the distribution of work 
on the wharves in contrast to the existing system where shipping companies, through 
^^ ibid., pp. 99-101. The conservatism of the University 
of Queensland was well-known. In 1919 V. Gordon Childe, an 
anti-conscriptionist, applied for a lectureship at the 
University but was turned down. He later taught archaeology in 
Edinburgh (1927-46) then in London (1946-53). F.W. Paterson, 
Rhodes Scholar and deputy-warden at St. Johns College, wrote: 
"At present the Head of the School is suspicious of my 
teaching and is making enquires among the boys". Letter from 
F.W. Paterson, 17 September 1923. BP 230/4 Box 1, Series 4, 
folder 3. AA (Brisbane). 
"^^  Nolan, op.cit. , p. 102. After this, the ARU 
disaffiliated from WEA and Crane left the Department of Public 
Instruction to be employed by the ARU. Proponents of workers' 
education established the Plebs League under the influence of 
communist trade union leader, Ernest Ellis, and George Rymer. 
Crane became President of the Brisbane Plebs League, his wife, 
along with communists, Jean Besant and Charles Wallbank, was 
on the Executive. Ellis was General Secretary while his wife 
J.E. Ellis was Secretary. Crane died in 1949 at about 50 years 
of age. 
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their stevedores and foremen, could boycott or victimise militant workers by not 
hiring them." Under the rotary system the local WWF Branch Secretary would 
present a list of unionists to the shipping companies who would allocate jobs to each 
member in turn until the list was completed. The men would be employed in the 
order their names appeared on the list, eliminating discriminatory practices of the 
stevedores.^ 
Although the dispute was meant to be a co-ordinated state wide action, 
involving simultaneous strikes by WWF branches at Cooktown, Port Douglas, 
Thursday Island, Cairns, Townsville, Mackay, Rockhampton, Gladstone, 
Maryborough, Bundaberg and Brisbane in September,*^ waterside workers in Cairns 
began their dispute prematurely in mid-July.^ 
The strike outraged the Cairns district farmers, coming as it did at die height 
of the sugar crushing and meat killing seasons.^'' Soon farmers and special 
constables enrolled by the Mayor were organising what the CPA described as a 
"reign of assault and intimidation" against the waterside workers.™ Vigilantes raided 
the home of Sidney Akers and surrounded Young's boarding house, demanding the 
65 Workers Weekly, no. 157 (23 July 1926), p. 3. 
" North Oueensland Register, 1 October 1928, p. 86. 
^^  See reports in Workers Weekly, 10 July 1925, p. 4 and 
18 August 1925, p. 4. 
^^  Police reported that one of the pro-rotary agitators 
was comimunist leader, Norman Jeffery. PRE/A, 773 of 1926, 
Cairns Police to Cairns CIB, 1 February 1926, p. 1. QSA. 
^^  Anne Smith, "McCormack, Rymer and the Bowen Industrial 
Trouble: 1925", Lectures on North Oueensland History, no. 4, 
1984, p. 174. 
°^ Workers Weekly, 23 July 1926, p. 1. 
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right to search it for communist printing presses.^' 
In the eyes of the CPA, workers and left wing officials the Labor government 
had colluded with the vigilantes in Cairns by its refusal to intervene. The police even 
excused die violence of the farmers as being simply a reaction to provocations of 
suikers.^" The Advocate stated without hesitation that the "Government not only 
remained inactive, but their inactivity amounted to almost open protection to the 
producers' Fascist!".^^ 
Unlike the basic wage dispute, the su-ike in Cairns ended in defeat in late 
October when the Industrial Registrar ordered a secret ballot to which the union 
officials agreed. Militants amongst the rank and file, however, disapproved of the 
ballot and subsequendy boycotted it. As the only waterside workers who voted were 
members who wanted to end the strike, the ballot resulted in a majority vote to 
return to work. 
To the dismay of the Labor government the rotary system dispute was not 
over. Bowen waterside workers later went on strike for the same reason, although 
their strike was complicated by simultaneous industrial action of British seamen 
whose ships were docked in Australia. 
In August 1925 the seamen began an unsuccessful seven month strike against 
''^  PRE/A, 773 of 1926, Commissioner of Police to Under 
Secretary, Chief Secretary's Department, 1 February 1926, p. 
2. QSA. 
^^  ibid. , p . 2 . 
" Advocate, 10 December 1925, p. 1. Later, in February 
1926, McCormack threatened Cairns workers who continued to 
raise the issue of the rotary system. He said: "You won't have 
the farmers to deal with next time, I will deal with you" . 
Quoted in Workers Weekly, no. 134 (12 February 1926), p. 3. 
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a £1 wage reduction.^ '* The su i^ke was not supported by the officials of their own 
union, the National Sailors and Firemens Union of Great Britain. In fact, their 
General President, Havelock Wilson, had consented to the reduction. But the seamen 
could not afford another pay cut because, since 1921, their income had virtually been 
halved." 
Ship-owners responded by stopping the pay of striking seamen. With no 
income, no accommodation and deserted by their own union leaders, the seamen 
turned to Australian unions and communists for support.^'' In Queensland unions 
established the Overseas Transport Union Strike Committee. Headed by George 
Rymer (ARU), it comprised representatives from the SUA, WWF, ARU, and 
Queensland Collieries Employees Union; branches were set up in Bowen, Gladstone, 
Townsville, and Cairns. The CPA, too, "took a very active part" in supporting the 
strike 77 
'"^ During the strike, editor of the Westralian Worker, 
John Curtin (later ALP Prime Minister), was declared "black" 
by unions for refusing to publish an article on the battle at 
the Fremantle wharves between British strikers and their 
Australian supporters and strike breakers trying to man the 
Borda. Lloyd Ross, John Curtin, a Biography (Sun Books: 
Melbourne, 1977), pp. 81-82. 
" Brian Fitzpatrick and Rowan Cahill, The Seamen's Union 
of Australia, 1872-1972 (Seamens Union of Australia, Sydney: 
1981), p. 51. For an anti-strike view of the dispute see T.R. 
Ashworth, Comimunism in Australia; The Lessons of the British 
Seamen's Strike and Other Papers (The Citizens League of 
Australia: Melbourne, 1926). At the height of the strike 
twenty-nine ships were held up in Australian and New Zealand 
ports, and in early Septemiber British ships in Durban, South 
Africa, joined the dispute. Sydney Morning Herald, 26 August 
1925, p. 14. 
^^  In Sydney the CPA rooms were turned into sleeping 
quarters for British seamen. Daily Standard, 23 August 1925, 
p. 1. 
^^  Surplus, op. cit. , p. 1. 
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The greatest direat to the British seamen came when the conservative Bruce-
Page federal government passed amendments to the Immigration Act. Under this 
draconian legislation the government was empowered to deport non-Australian bom 
strikers if the Governor-General proclaimed a serious industrial dispute existed. As 
well, anyone not born in Australia who had been convicted of an offence which 
hindered trade and commerce or obstructed the arbitration system could be 
summoned before a board to show cause why they should not be deported. The 
conviction did not have to be recent, but at any time "within three years before the 
notice of the summons to such a person".™ 
The Board, appointed by the Minister in charge of immigration, had power of 
recommendation only, the final decision being up to the Minister. The Act was 
described by the Queensland Attorney-General as 
...one of the most far-reaching and severe of its kind and a direct 
infringement of the rights of Magna Charta and the liberties of a free 
people...THE MINISTER WOULD BE THE PROSECUTOR, THE 
MAKER OF THE COURT, THE JUDGE ORDERING THE 
DEPORTATION, AND...THE GAOLER BEFORE THE 
DEPORTATION.'^ 
Non-Australian born unionists who participated in industrial action were in a 
worse position than criminals, as they would not be tried by their peers and the 
sentence of deportation meant, in fact, complete exile from the social network of 
support offered by their family and friends.^" 
By 24 August the indusu-ial situation was such that the Governor-General, 
'^^ Memo from Queensland Attorney-General, J. Mullan, to 
Premier W. Gilles (Queensland), 1925 re deportation aspect of 
1925 Immigration Act. PRE/A 847, In letters 7443 of 1925. QSA. 
'^  ibid. , pp. 4 and 5 
°^ ibid. , p. 4. 
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Lord Forster, proclaimed there existed "a serious industrial disturbance prejudicing or 
threatening the peace, order, or good government of die Commonwealth".^' The 
federal government was now empowered to deport strikers. In September arrests of 
British seamen began around the country. Two months later, a federal election 
centred around ending communist influence in the unions and expelling foreign 
agitators, saw the conservatives returned to parliament. This was a blow to Labor 
which lost seats all around the country and its poor showing made the right wing of 
the party even more determined to rid the ALP of any connection widi 
communists. 
Soon after the federal elections, the government attempted to deport two left 
wing leaders of the SUA - Tom Walsh, one of the founders of the CPA, and Jacob 
Johnson - for their involvement in the British seamen's dispute.^^ Although the two 
union officials were sent to the Garden Island Naval Depot to await deportation, they 
were soon released. The SUA, WWF, and miners federation threatened a general 
sdike over the issue, while the High Court ruled that their deportation was illegal.^ 
The attitude of the union officials is instructive. At the same time they lent 
their support to die British seamen, they were anxious to prevent a major industrial 
confrontation between Ausd-alian unionists and the government. For instance, E.J. 
Holloway, Secretary of the Melbourne Trades Hall Council, appealed to Gillies to get 
®^  Sydney Morning Herald, 25 August 1925, p. 9. 
^^  Farrell, op.cit., pp. 118-120. 
^^ Walsh had migrated from Ireland 32 years previously and 
Johnson (or Johannsen) had left Sweden in 1910. 
®^  Protests poured into Gillies' office demanding the ALP 
oppose the Immigration Act. See PRE/A 7443 of 1925 and PRE/A 
5856 of 1925. QSA. 
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the Congress of Ministers meeting in Melbourne to "see if some agreement cannot be 
arrived at and thus avoid what will be the greatest Industrial upheaval in the 
Industiial history of our country taking place".^ ^ 
In October 1925, in the middle of the Bowen WWF and British seamen's 
disputes, Gillies was replaced as Premier by "hard-liner" William McCormack, who 
was not prepared to yield to militant unions. Presumably agreeing with the 
sentiments in a contemporary school textbook diat a strike was "a barbarous method 
of settling a quarrel",^^ McCormack insisted that Labor stood for "evolutionary 
progress and not for revolutionary methods".^' 
His first task was to end the dispute on the Bowen waterfront which had now 
spread to involve railway workers. The focal point was the strike-bound ship Port 
Hardy. Being declared "black" by British seamen, Bowen waterside workers had 
refused to load it. As in Cairns, local farmers held anti-strike rallies and angry groups 
roamed the town seeking out strikers. The Advocate described how a crowd of 200 
"had the place more or less in terror, first pulling individuals from their boarding 
^^  E.J. Holloway to Gillies, PRE/A 5857 of 1925, 21 June 
1925. QSA. 
^^  Quoted in Libby Connors, "Ideologies of Powerlessness: 
Attitudes to Women and the Working Class in Queensland 
Schools, 1919-39", Hecate, vol. 11, no. 2, 1984, p. 47. 
'^ Quoted in Morrison, op.cit., p. 229. Gillies became 
head of the new arbitration court where he refused wage rises 
for meatworkers, public servants, railway workers, and the AWU 
while parliamentary salaries were increased 50% in September 
1926. Higgins, op.cit. , p. 87. The CPA claimed Gillies was 
paid "£40 per week to arbitrate as to whether £4/10 is enough 
for workers, who by the sweat of their brow produce the wealth 
of this country". Workers Weekly, no. 136 (26 February 1926), 
p. 3. 
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house...going all over certain hotels, ransacking the premises".**^ When Bowen 
railway men refused to run trains on the rail line to the port in support of the British 
seamen and WWF, McCormack dismissed the station master and suspended thirteen 
drivers, saying the Government would "take the necessary steps to see that its 
authority is not undermined".^^ 
In the midst of this dispute the 1926 state elections were called. As a 
concihatory gesture to the ALP the left union officials ended the industrial action so 
as not to embarrass politically Labor at such a crucial tinie.*^ They paid littie heed 
to McCormack's pre-election warning that he would not allow "any noisy minority, 
no matter to what union they may belong - railway union or otherwise - to assume 
control".^' After being returned to office by votes from the working class, 
McCormack pursued his campaign against the militant unions, denying employment 
to the Bowen railway workers dismissed during the Port Hardy dispute. 
In February 1925 an anti-Communist pledge was drawn up which had to be 
signed by all ALP members by 31 July. When the deadline came, only eighty-two 
branches had complied. Three branches refused, six returned "indefinite replies", and 
®*^  Quoted in Anne Smith, "Railway Strike", op. cit. , pp 
176-77. 
89 Quoted in Higgins, op.cit., p. 83 
'° In these elections 30% of the ALP campaign funds came 
from the AWU. Gerard Dalton, "The Queensland Labour Movement 
1919-29: A Social, Political and Administrative Analysis", BA 
Hons, University of Queensland, 1974, p. iv. 
'^  Queensland Parliamentary Debates, vol. 149, 1929, p. 
48. 
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209 branches ignored returning officer J.S. Collings.'^ ^ An extension to 12 
September was given but again the ALP leadership were disappointed. Finally, the 
deadline was extended to 7 November and any branch failing to respond positively 
was threatened with expulsion by the QCE. 
George Rymer and Tim Moroney (ARU), however, maintained their 
opposition to die pledge, particularly as they, along with all other ALP members, had 
already signed a similar pledge according to ALP Rule 64. On 27 November at the 
monthly meeting of the QCE, R.J. CaroU, a McCormack supporter, disputed 
Moroney's credentials as he had not signed the pledge. Moroney and Rymer walked 
out of the meeting - their actions later being endorsed by the ARU State Council as 
weU as all ARU district committees.''^ In the clash between the QCE and the ARU 
a meeting of representatives of twenty-five unions and metropolitan ALP branches 
threatened to form an Industrial Labour Party, although nothing came of this.** 
By the time of the Southport Labor-in-Politics Convention in February 1926, 
the ARU officials were prepared to submit their pledge, although they typed the 
following words over its text: 
The Q.C.E. has no authority under the rules of the A.L.P. (State of 
Queensland) to demand this pledge. It is therefore signed under the 
'^  Kett Kennedy, "William McCormack: Forgotten Labor 
Leader", in Denis Murphy, Roger Joyce, and Margaret Cribb, The 
Premiers of Oueensland (University of Queensland Press: St. 
Lucia, 1990), p. 372. 
^^  See copy of letter sent by Moroney to the QCE published 
in Advocate, vol. 6, no. 10, 10 October 1925, p. 15. 
'^' Higgins, op. cit. , p. 99. Later, in-September 1926, the 
Ironworkers' Union proposed establishing an industrial section 
of the ALP independent of the QCE, which again did not 
eventuate, ibid., p. 103. 
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protest of, and on instructions of the State Council of the A.R.U.'^ ^ 
When the credentials committee rejected this, ARU delegates were denied 
enu^ance.^ The Convention was now dominated by conservative elements - the 
AWU, QCE and the parhamentarians. With the expulsion of the left wing union 
officials, the Convention proceeded to alter the ALP's objective, removing reference 
to the nationatisation of banks.*^ ^ As the Brisbane Courier said, the expulsion of the 
ARU representatives "was actuated entirely in the interests of the politicians".*^ 
As the left wing ARU officials had no wish to stay outside the Labor Party, 
the union's State Council on 19 March 1926 advised die QCE that it would sign the 
pledge. When this offer was rejected, the union disaffiliated from the Labor Party, 
taking with it another left wing union - the AMIEU. 
LEFT WING UNION OFFICIALS LEAVE THE CPA 
Throughout the union movement and the ALP the right wing was reasserting 
itself, isolating and marginalising the left. For the leadership of the CPA, in 
particular Jock Garden, their estrangement from the Labor Party and the erosion of 
their dominance in the unions provoked a crisis.^ In 1926 proposals to dissolve the 
^^  Advocate, 15 February 1926, p. 15. 
^^  Fitzgerald and Thornton, op.cit., p. 39. 
" ibid. , p. 39. 
^^  Quoted in K. Kennedy, "The Anti-Communist Pledge 
Crisis", in Denis Murphy, Roger Joyce and Colin Hughes, Labor 
in Power: The Labor Party and Governments in Oueensland 1915-
1957 (University of Queensland Press: St. Lucia, 1980), p. 
380. 
^^  E.W. Campbell states that Garden had "quite frequently 
referred to the Labor Council as 'the spearhead of the 
revolution'", op.cit., p. 122. 
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CPA into the ALP were raised. It was suggested that the Communist Party 
experiment had been premature. Garden and his supporters believed that communists 
could better infiuence the working class if they were in the mass reformist Labor 
Party rather than being in a small sect on the fringes of the labour movement. 
Other leaders, particularly Jack Kavanagh, who had been a prominent member 
since arriving Australia in 1925, resisted the dissolution of the party. Expulsion from 
the ALP, he claimed, was of no particular consequence. In fact, communist work 
inside the Labor Party had been limited by the ALP's bureaucratic internal structure. 
The Workers Weekly commented that expulsion merely deprived communists "of one 
avenue of activity which has never been of much, if any, use to the CP or to the 
mditant working class movement"."^ Kavanagh and his supporters believed that 
"with the CP in a numerically weak state much valuable time was undoubtedly 
wasted" working inside the ALP - time "which might have been profitably employed 
in building up a strong Communist Party".'"' 
Once Garden's dissolution motion was defeated, he and other union officials 
left the Party to rejoin the ALP, Garden himself becoming an ardent supporter of 
NSW Labor Premier Jack Lang. At one time Garden even described Lang as "Greater 
than Lenin"."^^ The Workers Weekly appraised the loss of its union officials, 
saying: 
The wave of revolutionary enthusiasm existent from 1917 to 
1921 - the opportunity for basking in the revolutionary limelight in 
comparative ease, and safety, necessarily attracted to the working class 
movement in general and the Communist Party in particular many 
°^° Workers Weekly, no. 129 (8 January 1926), p. 2. 
1°^  ibid. , p. 2. 
102 Edgar Ross, Storm and Struggle, op.cit., p. 65 
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shades of working class thought from the militant u-ade unionist to the 
bourgeois Marxist. 
The subsiding of the revolutionary wave and the rise of 
reaction including fascist tendencies and the apathy and indifference of 
the masses of the workers, weakened the fervour of some of the more 
superficial elements.'°^ 
Brisbane also lost many of its leading members who were union officials, 
such as Jack Roche, Jerry Cahill, and Millard. However, there is no clear evidence 
that they left around the same time as Jock Garden and die NSW officials, nor that 
they left for the same reasons. 
In counterposition to the parliamentary strategy of Garden, Kavanagh 
contended that the party could only be built "by developing the militancy of the 
workers in the industiial areas",'°^ renewing the emphasis on trade union work. 
Unfortunately, the small size and influence of the CPA, especially as its most 
important union officials had left, limited its capacity to implement this strategy. 
Despite this, the CPA under Kavanagh remained faithful to the Comintern's 
line of uncritical support for left wing union officials. The consequences could be 
seen in the CPA's attitude toward the 1927 sugar workers and railway workers strike 
in Queensland. 
McCORMACK DEFEATS THE RAILWAY AND SUGAR WORKERS 
McCormack took office as the state began to slide into recession. In the 
financial year 1926-27 the value of wool fell from £12.9 million to £3.5 million. The 
°^^  Workers Weekly, no. 129 (8 January 1926), p. 2 
'°' ibid. , p. 3. 
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value of new buildings approved in the Brisbane metropolitan area fell,'°^ as did 
the value of export goods from Queensland, causing government revenue from rail 
u-ansport to plummet £11,600,000 from 1926-1927."^ The railways, an area of 
infrastructure which had always received the most expenditure from the 
government,'"^ suffered extensive cut-backs.'°^ 
The developing economic crisis put the capitalist class under pressure to 
lower wages and overheads as a means of reversing declining profit rates. But they 
faced an obstacle. The labour movement, although not as mihtant as it had been in 
1918, still maintained a level of confidence which had been boosted by the 
railworkers' victory in the basic wage dispute. As the most influential union in the 
labour movement at the time was the ARU, it became imperative to weaken the 
Queensland working class by inflicting a crushing defeat on this union - a defeat 
which would reverberate throughout the labour movement, creating demoralisation 
and confusion. 
In preparation, McCormack made it clear he would take a hard line against 
any industiial unrest. In February 1927 a dispute amongst building workers employed 
by the Department of Public Works provided him with an opportunity. The workers 
refused to work on Saturday in an attempt to force the introduction of the 40 hour 
°^^  Brian Costar, "Labor and the Depression", in Murphy, 
Joyce and Hughes (ed.). Labor in Power, op.cit., pp. 407-408. 
^°^ Oueensland Parliamentary Debates, vol. 149, 1927, p. 
935. 
°^^  Marian Gough, Helen Hughes, B.J. McFarlane, and G.R. 
Palmer, Queensland: Industrial Enigma; Manufacturing in the 
Economic Development of Oueensland (Melbourne University 
Press: Melbourne, 1964), p. 6. 
°^® Oueensland Parliamentary Debates, vol. 149, 1927, p. 
69. 
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week, officially part of the ALP platform. The building workers' strike was endorsed 
by die Brisbane TLC and diey were promised support from the ARU and SUA.'°^ 
One of the leaders of diis strike was J.B. Miles, working at the time in his trade as a 
stonemason. Although the stonemasons' union was not involved in the dispute, Miles 
who stopped work in support of other workers, was dismissed by his employer, then 
was appointed to the disputes committee of the strike. 
Both die Master Builders Association and the Public Works Department 
dismissed striking workers, while McCormack refused workers relief while on strike 
as they had broken away from "the accepted and constitutional method of dealing 
with the wages and hours," he claimed. In this he was supported by the QCE."° So 
unyielding was McCormack, he even refused to see a support committee established 
by the strikers' wives. 
When a mass meeting voted 2,110 to 30 to refuse to participate in a secret 
ballot, the Board of Trade, on 4 February, deregistered the carpenters, builders 
labourers, painters and bricklayers unions. In a show of bravado building workers 
sang The Red Flag in court after the deregistration was announced.'" But by die 
end of the month divisions emerged. Brisbane workers wanted to remain on strike, 
Toowoomba was divided while Townsville carried a motion to return to work."^ 
After nine weeks on su-ike the workers were unable to shift McCormack and, 
defeated, they voted on 19 March to return to work. 
°^^  Higgins, op . cit. , p. 91. 
^^° ibid. , pp. 91-92. 
"^ Morrison, op.cit., p. 230. 
"2 Workers Weekly, no. 187 (25 February 1927), p. 3 
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The Public Works dispute was one of a series defeats McCormack inflicted 
on die less powerful sections of the Queensland working class. With these victories 
boosting his confidence, he was poised to confront the larger, stronger trade unions 
and a dispute at the South Johnstone sugar mill in 1927 presented McCormack with 
the opportunity to do this. The South Johnstone mill had recently been privatised by 
the government and the new manager proceeded to dismiss all regular employees and 
re-hire only some of these. This went against established practice in the sugar 
indusdy where mills would hire all those employed during the previous crushing 
season. The new manager, Mr Gillan, had formerly run the Colonial Sugar Refining 
Company mill and was presumably well aware of the customary hiring practices. 
As in the rotary dispute on the wharves, at issue was union job control versus 
the employers' right to hire whomever they chose. Mill and sugar workers in the 
distiict had an estabhshed history of militancy which Gillan sought to undermine. 
Past annual reports going back to 1921 revealed the level of industrial action which 
affected the operations of die mill. The General Manager's report of 1921 claimed 
that industrially there was "almost continual trouble"."' The Auditor-General 
remarked in his 1921 report that due to strike action "the services of the men were 
not available some 64 per cent of die total time".""* The following year around five 
weeks were lost during the crushing season "owing to a strike which commenced 
amongst the canecutters"."^ In 1923 produce was held up by a waterside workers' 
stiike at Mourilyan Harbour. In 1924 an overtime dispute meant "the full advantage 
^^ ' Quoted in Oueensland Parliamentary Debates, vol. 149, 
1927, pp. 68-69. 
"^  Quoted in ibid., p. 69 
^^^ Quoted in ibid. , p. 69 
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was not derived by the South Johnstone mill"."^ In 1926 the General Manager 
claimed that as well as having to contend with a strike by its own workers: 
The work at the mills was interfered with by the railway strike in 
September last, while the dispute concerning the "rotary" system of 
wharf labour, which was in force for a time at all Queensland ports 
except Townsville and Brisbane, necessitated the storage of large 
quantities of sugar."^ 
Given this level of militancy it was not surprising mill workers voted to strike 
to reinstate all staff employed by the previous management. They soon found support 
from other unionists. A meeting of the Brisbane TLC on 26 June pledged to "support 
in every way" the struggle of the mill workers."^ But their own union officials in 
the AWU consistentiy urged workers to accept a Board of Trade and Industry 
proposition to return to work. 
The AWU was committed to arbitration which W.G. Spence, long time leader 
of the union, believed would "provide a peaceful means of avoiding strife, leaving 
the Labor unions free to devote their time, their money, and their energies to 
securing permanent and lasting reform by means of political action"."^ However, 
the AWU rank and file at South Johnstone consistentiy rejected the Board of Trade's 
recommendations. In exasperation the officials and the Labor politicians blamed 
foreign-born workers for the failure to secure an end to the dispute. Labor member 
for Fitzroy, Harold Hartley, bemoaned that: 
^^^ Quoted in ibid. , p. 69. 
^" Quoted in ibid., p. 69. 
^^® Quoted in K.H. Kennedy, "The South Johnstone Strike 
and Railway Lockout: 1927", Labour History, vol. 31, November 
1976, p. 2. 
^^^ Quoted in Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics, 
op.cit.. p. 39. 
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...when a decision had almost been reached, the Australian Workers' 
Union were unable to control their members and get the decision 
enforced. It involved the labour of five interpreters before those 
concerned could understand the terms of that settlement. It shows what 
a dangerous position the North is in through the Commonwealth 
Government policy of flooding it with foreign South European 
labour.'^ '^  
Without leadership from the Brisbane-based officials, the mill workers took 
on die task of organising the dispute themselves. They set up a rank and file strike 
committee which contacted other union bodies for support. One of the most 
successful responses came from the Innisfail TLC which on 24 July declared the 
mill, its supplies, and all its sugar "black". Mourilyan waterside workers and 
railwaymen resolved not to transport the mill's sugar. Every worker in the sugar 
industry in the Babinda area, that is, every canecutter, every mid worker, others in 
the town, and all field workers on the cane farms contributed 10/- a week toward the 
strike. 
The dispute was bitter and prolonged. It saw the deadi of one striker. Jack 
Hines, while on picket duty at Wangan - no-one was ever tried for his murder.'^' 
The AWU officials believed that the mill management and farmers were distributing 
weapons to be used against the suikers and, according to W. Braysher, chair of the 
strike committee, 25% of strike-breakers and cane farmers were armed.'^^ Acting 
Premier William Forgan-Smith invoked the Sugar Acquisition Act (1915) to 
^^ ° Oueensland Parliamentary Debates, vol. 149, 1927, p. 
56. 
- ^ ^^  In 1928 the AWU erected a memorial to John Hines 
(sometimes written as "Hynes") in Innisfail. 
122 Worker , 13 J u l y , 1927, p . 9 
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confiscate firearms within a 20-niile radius of the Innisfail Post Office.'" 
The over-riding concern of the AWU officials was to localise the dispute and 
prevent it from spreading to other sections of the union movement.'^ '* Neither the 
employers nor the government sympathised with the AWU. Rather, the dispute was 
deliberately spread to involve railway workers. This was recognised by many at the 
time. When the mill management sent a consignment of sugar by rail to Brisbane, 
Henry Bruce (ALP) described it as an act designed "to extend die local dispute".'^^ 
The mill management was prepared to risk all to win, keeping the mill going 
even at a loss of around £12,000 per week. With Mourilyan Harbour blocked by 
industrial action of waterside workers who supported the strikers, farmers proposed to 
go to Mourilyan and load the sugar themselves. However, the ship-owners would not 
co-operate. They did not wish to be brought into the dispute at that particular time as 
they feared their seamen would not staff ships loaded by strike-breakers. It was 
reported: 
...the mUl was advised by the Adelaide Steamship Company, the 
regular cond-actors for the shipping service, that they would not 
receive sugar loaded by farmers or odier labour. Negotiations were 
then opened up with the agents of certain overseas ships, due shordy 
to arrive in Townsville, but with the same result.'^^ 
It was then decided to send the sugar by rail to Brisbane. The Labor 
government readily provided the transport, claiming that as a common carrier it had 
123 Fitzgerald and Thornton, op.cit., p. 44. 
^^^ W.J. Riordan, AWU President, said: "The only way that 
we could confine it to the South Johnstone area was to make it 
an official strike". Quoted in K.H. Kennedy, "South Johnstone 
Strike, 1927", op.cit., p. 176. 
'^^ Oueensland Parliamentary Debates, op.cit., p. 43. 
^" Advocate, 15 February 1928, p. 24. 
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an obligation to do so. Yet as some Labor dissidents pointed out, despite being a 
common carrier the railways refused to carry such goods as explosives and, as the 
dispute widened, the NSW government refused to transport goods into Queensland 
for fear of its own railway workers su-iking in sympathy with Queenslanders. 
Therefore, they reasoned, the Queensland government could refuse to allow sugar 
from South Johnstone to be transported by rail. As well, Maurice Hynes (ALP) 
disclosed that transporting the sugar to Brisbane by rail was commercially unsound 
and that there were ample storage facilities for the sugar in the mill itself. He 
explained: 
During the seamen's strike I was organising in the sugar districts and 
immediately the management found they could not get their sugar 
away, and their storage accommodation was being exhausted, they 
built temporary sheds for the storage of dieir sugar. No attempt was 
made to use the railways on those occasions.'^'' 
Myles Ferticks (ALP) stated that the Premier wanted to bring the railway workers 
into die dispute in order to defeat them. The issue "was shifted from South Johnstone 
down to die metiopolis in order to bring about a 'tryout'" between labour and the 
government, he said.'^ ^ 
An appeal by the AWU officials for railway workers to transport the sugar, 
received a positive response - on the provision that only one shipment would be 
moved by rail. But rank and file members of the ARU at Bowen refused to move the 
sugar any further south, forcing the AFULE to take over its transportation. This event 
gave Labor the excuse to stand down railway workers who would not handle South 
Johnstone sugar. Before long nearly 140 workers on the northern division were under 
^^^ Oueensland Parliamentary Debates, op.cit. , p. 77. 
2^^  ibid. , p. 52. 
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suspension. 
On 29 August McCormack put himself in personal control of the Railway 
Department. Five days later, after consulting only Cabinet Ministers, he gave the 
railway unions an ultimatum to "handle whatever goods are submitted to the 
Commissioner as a common carrier" or "the Government will dismiss the whole of 
the members of that Union...and engage employees from those who are willing to 
obey his orders".'^^ 
When the unions failed to comply, McCormack closed down the railways on 
6 September. All 18,874 employees were locked-out and McCormack advertised for 
strike-breakers to replace them. It was anticipated that within a week a further 
100,000 Queensland workers would be stood down as the lockout had an impact on 
the state's economy. McCormack's hard line left no room for waverers amongst 
Labor parliamentarians. He warned them: 
If any member here believes that a principle of unionism...is at stake, 
and that, because he is a member of a union, he is compelled to give 
allegiance to some outside body and not to this Parliament, then he 
ought not to be in this Parliament - and if the Government give way to 
the authority of any outside body in a matter like that, then I say the 
final result will be revolution.'^° 
That defeat of the sugar and railway workers was vital to the employing class 
could be seen by the full support the conservative opposition gave McCormack. 
Arthur Moore, leader of the Country Progressive National Party [CPNP], said: 
There can be no question of the support of the Opposition in the fight 
by die Government to assert its authority and control the railways of 
this State...we do not intend or desire to embarrass the Government in 
^^^ Quoted in Frank Nolan, You Pass This Way Only Once: 
Reflections of a Trade Union Leader (Forward by John Egerton, 
ed. Denis Murphy), (Colonial Press: Brisbane, 1974), p. 41. 
'^° ibid. , p. 50. 
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any way, and are prepared to lend any possible aid to see that the 
rights of the people arc protected, that die authority of the Government 
is paramount, and that respect for die law is insisted upon.'^' 
William Deacon (CPNP for Cunningham) praised McCormack as "a good Tory. 
Would any Tory Government have dared to sack 18,000 men? The Premier and the 
Cabinet are bigger Tories than ever we on this side dreamed of being"."^ The 
Mackay Daily Mercury reported on 5 September the Employers Federation "had 
everything ready, and was prepared to assist the Government to maintain the essential 
services. If the Premier telephoned him for 100 motor-trucks, he could have them 
ready in an hour"."^ The Queensland Cane Growers Association declared it "the 
duty of every cane grower to get right behind the Government and render every 
practical assistance".'^ 
Railway unions responded immediately to the lockout. The Worker carried the 
following declaration: 
The combined Unions representing the A.R.U., A.W.U., loco, men and 
guards, A.E.U. and Traffic Employees' Unions, have decided to 
declare the positions of all dismissed men "black" and have instructed 
members to refuse to work with anyone appointed to fill vacant 
positions.'^^ 
A mass demonstration of 6,000 in die Brisbane Domain called on the QCE to sack 
Premier McCormack and his Cabinet. However, although the QCE met it took no 
action against the parliamentarians. The 1923 inner party struggle over restoring the 
'•^^ quoted in ibid. , p. 41. 
^^^ Oueensland Parliamentary Debates, op.cit., p. 209 
"^ Mackay Daily Mercury, 6 Septemiber 1927, p. 5. 
^^•^  Quoted in the Advocate, 15 January 1928, p. 18. 
^^^ Worker, 7 September 1927, p. 18. 
80 
basic wage revealed that the QCE could not discipline the parliamentary wing 
without creating ruptures within the party. The Communist Party attributed the 
QCKs inactivity to the contiadictory position in which it found itself: "Afraid of its 
base, the unions, it dare not back the Government. Not honest enough to abandon the 
sweets of office it dare not put the cabinet and supporters outside the A-L-P.".''*^ 
However, the QCE's stance more likely reflected its domination by 
parhamentarians. After all, six of the QCE's eleven members elected at die 1926 
Labor-in-Politics convention were parliamentarians: William McCormack (Premier), 
William Forgan-Smith (Deputy Leader), John Mullan (Attorney-General), D.A. 
Gledsen (Minister for State Enterprises), T. Wilson (MLA), G. Pollock (MLA), L. 
McDonald (ALP Secretary), Joseph Silver Collings (ALP organiser), William 
Demaine, George Lawson (Secretary of the Carters and Drivers Union), and Barney 
McLean.'" 
Resistance to die government continued. The Worker reported: 
By Monday morning the stoppage of work on the Queensland railways 
was complete. No trains were moving, and motor vehicles were used 
to assist the tramways for U'ansport in Brisbane...In all the big centres 
railway stations and depots were picketed to prevent persons entering 
the premises for the purpose of running trains. During the week-end 
officials of the various railway Unions were busy at all railway centres 
throughout the State addressing mass meetings of the men and urging 
them to stand solid against the Government's efforts to secure a 
resumption of the services.''^ 
Around the state workers' support for the locked-out railway men poured in. 
Waterside workers at Bowen voted to stand by them. At Innisfail 900 workers 
"^ Workers Weekly, no. 220 (23 August 1927), p. 3 
^" ibid., no. 136 (26 February 1926), p. 3. 
138 Worker, 7 September, 1927, p. li 
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marched behind the red flag at a rally in support of the ARU. Bowen Coal miners 
appealed to "all sincere members of die Queensland Labor Party and trade unionists 
to fall in to line with the railway workers".'^^ 
From interstate the NSW State Executive of the ARU sent the su-ike fund 
£200 and passed a motion demanding: 
All Unionists should pledge themselves to support the workers of 
Queensland and to repudiate the black conduct of McCormack. Pass 
resolutions and send real help to those who are engaged in the 
struggle. Smash any attempt to make the Government of Queensland 
the first Fascist State of the Commonwealth...Tyranny must cease. 
McCormack must go.'"*" 
The NSW Labor Council defended the Queensland ARU in "their splendid stand 
against that despicable act of the Fascist Premier McCormack"'"*' while the 
Melbourne Trades Hall Council likewise resolved to support the locked-out 
workers.''*^ 
Unfortunately, much of the support remained only verbal. The Brisbane TLC, 
for instance, declared on the day of the lockout that: 
Unless the QCE effectively disciplines McCormack and his 
stiikebreaking colleagues by Friday, September 9th, this Trades and 
Labour Council will take action to repudiate die McCormack 
Government, and take all necessary steps to assume control of the 
Political Movement.'''^ 
Yet, the deadline passed without the TLC assuming control of the Pohtical 
"^  Workers Weekly, no. 214 (9 September 1927), p. 3. 
"° Worker, 7 September 1927, p. 18. 
'^^  ibid. , p. 18. 
"2 ibid., p. 18. 
"^" Minutes of the Executive of the TLC meeting of 6 
September 1927. 
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Movement. Instead, two days later the railway unions surrendered. Many of the 
smaller and more conservative unions covering railway workers, such as the AFULE, 
Railway Officers' Union, Australian Clerical Association, and the Guards' 
Association, ordered dieir members to return to work. The AWU also ordered an end 
to the dispute fearing direats by the Arbitration Court to deregister the union, cancel 
their award, and revoke AWU preference. On 12 September workers at the South 
Johnstone sugar mill voted 368 to 11 to end their dispute without gaining their 
original demands. 
Following McCormack's victory, congratulatory telegrams and letters poured 
in from the Queensland Producers Association and the Local Producers Associations 
from: 
Tent Hill, Glen Eden, Irvingdale, Hatton Vale, East Barron, Malanda 
from the Shire Councils of: 
Wartoo, Esk, Isis, Cleveland, Hinchinbrook, Tweed, Miriam Vale, 
Tinaroo, Wooroolin, Tarampa, Lowood, Atikson's Lagoon, Degilbo, 
Kingaroy, Winton 
from the Chamber of Commerce at: 
Cooroy, Maryborough, Southport, Allora, Gympie, Landsborough, 
Warwick, Cairns, Rockhampton, Clifton, Toowoomba 
from the other primary producers like 
Queensland and Jandowae East Primary Producers Unions, Dalby 
District Agrarian Union, Cooroy Fruitgrowers Co-operative, Normanby 
Shire Agrarian Union (Harrisville), Maryborough and Herbert District 
Canegrowers' Associations, Mclntyre Grazing Farmers and Selectors 
Association, Winton Graziers Association, Rockhampton Hinterland 
Farmers and Graziers Association, Cooran Fruitgrowers Association, 
Atherton Tableland Farmers, Eumundi Producers and Citizens 
Committee, Dulacca Combined Producers Public Meeting 
from 
the Winton National PoUtical League, Yungaburra Progress 
Association 
from firms such as 
Kalamia and Pioneer Mill Suppliers, Childers Mill Cane Suppliers, 
Inkerman Mill Suppliers Association, John Burke Ltd, Mt Elliot Ltd, 
Motor Trades Association of Queensland, 
from the Mayor of Coolangatta, the Headmaster of All Souls School, Charters 
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Towers, and even Count di San Marzano, Royal Italian Consul.'''^ 
The CPA's analysis of the defeat reflected its uncritical support for the left 
wing union officials which was the Comintern line at the time. In an article by J.B. 
Miles the CPA criticised die AWU leadership for having "made no plans to 
fight".'''^ However, he also criticised the rank and file mill workers for presenting 
the government with an opportunity to attack the left wing officials of the ARU. 
Writing of the South Johnstone workers. Miles said: 
It took a State-wide railway lockout, which seriously endangered the 
ARU and the rank and file fighters in that and other unions, to bring 
the sdikers at South Johnstone to a realisation that a fighting force 
must retreat before superior forces or be smashed...the danger of 
leftism is one of the chief lessons [of the dispute].'"* 
Miles went on to praise the ARU officials for not falling into the trap of 
"leftism" which "would have resulted in disaster instead of a successful red'eat".''*^ 
So disoriented was die CPA leadership by the Comintern line of not criticising left 
officials, they described this disasU"ous defeat of the union movement as a "successful 
retreat". Not even the fact that during the dispute left officials of the AMIEU had the 
CPA evicted from their hall in Townsville provoked a re-examination of the 
Comintern line. 
No-one in the CPA leadership speculated on whether the officials could have 
built on the wide union support by calling more workers on strike to force 
McCormack to retreat. Rather, the CPA wrote that whatever the faults of the ARU 
^^^ PRE/A, 7553 of 1927. QSA. 
^^^ Workers Weekly, 28 August 1927, p. 3. 
"' ibid., p. 3. 
147 ibid. , p. 3 
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officials, "it can honestiy be said that they have carried on a policy more in the 
interests of the working class than the AWU officials have done".'"*^ 
Even during the dispute, the party was not prepared to alienate the left 
officials. At the large strike support meetings in Brisbane, even though communists 
like Jean and Bob Besant chaired these meetings, and others such as F.W. Paterson 
and J.B. Miles spoke, police reported that no communist literature was sold and no 
collections taken.''*^ 
During this time, in the lead up to the Third Period in 1928, the CPA's union 
work reflected the confusion of the Comintern on this question. Although, it should 
be noted that the party's theoretical position was limited to propaganda because their 
small membership prevented the CPA from implementing it on a grand scale. This 
time was also one in which "Bolshevisation", that is, purging critics, became an 
accepted mediod of dealing with discussion and debate within Comintern parties. 
Very soon, the CPA was to implement its own "Bolshevisation", directed against the 
leadership of Jack Kavanagh. 
148 ibid., no.- 145, (30 April 1926), p. 3. 
^^^ PRE/A, 7753 of 1927, Brisbane Police (Roma Street) to 
Senior Sergeant Police, 13 September 1927. QSA. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ADOPTION OF THE THIRD PERIOD LINE 1928-1929 
THE SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE COMINTERN 
The change of line came at the Sixth Congress of the Comintern (July-September 
1928) held in the Moscow Trades Hall. Jack Kavanagh, appointed substitute member of 
the Executive Committee of the Comintern [ECCI], and Herbert Moxon represented the 
CPA. The Workers Weekly reported: 
The great Congress Hall itself, was a blaze of red, with a frieze of 
revolutionary slogans in five languages - Russian, German, French, 
British and Chinese. 
Delegates sat at desks fitted with radiio sets, thanks to which 
translations could be listened to with no delay. The galleries were 
crammed with enthusiastic Party members.' 
Yet the instant translations via the radio sets, the colourful banners, and the 
unrestrained enthusiasm of die delegates masked the sterility of the congress. No debate 
or genuine discussion took place, the theses of the congress being passed without 
dissent. Some of the delegates who had participated in earlier congresses privately 
grumbled. Italian communist Palmiro Togliatti^ believed it a tragedy that the truth could 
not be spoken about vital issues.' No-one however was audacious enough to shatter the 
unity of the Comintern. Leon Trotsky, by now in exile in the Soviet Union, noted that 
since 1923 the process of bureaucratisation had "acquired absolutely unheard-of 
^ Workers Weekly, no. 271 (19 October 1928), p. 1. 
^ Palmiro Togliatti (1893-1964) was leader of the Italian 
Communist Party and elected to the Secretariat of the ECCI in 
1926. During the Spanish Civil War of the mid-1930s Togliatti 
oversaw the implementation of the Comintern's Popular Front line 
by the Spanish Communist Party. 
^ Deutscher, op.cit., p. 444. 
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dimensions and forms". He said: 
The bureaucratic spirit and arbitrariness of the party apparatus may be 
seen most obviously and incontestably in the fact that for more than four 
years the leadership dealt with worid events of die greatest importance 
without convening a Comintern congress. During this time, the Executive 
Committee elected at the Fifth Congress underwent total internal 
reorganization, without authorization by any congress and with the total 
removal of the leadership group elected at the Fifth Congress."* 
The Sixth Congress claimed, with littie factual evidence to corroborate its theory, 
that the world was entering a new period of wars, revolutions and gigantic working class 
battles - the Third Period.^ United front work widi reformists was no longer possible 
under these circumstances and communists were insU"ucted to lead struggles 
independentiy of their former allies. Further, they were to engage in an active campaign 
to expose reformist leaders as "social fascists", as the main enemy of the working class. 
The congress reasoned that reformism and fascism were twins. Reformists "pacified and 
misled the proletariat" while fascists mobilised the petty bourgeoisie to break up 
working class organisations.^ At the Tenth Plenum of the ECCI (July 1929) it was 
asserted that: 
In countries where there are strong Social Democratic parties. Fascism 
assumes the particular form of Social Fascism, which to an ever-
increasing extent serves the bourgeoisie as an instrument for the 
paralysing of the activity of the masses in the struggle against the regime 
of Fascist dictatorship. By means of this monstrous system of political 
and economic oppression, the bourgeoisie, aided and abetted by 
international Social Democracy, has been attempting to crush the 
^ Leon Trotsky, Challenge of the Left Opposition, 1928-1929 
(Pathfinder Press: New York, 1982), pp. 133-134. 
^ The First Period being the post-war years of revolutionary 
upheaval and the Second being the period of stabilisation which 
followed. 
^ Helmut Gruber, Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern: 
International Communism In the Era of Stalin's Ascendancy (Anchor 
Press: New York, 1974), p. 191. 
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revolutionary class movement of the proletariat for many years.'' 
Not even left wing reformists were spared. It was claimed that they delayed the break 
up of reformism by creating the illusion that it, the left wing, represented an opposition 
to the policy of the leading reformist bodies, "whereas as a matter of fact, it whole-
heartedly supports the policy of Social Fascism".^ 
In the years prior to the Sixth Congress many countries had experienced a 
decline in the level of working class combativity, rather than a resurgence. Party 
membership figures, often a good barometer of upturns and downturns in the class 
struggle, confirmed this. In Australia in the years before to the Sixth Comintern 
Congress party membership had been progressively shrinking and its influence in the 
labour movement was significantiy less than it had been in 1923-1925.^ In Britain the 
defeat of the general strike in 1926 led to a decimation of the small party. Membership 
fell from 10,730 in October 1926 to 3,200 by March 1928.'° In 1927 U-ade union 
membership fed below 5 million for the first time since 1916 and the number of unions 
affiliated with the British Trade Union Council plummeted." In China the defeat of the 
revolutionary struggles from 1925-1927 "was nearly one of annihilation" for the 
communist party, workers unions, and peasant associations.'^ Helmut Gruber claimed 
•^  Quoted in CLR James, World Revolution in 1917-1936: The 
Rise and Fall of the Communist International, (Martin Seeker and 
Warburg: London, 1937), p. 311. 
® Quoted in ibid., p. 312» 
^ Davidson, op.cit., pp. 33-34. 
°^ Cliff and Gluckstein, op.cit., p. 280. 
^^  Julian Symons, The General Strike: A Historical Portrait, 
(Cresset Press: London, 1959), p. 225. 
12 Isaacs, op.cit•, p. 299. 
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that in the four years prior to the congress defeats had isolated many international 
parties. On top of this the "most promising national leaders had fallen into official 
disgrace, and their timid, U-imming, and bolshevised successors held the helm widiout 
a course and awaited new directions".'^ 
The Third Period line did not develop from an accurate analysis that international 
proletarian revolutions were imminent. Rather, the Soviet Unions' increasing isolation 
on the world stage, exacerbated by the defeat in China and breaking off of diplomatic 
relations between it and the USSR, increased the pressure of the Soviet regime to 
speedily industiialise the country. R.W. Davies argues that this "led the section of the 
party majority headed by Stalin to be impatient with the results achieved by die cautious 
policies of 1925 and 1926" inside the USSR.'" A factional struggle within the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union developed around which the economic policy was 
best for the country. Towards the end of 1927 a rural crisis in the USSR threatened to 
destabilise the economy. Peasants withheld their grain as the state's buying price was 
too low to cover production costs. Peasant hostihty to the state was compounded by the 
unequal exchange of goods between the country and the cities which saw grain going 
to the urban areas but few indusu-ial goods going into the countryside.'^ 
The rural crisis produced a political crisis within the CPSU as Stalin's former 
ally, Nikolai Bukharin, moved into opposition. Bukharin advocated concessions to the 
peasantiy to entice them to sell their grain. Stalin on the other hand favoured physical 
13 Gruber, op.cit., p. 176 
^^  R.W. Davies, The Industrialisation of Soviet Russia: The 
•Socialist Offensive - The Collectivisation of Soviet Agriculture, 
1929-1930 (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 1980), p. 37. 
^^  E.H. Carr and R. Davis, Foundations of a Planned Economy, 
1926-1929 vol. 1 (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1974), pp. 47-51. 
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force to seize it and, consequentiy, forced requisitions were carried out in the spring of 
1928. The result was that in the first half of that year the secret police had to quell 150 
sporadic peasant rebellions."' The struggle against die peasantry necessitated a su-uggle 
against Bukharin, the spokesperson for peasant interests within the bureaucracy. 
Over a period of months before the Sixth Comintern Congress Stalin 
systematicaUy undermined the position and power of Bukharin and his allies within the 
party, state and Comintern. Since heading the Comintern in 1926, Bukharin had 
promoted aUiances between communist and reformist parties, believing that international 
revolutions were unlikely in a period of capitalist expansion.'^ This theory needed to 
be discredited within the Comintern in order for Bukharin's authority to be undermined. 
Consequentiy, the alternative, Third Period line of imminent revolution and unbending 
hostility toward reformists was adopted. Gruber says of the Third Period line that: 
More than any previous policy of the Comintern it was the outgrowth of 
the continuing power struggle among Russian leaders and factions, whose 
final outcome established die hegemony of Stalin in Russia and in the 
communist movement.'^ 
Statin's supporter, Solomon Lozovsky,'"^ began the campaign at the Fifteenth 
Congress of the CPSU in December 1927. He claimed that the European working classes 
were rapidly moving to the left as the reformist trade union bureaucracies were moving 
to the right, creating a leadership vacuum which could be filled by communists.^*' 
^^  Deutscher, op.cit., p. 444. 
" Michael Haynes, Nikolai Bukharin and the Transition from 
Capitalism to Socialism (Pluto Press: London, 1985), pp. 76-77. 
®^ Gruber, op.cit. , p. 176. 
^^  Solomon Lozovsky (1878-1952) was head of the RILU and was 
shot on Stalin's orders during an anti-Semitic campaign. 
20 Carr and Davies, op.cit., p. 168 
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Therefore, a new trade union policy was necessary. Instead of making alliances with the 
left wing union officials, as Bukharin had argued, communists should work only with 
rank and file unionists. The trade union leadership, Lozovsky said, had "linked its fate 
with the bourgeois state, and can be overdirown only with it".^' The unions themselves 
were merely "an extension of the bourgeois state apparatus within the working class".^^ 
Yesterday's allies were labelled "social fascist" and were seen as being more dangerous 
than the fascists themselves. The most menacing were the "left socialist fascists" - those 
left wing union officials and reformists who had previously been endowed with 
revolutionary potential first by Zinoviev and then by Bukharin. 
By the time of the Sixth Comintern Congress Bukharin, although still officially 
head of the Comintern, was the subject of a campaign of whispers. One American 
delegate recalled that two congresses existed - the official congress and another "cortidor 
congress" through which "a devastating campaign was carried on against Bukharin as 
a Right-winger".^^ Not long after this congress, Bukharin was removed from his 
position in the Comintern. 
That the non-Soviet communists accepted the super-optimism of the Third Period 
despite the knowledge that many of their own labour movements were experiencing 
demoralisation, can be understood by a number of factors. The most important was the 
stature of the Soviet communists - already great as they were the only ones to have led 
a successful proletarian revolution - which grew in importance as defeats in the west 
^^  Quoted in ibid., p. 174 
^^  Quoted in ibid. , p. 200 
^^  Quoted in ibid, p. 74. 
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mounted.^ ^ Reinforcing the dominance of die Soviet leadership was the political 
immaturity of the delegates - around 50% of them had never attended a Comintern 
congress before - while only four of the more than 500 delegates had been to all six 
congresses." Soviet communists impressed upon diem that unanimity was essential if 
the USSR were to survive. This reinforced what Trotsky described as a "close your eyes, 
and vote" attitude.^^ 
Of greatest significance was the delegates' total agreement that socialism could 
be built in die USSR providing that the international parties prevented military 
intervention by the West. This, Trotsky believed, would lead to the abandonment of 
international proletarian revolutions. He predicted: 
The new doctrine proclaims that socialism can be built on the basis of a 
national state if only there is no intervention. From this there can and 
must follow...a collaborationist policy towards the foreign bourgeoisie 
with the object of averting intervention, as this wiU guarantee the 
construction of socialism...^^ 
THE CPA HESITATES TO ADOPT THE THIRD PERIOD LINE 
Trade Union Policy Unaltered 
The new hne of the Comintern was discussed at die CPA's Eighth Conference 
in December 1928 where Lance Sharkey, Jack Ryan, EM Higgins and Norman Jeffery 
were re-elected onto the Central Executive Committee [CEC]. However, the Thu:d 
Period line was not adopted in its entirety. This can be seen by die party's attitude 
24 Deutscher, op.cit., p. 14! 
" Jane Degras (selected and edited by). The Comimunist 
International 1919-1943 vol. 3 (Oxford University Press: London, 
1965), p. 446. 
^^  Trotsky, Left Opposition, op.cit., pp. 252-253. 
" Trotsky, Third International After Lenin, op.cit. , p. 61. 
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toward the trade unions and the ALP. In the unions Jack Kavanagh continued to 
encourage party members to work with left wing officials. This sU"ategy was 
implemented in the colossal battles between labour and capital in 1928-1929. 
As the nation slid into depression, the employing class launched an offensive to 
weaken the tiade unions, force down wage rates and increase working hours. To 
embrace a theory which claimed proletarian revolutions were imminent when the 
working class was suffering major defeats, seemed questionable. Rather, Jack Kavanagh, 
while not rejecting the Third Period Line, argued that it applied to countries other than 
Ausd:alia. 
In 1928 the first union to come under fire was the WWF. The dispute arose when 
the WWF applied to the Arbitration Court for-a guaranteed minimum wage. Justice 
Beeby responded with a new award which increased the workload of waterside workers 
and instituted an all-day pick-up instead of the established two-hour pick-up.^ The 
union complained the all-day pick-up would "spread the pick-up over eight hours, so 
that a man might wait a full working day on the employer's pleasure, and then walk 
home without a penny in wages to show for his time".^^ 
Clauses in the award could not be challenged by workers for five years. If a 
®^ Wage cutting was not new to Beeby who was appointed 
president of the NSW Board of Trade by the Labor government. In 
1920, although the Piddington Royal Commission had found that a 
reasonable wage for NSW workers was £5/17/1, Beeby set it at 
£4/5/0. 
'^ Brian Fitzpatrick, A Short History of the Australian 
Labor Movement (Rawson's Books: Melbourne, 1944), p. 152. Workers 
even objected to the two-hour pick-up. Thomas Ferry, William 
Moxon, Ernest Purnell, "Report of the Committee Appointed to 
Inquire into the Causes and Extent of Unemployment of Waterside 
Workers in the Various Ports of Queensland, and into Other 
Matters Incidental Thereto", (hereafter, the Ferry Report), 
Queensland Parliamentary Papers, 1926, vol. 2, p. 1093. 
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strike broke out, the branches involved could be fined £500 per day and individual 
workers £5. These penalties were severe indeed. At the time the hourly income for 
Brisbane waterside workers was only 2/11.^° To encourage the union officials to police 
their members, the union as a whole could be fined £1,000 per day if it was found that 
a union committee of management encouraged any branch to breach the award. An 
individual officer of the union who incited or aided a branch to do so could be fined 
£20. 
The conditions of Queensland waterside workers, although covered by a state 
award, were not safeguarded. The amended Arbitiation Act (June 1928) stipulated that 
where a state award conflicted with a federal one, die latter took precedence," and the 
Beeby award specified that rules of individual union branches relating to working 
conditions were no longer applicable.'^ The most significant effect on Queensland 
workers was die loss of the rotary system in those ports where the WWF had forced its 
adoption. 
Queensland employers had always opposed the rotary system. During the 1926 
Queensland government inquiry into unemployment on the wharves. Shipping Manager 
for MacDonald, Hamilton and Co., Mr Cafisch, objected to the rotary system because, 
he said, "it took the cond-ol of the work out of the hand of the employers"." Shipping 
30 Brisbane Courier, 7 September 1928, p. 15 
•'^  0. Foenander, "The New Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
in Australia", International Labour Review, no. 2, vol. 19, 
February 1929, p. 161. 
'^  See Brisbane Courier, 11 Septemiber 1928, p. 14 for an 
outline of the Beeby Award clauses. The Ferry report, op.cit. , 
pp. 1077-1078 outlines a numiber of cases where branch rules 
imposed conditions of employment above the award. 
33 Ferry repor t , i b i d . , p . 10< 
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Manager for Walter Reid and Co., H. Walker, asserted that as the employer paid the 
wages, he "should have die right to select the best men for his money".^ The Overseas 
and Interstate Shipowners Association claimed: 
...the extremists have deprived the ship-owners of the right to select their 
own labour, have cut down loading rates until they have become farcical, 
and have increased the number of men to a gang beyond all possible 
necessity. They have extended their rule from port to port using the 
rotary system, intimidation and a plan of easy transfer of labour from 
port to port which permits the crushing of all moderates opposed to 
"Red" cond-ol." 
Elimination of die rotary system was part of an on going struggle by Australian 
employers in the post-war period to re-establish their prerogative to employ whomever 
diey chose. In 1919 both the AMIEU (north Queensland) and seamen (nationally) lost 
disputes over union input into the system of employment. Since 1923 ship-owners had 
been resisting attempts by north Queensland waterside workers to establish the rotary 
system. In 1927 the new management at die South Johnstone sugar mill defeated 
workers when they challenged his hiring practices. By 1928, with an economic 
depression on the horizon, employers were adamant that union influence over hiring 
practices had to be curbed. 
In Queensland, conditions on the wharves varied from city to city as there was 
no uniform system of employment. At Port Douglas, Innisfail, and Lucinda Point where 
the CPA had influence, workers had won the rotary system. In Cairns and Gladstone the 
"Bull" gang system operated. Here, men presented themselves for work and stevedores 
inspected them, as one waterside worker described, "like a lot of prize bullocks to see 
^' ibid. , p. 1091. 
•'^  North Oueensland Register, 1 October 1928, p. 18. 
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who had the biggest muscles".^ '^  Work was not evenly distributed but was given to 
whomever die stevedore chose, causing divisions between unionists in gangs and those 
not in gangs and even between the gangs themselves. There was regular victimisation 
of militants and union activists by the stevedores and favouritism was shown toward 
those gangs "prepared to give the stevedore information about Union matters, to 'shout' 
for him, and to present him with gifts"." This, waterside workers claimed, fuelled a 
haughty attitude amongst stevedores toward the men.^ ^ 
The Ferry report, which resulted from the 1926 inquiry, stated that a number of 
workers in every port who were "required to carry on the work of the shipping industry 
are earning considerably below the basic wage".'^ As well as low pay, conditions on 
the wharves were harsh. One Townsville waterside worker explained; 
...the men have to cross six to eight sets of rails on the wharf. In loading 
sugar they have diree bags on the trucks, weighing from 460 to 500 lb., 
and in going from eight in the morning till ten at night over these sets of 
rails the men get jarred very considerably.'*" 
At Bowen, where the jetty was 2,800 feet long, men also had to push heavy trucks over 
raised lines."' In Innisfail working hours were long. One worker stated that before the 
inu-oduction of the rotary system men worked from 9 a.m. to midnight.'*^ The Beeby 
Award threatened to make these conditions even worse. 
^^  Ferry Report, op.cit., p. 1079. 
" ibid., p. 1079. 
p. 1078. 
p. 1092. 
p. 1076. 
p. 1076. 
ibid., p. 1085. 
^^  ibid. 
'' ibid. 
'° ibid. 
'' ibid. 
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As the award was to come into effect on 10 September 1928, the WWF officials 
called a meeting on 5 September where they advised members not to work under the 
new award. The union also appealed to the ship-owners for a conference to negotiate an 
agreement outside arbitration, but the owners declaj"ed their loyalty to the court and 
refused a conference. Interestingly, the Ferty report uncovered many instances where 
ship-owners breached the award in Queensland ports when it was to their economic 
advantage.''^  
To the CPA the struggle over the Beeby award was not simply a dispute between 
wharf labourers on the one hand, and the government and ship-owners on the other. It 
was a struggle whose outcome would affect the entire labour movement of Australia, 
being a test case over the use of courts to subdue unions. 
As the economic oudook grew grimmer, the federal Bruce-Page government 
began to prepare for a struggle with the labour movement, introducing a series of harsh 
laws designed to curb industiial militancy. The Crimes Act was strengdiened to allow 
for the prosecution of unionists who took industrial action. This was tested first in 
Queensland on two union officials - H.G. Carrigan, Queensland Branch Secretary of the 
SUA (also President of the Brisbane TLC), and Andrew Brown, Brisbane Branch 
Secretary of the WWF - in Aprd 1928. Both union leaders were fined £100 and had to 
pay £150 costs for their part in an industrial dispute earlier in die year. This dispute 
resulted from an attempt to save jobs and saw seamen on the lighthouse steamer Cape 
York shut down the lighthouse. Although Carrington and Brown appealed to the High 
Court, their case was rejected.'' 44 
•^^  Ferry Report, op . cit. , p. 1091. 
'' Advocate, 16 April 1928 p. 12 and 15 May 1928, p. 9. 
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The amended Arbitration Act, described by the AWU as an attempt to "bring the 
workers into subjection and reduce them to a state of impotence","*^ imposed heavy 
fines on any union or worker who breached terms of their award. This was seen as an 
attack on the "most fundamental and elementary right of the workers...the right not to 
work on terms repugnant to them".'**^  The labour press was muzzled under Section 86D 
which stated that anyone who printed or published advice to breach die Act was guilty 
of an offence.'*^ A £20 fine could even be imposed on anyone who moved or seconded 
any resolution "abusive or insulting to the Court or one of its judges". Printing a report 
"inciting to commit a breach or to non-observance of the Act" could result in a £100 
fine. "Any person creating a disturbance or taking part in a disturbance near any place 
where the Court is sitting may be fined £100, or be imprisoned for six months, or 
both"."*^  The Act also provided that, if after a strike, "a union removed the executive 
which had ordered the strike, and expelled its members from the union, the maximum 
fine payable might be reduced from £1,000 to £100". However, if within twelve months 
of the expulsion the union readmitted the executive members, even to rank and file 
membership, it could incur a penalty of £1,000.^ *^ 
While workers could be heavily fined for defending or improving their living 
standards by industrial action, employers, through a loop-hole in the amended 
45 Worker, 29 February 1928, p. 10. 
^^  No Compromise! Organise Against... Bruce's Anti-Trade 
Union Bill (ALP and NSW Labor Council: Sydney, no date), p. 2. 
'' ibid. , p. 11. 
®^ Foenander, op.cit., p. 170. 
""^  Six Acts Against Civil Liberties (Council for Civil 
Liberties: Melbourne, 1937), p. 8. 
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Arbitration Act, could lockout their workforce without putting themselves in breach of 
the Act. The amended Act also broke with the old method of tying wage rises to the 
cost of living and ushered in a new system where wage rates were tied to workers' 
productivity and the profitability of the industry in which they were employed. Yet, 
under the amended Act, information about profits or the financial position of companies 
could be concealed from the employees. It was stated that this information could be 
given in private in court and "such evidence may not be published without an order of 
the Court" - the penalty for breaching this being £500 or six months imprisonment.^" 
The employing class, like the CPA, saw the su-uggle over the Beeby Award in 
the larger context of a generalised offensive against Ausu-alian trade unions. In 
September 1928 chair of the Adelaide Steam Ship Co., M.G. Anderson, made it clear 
that the Beeby award dispute would put the amended Arbitration Act to the test, saying: 
Employers have tried all means provided by existing legislation to 
terminate this incessant industiial turmoil, but so far without success, and 
it remains to be seen whether the recentiy-amended Arbitration Act will 
remedy the evil.^' 
The shipping companies complained that their falling profits were being severely 
affected by industrial disputes on die wharves. However, as Fred Paterson pointed out 
in the Workers Weekly, profits had not always been low. The Adelaide Steamship Co. 
had increased its net profit by over 400% from 1913-1917, and Huddart Parker Ltd 
increased its profits by over 350% from 1913-1919. In 1920 the Adelaide Steamship Co. 
distributed £1,550,090 in bonus shares while Burns Philp and Huddart Parker had over 
£1 million "hidden away" in 1925. Over the years 1916-1923 die four major shipping 
°^ F o e n a n d e r , op . c i t . , p . 170 
51 Brisbane Courier, 21 Septemiber 1928, p. l: 
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companies in Australia had extracted surplus value worth £8,769,320 from the labour 
of their workers yet despite their increasing profit rates during these years the companies 
bitteriy opposed any improvements in the wages and working conditions of seamen and 
waterside workers.^^ 
Accordingly, the waterside workers felt justified in their rejection of the Beeby 
award and on the day it came into effect workers in most Queensland ports refused to 
offer themselves for pick-up.^' In retaliation. Prime Minister Bruce threatened to invoke 
the Crimes Act against the union, while the shipping companies appealed to Justice 
Beeby to declare that a strike existed. This allow them to legally ignore the Award 
stipulation that preference be given to union members, thereby releasing them to hire 
non-union stiike-breakers.^ 
In a situation where profits were already flagging, the employers could not afford 
to have the wharves idle. Each day of strike cost the owners money. In Melbourne, in 
just one week of strike action, the Dutch steamer Niew Zeeland had to pay tonnage dues 
of £34/1/7 per day; shed dues of £28 for the first day in port and £4 for each succeeding 
day; and a supersti^ucture rate of around £8 per day.^ ^ By 19 September inter-state 
shippers were claiming to have lost £50,000.^^ 
Producers, importers and exporters watched as their merchandise stood idle on 
wharves and ships. By 14 September the strike at the Townsville wharves was holding 
^'' Workers Weekly, no. 109 (7 August 1925), p. 1. 
" Mackay Daily Mercury, 11 Septemiber 1928, p. 4. 
^^  Foenander, op. cit. , p. 167. 
^^  Townsville Daily Bulletin, 17 September 1928, p. 6. 
56 Mackay Daily Mercury, 19 September 1928, p. 5 
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up tons of sugar and about 4,000 bales of wool along the Western line. The strike at 
Cairns was holding up sugar, timber, and about 10,000 tons of maize from the Atherton 
Tableland. In Brisbane egg farmers panicked as 3,500 cases of 30 dozen eggs waited for 
shipment. They feared the total collapse of the egg d-ade as September and October were 
their biggest production months." 
Having received court approval to employ non-union labour the ship-owners 
announced their intention of calling for volunteers to work the wharves unless the 
waterside workers accepted the terms of the Beeby award. Frightened by this and by the 
threat of heavy fines, the WWF officials called another Interstate Conference in 
Melbourne on 16 September which resolved to return to work. The union officials 
believed that, for the time being, waterside workers had sufficiently demonsd"ated their 
opposition to the award. 
The divisions between the union officials and the rank and file were becoming 
more apparent as many of die rank and file refused to comply to the return to work 
order. According to the Townsville Daily Bulletin, "exu-emists at the conference were 
stiongly opposed to surrender. Several Communists representing north Queensland 
branches were conspicuous in declaring that those branches would not accept the 
ultimatum".^^ The paper went on to say that the only difficulty in implementing a 
return to work "would be the refusal of some of the Queensland branches to abide by 
" Townsville Daily Bulletin, 15 September 1928, no page 
number. The North Oueensland Register, 17 October, 1928, p. 32 
estimated that the 6,000 tons of sugar held up at Cairns was 
costing the cane farmers about £12,000, based on an estimate of 
£2 per ton. 
^^  Townsville Daily Bulletin, 17 September 1928, p. 6. 
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the instructions issued by the conference".'*'' In order to force the union officials to 
discipline their rank and file, the Federal Attorney-General, J. Latham, issued four 
summonses against the WWF under the Arbitration Act charging the federation widi 
inciting a strike.^ On 23 September the union was fined £1,000 under the Act. Two 
days later the federal government brought down the Transport Workers Act^ which 
empowered the Controller-General of Customs to appoint licensing officers from whom 
waterside workers had to purchase a 1/- license. Failure to produce a license on request 
by police or employers would incur a £10 fine. A clause in the Act, revealing its 
primary intention was to prevent disputes on the wharves, read: 
A licensing officer may cancel a license granted to any waterside worker 
in any case as to which he is satisfied that a worker (a) has refused or 
failed to comply widi any lawful order or direction given in relation to 
his employment, (b) having offered for work, or having been engaged to 
work as a waterside worker, has refused to work in accordance with the 
terms of a current award of the court, or (c) has been convicted of an 
offence against these regulations, or of an offence under the 
Commonwealth or State law committed upon a wharf, pier, jetty, hulk, 
barge, or ship.^ ^ 
In late September the Queensland Labor Premier, William McCormack, 
championed the cause of the ship-owners and the federal conservative government by 
instiucting the Labor Bureau to withhold rations to sd-ikers.*' The Workers Weekly 
reported that the State Ration Department refused one waterside worker's wife Lactogen 
^^  i b i d . , p . 6 
°^ Six Acts, op.cit . , p. 9. 
^^  Bruce was believed to have suspended Standing Orders to 
rush it through both Houses. Wendy Lowenstein, Weevils in the 
Flour: An Oral Record of the 1930s Depression in Australia 
(Scribe: Melbourne, 1978), p. 70. 
62 Quoted in Brisbane Courier, 26 September 1928, p. 15 
"^^  Brisbane Courier, 24 September 1928, p. 7 
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for her infant because, she was told, there was "plenty of work on the wharves".^ 
To subdue the striking workers, the Queensland Labor government mobilised 
police in large numbers. All police leave in Brisbane and in some country areas was 
cancelled. Many police from the suburban stations were sent to the city to patrol the 
waterfront, twenty recruits from Roma Street Police U-aining barracks were "hurriedly 
sworn in and detailed to assignments in the city", a large number of police from country 
areas near Brisbane were instructed to be prepared to go to Brisbane at a moment's 
notice, and retired policemen took up duties at suburban stations to release odiers for 
anti-strike duties.^ ^ By the beginning of October there were 700 police in Brisbane 
pad-oiling the waterfront.^ They protected volunteer labour, stopped waterside workers 
from addressing lunch-time meetings of other workers and prevented strikers from 
marching in protest against the Transport Workers Act in Brisbane.*^^ 
Soon die ship-owners were using sd-ike-breakers to work the idle ships. By the 
end of September over 1,500 were working the wharves in Brisbane.^^ In the northern 
ports of Cairns, Ingham, Goondi, Townsville, Mackay, Port Douglas, Innisfail, and 
Bundaberg farmers came from all over to break the su-ike.^ ^ 
On 3 October Queensland's Home Secretary, J. Stopford, refused to grant the 
WWF meeting permits if their speakers included well-known communists H.J. Moxon 
^^ Workers Weekly, no. 271 (19 October 1928), p. 3. 
^^  Townsville Daily Bulletin, 21 September 1928, p. 6. 
" ibid., 2 October 1928, p. 7. 
" ibid., 2 October 1928, p. 7. 
^^ ibid., 24 September 1928, p. 7. 
^^  See articles relating to the strike in ibid., September 
and October 1928. 
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and F.W. Paterson, or P. Kelly (Innisfail), N. Rancie (Lucinda Point), Fells, Dan 
Dowling or Foley.™ Foley, Paterson, Kelly and Rancie, representatives of the northern 
ports, were members of the strike committee and delegates to the triennial conference 
of the WWF. Fells was a seaman who was on strike, while Dowling was past President 
of the WWF. Not only did die Labor government suppress the striking workers, and 
attempt to stifle communist influence in the dispute, the ALP even expelled Andrew 
Brown (WWF) from the QCE for attending meetings of the communist party's trade 
union organisation, the Mihtant Minority Movement, during the strike.^' 
McCormack's anti-union stance further cost him the support of Queensland trade 
unionists. While presiding over a meeting in Albert Hall on 12 October McCormack was 
heckled by a section of the audience. One newspaper reported: 
The Premier had only spoken a few minutes when the crowd 
began to count him out. 
The Premier: I am going to have order here this evening. Don't 
make any mistake about that. (Uproar). If you think you are going to 
defeat Bruce on election day by interrupting me and Labour men, then 
you are traitors to the labour cause. (Boos, jeers, and catcaUs). 
The Premier: You can count me out if you like. 
After frequent interruptions the Premier said I am going to get 
freedom of speech, I am going to ask officers of the police force that 
where men are frequentiy and persistentiy tiying to kill this meeting to 
remove them out of the hall. (Uproar)." 
The hesitancy of the WWF officials in the face of employers' intransigence 
caused widespread confusion amongst the rank and file. This was compounded in Cairns 
where events reflected the division created by a previous dispute over the rotary system. 
°^ Brisbane Courier said Moxon "claims to be a Communist, 
and has recently returned from the Internationale held in 
Russia", 6 October 1929, p. 7. Also see Mackay Daily Mercury, 6 
October 1928, p. 13. 
•^^  Advocate, 15 March 1929, p. 16. 
'^^ Townsville Daily Bulletin, 13 October 1928, p. 4. 
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In this port, where the "Bull" gang system operated, only half the workers were in gangs 
and these received preference over other workers by the stevedores. The result was that 
"Bull" gangs of the Adelaide Shipping Co. were earning £15-£18 per week, while those 
not in gangs earned from £l-£5 per week in 1926 - well below the basic wage." One 
worker slated that diose in gangs "are sure of being picked up. Those who are not in 
gangs have to rush down and get close to the door in the hope of catching the eye of 
the picker-up".^" Consequentiy, workers in the gangs rejected the rotary system which 
would equalise employment opportunities for all. 
Early in August 1928, just prior to the Beeby award sd^ike. Cairns waterside 
workers su-uck once again to impose the rotary system. Although WWF officials called 
on the men to return to work, the more mihtant section of workers, influenced by 
communist party members and dubbed the "Red element" by die press, argued that 
members should remain on strike. Backing die officials who wanted to end the dispute, 
were workers in the "Bull" gangs. A secret ballot was held on 4 September which was 
boycotted by the militants and therefore resulted in a majority decision to end the strike. 
The union was sptit. The militants continued to strike while others returned to work 
under heavy police protection." 
The situation of having half die branch on sdike and half at work on the orders 
of their officials continued until the start of the Beeby award struggle.^ *' At the 
" Ferry report, op.cit., p. 1081. 
'^ ibid. , p. 1083. 
^^  Brisbane Courier, 4 September 1928, p. 15. 
•'^  On 6 September 1928 the federal officials of the WWF 
again ordered the Cairns branch to return to work and again the 
militants of the branch refused to comply, ibid., 7 September 
1928, p. 15. 
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beginning of this dispute the Cairns branch was able to present a united front against the 
employers, but as their officials pulled back from strike action and called for a return 
to work in mid-September, the branch split again with some workers returning to work 
while others, the "Red Element", remaining on strike." This created furdier bitterness 
amongst the already divided branch. By the end of September reports were surfacing 
that several of the WWF members working on the Cairns wharves had been assaulted 
by those who had remained on strike.^^ At the branch's monthly meeting in early 
October die Cairns workers decided by a narrow majority to remain at work. '^' Those 
who were opposed refused to present themselves for pick-up which enabled the ship-
owners to use a combination of strike-breaking farmers as well as WWF members to 
work the wharves. This only increased tensions within the branch. 
Other WWF branches in Queensland were also torn between loyalty to their 
officials who wanted them back at work and loyalty to the long established principle of 
not working with strike-breakers. Consequentiy, the action of the workers at many 
northern ports was unpredictable. 
Rockhampton, which had been working under the Beeby award since the start 
of the dispute, came out on strike towards the end of September, refusing to handle 
cargo loaded by sd-ike-breakers.^^ By early October they were back at work and even 
unloaded the Mildura whose crew, who had been dismissed for supporting the waterside 
" Townsville Daily Bulletin, 19 September 1928, p. 6 
®^ Mackay Daily Mercury, 30 Septemiber 1928, p. 5. 
''^  Townsville Daily Bulletin, 2 October 1928, p. 7. 
°^ ibid., 26 September 1928, p. 7. 
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workers, had been replaced by strike-breakers.**' Waterside workers at Maryborough 
unloaded die Tinana which had sailed from Brisbane under strike-breakers as the regular 
crew refused to work while non-union labour worked the port of Brisbane.**^ 
The Townsville branch su-uck on 10 September against die Beeby award, 
returned to work on 18 September, only to come out again on 26 September when they 
refused to handle the Arafura which had been loaded by strike-breakers.^^ They 
returned to work on 5 October, then came out on strike again four days later. This time 
it was over a secret ballot about whether or not to take out licenses under the Transport 
Workers Act. By 13 October the sd-ikers voted 294 to 145 to take out licenses and 
finally returned to work.^ 
Throughout the dispute a minority of members of other unions pressured their 
officials to take industrial action in solidarity with the WWF. But their efforts were 
undermined by the policies of the union officials, both left and right, who feared being 
drawn into the dispute and receiving a heavy fine. Time and again workers were told 
to follow the instructions of dieir officials and remain at work. 
Secretary of the Queensland Branch of the AFULE, J. Valentine, admitted that 
officials of his union were "stiaining every nerve to keep their men out of the 
dispute".^ ^ Frequent mass meetings of other unions such as the ARU, AFULE, AWU, 
SUA, Clerks Union, Stevedores Association, and Amalgamated Road Transport Union 
" ibid. 
'2 ibid. 
" ibid. 
'" ibid 
'^  ibid 
10 October 1928, p. 4. 
3 and 13 October 1928. 
3 October 1928, ?p. 3. 
5-16 October 1928. 
25 December 1928, p. 7 
107 
during the dispute are indicators that pressure was on union leaders to mobilise active 
support for die waterside workers. But the officials were united in their determination 
to let the rank and file WWF fight alone the attacks coming from the federal and state 
governments, press, courts, police and ship-owners. 
The one exception was the SUA. This union initially refused to support the 
WWF but towards the end of the dispute, since so many of its members took industrial 
action independentiy of their leaders, it came out officially in support of the strike. In 
Townsville firemen refused to supply steam to die Junee when it was worked by sd-ike-
breaking farmers. Even threats of prosecution under the Crimes Act was not enough to 
change the firemen's stand. Subsequendy, they were "logged" - that is, their refusal to 
work was noted in the ship's log thereby setting in train steps for the men to be charged 
under the Navigation Act for disobeying the lawful dtiection of the ship's master.^^ On 
29 September the crew of the Wortanna, berthed at Cairns, was dismissed for refusing 
to take the vessel to sea. In response farmers supplied a crew and sailed it to Mourilyan 
Harbour.^ ^ 
At Lucinda Point twenty-four crew members of the Fiona took industrial action, 
were arrested for breaching the Navigation Act and were also charged under Section 28 
of the Crimes Act for obstructing the u-ansport of goods.^ Fifteen were sentenced to 
one month's hard labour at Stewart Creek Prison, Townsville, including their delegate. 
^^  ibid., 2 October 1928, p. 7. 
'^ ibid. , 2 October 1928, p. 7. 
®^  ibid., 4 October 1928, p. 9 and 5 October 1928. 
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Alfred Davenport.^'' Another seven were fined £10 or seven days gaol under die Crimes 
Act to "deter others from taking the same action",*^ while the remaining two seamen 
were discharged under the Crimes Act then immediately prosecuted under Section 30 
of the Navigation Act. One was fined £3 or 48 hours in gaol, the other £1 or 24 hours 
in gaol.^' When the men from the Fiona arrived under police guard in Townsville on 
their way to prison, they were met by a sympathetic crowd singing the Red Flag.'^^ 
Later in Cairns three crew members of the Kallatina refused to supply steam to 
the winches. Although they were instructed by their union not to withhold their labour, 
they still refused and were arrested. Stanley Penrose, one of the men charged, 
represented the three in court His defence was that: "We could not work with non-union 
labour on the ship; otherwise we will be breaking rules".^^ Unmoved, the judge 
sentenced each man to 30 days gaol.** 
Even some British seamen became involved in the dispute. In Brisbane British 
firemen refused to supply steam for the Port Adelaide and the Fordsdale. It was not 
until sixteen were issued with summonses for refusing duty that some returned to work. 
The others appeared before the Police Court on 22 September where they agreed to 
^^  Two months hard labour was not an unusual sentence. In 
September 1928 Robert Kitto, one of the "Red Element" amongst the 
Cairns waterside workers, was given the same sentence for 
spitting on a moderate member during a WWF union meeting. North 
Oueensland Register, 24 October 1928, p. 7. 
°^ ibid. , 5 October 1928. 
^^  Mackay Daily Mercury, 6 October 1928, p. 13. 
^^  Brisbane Courier, 8 October 1928, p. 15. 
- " Mackay Daily Mercury, 11 October 1928, p. 7. 
^^  ibid., 11 October 1928, p. 7. Also see Brisbane Courier, 
6 October 1928, p. 7. 
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return to work if their summonses were withdrawn."^ 
At Bowen sixteen railway workers had been stood down by late September and 
another in Brisbane was instantly dismissed for refusing to carry goods to die wharves 
while they were being worked by non-union labour.*^ On 23 September AWU sugar 
workers at Proserpine declared they would not crush the sugar if farmers went to Bowen 
to break the sd^ ike.^ ^ Although workers at South Johnstone sugar mill voted to handle 
sugar despite the strike-breaking activity of cane farmers on the wharves, hostility 
toward this decision was such that after the meeting a fight broke out between those 
workers who opposed handhng the sugar and those who favoured it.^ ^ 
In early October several permanent foremen, members of the Townsville 
Stevedores Association, refused to work with strike-breakers.^ In Brisbane in early 
October sixty members of the Storemen and Packers Union refused to work goods 
handled by non-union labour.'*" On 11 October two carters were dismissed for 
refusing to haul goods from the wharves handled by volunteer labour,'"' and at Bowen 
two workers at O'Toole's timber yards were dismissed for the same reason.'**^ 
While rank and file unionists were taking indusd-ial action to support the 
^^  Mackay Daily Mercury, 24 Septemiber 1928, p. 5. Seamen on 
the American steamer Oak Park were not so supportive. They loaded 
and unloaded the ship themselves, ibid., p. 5. 
^^  Townsville Daily Bulletin, 25-27 September 1928. 
" ibid., 24 September 1928, p. 7. 
®^ ibid., 4 October 1928, p. 9. 
^^  ibid., 3 October 1928, p. 3. 
'°° ibid. , 4 October 1928, p. 9. 
°^^  Mackay Daily Mercury, 11 October 1928, p. 7. 
102 ibid., 10 October 1928, p. 10. 
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waterside workers, union officials hesitated. In Brisbane lefi wing ARU official, George 
Rymer, insisted he could not call his members out in support of the WWF because no-
one had adequately shown how the withdrawal of railway workers' labour would assist 
the suike.'"^ Rymer also criticised a leaflet distributed by die CPA's rank and file 
group in the railways, the Transport Workers Propaganda Organisation [TWPO],'** 
which argued that the dispute affected all workers and called on the rank and file of all 
unions to refuse to handle cargo loaded or unloaded from ships by sdike-breakers. "It 
is no longer a question of the Beeby award alone", said the TWPO, "but the prmiitive 
right to the workers to protect their living standards and maintain their 
organisations".'°^ The TWPO went on to censure union officials who failed to organise 
industrial solidarity with the waterside workers. Rymer was particularly incensed 
because die TWPO secretary, C.J. Wallbank, was a member of the ARU State 
Council'"^ and at a subsequent meeting of the union Rymer insisted that Wallbank's 
loyalty go to the ARU, not the TWPO.'°' 
By mid-October sd^ike-breakers were keeping the major ports in Queensland 
103 Townsville Daily Bulletin, 15 October 1928, p. 6 
°^^  The TWPO was established in on 29 July 1928 at a meeting 
of workers from the railways, road transport, wharves, tramways, 
and shipping lines. The inaugural meeting was addressed by Fred 
Paterson, editor of Transport Worker, and Charles Wallbank of the 
ARU was elected Secretairy. Advocate, 15 August 1928, p. 13. 
°^^  Quoted in Townsville Daily Bulletin, 25 September 1928, 
p. 7. 
°^^  Charles James Wallbank (sometimes spelt Walbank), a 
fettler at Mayne Junction, was an ALP member for 20 years before 
becoming a communist. He was ARU delegate on the State Council 
of the union in 1927-28 then in 1929 became Secretary of the 
TWPO. In the 1930s he stood as communist candidate in ARU 
elections without success. 
°^^  Advocate, 15 March 1929, p. 8. 
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operating. Waterside workers at Brisbane, Bowen and Innisfail voted to take out licenses 
and return to work under the employers' conditions.'"'* The WWF had been defeated. 
The ship-owners, however, did not relent, employing non-union labour in 
preference to WWF members. In Brisbane WWF members were even refused entrance 
to the pick-up shed on 22 October thereby preventing them from being hired. When the 
union appealed to the authorities, they were informed it was within the employers' rights 
to deny any worker entrance to the shed.'*^ By 29 October only fifteen unionists, 
compared to 500 non-unionists, were employed on the Brisbane wharves. At Ingham, 
Bowen, Port Douglas, and Innisfail the situation was the same and in Cairns a number 
of seamen were also refused employment for their stand in the dispute."° 
The defeat devastated the WWF, completely destroying the Lucinda Point branch. 
In 1937 it was reported that no WWF member had been employed there since 1928. In 
the Port of Brisbane less than 400 union members got their jobs back.'" For many 
years die union remained weak, divided between those who had been hired during the 
dispute and those who had gone on strike. One worker recalled that die WWF refused 
to admit die ex-strike-breakers into the union for a long time: 
It was about 1937 that the Brisbane Branch took them in, but the 
northern ports wouldn't...The worst port I had to deal with was 
Bundaberg. If you talked to a scab in Bundaberg you got fined five quid 
by the union. That would be a week's wages at least They wouldn't hear 
of absorbing them. But the conditions in Bundaberg was (sic) the worst 
°^^  Townsville Daily Bulletin, 19-23 October 1921 
°^^  ibid. , 23-25 October 1928. 
no ibid., 27 October to 1 November 1921 
^^^ Jim Healy, Brief History of the Australian Waterfront and 
tile Waterside Workers Union (1948), p. 57. 
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in North Queensland because of the scabs."^ 
The WWF defeat was swiftiy followed by the disastrous defeat of the 20,000 
sd-ong Timber Workers Union. Their strike erupted in January 1929 when 14,000 timber 
workers in NSW and Victoria were locked-out for rejecting their new award handed 
down by Arbid-ation Court Judge Lukin."^ As in the WWF dispute, one of the issues 
was the employers' desire to weaken union control at the work place. On the waterfront 
this revolved around replacing the rotary system with the "Bull" gang system. In the 
timber industry it was the introduction of the Butty Gang system of piece-work."" 
The Lukin award increased timber workers' hours from 44 to 48 per week and 
cut the base wage of skilled workers from between 5/- and 10/- at a time when the cost 
of hving had risen 6% in NSW."^ Lukin justified the wage cut on the basis of 
declining profits of the timber companies. But as the CPA pointed out, the companies 
were not penniless. The Kari Timber Co. (Vic) had paid-up capital of £750,000; H. 
McKenzie Ltd (NSW), which made a profit of £6,235 in 1928, was still paying 
dividends to their shareholders and had paid-up capital of £175,819; Reid Bros Ltd (SA) 
paid a 10% dividend to its shareholders in 1928; Allen Taylor & Co. (NSW) had 
"^  Lowenstein, op.cit., pp. 69-70. 
"^  Lukin's income of £50 per week plus an annual income of 
£1000 from his Queensland pension was equivalent to the income 
of 17 timiber workers in country towns. Workers Weekly, no. 281 
(11 January 1929), p. 1 and ibid. (18 January 1929), p. 4. The 
ARU said Lukin, "pensioned off in Queensland with £1000 per year 
as unfit for service is resurrected by the Bruce Government and 
given an additional £2500...to smash down the basic wage of the 
timber workers to as low as £3/14 per week." Advocate, 15 
September 1929, p. 21 
"^  E.R. Voigt and J.S. Garden, The 1929 Lock-Out In the 
Timber Industry (Tomalin and Wigmore: Sydney, 1930), p. 12. 
^^^ M. Dixson, "Timber Strike of 1929", Historical Studies 
of Australia and New Zealand, no. 10, no. 40, May, 1963, p. 480. 
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£50,875 in reserves and paid-up capital of £150,000; while A&E Ellis (connected widi 
Allen Taylor & Co.) had capital worth £100,000.'"^ 
The ACTU along with the NSW Labor Council's Disputes Committee, chaired 
by Jack Kavanagh, counselled workers to boycoti Saturday work, thereby maintaining 
their 44 hour week. So as not to excessively antagonise the employers, the union 
officials consented to a deduction of four hours pay from the workers' wages."^ The 
officials employed a strategy of "Limitation and Not Extension", being reluctant to call 
out other unions. In fact, not even all the timber workers were called upon to strike. 
Those employers who came to an agreement with the union were allowed to continue 
operating."^ The Disputes Committee reasoned that this would confuse the employers 
and weaken their ranks. "^ Yet it only served to confuse and weaken the striking 
workers. 
As the dispute dragged on, the weakness of die officials' strategy became 
obvious as more and more timber mills commenced operations. The rank and file, 
sensing that they would be defeated unless their tactics changed, began to call for an all 
out stiike in the face of their leaders' timidity. The officials "would do anything rather 
than risk an extension of the area of conflict", Miriam Dixson claimed.'^" When 
unionists outside the building trades refused to handle "black" timber they were 
reprimanded by the Disputes Committee because their actions jeopardised the neutrality 
116 Workers Weekly, no. 282 (18 January 1929), p. 2 
"^  Dixson, op•cit., p. 482 
118 ibid., p. 483 
^^^ The Picket Line, Timber Workers' Disputes Committee 
Official Bulletin, 19 June 1929, p. 1. 
^^° Dixson, op .cit. , p. 485. 
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of their unions in the strike.'^' 
Jack Kavanagh recognised problems with the handling of the su-ike and through 
the CPA called for the establishment of elected strike committees, pickets of saw mills 
and timber yards and a conference of all unions covering allied occupations to plan a 
systematic defence.'^^ Yet, despite this and despite the d-emendous amount of work 
put into the pickets by members of the CPA, the party leaders never publicly criticised 
the Disputes Committee.'" 
The CPA leadership's dilemma sprang from the previous Comintern policy of 
being uncritical allies of left wing officials, from which Kavanagh had not yet broken. 
Consequentiy, the party's propaganda was often cond-adictory. On the one hand they 
called for an all out sd-ike against the timber employers. Yet on the other, they 
regurgitated the union officials' argument that the most vital support other workers could 
give would be financial rather than industrial.'^" 
The CPA even praised the officials' "sacrifice" in foregoing their salaries during 
the dispute.'^^ This amounted to £24 per week and whether the dispute won or lost the 
officials would continue to have regular employment on wages far greater than those of 
the timber workers. Later, in 1931, Kavanagh reappraised die tactics of the dispute, 
writing: 
^^' i b i d . , p . 4 8 5 . 
^^^ Workers Weekly, no. 281 (11 January 1929), p. 1. 
^^•^  For an account of some activities carried out by CPA 
members in support of the timber workers see Audrey Johnson, 
Bread and Roses: A Personal History of Three Militant Women and 
Their Friends 1902-1988 (Left Book Club: Sutherland, 1990), pp. 
20-24. 
^^^ Workers Weekly, no. 287 (22 February 1929), p. 1. 
'" ibid., p. 1. 
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...we did not realise the full extent of die crisis that had developed. We 
should have attempted mass picketing at the commencement of the 
struggle with a view to a swift termination, with a possible spreading of 
the dispute...'^ "^ 
During May the Disputes Committee, still reluctant to extend the sd-ike and still 
u-ying to find ingenious ways to divide die timber employers, attempted to get firms 
working on union terms. "In many cases, the firms' departures from the Lukin award 
were mere tokens designed to save the face of the Disputes' Committee", Dixson 
said.'" At the same time officials tried to bolster flagging morale of the rank and file 
with theatrical stunts like mass pickets of 1,000-2,000 at selected firms. These were 
suspended a few weeks after the arrests of Kavanagh, Garden, Charles Reeve (one of 
the IWW 12), and four odier strike leaders. Although they were charged with 
"conspiracy to prevent men from following their lawful occupations", they were found 
not guilty by the jury.'^ 
The mass pickets did not close down the industry, nor did they draw in the 
majority of the striking timber workers. Kavanagh admitted the pickets were called off 
because "the men were not turning out". He also confessed that some strikers were 
pressured by the officials into attending "by the direat 'NO PICKET NO STRIKE 
PAY'".'^^ Kavanagh said; 
On the last Mass Picket..there were not more than three hundred present 
and of them not 20% were Timber workers. The police were sd-onger in 
^^^ Kavanagh's appeal to the 1931 Party Congress against his 
expulsion, p. 1. Kavanagh Collection, N57.375. (ABL). ANU 
"^ Dixson, OP.cit., p. 486. 
^^® Fitzpatrick, op . cit. , p. 156 
129 Kavanagh's appeal against his expulsion, op.cit., p. 1. 
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numbers than those who attempted to follow the scabs."" 
The sdike finally collapsed in October 1929. While it lefl the timber workers 
divided and embittered, it left the employers in a sd-ong position. Although the workers 
fought for six months and at times crippled the building industries of Melbourne and 
Sydney, they lost and many of the militants were subsequendy blacklisted by the 
employers. To the end, the Disputes Committee refused to recognise that its disastrous 
strategy had led to defeat. Instead, it embeUished the return to work order as merely "a 
breathing space in which to gather together the organisation".'^' 
While the timber workers were on strike, another important sector of the 
country's work force was defeated. 10,000 coal miners in northern NSW were locked-
out on 15 February 1929. Their dispute, over the coal employers' demand for a 12.5% 
wage reduction, ran for sixteen months. On 16 December 1929 police fired on striking 
miners at Rothbury killing Norman Brown and wounding forty others, incapacitating 
some for the rest of their lives.'^^ There was a virtual police occupation of the coal 
fields with frequent arrests and batonings as the authorities tried to enforce a law 
prohibiting gatherings of more than two people.'" 
As in the WWF and timber workers' disputes, the militant rhetoric of mining 
union's leader, Thomas "Bondy" Hoare, member of the Socialist Labor Party, did not 
accord with his tactics. Miners outside the northern NSW coal fields were urged not 
only to stay at work, but to increase their output of coal. Hoare's other tactics included 
' '° i b i d . , p . 1 . 
^^^ The Picket Line, no. 18, 17 October 1929, p. 1. 
^^^ Ross, Storm and Struggle, op. cit. , p. 44. 
^" ibid., p. 47 . 
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unsuccessful "prou-acted negotiations, commissions of inquiry, tribunal hearings" - all 
designed to reach a compromise with the intransigent mine-owners.'^ Then, during 
the federal election campaign of 1929, the union officials campaigned to get Labor into 
office. Edward Theodore and James Scullin had promised to open die mines and 
prosecute the mine-owners for the lockout. However, once elected their promises were 
broken and in 1930 the miners were starved back to work.'" Compounding the defeat, 
those miners in other fields who were ordered by their officials to remain at work also 
had their pay cut by 12.5%. 
During these disputes die CPA adhered to the pre-1928 Comintern line of support 
for left wing union officials, as the Third Period line with its insistence on the 
imminence of working class revolutions, did not seem entirely relevant to the Australian 
conditions. The Comintern's Thu-d Period policy insisted that western counu-ies were on 
the brink of revolutions, that workers were breaking with reformism and moving to 
embrace communism. Yet, this was not apparent in Australia. 
The defeat of the WWF adversely affected the CPA. Prior to the dispute, the 
party had some influence amongst waterside workers in north Queensland ports. The 
Brisbane Courier reported that they exercised a majority influence on the wharves at 
Innisfail, Bowen, and Lucinda Point and had substantial influence in Cairns.'^^ The 
CPA's audience amongst Bowen workers is indicated by the high circulation of the 
Workers Weekly which was "proportionately greater than in any other Queensland 
'^' i b i d . , p . 4 5 . 
"^'^  F i t z p a t r i c k , op . c i t . , p . 15f 
136 Brisbane Courier, 6 September 1928, p. 17 
118 
centre".'" Indeed, diese diree northern branches of the WWF - Bowen, Lucinda Point 
and Innisfail - had been successful in imposing the rotary system. North Queensland 
communist, Ted Tripp, reported in July 1929: 
During the waterside dispute there was a good militant spirit right 
throughout Queensland and the "Militant Worker" received a good deal 
of support But at the present time there is again a general apadiy and we 
have a great task to tiy and combat this.'^^ 
The defeat wiped out party influence in Queensland ports which had to be 
painstakingly rebuilt over the following decade. The CPA summed up the consequences 
of the strike on the organisation by saying that not only was recruiting a failure, "the 
dispute on the waterfront destroyed the Cairns and Lucinda Point Party groups".''^ 
This came hard on the heels of CPA losses following the South Johnstone lockout the 
previous year. According to Diane Menghetti: 
This dispute, and the victimisation which followed it had a devastating 
effect on die Communist Party in the far north. Several branches 
collapsed and organisation within the sugar industry did not recover untd 
the 1930's.'^° 
Clearly, these defeats showed that workers were not on the brink of a 
revolutionary chaUenge to capitahsm, nor were they embracing communism as the 
Comintern had predicted. It is true that the class struggle had intensified. But, an 
137 Workers Weekly, no. 267 (21 Septemiber 1928), p. 1 
"^ Report of M.M. Conference, 19-20 July, 1929, p. 5. Tripp 
joined the British Labour Party before moving to Australia in 
1924. In 1926 he helped form the Townsville Comimunist Group and 
became Secretary of the north Queensland executive of the CPA. 
In 1929 he led the communist faction of the Townsville Labour 
Council, then went to the USSR for a year where he fell out with 
Comintern officials and was dubbed a "right opportunist". Tripp 
stayed in the CPA until his expulsion in the mid-1930s. 
"^ Workers Weekly, 31 May 1929, p. 3. 
'^*° Menghetti, op . cit. , p. 17. 
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examination of the major disputes shows that the nature of these strikes were defensive 
rather than offensive. Workers were attempting to protect already established conditions, 
rather than sd-uggling to increase and improve them. That is not to say that defensive 
struggles cannot turn into offensive ones which challenge the system. But diese struggles 
did not do that The defeats of the sugar and railway workers in Queensland (1927), the 
waterside workers nationally (1928), the timber workers in NSW and Victoria (1929) 
and the NSW coal miners (1929), demoralised the working class. Su-ike figures for 
Queensland verify this. In 1927 428,135 working days were lost in strdce action. Two 
years later this was down to 3,443. The number of workers involved in strike activity 
fed from 30,234 in 1927 to 3,628 in 1928 and continued to fad until, in 1930, only 
1,631 Queensland workers took part in sd-ikes.'"*' The fall in trade union membership 
denoted, not a shift to the left by the working class as predicted by the Comintern, but 
a degree of apadiy. From 1929-1931 union membership fell by 21.6% and union 
affiliation to the Brisbane TLC also fell from fifty in 1927 to twenty-four in 1933.'^^ 
Officials watched as their membership and revenue declined through rising 
unemployment and falling wages. In October 1930 the Queensland branch of the 
Clodiing Trades Union reported: 
One of the biggest difficulties of Union dues is the intense widespread 
unemployment existing amongst the male relatives of our members. 
Hundreds of the girls state that even though they are working they cannot 
pay their Union dues because their famihes have difficulties in making 
141 Dalton, op.cit., pp. 188-189 
^^^ Elizabeth Jensen, "The Effects of the Depression on the 
Trade Union Movement in Queensland, 1929-1931", BA Hons, 
University of Queensland, 1971, pp.22-23. 
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their wages spread over the upkeep of their respective homes.'''-' 
The Queensland Colliery Employees Union, also in financial d-ouble because of falling 
wages and rising unemployment, had to "borrow money to survive". Membership fell 
by 40% and over half the miners who retained their jobs were working on short-
time.'** Unemployment also devastated the Federated Ironworkers Association. The 
union "barely kept its head above water" and the Brisbane branch fell into debt.''*^ 
Aware of the defeats of the labour movement, the CPA at its Eighth Congress 
in December 1928 did not entirely adopt the Third Period line, although some aspects 
of it were taken on board. In the Resolution on the Trade Union Question many of 
Losovsky's points could be seen in the leadership's assessment that the labour 
movement was undergoing a profound crisis brought about by the weakness of the 
reformist leadership in the face of the employers' offensive. Communists needed to 
capture the leadership of the working class through establishing left wing rank and file 
committees within the unions. The CPA resolved diat the Militant Minority Movement 
[MMM] would be "the organisational medium through which we are to organise and 
develop a mihtant Left Wing in the trade unions".''"' 
The importance of tiade union work could not be overstated. The Central 
Executive was instiiicted to: 
"^^  Kosmos Tsokhas, "Work Practices in the Clothing Industry, 
1929-1965", Working Papers in Economic History, no. 123, May 
1989, pp. 3-4. 
^^•^  Denis Bailey, Holes in the Ground: Queensland Coalminers 
in Struggle: 1840-1980 (no publisher, no date), p. 18. 
'^'^  Robert Murray and Kate White, The Ironworkers: A History 
of the Federated Ironworkers' Association of Australia (Hale & 
Iremonger: Sydney, 1982), p. 74. 
146 Workers Weekly, no. 281 (11 January 1929), p. 3. 
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...react without delay to every occurrence on the industrial field and 
define the attitude of the CP. on every issue which concerns the working 
class...It should be a matter of course for the CP. to consider the annual 
Congresses and executive meetings of the A.C.T.U. and the various 
important unions as very important events in the trade union life of this 
country. The CP. must therefore prepare for these events...''*^ 
Communist publications were to give more space to union issues and CPA factions were 
to be established wherever die party had members in unions. Through regular fraction 
meetings which discussed "the current problems of the movement generally and of their 
own unions particularly", communist views and policies could be carried into the 
148 
unions. 
Work to unite industrial militants "in every branch of industry in every union" 
was urgent, the party claimed."*^ In particular, Queensland communists needed to 
boost their efforts as the organisation in the state was weak.'^° The most significant 
advance communists had made was with the Transport Workers Propaganda 
Organisation whose conference (December 1928) attracted delegates from Cairns, 
Mackay, Lucinda Point, Innisfail, Bowen, Bundaberg, and Brisbane.'^' 
CPA Attitude Toward the ALP Changes Slightly 
At the party's Eighth Congress in December 1928 communists' attitude toward 
the ALP, like their tiade union work, reflected some influences of the Third Period line 
but did not fully embrace it. The party reaffirmed its analysis that the Labor Party had 
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"abandoned the class su-uggle and the defence of the class interests of the proletariat" 
in order to stabilise Ausu-alian capitalism. It was aiding preparations for a further 
imperialist war and had almost exhausted its programme of social reform.'^^ That 
being said, the question of how the CPA was to relate to the Labor Party was not clear-
cut This was a tactical issue which was determined: 
1. by the concrete situation in each given case 
2. by the relation of forces between the ALP and the CPA 
3. by the organisational su-ength or weakness of the CPA 
4. by the prevailing state of ideology of the mass of the 
workers.'^^ 
The CPA believed that the mass of workers in Queensland and Victoria were 
disgusted and dissatisfied with the ALP and were breaking with reformism. However, 
this could not be said of the mass of workers in NSW. The party went on to say that 
although communists understood the role of that the Labor Party played in supporting 
capitalism, this was not enough. "We must get the masses of the working class to see 
and feel and think on the same lines", it said. This could not be achieved simply by 
communists telling workers that the ALP would not defend and uphold workers' 
interests. Such a stiategy would only isolate the party on die margins of the labour 
movement. Rather, it was resolved that workers would only come to fully understand 
the role of the ALP once they lived under a Labor government. Then, through their own 
"bitter experience, through repeated disillusionment" they would break with 
reformism.'^ 
Therefore, the leadership reaffirmed the new stance it took in the Queensland 
'" ibid., p. 4. 
'" ibid., p. 4. 
1S4 ibid., p. 4 
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stale elections of that year when it substituted for its old position of calling for a vote 
for Labor a new strategy of standing a bloc of candidates comprised of communist and 
other left wing people. In Queensland, the CPA believed, workers had already lost their 
illusions in Labor after having it in government for the past fourteen years and seeing 
it attack sugar workers, waterside workers, railway workers and others. However, the 
party continued to call for a vote for Labor in the 1929 federal and NSW state elections 
because workers here had yet broken with Labor. 
In Queensland communists believed a breach had taken place between workers 
and the ALP. They pointed to indicators such as the growing criticisms of the 
McCormack government within the trade union movement The Trade Union Congress 
in October 1927 was divided between those who wanted to reform the ALP to make it 
more responsive to the unions, and those like the ARU leaders, who believed this was 
an impossible task and recommended building a rival Industrial Labor Party. As early 
as 1920 the ARU proposed that delegates to the State Labour Convention be "elected 
solely from the ranks of the workers". Otherwise, "the aspirations and views of the 
unions of Queensland wiU continue to receive such shameful treatment at the hands of 
politicians and Cabinet ministers".'^^ Hostility to the Labor government was such that 
in September 1928 leader of the Carpenters' Union, Ernest EUis, resigned from the QCE 
in protest at its anti-union activity. Within the ALP itself demoralisation and confusion 
at McCormack's stance was apparent. Even the Brisbane Courier admitted McCormack 
was "much more unpopular with the extremists of his own Party than with diose who 
are politically his opponents".'^*' 
^^^ Quoted in Morrison, op. cit. , p. 218 
^^^ Quoted in Higgins, op. cit. , p. 122. 
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However, while the voices of dissent were growing, the level of combativity of 
the working class was declining. It was easier to criticise the government in speeches 
and union publications than to organise industrial action against it The most vocal union 
officials were those of the left, particularly of the ARU, who consistently denounced 
McCormack's attacks on the labour movement and advocated direct action as the only 
way of maintaining wages and conditions.'" Yet, when it came to defending waterside 
workers against a savage attack by the government and ship-owners, the ARU officials 
remained passive - indicating a gap between the union officials' rhetoric and their 
activity. 
It was to this militant bravado of the left union officials that leading Brisbane 
communists pointed when they claimed unionists were breaking with Labor. They also 
misunderstood the growing discontent within the ranks of the ALP - describing the low 
participation of ALP members in plebiscites and the falling membership of ALP 
branches in Queensland as a move to the left.'^ ^ Yet while this highlighted growing 
disiUusionment with the ALP leadership, it also underscored a growing level of apathy 
amongst members who preferred to drop out of poUtical activity then to fight the 
dominate right wing of the party. 
Believing there was a growing shift to the left within the working class, Brisbane 
communist, Herbert J. Moxon, insisted the time had come "to give concrete expression 
^^^ Moroney said that benefits conferred on workers through 
the arbitration courts could have been achieved "more 
expeditiously, and at much less cost, and with more permanency 
through organisation on the job". Advocate, 15 September 1929, 
p. 3. 
158 Workers Weekly, no. 267 (21 September 1928), p. 1. 
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to this discontent".'^'' In April 1928 Moxon, Norman Jeffery and Jack Ryan discussed 
the CPA's attitude towards the Labor Party with die Executive Committee of the 
Comintern. 
There was already divisions inside the CPA leadership over how the party should 
relate to the ALP. At the party's Seventh Conference in December 1927 four members 
of the CEC were removed from office - Jack Ryan and Esmond Higgins, personal 
friends of Jack Kavanagh, as well as Lance Sharkey and Norman Jeffery. These men, 
deemed "rightist" by Kavanagh, believed that the party should concentrate on the 
sdiiggle in die ALP between the conservative poUticians and the trade union 
officials."^ 
J.D. Blake maintains that Kavanagh used questionable tactics in removing these 
people. Blake claimed: 
He arranged through Moxon to have a number of Queensland branches 
provide them with proxy votes at the annual party conference. These 
were used to vote Ryan, Sharkey, Higgins and Jeffery off the Central 
Executive - as opportunists too much under the influence of Garden. 
(Some of the Queensland branches appear to have been only the bogus 
creations of Moxon)."^' 
While there is no reason to doubt Blake, it should be noted that even after these people 
were removed from office their standing as leaders remained and they continued to 
represent the party at important external meetings. This was in stark contrast with the 
tieatment of deposed leaders under the Sharkey-Moxon-Miles regime of the 1930s. 
159 ibid., no. 264 (14 September 1928), p. 4. 
^^° Barbara Curthoys, "The Communist Party and the Communist 
International (1927-1929), Labour History, no. 64, May 1993, pp. 
57-58. 
^^^ J.D. Blake, "The Australian Commiunist Party of Australia 
and the Comintern in the Early 1930s", Labour History, no. 23, 
November 1972, p. 40. 
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A committee of the ECCI, under the leadership of British communist, William 
Gallagher, addressed the issue of how the CPA was to relate to an increasingly right 
wing Labor Parly who, in Queensland at least had lost much of its support amongst 
workers. The committee came up with what became known as the "Queensland 
Resolution". The CPA would draw workers around it by instituting the following 
guidelines: 
1. In some constituencies left-wing ALP candidates were to 
stand and would have specially created workers' electoral 
committees to support them. 
2. In all other constituencies a clear campaign against the 
McCormack Labor Party was to be conducted. Labor Party 
candidates were to be pressed to repudiate their past 
policy and to support working class demands. If they 
refused, workers were to be asked not to vote for them but 
to make their reason for withdrawing support quite clear. 
Opposition was to be against persons not the Labor Party 
itself. 
3. Three or four Communist candidates were to stand in 
carefully selected constituencies.'" 
This broke with the past policy of calling for a vote for Labor and, instead, advocated 
standing against the ALP in some electorates.'^^ 
The leadership proposed establishing Left Wing Committees [LWC] comprising 
communists and prominent left activists outside die party which would draw in 
individuals, unions, and other organisations in a united front against McCormack. The 
LWCs' programme would replicate that of the ALP left In electorates where no 
candidates were being fielded the CPA would demand ALP candidates repudiate the past 
162 Quoted in Curthoys, op.cit., p. 5! 
"^ Even when the CPA-stood candidates in the 1925 NSW state 
election they insisted that at the elections the CPA "will make 
every effort to return a Labor government". Workers Weekly, (9 
January 1925), p. 1. 
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policy of the Labor government and stand on a pro-working class platform.'**^ If the 
Labor candidate rejected this, the CPA would call for an informal vote."^^ 
Through the hard work of J.B. Miles, LWC organiser for north Queensland, and 
Moxon, organiser for soudi Queensland, the party made some initial headway. In 
November 1928 a LWC was formed in Kelvin Grove. ARU member and communist 
Charles Wallbank, was chosen as the candidate. Resolutions were passed to guarantee 
that Wallbank would remain true to his election statements if he gained a seat He would 
give £150 out of his parliamentary salary of £750 to the workers' movement and on 
days when Parliament was not sitting he would devote his time "to propaganda and 
agitational work for the working class"."^ Secretary of the Kelvin Grove LWC was 
Herbert James Huggett Police reported that he was a member of the BLF, ex-IWW, and 
was gaoled in the Red Flag Riots. They said: "He is considered an exd"eme Communist 
and is an expert in sabotage, direct action, and 'Go Slow' tactics. Mrs Huggett is also 
an extreme Communist".'^^ 
In Townsville two candidates were fielded.'^ ** One was communist, Ted Tripp, 
a member of the AEU, who became the candidate for Mundingburta. The odier was the 
LWC candidate, A.J. (Berg) Morris, Secretary of the Lucinda Point branch of the WWF 
164 i b i d . , p . 1 
^^^ In Collinsville the informal vote registered 10%. ibid., 
no. 301 (31 May 1929), p. 3. 
166 ibid., no. 277 (7 December 1928), p. 3 
^" PRE/A, In-Letter 6621 of 1933, Confidential Memorandum 
CIB to Home Secretary, 28 November 1933. QSA. 
^^® The Townsville LWC did not attract as many people to its 
initial meetings as the Brisbane ones. When an ARU member 
attended a Townsville LWC meeting early in 1929 to assess whether 
or not the union should affiliate to it, he was disappointed to 
find only nine people there. Advocate, 15 February 1929, p. 17. 
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where the communists were influential. Two other LWC candidates were fielded in 
Brisbane - Jack Durkin (former AWU Organiser) who stood for Fortitude Valley and 
F.W. Paterson for Paddington. Steps were also taken to form LWCs in Ipswich in 
September 1928 and Rockhampton in early January 1929."''^  
The first meeting of the Kelvin Grove LWC attracted representatives from the 
Builders Labourers Union, WWF, ARU (North Brisbane Branch), CPA and a number 
of CPA-led organisations and in February 1929 the Townsville branch of the AEU even 
discussed joining the LWC.'™ Here the CPA opened their campaign with a meeting 
of 500-600 where Tripp informed them that a vote for the ALP was a vote to condone 
"scabbery".'^' The meeting at the Brisbane Exhibition Hall to open the campaign in 
the capital in February 1929 atd-acted around 600 people who listened to speeches from 
Paterson, Durkin and Wallbank.'^^ At a separate public meeting on 5 March 1929 
Paterson was able to draw in a crowd of 400 people.'" 
However, electoral work was curtailed during the last few months of 1928 as 
communists put their energies into defending the WWF. Miles reported that in soudiem 
Queensland "the Party became so much involved, particularly in Brisbane, in assisting 
the fighting wharf workers that preparation for the elections had to be neglected and the 
organiser was unable to visit other centres".'^ "* 
"' Workers Weekly, no. 282 (18 January 1929), p. 3. 
"° ibid., no. 284 (1 February 1929), p. 3. 
"^  ibid.. no. 291 (22 March 1929), p. 3. 
"^ ibid, no. 285 (8 February 1929), p. 1. 
"^ ibid., no. 299 (15 March 1929), p. 1. 
"^  ibid., no. 301 (31 May 1929), p. 3. 
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Once the WWF strike ended, the CPA revived its work around the state 
elections. But despite putting an enormous amount of energy into building the Left Wing 
Committees the end results were negligible. The initial enthusiasm of non-party 
members and organisations had died away. In July 1928 a meeting to discuss the 
"Queensland Resolution" in Brisbane attracted "many prominent militants. Left-wing 
trade union officials and trade unionists" who endorsed die resolution. Yet, by the time 
the elections took place in May 1929, "not one-fifth of the persons who attended that 
meeting" were to be found in the ranks of the LWCs.'" Apart from the Brisbane 
branch of the WWF, most other unions withdrew their support for the LWCs; only the 
CPA-led groups remained active throughout the campaign.'^^ 
In fact the CPA was subject to a concerted attack by union officials during the 
election campaign. The Brisbane TLC, pressured by G. Lawson of the Transport 
Workers Union, evicted the CPA from its room at Trades Hall while in Townsville 
militants were expelled from the TLC. Ted Tripp reported: 
Day by day motions [were raised] to make every militant declare that he 
is not in any way connected with the left wing movement - this was the 
movement that took up die opposition against the McCormack Labor 
Government and endeavoured to run candidates upon a working class 
program.'^^ 
In Kelvin Grove the LWC revealed the same d-end as in other places. It 
175 ibid., no. 300 (24 May 1929), p. 3 
"^ Moxon said in ibid., p. 3 that the activity of the MMM 
fell off. Bob Besant in ibid., no. 303 (14 June 1929) , p. 3, said 
the MMM sent five non-party members to LWCs, all of whom joined 
the CPA. The three union officials who remained active in the 
committees were Andy Brown (WWF), Ernie Ellis (Carpenters and 
Joiners Union) and Gordon Crane (ARU). Nolan, op cit., p. 48. 
5. 
^" Report of M.M. Conference 19-20 July 1929, op.cit., p 
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"atd-acted a number of non-party workers to the early meetings, but before die contest 
was abandoned in that electorate the committee was reduced to Party members and one 
other who joined the Party as a result of the contact".'^^ LWCs in Maree and South 
Brisbane: 
...had to be nursed by the Campaign Committee, and, when inability to 
raise funds and secure suitable candidates had reduced these committees 
to three or four members, these constituencies were abandoned... 
The Valley committee and that in Paddington carried through the 
opening meetings and preliminary leaflet distribution and canvassing, but 
always with the Campaign Committee leading and driving.'™ 
The Rockhampton LWC was still-born and the Townsville one "never functioned apart 
from the Party Campaign Committee". In fact, both Townsville campaigns - for Tripp 
and Morris - were directed by one committee made up mainly of CPA members.'^ *^ 
Communists applied themselves to the election campaign even though in some 
areas they faced police harassment On the Atherton Tableland police threatened to 
arrest one member for handing out LWC literature. In Townsville, in late March 1929, 
the police banned the CPA from holding a public election meeting at the Tree of 
Knowledge. In another incident a person was arrested and fined 8/6 for distributing 
LWC leaflets in the town.'^' Despite their emest efforts, none of the candidates fielded 
- J.B. Miles (Brisbane), J.M. Durkin (Fortitude Valley), Fred Paterson (Paddington), Ted 
Tripp (Mundingburra), and D.J. Morris (Townsville) - was elected and all five lost their 
deposits. However, while not capturing any seats the CPA polled better than it had in 
1925 when Jock Garden stood in NSW. The party also recruited from the campaign. J.B. 
"^ Workers Weekly, 301 (31 May 1929), p. 3. 
''^ ibid. , p. 3. 
'^° ibid. , no. 302 (7 June 1929), p. 3. 
'^' ibid. , no. 292 (29 March 1929), p. 2. 
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Miles said: 
We entered die campaign with weak organisation (about 14 members in 
the strongest group in Queensland), meagre resources, and very little real 
influence. We finished the campaign with over 50 members in the group 
that had been 14 strong, and hundreds of new virile contacts were 
made."' 
The election was disasd-ous for the ALP which suffered a swing against it in 
most electorates, particularly in working class ones. The Minister for Railways, J. 
Larcombe, hated for his role in the 1927 railway lockout, lost his previously safe Labor 
seat The CPA claimed the low Labor vote in the railway areas resulted from the policy 
of the ARU officials calling neither for a vote for Labor nor for the LWCs which, they 
claimed, gave workers no clear guidance.'^' At the same time the ALP criticised the 
CPA's policy of calling for an informal vote where no LWC candidate stood. In 
Colhnsville, where the CPA had some influence, the informal vote was as high as 10%. 
Recriminations aside, the victor in the elections was the conservative Country 
Progressive National Party led by Arthur Moore. If workers were breaking from 
reformism as the Comintern claimed, they certainly were not moving to embrace 
communism en masse. 
ANTI-KAVANAGH FACTION FORMS IN CPA 
Following the state elections the Workers Weekly opened its pages for debate and 
discussion on the lessons of die "Queensland Resolution" - tactic which was meant to 
help communists reach a wider audience."^ With the decline in attendance and 
^^2 Workers Weekly, no. 321 (25 October 1929), p. 3 
'"ibid., no. 303 (14 June 1929), p. 3. 
184 Blake, op.cit., p. 43 
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influence of the LWCs, most contributors to the debate recognised that the attempt 
failed. They also argued that the hoped-for united front with left wing reformists had not 
succeeded. 
The "Queensland Resolution" had been devised in Moscow in April 1928 as a 
mechanism for die party to work with the ALP left and to draw around it the increasing 
number of workers who were hostile to McCormack. Since then, important changes had 
taken place in communist theory and practice. In August 1928 the Comintern had met 
and adopted the Third Period Line with its open hostility toward reformists - particularly 
left wing reformists. Four months later the CPA held its Eighth Conference which 
partially adopted the new Comintern line. The CPA resolved to implement the 
"Queensland Resolution" in the state elections in May 1929, and to call for a vote for 
Labor in the Federal elections due in October that year. 
But 1929 was a year of political polarisation and factionalism within the CPA 
as a section of the leadership moved closer toward supporting the Third Period analysis 
in its entirety. The events in Queensland became a focal point in this struggle between 
Kavanagh and Ryan who supported the resolutions of the Eighth CPA Conference and 
Moxon, Sharkey, and Miles who called for a complete break widi the ALP "social 
fascists". Although, in 1928, the Comintern advised the CPA to work with left wing 
ALP members during the Queensland elections, diis point became lost in the factional 
dispute. Radier, many communists concluded that the events in Queensland corroborated 
the new Comintern policy of complete independence from reformists. 
Moxon pointed out that most of the non-communists worked with the CPA rather 
than with the LWCs and most of those who did work with the LWCs eventually joined 
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the party. He went on to say: 
The Communist Party financed the Left-wing committees, paid 
£20 deposits demanded by "democracy", paid most of the printing 
expenses, procured the posters, arranged the speakers and meeting places, 
supplied 80 per cent of the speakers, and did everything short of 
nominating the candidates. 
On election day the Communist Party had to surrender the 
majority of its Brisbane members to complete three sets of scrutineers 
and outside workers.'^* 
J.B. Miles, Ted Tripp, and Bob Besant agreed that the LWCs were redundant 
Miles, in fact claimed they "resulted in a dissipation of Party energy to the detriment 
of the campaign".'^^ Rather dian the LWCs acting as a nucleus for the disenchanted 
left. Miles claimed a LWC "which could be described as a spontaneous response to the 
Party lead with party contacts, could not be tested; there was a possibility in 
Rockhampton but it fell through".'*^ 
A member from Maryborough branch claimed it was a mistake to form alliances 
with those who "did not leave the A.L.P. on account of dieir revolutionary principles but 
were kicked out because they had dared to criticise some action of the A.L.P.".'^ "^ The 
member, alluding to Durkin, said: "It was 'half way stuff to pick up these political 
charlatans as 'Left-wingers' and to ask them to function as revolutionary 
candidates".'^ Another contributor, regurgitating the "social fascist" line, insisted it 
was better to have the CPNP in office than the Labor Party, because the ALP "is a 
^^^ Workers Weekly, no. 300 (24 May 1929), p. 3. 
'^^ Ibid. , p. 3. 
187 ibid 
"^ ibid. 
''' ibid, 
190 ibid, 
no. 302 (7 June 1929), p. 3. 
p. 3. 
no. 303 (14 June 1929), p. 3 
p. 3. 
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greater danger to the workers in office than in opposition".''" Even Tripp applauded 
the swing to the conservatives, saying: 
The step taken by the workers in repudiating the reactionary policy of 
their leaders is a good sign of awakening. Their next step should be 
unhesitatingly into the Communist Party, the Party that has given the 
correct lead throughout.'''^ 
The leaders of the Queensland branch of the CPA rejected united front work with 
non-party members as they moved closer to total support for the Third Period Line. The 
attempted united front of the "Queensland Resolution" became an issue in the growing 
faction fight between the existing leadership under Kavanagh, and a pro-Third Period 
opposition led by J.B. Miles and Herbert Moxon from Queensland, and Lance Sharkey 
from New South Wales. 
The opposition faction called for a review of the entire election policy adopted 
at the party's Eighth Congress (December 1928) which had decided to restrict the tactic 
of opposing Labor to Queensland only. In the forthcoming federal elections set for 12 
October 1929, die conference had decided that the CPA would not stand its own 
candidates and would continue to call for a vote for Labor. The leadership of the party 
became polarised over the issue. 
A CEC meeting on 15 September 1929 resolved to support the ALP in the 
October election. Although Skarkey agreed with this position at the meeting, he was 
quickly won to Herbert Moxon's argument that communists should stand their own 
candidates. In those electorates where this was not possible, diey should call for an 
informal vote. Three days later Moxon and Sharkey reported their disagreements with 
^^' i b i d . , p . 3 . 
' ' ' i b i d . , p . 3 . 
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the CEC to the Executive Committee of the Comintern.'''^ 
The ECCI established a commission to investigate the Australian situation. 
Participating in the commission was an Ausd-alian communist in Moscow, one I. 
Clayton. This was most probably a pseudonym and it would appear diat the Australian 
involved was Queenslander, Ted Tripp, who was in the USSR attending die Lenin 
school.'^ The ECCI supported the Moxon-Sharkey position and cabled the CEC on 
26 and again on 29 September insisting they overturn their previous decision to support 
the ALP."' 
The CEC replied to Moscow that the conservatives now in office in Queensland 
had begun cancelling workers' awards, and the federal conservatives were threatening 
to do the same. The implication was diat although the ALP was right wing, it was not 
as bad as the conservatives. The CEC explained: 
Because of the great variation in the character and organisation of the 
various state branches of the Labor Party and the varying extent of the 
disillusionment with Labor governments experienced by the masses, it is 
obvious that the Communist Party cannot have one uniform tactic to be 
applied in elections throughout Australia.'^ 
Further cables were urgently sent from Moxon and Sharkey to the ECCI pressing 
them for support. The ECCI again cautioned the CPA leadership that "a victory for the 
Labor Party would strengthen illusions among the masses of workers and encourage 
193 Curthoys, op.cit., p. 62 
^'^^ After the Queensland elections Tripp left the railway 
workshops where he was employed and went to Russia for 12 months. 
PRE/A, In-Letter 7953 of 1930, Senior Sergeant (Roma St) to 
Commissioner of Police, 10 November 1930. QSA. 
^^^ Curthoys, op . cit. , p. 62. 
^^^ Quoted in ibid. , p. 62. 
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liquidationist tendencies among Party members".''^^ The CEC was ordered to stand 
independent candidates against Labor. 
Miles, Moxon and Sharkey claimed that support for Labor in the federal and 
NSW state elections showed Kavanagh's subordination to reformism at a time when 
Stalin was calhng for a decisive break and demanding communists organise an 
unrelenting fight against "social fascists". The opposition faction's slogan - "Capitalism 
has two parties; fight both" - encapsulated the Comintern's new line that there was no 
difference between the ALP and the various conservative parties. Defending himself, 
Kavanagh explained: 
It is not a question of like or dislike with respect to the Labor party. It 
is one of an objective situation confronting us. A question of giving our 
second preference to a party with its roots...in the working class, one that 
alos (sic) desires the suppression of the revolutionary movement but 
which, because of its base dare not ask for such a mandate.'^^ 
But m the context of growing support for the Third Period Line, Kavanagh's 
purported capitulation was inexcusable. Communist, J.D. Blake, later revealed the 
hypocrisy in Mdes, Moxon and Sharkey's accusations against Kavanagh. At the Central 
Committee meeting which discussed the CPA's attitude to the federal elections only 
Moxon and Ross supported standing communist candidates. The majority was content 
with the party's election slogan: "Down with the Bruce Government". It was only after 
this meeting that Sharkey became critical of the Central Committee position and allied 
with Moxon against Kavanagh.'^ 
197 Quoted in ibid., p. 63 
'^® Jack Kavanagh to Edna, 12 April (no year), p. 1. 
P12/4/12. (ABL). ANU. 
^^^ Blake, op.cit., p. 44. Campbell, op.cit. , p. 127 makes 
an error when implying that Sharkey and Moxon opposed the 
decision to vote Labor federally 
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Miles, too, had publicly supported voting Labor in the federal election. At an 
open air meeting in Townsville during the Queensland campaign he advised workers: 
"Vote Labor at the Federal elections as a means of registering your protest against the 
nationalist Government legislation".'*^ Miles, too, had vigorously defended unity 
between communists and left reformists at the time. Writing in die Workers Weekly he 
criticised both those members who believed the CPA should have nothing to do with 
parliamentary elections and those who felt the CPA should stand only communist 
candidates. Miles said: 
Communists who will not work with non-Party enemies of the capitalist 
class, Communists who insist on pure Communist propaganda or 
organisation, may continue to use the term but they cannot continue in 
the Party of the Communist International, die Leninist Party.^ **' 
The issue dispute intensified when Sharkey and Moxon successfully appealed to 
the Comintern for support in their campaign against Kavanagh. At the Ninth CPA 
Congress in December 1929 Kavanagh and his supporters were defeated on this issue. 
°^° Workers Weekly, no. 271 (19 October 1928), p. 3 
°^i ibid. , no. 292 (5 April 1928), p. 3. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
KAVANAGH REPLACED BY SHARKEY, MILES, AND MOXON 
"BOLSHEVISATION" OF THE CPA 
On 12 October 1929 Ausd-alian electors went to the polls in a politically charged 
atmosphere. The defeat of the WWF, the shooting of striking waterside workers by 
police in Melbourne, the introduction of the Transport Workers Act; the defeat of the 
timber workers and the arrest of their leaders; and die bitter dispute on the northern 
NSW coal fields overshadowed the elections. The federal Bruce government proposed 
radical changes to the arbitration system, suggesting transferring federal arbitration 
jurisdiction (except for transport workers) to the states. The CPA believed this was 
suggested because: 
(1) ...compulsory arbitration - which has been of immense 
service to the employers in keeping the workers docile and 
legalist in the period of capitahst expansion - is too 
cumbersome and slow to meet the needs of the capitalist 
class at a time of rapid attack upon wide sections of the 
workers. Further, duplication between Federal and State 
machinery hampers employers' freedom of action. 
(2) The stubborn and unexpected resistance of the timber 
workers to an award of the Federal court, and the whole-
hearted support accorded the timber workers by the rest of 
the trade union movement, have shown that the court has 
lost its power to hypnotise and control the working class 
and even to enforce its own decisions.' 
This was not to say that the CPA now supported Arbitration. Rather, it claimed 
that the transfer would "in no way lessen the coercive aspects of arbiu-ation" and it 
criticised die ALP for making it a central issue in the elections. It was Federal 
Arbitiation Court judges, Beeby and Lukin, who handed down unfavourable awards to 
^ Workers Weekly, no. 317 (20 September 1929), p. 1. 
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waterside and dmber workers. It was compulsory arbitration which weakened the trade 
union movement by engendering in it a legalistic outlook. This, the CPA argued, left 
u-ade unions "at a great disadvantage in the present period of a capitalist offensive".^ 
The alternative to compulsory arbid-ation was "direct negotiation with the employers 
...keeping intact the unrestricted right to strike".' 
The ALP's defence of the Federal Arbitration Court, its advocacy of "industrial 
peace", its support for the White Australia Policy, and its "eagerness to build up 
armaments for the use of imperialism" indicated its support for capitalism. The ALP 
offered no way forward for the working class. 
However, in line with the CPA 1928 congress decision, die party called for a 
vote for Labor over the conservatives. A Labor government would "in the present 
cu-cumstances inconvenience the employers' plans and may provide a short breadiing 
space in which preparations could be made to meet fresh attacks", it was stated.'* At the 
same time, workers should harbour no illusions in Labor. Only the Communist Party 
presented a progressive programme: 
...of unremitting working-class struggle against capitalism leading to the 
seizure of the means of production by the workers, the overdirow of the 
present ruling class, and the establishment of a real workers' 
government^ 
As it turned out, the ALP led by James Henry ScuUin was brought to office, 
defeating the conservative Bruce government 
Although ordered via Comintern telegrams to carry out an attack on "social 
^ ibid. 
' ibid. 
' ibid. 
^ ibid. 
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fascists", the Central Executive Committee ignored these instructions.^ Finally, the 
Comintern reproached Kavanagh for supporting the ALP, claiming it was a "glaring 
example of right deviation deserving the severest condemnation".^ 
Kavanagh opened the pages of the Workers Weekly for a debate on the new line -
the last open debate in the party press. The paper set the tone of the party discussion, 
saying: 
It is very important that a high standard be maintained in the discussion 
and that attention be concend-ated on the fundamental problems of the 
Party. No comrade should yield to the temptation to score personal points 
on another or give any encouragement to factionalism. The following 
typical questions are suggested for discussion:-
(1) Is there today a basis for Social-Reformism in the 
country? 
(2) Is there a Right danger in the Party? 
(3) The role of the Party in the economic struggles. 
(4) The fight against the imperialist war danger. 
(5) The basis for united front work. 
(6) Issues and methods on which factory group work can be 
developed. 
(7) Did die central committee fail in the Federal elections to 
give a lead for the Party's independent revolutionary fight 
against capitalism and reformism? 
(8) The Party's next tasks in the trade unions. 
(9) How to increase the effectiveness of the Party's agitation 
and propaganda work. 
(10) The Party and the Militant Minority Movement* 
^ Davidson, op.cit., p. 50. 
^ Quoted in Davidson, op.cit., p. 51. Uniting with 
reformists was forbidden even in the struggle against fascism. 
In 1932 the German Communist Party [KPD] was ordered by Moscow 
to stop proposing common action with reformists against the 
fascists. The KPD's Central Committee obediently "sent a circular 
letter to its branches and organisations, explaining that the 
social-democratic workers were not yet ripe for common 
demonstrations with the KPD, and that meetings between memibers 
for the 'abstract' discussion of a united front should be 
discouraged". E.H.Carr, Twilight of the Comintern, 1930-35 
(MacMillan: London, 1982), p. 45. 
^ Workers Weekly, no. 321 (25 October 1929), p. 3. 
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Against Kavanagh, it was argued that qualified support for reformism was no 
longer applicable as the ALP had "joined hands widi the capitalist class, and are 
themselves in many instances the organisers of the capitalist offensive".^ Getting this 
wrong was not simply a tactical error. It was "right liquidationism" which threatened the 
entire outcome of communist work: 
The Comintern correctiy estimated diat until the Right danger is smashed 
and the parties of the Comintern adopt a single line throughout die world, 
i.e., the independent role of the C.P., the majority of the working class 
cannot be organised by and to the Communist Party.'° 
In Australia support for the ALP in the 1929 federal elections was, therefore, the "most 
glaring recent example of the utter repudiation of the single world line of the 
revolutionary working class". In a situation of world crisis, and growing threats of a 
second imperialist war, Ausd-atian communists could not hold to outdated tactics. 
Workers were breaking widi Labor in Queensland and could only be won to 
communism, it was argued, if the party had "bold" policies. If this did not occur, 
fascism would triumph." 
From Queensland, J.B. Miles criticised the notion that a victory for die ALP in 
the federal arena would give the working class a "breathing space". Workers in 
Queensland had never had a "breathing space" in all the fourteen years Labor was in 
office there. If communists believed that class struggle was the motor of historical 
change, he asked: "why do we vote Labor to secure a reformist 'breathing space'"?'^ 
Another Queensland communist Bert Hurwordi, agreed with Miles. He believed that by 
' i b i d . 
°^ i b i d 
' ' i b i d 
'^ i b i d 
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calling for a vote for Labor the CPA side-stepped the class su-uggle and fostered the 
illusion diat parliament could ameliorate workers industrial and economic conditions. 
Hurworth questioned the validity of welcoming to office a party committed to arbitration 
and "industrial peace". He said: 
Had the Labor Party been in office and shown by its repeal of the "Dog 
Collar Act", by putting all scabs off the wharves, and out of the timber 
mills, by releasing working-class fighters now in gaol, and lifting the ban 
on hterature, recognising Soviet Russia unconditionally, etc., then there 
would have been ample justification for "welcoming" such a 
government'^ 
Moxon and Sharkey claimed diat the CPA was dominated by the NSW Trades 
Hall, that the failure of the "Queensland Resolution" showed the party could and should 
be independent of the ALP, and that the CEC disobeyed the Comintern.'" 
Kavanagh, T. Wright and Esmonde Higgins, on the other hand, reiterated that 
although they agreed with the Third Period Line in general, there was no indication that 
the revolutionary situation predicted by the Comintern was developing in Austratia. The 
Third Period Line therefore applied more to Europe than to Australia.'^ Kavanagh 
insisted that the general line of the Comintern had to be adjusted to suit the specific 
circumstances in each country. He said that communists could not mechanically apply 
the decisions of the ECCI's Tenth Plenum, which adopted the Third Period line, in every 
circumstance. As these decisions were based on a world survey, communists had to first 
estimate the development of the class struggle in their own country to assess the 
suitability of the new tine. To do otherwise was "not Leninism but Romanticism", he 
^^  ibid., no 323 (8 November 1929), p. 3. 
" Davidson, op.cit., p. 51. 
15 ibid., p. 51 
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claimed."^ 
Kavanagh went on to say that the capitalist offensive which began in Europe, 
Asia and the US in 1921, did not occur in Australia until 1927. Illusions in reformist 
parties in Europe had been shattered since the end of the Great War. Yet in Ausu-alia, 
this phenomenon had only occurred in Queensland. Showing his independence from the 
Comintern, Kavanagh claimed that during the 1920s: 
...the most intensive criticism should be been levelled against the Labor 
party, its futility as a medium for the relieving of the workers from 
exploitation exposed, its chauvinistic White Ausd-alia policy denounced. 
Instead, this was the period in which the tactic of the United Front was 
mechanically applied to Australia, almost resulting in the liquidation of 
the Party. 
In the same means is the decision of the Tenth Plenum being 
mechanically applied to the present situation by the critics of the C.C.'^ 
As the federal ALP had been in opposition while Bruce attacked waterside 
workers, timber workers and miners, illusions in the ALP had grown amongst workers. 
Had the conservatives been re-elected, workers illusions in Labor would have been 
perpetuated. From this Kavanagh concluded that it was therefore important for 
communists to support an ALP victory. Only by workers hving under a Labor 
government, and experiencing first-hand their austerity measures, would workers' 
illusions be shattered.'^ 
In a later article, Kavanagh criticised the lack of independent thought amongst 
those who challenged him. He claimed that opponents of the CEC line fell into four 
categories: (1) sincere rank and file members who lacked wide experience and a 
thorough understanding of Marxism; (2) those who were out of touch with the working 
^^  Workers Weekly, no 324 (15 November 1929), p. 3 
" ibid. 
18 ibid 
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class movement and based their objections for support for Labor on philosophic grounds; 
(3) those who were against the government without understanding why; and (4) those 
who were "not confident of their own analysis of the situation and depend upon the 
decisions based upon a worid review". In this category Kavanagh placed Moxon and 
Sharkey.''' 
On 6 December die leadership published an open letter from the Comintern in 
the Workers Weekly. It claimed that Australian capitalism was going through a third, 
post-war phase of crisis and intensification of class antagonisms. Spurred on by the need 
to compete on the world market, the capitalist class was compelled to drastically reduce 
the costs of production by lowering the living standards and working conditions of 
Ausd-ahan workers. This could be seen in the growing anti-worker legislation like the 
Crimes Act, the Transport Workers Act and the ban on the importation of pro-Soviet 
literature; as well as the offensive against waterside workers, miners, railway workers 
and so on. Given this, and the growing unrest amongst Australian workers, the 
Comintern concluded: 
The question as to whether Australian capitalism will succeed in its plans 
to subjugate the working class or whether the working class wdl assume 
the counter-offensive and develop its revolutionary struggle against 
capitalism wid depend on the ability and determination of the CP. to 
organise and lead the counter-offensive.^*^ 
To support the ALP under those circumstances would only mislead the working class. 
The Comintern accused the CEC of "right deviationism", of d-ailing behind die working 
class and of isolating itself from the masses.^' 
^^  ibid., no. 330 (20 December 1929), p. 3. 
°^ ibid., no. 328 (6 December 1929), p. 3. 
2' ibid 
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Since no disagreement could be tolerated in the Comintern, charges, both real 
and imagined, were raised against Kavanagh. His involvement in the timber workers' 
strike, his support for the union officials during the NSW coal miners' dispute, and his 
call to vote ALP in the federal elections supposedly proved his right wing tendencies. 
Yet all of these had been established Comintern policy prior to 1928. Kavanagh was 
later to write that attempts to make him admit that supporting Labor was a mistake were 
"merely the saving of the face of the E.C.C.l at our expense".^^ After all, as Barbara 
Curthoys shows, Kavanagh had consistently fought for communists' independence from 
reformists. In Canada, he had disagreements with the both Communist Party of Canada 
[CPC] and the Comintern over how communists should relate to the Labor Party. 
Curthoys said: 
Kavanagh accused the Canadian party of interpreting the united front as 
working with the trade-union bureaucracy in 1922 and questioned the 
affiliation of the CPA with the Canadian Labor Party in 1924 for fear it 
meant submerging the communist party. Kavanagh considered CPC 
independence was essential and that the united front meant working widi 
the rank and file of the Labor Party to strengthen its policies..." 
Similarly, in die debate with Garden over dissolving the CPA into the Labor Party, 
Kavanagh strongly defended the independence of the party. He called on communists 
inside the ALP to declare their membership of the CPA, even if it meant expulsion from 
the Labor Party. 
The turning point in the faction fight came at the Christmas conference of the 
CPA in 1929 when Kavanagh and his supporters, with the exception of Higgins, were 
removed from the Cential Committee. The Sharkey-Miles-Moxon group, with the full 
^^  Kavanagh's diary, 22 June 1930. Z400 Box 1. (ABL) ANU. 
^^  Curthoys, op . cit. , p. 60. 
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support of the Comintern, was now in control."'* J.D. Blake said in 1972: 
Without that intervention the outcome might have been a little different, 
in view of the forces involved. The internal confiict might have been 
more prolonged, and as a result the leadership might have embraced a 
wider spectrum of opinion than was actually the case. However, this is 
speculation; the Comintern intervention did at the time decide the 
issue." 
After the new leadership's victory, they cabled the Comintern "offering 
unswerving loyalty to the new line".^ *' Yet their success was not without repercussions 
within the party. Diane Menghetti claims that the Queensland branch split over the new 
leadership, although Edgar Ross refuted this saying that J.B. Miles had a substantial base 
in Queensland." Menghetti insists there was "opposition, particularly from Paterson, 
to the withdrawal of support from the rank and file of the A.L.P., and Paterson was 
censured by the Central Committee, although he did not leave the Party. Had he done 
so, the Queensland organisation would probably have split".^ ^^  Kavanagh claimed that 
after the conference the morale of the Sydney branch declined. Meetings were poorly 
attended and speakers rarely showed up for street meetings.^^ 
Initially, things did not go smoothly for the new leadership. After Kavanagh was 
removed from office, his supporters were elected to the Sydney and NSW state 
committees of the party, the largest communist bodies in Austratia. The new executive 
of the CPA saw this as a threat and Moxon cabled the Comintern in January 1930 that 
^^  Blake, op.cit. , p. 44. 
^^  Blake, op.cit. , p. 44. 
^^  Quoted in Curthoys, op.cit., p. 66. 
^^  Edgar Ross interviewed by Beris Penrose, 9 October 1991 
®^ Menghetti, op.cit., p. 18. 
'^ See various entries Kavanagh's Diary, op.cit. 
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"the old CC was trymg to usurp power . 
Moxon, Sharkey and Miles responded by undermining Kavanagh's political 
influence widiin the party. They used a combination of expulsions and "exilings". Many 
of the leaders of the Militant Womens' Group in Sydney had personal and political ties 
with the Kavanagh-Ryan leadership. These people were dispersed throughout the 
organisation to make it more difficult for them to cohere organisationally. Kavanagh's 
supporters on the Sydney District Committee were either expelled or sent to other 
places. Kavanagh, himself, was banished to Adelaide against his wishes. He recorded 
in his diary on 28 January 1930 that on arriving back in Sydney from the coal fields he 
found a letter "insttucting me to go to Adelaide as Resident Organiser. Took letter into 
office and refused".^' Kavanagh finally relented, after being called before the Central 
Executive and he reluctanUy left for Adelaide on 8 February 1930. 
The means by which Kavanagh's influence in the party was neuttalised were not 
only political, but personal. He was subjected to petty indignities and insults by the new 
leadership who sent him to address meetings which no-one had organised. On his way 
to Adelaide Kavanagh had a stop-over in Melbourne, yet no party members from 
Melbourne met him at the station. In Adelaide, although he had to financially support 
himself, his wife and son, he often had difficulty getting his pay from the party.^ ^ 
Communist Mary Lamm, recalled Tom Wright being "scorned" and "abused" by a 
female comrade at a dance and Lamm was warned by Sharkey "not to be too friendly" 
°^ Davidson, op . cit. , p. 51. 
^^  Kavanagh's Diary, op.cit., 28 January 1930 
32 See various entries in ibid. 
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with Kavanagh's wife and party member, Edna." 
However, if the new leadership thought Kavanagh's exile would silence him, 
they were mistaken. He was so popular in Adelaide "that the party expected him to 
organise an opposition" and so he was brought back to Sydney where his authority was 
furdier undermined.^ 
To ensure diat the new leadership's position was unconditionally established, the 
Comintern sent a member of the Communist Party of the United States, Herbert (Harry) 
Wicks," to oversee the process. Wicks, known in Austtalia as, Herbert Moore, 
described his task as a reorganisation of the party and establishment of: 
...what was generally referred to as a collective leadership freed of 
rightist influences, which as elsewhere in Comintern sections, were 
personified by those older political leaders who had begun their political 
lives in the Socialist Parties of the Second International and had broken 
with them because of theu: social pattiotism in the Ftist World War.^ *^  
As Wicks indicated, this was an international phenomenon, known as 
"Bolshevisation". The effect was to removed independent minded leaders from the 
international parties and replace them with ones more servile to Moscow. Trotsky 
commented that a situation now existed "in which the actual initiators and founders of 
almost all the communist parties of the worid have been placed outside the 
International". He claimed this drove "die young leaderships of the national parties into 
" Johnson, op.cit., pp. 26-27 
^^  Johnson, ibid. , p. 52. 
35 Herbert Moore Wicks (1889-1957) was born in Peoria, 
Illinois. He left the Socialist Party to join the Comimunist Party 
of the United States in September 1919, but left the CPUS under 
a cloud in 1938. 
36 Quoted in Davidson, op.cit., p. 51 
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a blind alley" and doomed "their individual representatives to ideological 
degeneration"." 
Under Wicks' direction Moxon and Sharkey exerted tighter conttol over the party 
machine. J.B. Miles later admitted that Wicks "showed us how to correctiy deal with 
anyone in opposition", which was "to convince the Party that they were no longer fit to 
be in it Then having undermined any basis they may have held in the Party, then the 
Comrade can be easily emptied out".'^ A Centtal Control Commission [CCC] was 
established which subjected elected bodies of the party to the judgements of its 
unelected appointees.'^ Ted Tripp later defined the CCC as a "special police organ" and 
asserted that anyone who criticised the leadership would find themselves before it.'*" 
As bureaucratic conttol over the party machine tightened, dissent became 
impossible. All critical thinkers were expelled, discredited or disciplined and decrees 
were substituted for democratic debate."*' Tripp explained: 
Instead of the party policy being hammered out through the conflict of 
ideas, as in the past the thinking is now done by the secretarial 
hierarchy. Not only is one not allowed to present a difference of 
opinion...but the holding of any such difference of opinion is branded as 
heretical, and the individual concerned is designated as a "counter-
" Trotsky, Comintern After Lenin, op.cit., pp. 157-158. 
•'^  Closed Session Central Comimittee Plenum, 2 January 1932, 
p. 24. 
^^  Kavanagh's Diary, op.cit. , 12 May 1930. 
°^ Militant, July 1935, p. 6. 
^^  The leadership's control of memibers even extended to 
their personal lives. In 1935 the NSW leadership closely observed 
the behaviour of Comrade Esme Odyers who was seen whispering into 
the ear of married Comrade Sam Aarons at a meeting. Odyers was 
told by Bill Orr to end her friendship with Aarons. Letter Esme 
Odyers (25 March 1935), Letter from L.H. Gould (16 January 1935), 
Letter to Mrs Aarons (5 March 1935). A6335/1 31. AA (Canberra). 
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revolutionary" a "disruptor" - and is expelled!'*' 
The new Cend-al Committee was able to maintain its composition over the years, 
Tripp claimed, because the leadership prepared the list of names which was then 
"presented to the congress delegates with the word 'anyone against' - woe betide the 
delegate that would attempt to break die splendid unanimity of congress"."' This 
approach was adopted because it was believed that, to achieve unity amongst workers, 
complete unity within the party was necessary."*" 
Wicks continued the campaign against Kavanagh even, it was reported, 
suggesting he be physically assaulted. Herbert Moxon, the new General Secretary of the 
CPA, reported: 
Moore [Wicks] told us to beat up Kavanagh. Comrade Sharkey told me 
privately that he thought it romantic and stupid to do so...That is not 
fighting politically. That is definitely personal reactions."^ 
At the NSW state conference in Aprd 1930 a further debate developed. Kavanagh 
questioned the relevance to Austialian conditions of a manifesto drawn up by Wicks and 
this provoked a heated debate. However, at the Cend-al Committee plenum in June -
where Kavanagh claimed the "Majority present kowtowed" to Wicks"* - no opposition 
to the Third Period line was voiced. There was now no debate, only unanimity. 
The Plenum insisted that the Australian working class faced "the concerted fire 
of the d-iple alliance" of capitalists, the governments (state and federal) and the 
^'' Militant, July 1935, p. 7. 
^^  ibid., vol. 2, no. 15 (February 1936), p. 14. 
44 Workers Weekly, no. 645 (15 November 1935), p. 1. 
''^  Closed Session Central Committee Plenum, 2 January 1932, 
op.cit., p. 22. 
46 Kavanagh's Diary, op.cit., 29 June 1930 
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"reactionary officials at die head of the trade union movement"."^ There existed a 
deepening economic crisis as well as "a mighty wave of radicalisation of the masses" 
accompanied by "the development of new organisational measures in combating the 
capitalist offensive"."^ Amongst the greatest enemies of the working class, it was 
claimed, were the reformists or "social fascists". 
Social fascism...not only paves the way for open fascism, but the social 
fascists themselves are brazenly abandoning their attempts to conceal 
their role under radical phrases and are coming more and more into the 
open as outright fascists...The McCormack Labor Government in 
Queensland locked out 18,000 railwaymen during its term of office, 
gaoled militant workers, declared stop-work meetings on the railway 
illegal, and fined those who participated in such meetings one pound 
each, that was subsequendy taken out of their wages."'' 
In July 1930 north Queensland CPA leader, Ted Tripp, returned from Moscow 
where he had spent nine months at the Lenin School. While he was there Tripp alienated 
the leadership by criticising Harry Wicks. For this political blunder Tripp was labled a 
"right deviationist".^" Although Kavanagh commented in his diary that Tripp was "not 
impressed with the procedure here,"^' fear of being outside the party prompted him to 
remain silent and work diligentiy for the CPA. Later, Tripp confessed that the "thought 
of separation from the party was unbearable."^^ 
The vendetta against Kavanagh culminated in his expulsion from the CPA. On 
'^^  From "Australia's Part in the World Revolution", 
reprinted in Jim Hagan (ed.), Australian Trade Unionism in 
Documents (Longman Cheshire: Melbourne, 1986), p. 73. 
""^  ibid. , p. 73. 
"" ibid. , p. 77. 
°^ Transcript of taped interview with Ted Tripp, 1961. 
Normington-Rawling Collection, N57/109. (ABL) ANU. 
'^ Kavanagh's diary, op.cit., 7 August 1930. 
" Militant, July 1935, p. 6. 
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20 December 1930 he noted in his diary that the Workers Weekly contained a: 
...vicious, lying attack upon self over name of C.C. Secretariat It is 
obviously written by Moore [Wicks]...This has been followed by my 
expulsion from the Party." 
Soon after Kavanagh's expulsion his close collaborator, Higgins, was removed from his 
position of authority within the party also. With Kavanagh and his supporters defeated, 
the new leadership under Harty Wicks embarked on an extreme policy, firmly beheving 
the Comintern's appraisal that proletarian revolution was within sight. 
EXTREMISM UNDER SHARKEY-MILES-MOXON 
The new executive of die party was eager to implement unrestricted, the Third 
Period Line. Believing that the coming period would be one of revolutions and wars, 
they speculated that even small strikes and lockouts would grow into mass political 
struggles. The "social fascist" union officials, incapable of handling any dispute to the 
benefit of workers, would be swept aside, their leadership usurped by rank and file 
militants under communist control. 
Undoubtedly these were years of political turmoil. In 1931 the ALP spht three 
ways into the federal Scullin-Theodore Party which was committed to repaying the 
national debt; the supporters of Joseph Lyons who had left the party in early 1931 to 
become head of the conservative opposition in May that year; and the NSW Lang Party, 
expelled from the ALP in March 1931. Lang was committed to austerity measures but 
also wanted to repudiate the interest on government debt, causing uproar within the 
53 Kavanagh's Diary, op . cit. , 20 Decemiber 1930. 
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moneyed class.^ R.G. Menzies, conservative politician and later Prime Minister during 
the 1950s Cold War era, expressed the mood of the nation's capitalists when he said: 
Rather than that Australia should fail to pay her honest debts to her 
bondholders, I would prefer to see every man, woman and child in 
Ausu-alia die of starvation in the next six months." 
The government responded to the economic crisis with repression and austerity 
measures. During late 1931 the federal ALP government ordered the destruction of every 
copy of Red Leader, paper of the Minority Movement, which was transmitted by post. 
In Sydney 3,000 copies of the paper's second issue were burned at the Post Office.^ ^ 
Governmental limitations on civil liberties and freedom of speech grew. Under Scullin's 
successor, the Lyons United Australia Party [UAP] government the provisions of the 
Crimes Act were extended. In 1932 Workers Weekly editor, Francis Devanny, was 
sentences to six months gaol under the Act although the High Court overturned this. 
The extended Crimes Act now stated that if any organisation be declared unlawful, each 
member of its executive could be disenfranchised for seven years." In 1935 the Crimes 
Act was again invoked against the CPA and its associated organisation, the Friends of 
the Soviet Union. Bodi organisations were required to show cause why they should not 
be declared unlawful. The Crimes Act was also used to impose a postal ban on the 
^^  The CPA argued that as the agricultural sector of the 
employing class was in a worse financial position than the 
industrial sector, it was the latter which bore the brunt of the 
debt repayments. Lang's stance, the comimunists contended, arose 
from his comimitment to protect industrial employers. Red Leader, 
25 may 1932, p. 2. 
^^  Quoted in Ralph Gibson, My Years in the Communist Party 
(International Bookshop: Melbourne, 1966), p. 9. 
56 Red Leader, 10 August 1932, p. 4 
" Don Watson, Brian Fitzpatrick: A Radical Life (Hale & 
Iremonger: Sydney, 1979), p 63. 
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Workers Weekly and publications from communist united front groups. Eventually by 
1937, forty-eight publications were banned from transmission by post^ ** 
The Lyons government also added a new clause to the Customs Act in 1932 
which prohibited the importation of literature in which "a seditious intention is 
expressed, or a seditious enterprise advocated". '^^  By 1933 almost 160 political 
publications were banned by the Minister of Customs. Many of these were communist 
publications. William McMahon Ball, Lecturer in Political Philosophy at the University 
of Melbourne, said in 1935: 
Russia is now a member of the League of Nations; Mr. Anthony Eden 
visits Moscow as an honoured guest and ally; the British Cabinet consults 
the Soviet Government before making new diplomatic moves in Europe. 
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace...publishes and 
disdibutes the latest of Stalin's writings in its periodical "International 
Conciliation"...But our Minister for Customs is unimpressed...The policy 
of the Federal Government is a confession that it can only lead a 
democracy in blinkers, or at least with a blinker over the left eye. It is 
strange that the States should spend so much money on compulsory 
education, while the Federal Government seeks to build its authority on 
compulsory ignorance.*^ 
In the extra-parliamentary sphere the extreme right was organising itself into 
fascist and semi-fascist societies such as the New Guard, committed, as they said, to the 
"complete extirpation" of communism.* '^ To salvage the nation they believed that "8 
to 10 citizens of high repute be appointed to administer the State for 3 years or longer 
®^ L.J. Louis, "Victorian Council Against War and Fascism", 
Labour History, May 1983, pp. 40-41. 
" William McMahon Ball, "The Australian Censorship", 
Australian Quarterly, no. 26, 1935, p. 11. 
60 ibid., pp. 10-11. 
^^  Combined Locality Conference, Highland Society's Hall, 
Sydney, 17 November 1931, New Guard Movements 9/2459. NSW State 
Archives . 
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period (sic) during which time parliament would be dissolved or in recess without 
pay"." 
The CPA believed that revolution was imminent To foster this process, Moxon, 
Miles and Sharkey urged die membership to rejuvenate the Militant Minority Movement 
which had made litde headway since being initiated by Kavanagh in 1928. In July 1929 
Ted Tripp reported that the Queensland MMM was "not of a very strong nature". It had 
no newspaper and the roneoed sheets issued by the MMM were unattractive." If the 
organisation were to act as the conduit for revolutionary ideas into the work place, a 
d-emendous amount of work had to be done by communists.^ The Ninth CPA 
Congress in December 1929 insisted: 
The formation of pit, shop and factory committees must be an immediate 
objective of the Party wherever Party members are operating; such 
committees shall be representative of all workers on a particular job and 
are the real basis of unity from below for effective struggle against the 
boss and the reformists.*^^ 
The MMM's task was to make the unions "militant organisations for the class 
suiiggle".^ This would be achieved by recruiting workers "to a policy of mihtant 
stiiiggle and the replacing of the bureaucrats with revolutionary fighters".*^^ The 
communists' slogan became: "Every workshop a stronghold for the Party".^ 
^^  General Council Meeting, 3 August 1931, p. 2. New Guard 
Movements, 9/2459. NSW State Archives. 
" Report of MM Conference, 19-29 July 1929, op.cit., p. 5. 
" Workers Weekly, no. 332 (17 January 1930), p. 6. 
^^  ibid. , p. 6. 
^^  Report of MM Conference, 19-29 July 1929, op.cit., p. 9. 
'^ ibid. , p. 6. • 
68 ibid., p. 6 
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Work amongst the jobless was also given priority. As the employers and 
governments shifted the burden of the crisis onto the shoulders of die working class, 
long-term unemployment became a permanent feature of Australian society. Therefore, 
the struggles of die employed and unemployed, the CPA reasoned, needed to dovetail 
into a united battle against die system. To co-ordinate the struggle the CPA established 
the Unemployed Workers Movement [UWM] which, by September 1931, had 
established branches in Brisbane's western suburbs. South Brisbane, West End, Spring 
Hill, Home Hill and Townsville.^'' By October 1931 the Wynnum UWM had grown 
from three members to over 100 in just eight weeks.™ 
UNEMPLOYED STRUGGLES 
In 1931 about 30% of Queensland's work force was jobless. As this figure was 
the state average, it did not show variations for different industries such as the motor, 
motor bodies, and cycles industry where unemployment rose to 38.5% between 1928-29 
and 1931-32.'' 
The newly elected CPNP government headed by Arthur Moore, who referred to 
the working class as "parasites",'^ endeavoured to raise financial support for the 
unemployed from the wages of the employed. Moore amended the Income 
(Unemployment Relief) Tax Act in August 1930 to make all workers pay threepence out 
^^ Red Leader, 21 August 1931, p. 8; 28 August 1931, p. 3; 
and 18 September 1931, p. 8. 
'° ibid., 9 October 1931, p. 8. 
'^  Economic News, February 1933, p. 4 
72 Brian Carroll, "William Forgan-Smith: Dictator or 
Democrat?", in Murphy, Joyce and Cribb, Premiers of Oueensland, 
op.cit. p. 406. 
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of every pound they earned, into the fund," only to double this a year later.'"* Moore 
also established a scheme of relief work, or work for the dole. Unemployed men were 
offered 44 hours work per week at the rate of £3 per week for married men and £2/10/-
for single men. Initially, the Moore government gave preference to men drawing food 
relief, but this was abandoned after there was a rush by unemployed to be put on this 
to make them eligible for work. Moore was further forced to alter the scheme once it 
proved inadequate to deal with the high number of unemployed in the state. A twelve-
week rotation system was introduced but this direw unemployed men back onto food 
relief after their twelve weeks of work expired. In March 1931 a new scheme of 
Intermittent Relief Work [IRW] was introduced. 
By this means it was hoped to give every person eligible to draw food 
relief at least some work every week. At the same time, the three 
schemes were so co-ordinated that rations could be drawn if work was 
not avadable, while each intermittent relief worker could hope to get at 
least one period of ordinary relief work during the year." 
In October 1931 almost 9,500 men were working on full-time and intermittent relief 
work schemes. By June 1933 this had risen to 28,200.^^ 
The CPA denounced IRW as slave labour since workers were paid well below 
the basic wage.^ ^ The party also pointed out that during 1934-35 the government 
" Advocate, 15 August 1930, p. 1. 
•^^  Brian Costar, "Was Queensland Different", in J. 
Mackinolty (ed.) Wasted Years? (Allen & Unwin: Sydney, 1981), p. 
162. 
^^  F.A. Bland, "Unemployment Relief In Australia", 
International Labour Review, vol. 30, 1934, p. 43. 
^^  Brisbane Courier, 12 May 1931, p. 11. The Intermittent 
Relief Works Scheme was introduced in March 1931. Bland, op.cit. , 
p. 43. 
" Costar, "Wasted Years", op.cit., p. 165. 
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received £2,426,000 in unemployment relief tax, yet their expenditure in relief work was 
only £1,674,000.^^ As well as the relief tax, all workers over eighteen years of age and 
who were on award wages were compelled to cond-ibute to the Unemployment Insurance 
Fund. These workers had to contribute 6d. per week into the scheme, for a period 
twenty-six weeks before diey were eligible for fuU benefit that was, 14/- per week, or 
a grant of £10/10/- in sustenance payments for a period of fifteen weeks on becoming 
unemployed. Again, the CPA criticised the unjusmess of this scheme. They pointed out 
that before a worker could draw on this benefit they had to be a resident in Queensland 
for over six months. Therefore, seasonal workers such as shearers, who move from state 
to state, were obliged to pay into the scheme, aldiough they could not receive any 
benefits if their search for work took them out of the state. The CPA said that "this class 
of worker is paying to a fund in order to relieve the Queensland employers of portion 
of their responsibility".^^ It was also pointed out that, in the case of a single man who 
had been employed for fifteen years, he would have paid, over that time, a total of 
£97/10/- into both the unemployment relief tax and the unemployment insurance fund. 
Yet if he were to become unemployed he would receive only 14/- per week for fifteen 
weeks. If he was sent on relief work, he would get only a bare subsistence for work 
done, or after the expiry of fifteen weeks, and still being unemployed, he would be put 
on food relief at 7/6 per week. The party said: 
If we carry this analysis further we find that there remains £87/10/- the 
worker has paid to the fund, and this sum would be equivalent to four 
and a half years' food relief at 7/6 per week.^° 
®^ W. McKenzie and M. Hade, "Unemployment Insurance in 
Queensland", Trade Union Leader, Decemiber 1935, p. 114. 
" ibid., p. 113 
'° ibid. , p. 114 
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As well, conditions on the IRW projects were appalling. In March 1931 a protest 
meeting of men employed on relief attracted a crowd of about 200 at Brisbane Trades 
Hall. The meeting condemned the "slavery scheme of intermittent work for rations, 
under police cond-ol". '^ It was reported that a deputation to H. Sizer, Minister for 
Labour and Indusuy, was met with cold contempt Sizer threatened the men that "if 
Boggo-Road was not big enough he would build more gaols" to accommodate protesting 
jobless.^^ Sizer also notified the delegation that single men had to leave the city, as: 
...he was not going to have these single men living a life of indulgence 
in the city and creating disturbances...Mr Sizer had stated emphatically 
that they would have to work for their rations, and that any opposition to 
the scheme would be smashed.^' 
The next month a delegation of Intermittent Relief Workers complained to Sizer 
of "lack of suitable working clothing, transport facilities, and many other things that 
needed remedying".^ Men clearing the mangroves at Breakfast Creek were not 
provided with boots or clothing. Some "got wet to the waist, and after lunch had to 
resume work in wet clothing. Others had to go into the creek barefooted".^^ The 
Holland Park gang of IRWs was supplied with only four overcoats and seven tunics for 
ninety men. Although they lived in Holland Park, these men had to go to the Ipswich 
Road Depot to collect their pay despite there being a more convenient depot at Holland 
Park. 
Another grievance raised by the IRW men was die harsh treatment of the 
®^  Daily Standard, 20 March 1931, p. 1 
2^ ibid. , p. 1. 
" ibid., p. 1. 
^^ ibid. , 10 April 1931, p. 11. 
^^  ibid. , p. 11. 
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unemployed by police and the evictions of workers who fell behind in their rent^^ 
Constant complaints about the police arose because of the power they exercised over the 
unemployed. Food and work relief were only available to those eligible under the terms 
of the permissible incomes regulations. Each applicant had to fill in a questionnaire 
which outiined their income, including that of dieir parents. These statements had to be 
sworn to, including a statement that the applicant was "destitute and in need of 
relief'.^ ^ Those applying for IRW had to lodge the application form with the local 
police who then investigated the "truth of the statements". Neither work nor rations was 
granted without the certificate from the police.^ 
In this atmosphere it was not surprising the CPA found a ready audience. 
Brisbane's leading figure in the UWM was communist Albert Hulme, described by the 
police as "the most outstanding figure in the agitation and movement" around 
unemployment*^ and "a Communist of extreme tendencies".^ Both he and other 
leaders of the CPA were kept "under sdict surveillance" by the police^' and Hulme's 
tireless commitment to the class struggle led him into countiess scrapes with the 
employers and the authorities. 
In late February 1930, Hulme along with fifteen other men was sent by the 
^^  ibid. , 10 July 1931, p. 1. 
^'^ McKenzie and Hade, op. cit. , p. 114. 
®^ Bland, op.cit. , p. 43. 
'^ PRE/A, In-Letter 7953 of 1930, Senior Sergeant Pugh (Roma 
St.) to Commissioner of Police, 18 March 1930. QSA. Hulme was on 
the executive of the Brisbane CPA in 1930 and was president of 
the Queensland MM in 1931. 
'° PRE/A, In-Letter 7953 of 1930, Senior Sergeant Pugh to 
Commissioner of Police, 14 March 1930. QSA. 
" ibid. 
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Labour Bureau to Malu Quarry in the Stanthorpe district Hulme claimed this was to 
frustrate his UWM work in Brisbane. By the second day on the job the men had elected 
him as their union delegate, a necessary step to take as the employer was particularly 
unpleasant He refused to pay overtime, physically threatened the men and dismissed 
two workers who were unable to keep up the brisk pace demanded of them. These two 
men had been unemployed for fourteen to sixteen months and were in a weakened 
condition. Although dismissed, the employer stamped "LOA" - "left of own accord" -
on their ration books. This was a severe punishment indeed. To receive rations, workers 
had to present theu: contribution book to their employer who would stamp it with the 
following initials: "D", if discharged or the work project ended; "DOF", if dismissed 
through dieir 'own fault'; or "LOA". The CPA said of this: 
Should your book be noted "L.O.A.", then the council may decide that 
you have become unemployed solely by our own fault; and similarly if 
your book is noted "D.O.F.". In the event of the council making this 
decision then you may be refused sustenance up to a period of two 
months...In the case of the Mt Coolon strike (1935), insurance sustenance 
was refused the strikers under this clause.^^ 
Hulme attempted to organise a strike and was supported by the Brisbane men. 
However, he was unable to convince a majority of the quarry workers who were mainly 
locals. Eventually he left the job and returned to his UWM work in Brisbane.^^ 
The party was also involved in anti-eviction struggles. Leading this work was 
communist, Keith Richards. Richards stood for the CPA in the 1932 state elections. He 
was married with 6 children, was on intermittent relief work and had been evicted from 
rented accommodation five times during 1929-1933. Richards was a ex-member of the 
92 McKenzie and Hade, op.cit., p. 115. 
" PRE/A, In-Letter 7953 of 1930, Senior Sergeant Pugh to 
Commissioner of Police, 10 March 1930. QSA. 
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Road Transport Union and had been gaoled in 1930 in a fight for free speech in the city, 
and had also been gaoled for protecting his children during an eviction fight.** 
According to the police, the CPA was "successful in preventing many evictions 
in Brisbane".*^^ On 25 February 1931, in one of its four anti-eviction struggles in Spring 
Hill, the UWM prevented the removal of furniture from one worker's house.^ The 
party was also involved in an anti-eviction fight in Armstrong Terrace, Upper 
Paddington, in April 1931. Led by Hulme, CPA members barricaded themselves inside 
the house and the police reported that a relief gang "working in the neighbourhood of 
the house...have expressed their willingness to support the communists if necessary".^^ 
The man involved in the eviction was J. Quail, a relief worker and returned soldier, 
whose eviction was delayed because of the campaign. Unfortunately, police waited until 
the campaign lost momentum and then eighteen officers widi sledge hammers and bars 
arrived to evict the Quail family.^ ^ In July communists u-ied to stop a further eviction 
of a worker from his home in Isaac St, Spring Hill.^ Then in September the Brisbane 
District Committee of the UWM initiated a "No Rent Campaign", demanding the 
government introduce a moratorium on rents.'^ 
94 Workers Weekly, no. 449 (6 May 1932), p. 3 
'^  PRE/A, In-letter 6621 of 1933, Inspector of Police (Roma 
Street) to Commissioner of Police, 1 June 1931. 
96 Workers Weekly, no. 389 (6 March 1931), p. 6. 
" PRE/A, In-Letter 6621 of 1933, Inspector of Police (Roma 
Street) to Commissioner of Police, 21 April 1931. QSA. 
'^ Daily Standard, 24 April, p. 1; 7 May 1931, p. 2 and Red 
Leader. 2 October 1931, p. 8. 
^^  Workers Weekly, no. 409 (24 July 1931), p. 3. 
°^° Red Leader, 4 September 1931, p. 8. 
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However, the Third Period Line, as it was implemented under Moxon, Miles and 
Sharkey, led to some extreme activity on the part of CPA members. This was most 
clearly seen in die southern states. In an anti-eviction struggle in Bankstown, Sydney, 
in June 1931, it appears communists prepared for an armed struggle with the police. The 
u-anscript of the Central Committee meeting where the eviction was later discussed has 
been censored, but contributions to the debate from various leading members hint at an 
armed confrontation. 
The CPA was informed that 1,000 returned soldiers in the neighbourhood "were 
so incensed that they were prepared to offer [censored] resistance".'*^' It was also 
reported that "diey had electrified barbed wire, and sandbags and so on" to fortify the 
house.'°^ As well, the returned soldiers were "prepared to back up the eviction fighters 
in an open struggle against the police".'"^ 
The party leadership said of this, that if die returned soldiers "could clean up 
some of these thugs that had been cleaning up workers for so long, so much the better, 
and that they should be encouraged to do it".'** William Orr, communist miner, 
confessed: 
...the attitude of the P.B. should be that of developing struggle in 
Bankstown even to [censored] clash with the police, on the basis of the 
mass support we were able to get for it. In this period we had been 
carrying on and mobilising large numbers of workers against diese 
eviction fights, and these evictions were being carried on by the social 
fascist Lang Labor government. We were concerned about chrystallising 
(sic) and dramatising the situation in such a way as to draw the attention 
°^^  Closed Session Central Committee Plenum, 2 January 1932, 
p. 2. Series A6335/1, Item 31. AA (Canberra). 
'°2 ibid. , p. 4. 
°^^  ibid. , p. 10. 
104 ibid., p. 4 
164 
of all workers to the anti working class action of the Lang 
government.'°^ 
It transpired, however, that there was no local support.'* '^ Instead of the 1,000 
men expected, sixteen u-ied to hold the cottage. As divisions amongst die defenders 
developed over the best tactics to employ, it appears that one communist leader ordered 
the removal of the weapon/weapons from the house. Although, as Moxon said, it was 
"never discovered who ordered [censored] to be taken out of the house at 
Bankstown".'°^ 
That communists contemplated the use of weapons is not an unreasonable 
assumption. On the northern NSW coal fields, in the closing months of the strike, the 
new Central Committee of the CPA, while recognising a general su-ike in the coal 
industry was necessary, also issued a bulletin calling on miners to arm themselves. 
Moxon even suggested seizmg Cessnock.'"^ E.M. Higgins was sent to lead CPA work 
on the coal fields seven weeks before die strike collapsed. He was insU"ucted to prevent 
the miners' leaders from addressing the final mass meeting where diey were expected 
to call for a return to work. The Central Committee demanded "that any means, 
including violence, was to be used to ensure" the officials did not speak.'*^ 
In Broken Hill the party prepared for what Moxon later called a putsch."° 
Comrade Docker narrated: 
°^^  ibid. , p. 10. 
'°' ibid. , p. 2. 
107 ibid., p. 5. 
'°^  ibid. , pp. 9 and 14. 
°^^  Blake, op.cit. , p. 45-, 
no Closed Session Central Committee Plenum, 2 January 1932, 
o^^^Lt. , p. 5. 
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A communication came through from the cenu-e, pointing out that we 
should broaden the struggle, seize the police station, the railway station, 
and all strategic positions in Broken Hill, and take complete control of 
the town. I perfectiy agreed with the directions in the letter sent across; 
The only thing that had me worried was that I could see terrible 
difficulties in carrying it out '" 
In Adelaide, too, exu-eme adventures were discussed. Docker admitted communists "d-ied 
to put die town in darkness in order to stop every shop in Port Adelaide"."' 
Communist miner, Charles Nelson, later suggested that much of the extremism 
of the party came from the Comintern envoy Wicks who, Nelson claimed, was so 
confident a general strike was imminent, claimed "it would be possible to stop the 
d"amways, powerhouses, etc., to take the Labor Daily printer/ and publish a paper".'" 
No-one in the party questioned these antics because, as Comrade Loughran explained: 
"All the rank and file of this organisation attempted to do was what Moore [Wicks] 
wanted them to do and say"."'' 
This was one factor which explained the behaviour of communists. Another, 
more important one, was the CPA's exaggerated assessment of the political climate at 
the time. They believed Australia was on the brink of revolution, with workers breaking 
from reformist control and moving toward communism. One consequence of this 
analysis was that the party formed a "Red" trade union in the pastoral industry in 1931. 
EMPLOYED STRUGGLES 
After taking office in Queensland in May 1929 the conservative Moore 
"' ibid., p. 12. 
''^ ibid. , p. 12. 
"^  ibid., p. 19. 
''' ibid. , p. 20. 
166 
government issued an Order in Council to abolish rural awards, leaving rural workers 
without unemployment benefits which applied only to those employed under a registered 
award."^ Then on 11 September 1930 awards for shed hands, metal miners, and 
Public Servants were suspended for one year and by June 1931 over 50% of Queensland 
workers was outside of the Arbitration system despite Moore's election promises to 
maintain the award structure."^ 
The government also restored the power of the Industrial Court to fix working 
hours in industry."^ By 1 July 1931 Justice Webb, president of the Industrial Court, 
had effectively made the 48 hour week the standard for many workers, reversing the 
gains of 1925 when die 44 hour week had been won in a number of industries."^ 
When Webb increased the hours of female confectionery workers, he did so, he said, 
because "the employers were entitled to some relief'."^ This reflected the prevailing 
attitude in the Industrial Court which was, that as profits declined, so too should wages. 
Parliament also reduced public servants wages by 10-15%, claiming it was just and 
unavoidable,'^° then further decreased them in 1931. 
The Industiial Court continually reduced the basic wage. In July 1930 it was cut 
115 Nolan, op•cit., p. 50. 
^^^ Brian Costar, "Labor, Politics and Unemployment: 
Queensland during the Great Depression", Ph.D., University of 
Queensland, 1981, p. 54. 
"^ Nolan, op.cit. p. 50. 
"^ Brisbane Courier, 27 May 1931, p. 11. 
"' ibid., p. 11. 
120 "The Eleventh Annual Report of the Public Service 
Commissioner (Being for the Year 1930-31)", Oueensland 
Parliamentary Papers, vol. 1, 3rd and 4th Sessions of the 25th 
Parliament 1931, p. 6. 
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to £4 a week for men and £2/1/- for women - a reduction of 6%;''' in December 1930 
it was further reduced to £3/17/- for men and £1/19/6 for women; then in July 1931 it 
was decreased to £3/14/- and £1/19/- respectively.'^^ Compounding this, from 1930-
1933, the federal basic wage fell in money terms every quarter: 
...the aggregate reduction amounting to over 30 per cent; the index of 
average weekly wages had also fallen each quarter, the total fall being 
over 20 per cent; and the State awards all showed very large 
reductions.'" 
It was not that the union officials did nothing to prevent these attacks, but their 
stiategy was to defend die basic wage through hearings in die Indusuial Court radier 
than through industrial action.'^'' They appealed to the employers on the basis that a 
cut in workers' living standards would reduce their buying power and ultimately affect 
the employers' profit rates. In the 1931 Industrial Court case to further reduce the basic 
wage, W.J. Riordan (AWU) argued "if wages are reduced there will follow a decreased 
consumption, and manufacturers will have a resu-icted market". A 21- per week wage cut 
for Queensland's 235,000 workers would amount to a reduction in workers' buying 
power of £1,220,000 in 12 months, he estimated.'" But the Court was unmoved and 
the basic wage was cut 
121 
122 
The Advocate, 15 July 1930, p. 13. 
"Eleventh Annual Report of the Public Service 
Commissioner", op.cit., p. 7. 
^" W.R. Reddaway, "Australian Wage Policy, 1929-1937", 
International Labour Review, vol. 37, 1938, p. 324. 
^^^ This strategy was pursued even though it was a drain on 
union funds. Robert Murray and Kate White, The Ironworkers: A 
History of the Federated Ironworkers' Association of Australia 
(Hale and Iremonger:Sydney, 1982), said: "Brisbane branch funds 
had been exhausted following presentation of a log of claims in 
the Industrial Court there", p. 74. 
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The economic crisis squeezed profits rates to such an extent that production costs 
- the bulk of which were wages - had to be cut if die employers were to survive. No 
reasoned arguments by die union officials could make that reality disappear. What was 
needed, claimed the CPA, was indusu-ial action which would break the unions' reliance 
on arbid-ation which had "reduced the bulk of the trade union officials to low grade 
lawyers".'^ '^  
The Shearers' Dispute 1930-J931 
In July 1930 Federal Arbidration Court Judge Dethridge cut the wages of 
shearers, crutchers, shed hands, wool-pressers, and wool scourers in die eastern states 
from 41/- for one hundred sheep to 32/6.'^^ This was in response to the fall in the 
world price of wool, an important export item accounting for over 40% of all Ausu-alian 
exports. Since 1924 Australia had been the world's largest raw wool producer, making 
up one quarter of the global wool production.'^^ 
The Dethridge award cut NSW shearers' wages by 30%, inciting them to su-ike 
for the first time since 1922. After two months they returned to work defeated. Angry 
at the ineffectiveness of the union leadership, the final meeting of the striking shearers 
at Wee Waa on 16 August 1930, chaired by J.M. Durkin, passed the following motion: 
That this meeting of delegates...are reluctantiy compelled to recommend 
126 Report of M.M. Conference, 19-20 July 1929, op. cit., p 
^^^ Ruth Kerr, Freedom of Contract: A History of the United 
Graziers Association of Queensland (United Graziers' Association 
of Queensland: Brisbane, 1990), p. 64. 
^^® Australia Parliament Commonwealth Wool Inquiry Committee, 
The Australian Wool Industry Report (Commonwealth Government 
Printer: Canberra, 1932), pp. 2-5. 
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to their respective centres to call off the strike...In doing so we definitely 
point out to members that the principal factors contributing to our defeat 
were the scientific sabotaging of the fight by our officials [of the 
AWU]...'^^ 
The CPA, totally committed to the notion that union officials were "social 
fascists", initiated the formation of a new "Red" union in August 1930, the Pastoral 
Workers Industrial Union of Australia [PWIU]. Its leader was Norman Jeffery. Although 
in 1920 Lenin dismissed "Red" unions as "infantile leftism", the nature of Third Period 
politics of imminent revolutions and the need to sweep aside "social fascists" seemed 
to legitimise the formation of these unions. 
Following the defeat of the NSW shearers, in October 1930, Justice Webb 
reduced Queensland shearers' wages by 10% from 1 December 1930. This represented 
a cut in wages from 40/- per 100 sheep to 30/- per 100.'^ ° In the Industrial Court 
hearing the AWU maintained that over the previous twelve years there had been an 
unprecedented growth in wool profits - an average of £17,700,000 per year. Therefore, 
the slump in the 1930 market, they argued, could be absorbed by the growers.'^' 
Dalgety's Annual Wool Review for Australasia also noted that the 1928-29 season had 
yielded "a handsome wool cheque" and in "the continuous period of thirty years" had 
been the best season the graziers had.'^ ^ It was hard to sustain the argument that the 
graziers were poverty stricken. The ARU noted sarcastically: 
^^^ Advocate, 16 February 1931, p. 4, in a letter to the 
editor from J.M. Durkin. 
^^° Brian Costar, "Arthur Edward Moore: Odd Man In", in 
Murphy, Joyce and Cribb, Premiers of Oueensland, op.cit., p. 386. 
^^^ Worker, 23 July 1930, p. 6 
^^^ Dalgety's Annual Wool Review for Australasia, 1927-1928, 
P- 17. 
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Examination of the Reports of the Director of Labour do not enable us 
to discover "Pastoralists" among those who drew sustenance, and a 
frequent visitor to the Government Ration Department said he hadn't 
noticed any in the crowd that attended there.'" 
However, during die depression, as wage rates were based on the industry's capacity to 
pay, once wool prices fell graziers demanded, and got, a reduction in their employees' 
wages. Yet as the Barcaldine newspaper. Western Champion, noted, when wool prices 
were high graziers were not quick to share this windfall. In fact during the past period 
of prosperity for the graziers, pastoral workers' wages had increased by only a 
fraction.'^ 
Early in November 1930 meetings of AWU members in Hughenden,'^^ 
Winton'^ ^ and Longreach'^^ decided to take industrial action. By late November rank 
and file committees had formed at Barcaldine, Richmond, Aramac, Tambo, and 
Clermont'^^ while shearers from Roma joined the strike in December.'^^ At Jericho 
a meeting of delegates from all over the state took place to co-ordinate the strike 
action."° 
At Longreach a Manifesto was compiled, stating that die cost of living figures 
"^ Advocate, 15 May 193 0, p. 2. 
"'' Western Champion, 1 November 1930, [page not numbered] 
^^^ ibid. , 11 November 1930, p. 6. 
^^^ Morning Bulletin, 4 November 1930, p. 7. 
^" Western Champion, 22 November 1930, [page not numibered] 
"^ Workers Weekly, no. 376 (21 November, 1930), p. 1. 
^^^ Brisbane Courier, 4 December 1930, p. 15. 
^^° Morning Bulletin, 2 5 November 193 0, p. 7. 
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used in the Indusu-ial Court were misleading.''" The workers' messes charged the same 
price for mutton in both boom and slump years irrespective of its current market 
value.'''^ There were many hidden expenses like the travel allowance, which was only 
6d per mile for a one-way trip between the sheep station and the nearest railway. Often 
these distances were so large that the return trip to the railway station put shearers out 
of pocket.'"^ ^ The price of combs and cutters had risen from 5/- each in 1930 to 5/4'/2. 
If the worker was "shearing burry sheep he may have the misfortune to break those tools 
on the first sheep and half his wages for his first two hours' work is gone".'"" 
But despite the enthusiasm of the rank and file to take action, the officials of the 
AWU prevaricated. Riordan claimed it was "not possible for the A.W.U., with its policy 
of arbitration, to support the policy of direct action". Questioning die validity of this 
statement the left wing officials of the ARU pointed out that if their support for 
arbitiation "was so sacred to diem, action in defence of it should have been taken by 
them when the awards for rural workers and station hands were abolished".'"^ 
Rather, fear of heavy fines against the union was probably the main reason the 
officials opposed direct action. They admitted: 
...any assistance...which might be given to those engaged in the strike 
would compel an injunction, automatically involve the cancellation of the 
Award within seven days, and also involve the organisation in the 
"^  A copy of this manifesto is in the QSA. PRE/A, In-Letter 
3178 of 1931, Longreach Police to Comimissioner of Police, 9 
December 193 0. 
'^'^  Western Champion, 6 December 1930, [pages not numbered] . 
^^^ Daily Standard, 1 January 1931, p. 8. 
''' ibid. , p. 8. 
"^ Advocate, 15 December, 1930, p. 15. 
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heaviest penalties for the infringement of the law.""* 
Although the preface to die Rules and Constitution of the AWU stated; "We trust 
that each member will become active as an agitator..(as)...we must attack the system 
and change it",'^ ^ by 1930 the AWU officials argued the opposite. Such action would 
jeopardise die entire union movement, they claimed. The Worker said: 
...if indusurial Unions are to retain their su-ength...we must have sanity 
and solidarity...Let all hare-brained, feather-brained and half baked calls 
to revolution and direct action pass by for the time being... conserve and 
consolidate your strength for the proper moment, when the present 
stianglehold of Capitalism will gradually be relaxed and the opportunity 
will arise for the complete overthrow of an enemy weakened, as he must 
be soon, as a result of his own insane policy of finance."'^ 
The policy of the officials put them at loggerheads with the sdriking shearers and 
the AWU officials spent their time undermining the strike. At two sheds the strikers 
were trying to close down - Crossmore and White Hill - AWU officials signed strike-
breakers into the union."*^ Two hundred strike-breakers passing through Emerald on 
27 January insisted diey were not "scabs" as they were working with the consent of the 
union officials.'^" In early February 1931 three AWU officials spoke to men at Meteor 
Downs "advising them to go to work" despite the sdike.'^' 
The CPA felt justified in its analysis that union officials, most of whom were 
146 Worker, 17 January 1931, p. 14. 
'^'^  Quoted in James Slater, The A.W.U. Officials Exposed, 
issued by the Sugar Workers Section, Militant Minority (Wright 
and Baker: Sydney, 1934), p. 7. 
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ALP members, were "social fascists". The activities of union officials, they wrote, "have 
been directed towards finishing strikes and not winning them".'^' They claimed "the 
bulk of die trade union officials are endeavouring to u-ansform the trade unions into 
organs of capitalist administration - in other words to secure die fascisation of the trade 
union movement".'^^ 
During the dispute Moore stood firmly behind the graziers, particularly as wool 
represented 60% of Queensland's exports.'^ In December 1930 Moore announced his 
willingness to provide armed police protection for anyone prepared to break the 
strike.'" Rockhampton police protecting working sheds were ordered to "always be 
armed" and police on night duty must "carry their rifles fully loaded".'^^ One 
policeman said he was "instructed to take with me my uniform, handcuffs, baton and 
revolver and 20 rounds of revolver ammunition" when protecting strike-breakers.'" 
T. Jordan, a communist active in the strike, was harassed, beaten, and arrested by police 
at Barcaldine, Emerald and Rockhampton. At Emerald he received "a good bashing" and 
then had "to listen to the local Sergeant Roach say diat a policeman was like a school 
master and had to baton workers who would not work".'^ ^ 
"^ Workers Weekly, no. 332 (17 January 1930), p. 6. 
'" ibid., p. 6. 
^^^ Graziers Review, 16 February 1931, p. 1045. 
^^^ Brisbane Courier, Friday 9 January 1931, p. 13. 
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Many others were arrested, fined, and gaoled during the dispute. Police also put 
the agitators under surveillance. One policeman even supplied the Commissioner with 
names of raUway feUlers who "took a very prominent part in the hooting" at su-ike-
breakers at Morven railway station. The policeman said this "distinctly showed that they 
whole heartedly supported the su-ikers. This hooting, 1 should think, should be brought 
under the notice of the Minister of Railways".'^'' 
One Oscar Jones was charged with creating a disturbance on the Longreach-
Artilalah road when he and other shearers uied to prevent sdike-breakers from working. 
In court Jones admitted offending Senior-Sergeant Moloney by saying, "Moloney, it's 
only the likes of you that kept Ireland from getting Home Rule 200 years ago", and 
"You come down here at 50 miles an hour for bloated capitalists. If we were to send 
for you you would not come at all".'*^ President of the Longreach sd-ike committee, 
Charles Nehmer, was fined a total of £9/4/4 for a breach of the Enclosed Lands Act 
(1854) in February 1931. Another Longreach sdiker, James Cullinan, was fined a total 
£5/3/6 for not stopping his car when requested by the police. Both were given only 48 
hours to pay their fine or be gaoled for two months.'*'' 
The government also withheld sustenance payments to sd-iking shearers.'^^ In 
late January 1931 the United Graziers Association urged Moore to be harder, claiming 
'^^ PRE/A, In-Letter 3178 of 1931, Sub-Inspector Charleville 
to Commissioner of Police, 13 January 1931. QSA. 
160 Morning Bulletin reported on 12 January 1931, p. 9, that 
the roads from Roma, Augathella, Clare Creek, and Charleville 
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"^ PRE/A, In-Letter 3178 of 1931, Longreach District Police 
to Commissioner of Police, 11 February 1931. QSA. 
"^ Morning Bulletin, 10 January 1931, p. 7. 
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that "while diese shearers are on strike and can get plenty of good Government money, 
there is no need for them to think about shearing".'" 
To lighten the financial load of die graziers Moore reduced rents on their 
selections by 23%. The Graziers Association estimated this, along with a seven year 
extension of their lease, would increase the value of their holdings substantially.'*^ 
Rail freight charges for graziers were also reduced by a total of 25% between April 
1930 and May 1931.'*^^  Dalgety & Co. estimated the "wool concession made by 
Queensland was £899,743"'*^ at a time when die government to balance the railways 
budget, was reducing wages and jobs of the railway workers. 
At the beginning of the dispute the preferred tactic was to convince strike-
breakers through argument not to shear. A meeting of 200 strikers from Aramac, 
Longreach, Barcaldine, Charleville, Capella, Clermont, Springsure, and Emerald on 8 
January voted to maintain a "lawful and orderly course of conduct" in their dispute. In 
the words of Bert Buckley, leader of the strike in the Peak Downs area, the men "have 
broken no law and do not intend to do so".'*^ ^ 
At Barcaldine in early January, 120 strikers faced police with drawn revolvers 
^" PRE/A, In-Letter 3178 of 1931, United Graziers 
Association to the Premier, 19 January, 1931. QSA. 
^^•^  Graziers Review, 16 February 1931, p. 1045. 
^^^ Dalgety's Annual Wool Review for Australasia, 1932-33, 
p. 89 and The Wool Industry Report, op.cit., p. 19. 
^^'' ibid. , p. 89. A similar position had been taken by other 
state governments. The Western Australian government reduced rail 
freight costs to wool growers by 30%; the Victorian government 
by 25%, and the New South Wales government reduced rail freight 
charges by 10% by 1932, ibid., p. 19. At the same time shearers' 
wages in all states were reduced. 
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as they successfully convinced eleven of die nineteen shearers brought up from southern 
states to join the sdike.""** Rockhampton's Morning Bulletin reported on 9 January four 
more men "from the Crossmore team of loyalists have joined up with the su-ikers and 
will leave for Sydney by to-morrow's train to assist in New South Wales in the 
campaign against the new award".'^ "^ At Roma on 22 January similar incidents 
occurted.'™ 
In retaliation, police shielded strike-breakers to prevent any close contact between 
them and the strikers. On 12 January local shearers from Dalby were stopped from 
approaching them;'^' on 23 January a similar thing happened at the Rockhampton train 
station as a trainload of strike-breakers arrived. It was reported: 
"No platform tickets issued" was the order, and the big crowd was 
barricaded off the platforms, which were occupied only by a large force 
of police and railway officials. There was a busUe of excitement as the 
first division of the mail drew in with the first three carriages shuttered. 
The inmates could be seen peering out through the shutters, and it was 
apparent that, despite the big police escort and the guard on the station, 
they were nervous.'^^ 
By mid-January, despite having no support from dieir union officials, the sd-ikers 
were confident they could win. On 18 January at meetings in Charleville, Roma, and 
Winton shearers decided to continue the stiike. The Winton meeting also passed a 
censure motion against Riordan (AWU).'^' But success depended on solidarity with 
^^^ Western Champion, 10 January 1930, [pages not numbered] 
^^^ Morning Bulletin, 9 January 1931, p. 7. 
"° Brisbane Courier, 22 January 1931, p. 13. 
"^ Morning Bulletin, 13 January 1931, p. 9. 
"^  ibid., 24 January 1931, p. 6. 
^" ibid., 19 January 1931, p. 8 and 20 January 1931, p. 7 
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other U-ade unions which was not forthcoming. No other official would support an 
industrial dispute which was not sanctioned by AWU officials. Even the left wing ARU 
officials refused to black-ban wool,'^ '* claiming they would not take industrial action 
without die support of the more conservative railway unions like the AFULE - support 
which they knew would not be forthcoming. The Queensland TLC rejected a motion by 
CPA member, Charles Wallbank, on 21 January 1931, to recommend all unions give 
financial aid to the shearers.'" 
By late January 1931 more strike-breakers were coming into Queensland under 
armed police guard. On 22 January 1931 a trainload of 300 men from Wallangarra 
stopped at Brisbane while on their way out West. When their train arrived in the capital 
...the shearers were marched in a body through the subway to have a 
meal, with uniformed police at the rear and at the head of the procession. 
As the tiain to Rockhampton drew out police walked along the 
cartiages until the platform was clear.'^* 
Even the NSW Lang Labor government provided a trainload of strike-breakers under 
police protection. The Communist Party remarked: 
It is sd-ange, is it not, that the graziers who cannot afford to pay 40/- per 
hundred to the shearers can afford to charter special u-ains to pay the 
fares of 43 scabs from Sydney to Springsure and the wages of the 59 
"coppers" who have accompanied them and who will stay with them 
while shearing is being cartied on.'" 
As hostitity toward the AWU officials increased, support for the CPA's proposal 
of an alternative, revolutionary union of pastoral workers grew. A meeting of 168 
174 ibid., 23 January 1931, p. 7 
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suikers at Charleville on 5 January voted to resign from the AWU. At Cunnamulla over 
100 strikers decided unanimously on 9 January to write to the AWU Branch Secretary 
in Brisbane and give him seven days "to come out in the open and give financial and 
moral assistance, failing which the shearers and shed workers of this district would 
forward their resignation on three months' notice".'''^ According to a PWIU bulletin 
put out in January, shearers at Toowoomba, Longreach, Charleville, Cunnamulla, 
Blackall, Hughenden, St George, and Goondiwindi had resigned from the AWU 
"because of die scabby attitude of the AWU officials in helping the Graziers to get scabs 
so as to d-y and to break the strike".'™ These sentiments grew as the strike developed. 
At a meeting in Emerald on 31 January, 116 shearers voted not to renew their AWU 
tickets, and in Longreach a motion was passed condemning the union and voting in 
favour of setting up an alternative union.'^° 
The sd-ikers' grievances were aired in a letter published in die Advocate; 
This Union [AWU], with an army of highly-paid officials, a heavy bank 
balance...assets in this State alone of over £100,000 and the control of 
two papers - "The Daily Standard" and die "Worker"...is openly ahgning 
itself with the squatters to defeat the su-ongest section of its pastoral 
workers, the shearers, shed hands, cooks and pressers, now desperately 
stiiving to retain the wages legally filched from them by the capitalist-
dominated Courts. We had the spectacle a few nights ago of a few rank 
and file members vainly endeavouring to interview police-escorted 
"scabs" "trucked" at the Central Railway Station, Brisbane, for Western 
sheds, while over-paid A.W.U. officials on 30s a day exd-a for 
expenses...were sitting back in the expensive padded stalls of this city's 
178 Morning Bulletin, 10 January 1931, p. 7 
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theau-es enjoying the shows.'**' 
The party hoped that the PWIU would act as a Militant Minority Movement 
within the wool indusd-y. They were convinced it would be a revolutionary union which 
would defeat the graziers and replace the AWU. In May 1931 the Workers Weekly 
cartied a letter from communist W. "Trucker" Brown, PWIU Organiser, who called the 
AWU leaders "social fascist job-hunters, who control and exploit the membership of the 
A.W.U."'^ ^ and insisted rank and file committees "will soon end both die graziers and 
the A.W.U."."' 
The PWIU managed to gain a foothold in the pastoral industry. Two branches 
were established - one at Barcaldine, the other at Charleville. In early February ninety 
men from Cunnamulla left the AWU to join the new union.'^ A conference of the 
new union atd-acted sixty-five delegates who were anxious to avoid becoming as 
bureaucratic as the AWU. It was decided that all delegates to future conferences would 
be rank and file members and only those working in the industry would have the vote. 
This "precluded all paid officials from voting or being delegates at conference".'^^ 
All officials elected at the conference were from the rank and file and all had 
established credentials as militants. Bob Patterson, the President was "one of the 
pioneers of the Meat Workers' Union of New Zealand. He is hated by die A.W.U. 
officialdom because of his long fight against their d-eacherous rule". Arthur Rae, 
"^  Advocate. 16 February 1931, p. 4. 
®^^  Workers Weekly, no. 4 00 (22 May 1931), p. 4 
'" ibid. , p. 4. 
^^ ^ i b i d . , no . 385 (6 February 1931), p . 6. 
185 i b i d . , no . 381 (9 January 1931), p . 4 
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Honorary Treasurer, was prepared to combat "the most treacherous and vilest gang of 
capitalist lackeys in Australia, the A.W.U. officials"."^ *^ 
The shearers faced a desperate battie as strike-breakers fiooded into Queensland. 
Isolated from the rest of the d-ade union movement and without the support of even their 
own officials, it became evident that the strike would be lost At this point the strikers' 
tactics became more desperate. To stop the movement of strike-breakers, shearers 
derailed a train at Capella in late January'^^ and attempted to do the same at 
Barcaldine on 21 February."^* 
When a trainload of 240 strike-breakers passed through Emerald on the night of 
27 January, a batile broke out as shearers, aided by some of their wives, died to stop 
the d-ain: 
As the train rumbled over the fishplates out of the Emerald yards 
on to Clermont a crowd of sd-ikers made a desperate rush, breaking the 
barriers, the police guard being unable to stem the tide. 
The "special" ran the gauntlet of a fusiUade of blue metal. Several 
cartiage windows were broken, and a stone hurled with considerable 
force struck Constable McNaught, of St. Lawrence, in the face, breaking 
his nose...'^^ 
A number of shearers were gaoled for their part in the incident, prompting the 
^^^ ibid., p. 4. The executive was made up of D. Eatock, L. 
McGinty, M. Mercer, G. Ryan, J. Thurbon, P. Monaghan (a founding 
member of the AWU), J. Doyle, T. Mulheron, T. Williams, M. Foley. 
G. Arbuthnot was elected vice-president and Trucker Brown, J. 
Boyle, G. Bellamy and Paddy Ryan were organisers. 
^^^ Morning Bulletin, 29 January 1931, p. 9. The Alpha Branch 
of the ALP protested to Premier Moore that passenger trains 
should not be used to carry strike-breakers - not because the 
Branch supported the strikers, but because in doing so it was 
"endangering the lives of other passengers"! PRE/A, In-Letter 
3178 of 1931, Alpha Branch ALP to Premier, 25 February 1931. QSA. 
^^® Morning Bulletin, 24 February 1931, p. 6. 
^^^ Brisbane Courier, 29 January 1931, p. 11. 
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Unemployed Workers Movement to demand all charges against shearers be dropped and 
all those gaoled be immediately and unconditionally released.''^ 
At Blackall on 28 January graziers successfully took 120 strike-breakers to their 
properties through the picket line of an estimated 350 strikers and their supporters.'*" 
Shearers at Clermont also failed to stop the strike-breakers who passed through from 
Capella at 7.30am on 28 January. The police "had to draw their batons to compel them 
to move. There was a scuffie and a police officer was struck. Immediately the man was 
hit over the head with a baton and he dropped as if shot".'^' 
When a trainload arrived at Emerald on the night of 31 January, 400-500 people 
assembled to confront the stiike-breakers who were protected by a cordon of police. As 
strikers rushed forward, die police fired a volley over their heads. They drew their 
batons and drove the crowd off the platform injuring ten people.'^^ The next day, in 
the early hours of die morning, police raided the strikers' camp on die pretext of looking 
for guns. The camp was broken up and the fifteen strikers were summonsed on charges 
of assaulting police, creating a disturbance and obscene language.'** 
On the same day as the battie on the Emerald railway station, a similar one 
occurred in Barcaldine. Here a u-ainload of strike-breakers and police were met by 400-
500 stiikers and their supporters. 
When the train pulled in these rushed to the carriage and called to the 
^^° PRE/A, In-Letter 3178 of 1931, Unemployed Workers 
Movement to Premier, 25 February 1931. QSA. 
"^  Morning Bulletin, 29 January 1931, p. 9. 
'^^ ibid. , p. 9. 
'" ibid., 2 February 1931, p. 9. 
^^' ibid. , 3 February 1931, p. 9. 
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men to come out They used uncomplimentary epithets. There was also 
much hooting, and jeering...A couple of militant women were 
conspicuous by their angry exclamations to the men in the carriage...'''^ 
It was after this incident that a meeting of shearers in Barcaldine voted 116 to 50 not 
to renew their AWU membership.'^ The previous day a meeting in St. George voted 
69 to 10 to do the sanie.'*^^ 
At Surat a number of strikers physically attacked three sheds - Noorindoo, 
CoUingwood, and 'Ventura Downs - and drove off the strike-breakers.'^^ Police 
reinforcements were sent in from Roma and three strike organisers - communist, 
"Trucker" Brown; George (Jack) Welch, Secretary of the St. George strike committee; 
and Christopher Mitchell, Secretary of the Roma sd-ike committee - were arrested for 
having "violentiy compelled men to leave their employment".'^ Brown, Welch and 
Mitchell were described by the police as "the spokesmen and ringleaders of the 
mob".'*^ 
Despite their isolation from the rest of the union movement, the influx of su-ike-
breakers and die continual harassment by the police, the shearers were determined to 
hold out against the new award. A meeting at Charieville on 2 February had two 
separate ballots. One was an open ballot of 140 single men, the other a secret ballot of 
^^^ ibid. , 2 February 1931, p. 9. 
'^^ ibid. , p. 9. 
"' ibid., 3 February 1931, p. 9. 
15^  Workers Weekly, no. 386 (13 February 1931), p. 6. Also 
see Brisbane Courier, 20 January 1931, p. 11. 
199 Workers Weekly, no. 386 (13 February 1931), p. 6 
°^° PRE/A, In-Letter 3178 of 1931, Roma District Police to 
Commissioner of Police, 4 February 1931. QSA. 
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40 married men. Both voted to continue the strike.""' At an AWU conference in 
Jericho from 4 to 8 February there "was great cheering in the hall" when it was decided 
178 votes to 34 to continue the dispute.^"' At Roma, Mitchell, Toowoomba, 
Cunnamulla the vote to continue was unanimous.'"^ In Hughenden the majority also 
favoured remaining on strike.^ ** 
Within twelve days, however, many sd-ikers began to waver. Although 
maintaining their standard of living depended on winning the strike, dieir isolation began 
to have its effects. Longreach su-ikers, at a "rowdy" meeting in the picture theatre on 14 
February, narrowly carried a motion to continue the strike by 104 votes to 92.^ °^  
Barcaldine shearers, despite the pleas of "Trucker" Brown, voted on 18 February 158 
to 108 to end the strike.^^ Tempers ran high. The meeting, "very rowdy at times", saw 
two men come to bIows.^ °^ The next day Longreach shearers voted 155 to 35 to 
declare the strike offi^ '*^  Commenting on the vacillation of the strikers, Blackall police 
said: 
It is very hard to arrive at a conclusion as to how the dispute is 
progressing as the Strikers vote one minute with a majority to go to 
work, and an hour afterwards call another meeting and a majority to 
°^^  Morning Bulletin, 2 February 1931, p. 9. 
°^2 ibid. , 10 February 1931, p. 7. 
^" Workers Weekly, no. 387 (20 February 1931), p. 1. 
°^'' Morning Bulletin, 12 February 1931, p. 6. 
°^^  ibid. , 16 February 1931, p. 8. 
°^^  Western Champion, 21 February 1931, [page not numbered]. 
°^^  Peak Downs Telegram, 21 February 1931, [page not 
numbered] . 
20E Morning Bulletin, 20 February 1931, p. 6 
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strike is the result..~°'^  
By the end of February 1931 the strike had ended in defeat. The CPA's call for 
it to continue did not find enough support.^'" The Graziers Association of Central and 
Northern Queensland thanked Premier Moore: 
...for the valuable assistance rendered during the recent Strike through the 
Police and RaUway Departments in the effort to defeat the forces of 
anarchy that were arrayed against this organisation."" 
They also said that without the police it would "have been impossible to carry 
the various shearings through".^'^ The demoralisation of the shearers following their 
defeat allowed graziers to continue to cut their wages and working conditions over the 
following years. By 1932 shearing rates had been reduced by 25% and the wages of 
shed hands by 30%,^'^ and graziers also secured a reduction in shearing labour. At the 
same time, the estimated income of graziers increased from £27,000,000 in 1930-1931 
to £35,000,000 from 1932-33.'" 
The defeat of die strike increased shearers' hostihty toward the AWU officials. 
°^^  PRE/A, In-Letter 3178 of 1931, Longreach District Police 
to Commissioner of Police, 25 February 1931. QSA. 
^^° On 20 February 1931 Trucker Brown released figures 
claiming the overall state vote to continue striking was 1271 to 
681 against. But whether this was so or not the strike ended. 
Morning Bulletin, 20 February 1931, p. 6. 
^^^ PRE/A, In-letter 3178 of 1931, Graziers Association of 
Central and Northern Queensland to Premier, 28 May 1931. QSA. 
^^^ PRE/A, In-letter 3178 of 1931, United Graziers 
Association to Premier, 27 February 1931. QSA. 
213 The Australian Wool Industry Report', op.cit. , p. 21. 
^^^ Pastoral Workers Bulletin, (Issued by the PWIU), vol. 1, 
no. 3 (25 September 1933), p. 1. 
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In Charleville, where there had been a big meeting of the PWIU in late February,^'^ 
the strike committee recommended a return to work only on the condition that "no 
shearer or shedhand shall work with a man holding an A.W.U. ticket or anyone who 
'scabbed' during the strike".'^"' The Western Champion reported that "it is an open 
secret that the strikers burned all their A.W.U. tickets in the strike centres".''^ 
At the end of the dispute two unions existed in the pastoral industry - the now 
discredited AWU and the CPA-led PWIU. Tensions between the two unions ran high. 
The AWU officials called the PWIU a "gang of Communist disrupters" bent on splitting 
the labour movement,''^ while the PWIU answered that "to be condemned by the 
A.W.U. officials is an honor".''*' 
The party insisted that diree factors contributed to the strike's defeat. One was 
the failure to conduct "active struggle by revolutionary action" against strike-
breakers.^ ^° By this they meant physical intimidation. They wrote that "the passive 
attitude to the scabs should be changed and these people be made to understand that 
police or no police they must not and will not be allowed to scab".^^' The Workers 
Weekly described how over 200 shearers confronted strike-breakers at Springsure. 
^^^ PRE/A, In Letter 3178 of 1931, Sub-Inspector of 
Charleville to Commissioner of Police, 3 March 1931. QSA. 
^^^ Western Champion, 28 February 1931, [page not numbered]. 
^" ibid. 
218 Worker, 17 January 1931, p. 14 
^" From the PWIU rank and file Bulletin # 20, PRE/A, In-
Letter 3178 of 1931, Longreach District Police to Commissioner 
of Police, 11 February 1931. QSA. 
^^ ° Workers Weekly, no. 389 (6 March 1931), p. 6. 
2^1 ibid. , no. 382 (16 January 1931), p. 6. 
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Yet all that the leaders did was to address the scabs and ask them not to 
work. The result was...A few minutes later a string of lorries and motor 
cars travelling at high speed left Springsure for Meteor Downs Station 
with its precious load of scabs and police aboard."-^ 
The second contributing factor was the failure of the rank and file leadership to 
function effectively. Members of the central strike committee were scattered all over 
Queensland, dierefore the strike was in the hands of one or two men "giving direction 
to the strikers according to their individual opinions".^" The third factor was die 
treachery of the AWU officials. The Workers Weekly believed this was the behaviour 
of men who were under the pay and "the direct control of the Graziers' Association and 
the Arbitiation Court".^ '^' 
At its height the PWIU claimed 2,000 members nationally,^" and by December 
1931 die Toowoomba branch of the PWIU was affiliated to the local Labor Council.^ '^^  
However, die AWU, with its massive bureaucracy, was far too strong to be replaced by 
the PWIU. It faced not only a "victimisation campaign of the graziers" but also effective 
oudawing by the Labor government. In 1933 die Forgan-Smith Labor government re-
established AWU preference in the pastoral industry. Anyone who was not a member 
of the AWU could not be employed. As the CPA admitted, union preference "lost nearly 
all the Queensland membership of die P.W.I.U."^" including one of their own leaders. 
Ray Brown, elected representative of the PWIU, was dismissed for not possessing an 
222 ^ bid. , no. 385 (6 February 1931), p. 6. 
2" ibid., no. 389 (6 March 1931), p. 6. 
22^  ibid. , no. 382 (16 January 1931), p. 6. 
22^  O'Lincoln Tom, Militant Minority, op.cit., p. 10. 
22^  Red Leader, 4 December 1931, p. 3. 
2" Trade Union Leader, vol. 1, no. 1 (August 1935), p. 7 
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AWU ticket in 1934. Therefore, he was not able to be employed in the industry.^ ^^ 
In 1934 the Sydney conference of the PWIU admitted the union had gone 
through a period of difficulties.^ ^"^ To popularise the PWIU amongst rural workers it 
was resolved to build Bush Workers' Committees."** Although the CPA reported 
active Committees functioning at Winton, Barcaldine, Charleville, Dirranbandi, and 
Hughenden in August 1935, at the same time the PWIU wrote to the AWU proposing 
what amounted to amalgamation between the two organisations, but nothing came of 
this."' Edgar Ross later said of the CPA's only "Red" union that "life itself showed 
the tactic was cockeyed"."^ 
PARTY GROWTH AND RECRUITMENT 
The party recruited rapidly during this phase. The Sydney branch, for instance, 
signed-up seventy-five workers on May Day in 1931."' In Queensland, the state's 151 
members sold 1,858 copies of the Workers Weekly in July 1931.^^ In 1932 the CPA 
was able to draw an audience of around 500 to a meeting in Cairns on the Russian 
22^  Pastoral Workers' Bulletin, Organ of the PWIU, vol. 1, 
no. 13 (18 June 1934), p. 4. 
225 Workers Weekly, no. 535 (12 January 1935), p. 6. 
2^° In 1922 the One Big Union Propaganda League became the 
Bush Workers' Propaganda Group which advocated rank and file 
control over the AWU and the removal of the colour-bar. 
2^ ^ Red Leader, no. 197 (19 June 1935), p. 9. 
2^2 Edgar Ross interviewed by Beris Penrose, 9 October 1991. 
2" Report-of Plenary Session No. 1 District Committee, p. 
1. Series C320 PI, Item CIB 631. AA (Sydney). 
234 Workers Weekly, no. 408 (17 July 1931), p. 3. 
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Revolution. This was far greater than the small party membership there.^ '^^  The party 
also established small a working class base in a number of Queensland towns. By July 
1931 MM groups - the name of the Militant Minority Movement had been changed to 
the Minority Movement by then - had been established in Brisbane, Ipswich, 
Rockhampton, Scottville, Collinsville, Torbanlea, Mackay, Townsville, and Mt Isa. 
It was not surprising the CPA was able to recruit at Mt Isa. The Workers Weekly 
described the conditions in the mine as "treacherous". Even though there had been two 
fatal accidents since the mine opened, "the workers have no check-inspector".2^'' Mt 
Isa, they said, was a "Company Town": 
...every facility that is required by the worker is under the control of the 
company. To wit: Housing, stores, hospital (contributed to by the 
workers), barracks (for single men), mess house, recreation grounds, bank 
rotunda, park, and employees' club (controlled by the boss), etc.; even 
football teams are subsidised by the company.2" 
One of the most peculiar strikes that occurted in die town was in November 
1929. Workers launched a beer strike - boycotting the two hotels in the town in protest 
at the exorbitant prices they charged. The strike lasted for many mondis and was so 
solid that even in July 1930 the local policeman reported there were no more than ten 
or twenty customers in the hotels. At the same time meetings of the strike committee 
atd-acted around 700.^'* 
2^ ^ ibid., no. 480 (9 December 1932), p. 4. The meeting was 
addressed by Alfred Paull who had recently been gaoled for his 
part in defending the unemployed when they were attacked in 
Parramatta Park, Cairns. 
2^ ^ ibid. , p. 8. 
2" ibid., p. 4. 
2^ ^ PRE/A 1709 of 1930, Sergeant Landy to the Commissioner 
of Police, 5 July 1930. QSA. 
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The strike split the local Chamber of Commerce which was dominated by the 
hotel owners. Many businesses withdrew from it and distanced themselves from odier 
business people who had been black-banned by the workers.2^ *^  Even the Hospital 
Committee was split One H. Cleary was on both the Hospital Committee and the strike 
committee. When the strikers put a ban on the picture theatre which was booked for the 
Hospital Benefit, only sixty-eight people defied the ban and attended the function. On 
top of this fund raising disaster, the Mt Isa Hospital Medical Officer threatened to sue 
the strike committee for defamation as they claimed he spent three hours a day drinking 
in a strike affected hotel. Littie wonder it was reported that the Hospital Committee had 
"not been working harmoniously of late".2'"' During a speaking tour of north 
Queensland in December 1930, Ted Tripp spoke to an audience of 500 workers in Mt 
Isa,2'*' and in July 1931 the MM had eleven members there who were "very active in 
attempting to mobilise the miners for struggle against further wage cuts".2^2 
Other mining centres where the CPA sank roots were Collinsville and Scottville. 
In 1931 Tripp reported that they "far exceeded the hopes of any Communist".2"^ In 
both cend-es he held large meetings and even though the miners were working only two 
2" PRE/A, In-Letter 1709 of 1930, Sergeant Landy to the 
Commissioner of Police, 5 February 1930. QSA. Landy believed the 
organisation had been formed with the specific intent of smashing 
the beer strike. 
2^° PRE/A, In-Letter 1709 of 1930, Sergeant Landy to 
Commissioner of Police, 16 May 1930. QSA. 
2^^ PRE/A, In-Letter 7953 of 1930, Constable Bell to the 
Commissioner of Police, 31 December 1930. QSA. 
2'2 Workers Weekly, no. 406 (3 July 1931), p. 4. 
2^ ^ Workers Weekly, no. 381 (9 January 1931), p. 4. 
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shifts per pay, "they responded magnificently for a call for financial support".2"" Jim 
Henderson, one of the founding members of the Collinsville CPA branch, admitted it 
was "quite easy" to build an MM section there because "miners had been militant for 
years".'"' 
The CPA also attracted support amongst railway workers in north Queensland, 
particularly in Townsville, where they called a rank and file conference of north 
Queensland railway workers on 5 January 1931. This conference originated from a mass 
meeting of Townsville railway men who "decided to completely repudiate the Trade 
Union officials... and to set up a rank and file committee with representatives from every 
department elected by the workers on the job".'""^ The CPA claimed of the union 
officials: 
They have sought to disarm the workers, and assist the Boss in his wage-
slashing drive by disgusting lying, and cowardly slogans, such as "The 
Depression is only a Passing Phase", "Bring down the Cost of 
Commodities", "Wait for a Labor Government". 
Thus these traitors seek to render the workers harmless to the 
Boss.2'' 
The party believed that the north Queensland conference would "lay the basis for 
the organisation from below for workers' control", which would "smash forever the 
tieacherous influence of the Union officials" and would "prepare plans for staying the 
offensive of Capitalism and for the launching of the counter attack".'"'^  High hopes 
2^ ^ ibid. , p. 4. 
2^^ Jim Henderson interviewed by Beris Penrose, 10 October 
1991. 
2^^ Workers Weekly, no. 381 (9 January 1931), p. 4. 
2^ ' ibid. , p. 4. 
24E ibid., p. 4 
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were generated around building a large party branch in Townsville. Tripp wrote 
confidentiy in January 1931, after local police tried to prevent a communist street 
meeting, that "in the very near future we will have sufficient strength to win the streets 
despite the Police force and the assistance they obtain from the Trade Union 
leaders".'^' 
To the party leadership the growing recruitment, paper sales and audiences at 
meetings confirmed the Third Period analysis that workers were rapidly moving to the 
left Consequentiy, in April 1931 the MM in Brisbane set itself the aim of establishing 
the independent leadership of the working class without and against the "social fascist" 
union bureaucracy. Left wing Queensland union officials, Tim Moroney (ARU) and 
Emie Ellis, ex-CPA leader of the Carpenters Union, were cited as left "social fascists", 
of the calibre of NSW officials Jock Garden and "Bondy" Hoare.2^ *^  
At the MM's April conference J. Elder was elected Secretary for the Queensland 
MM and Albert Hulme was elected President.'^' Yet, despite the party's expectation 
that it could soon become the leader of the working class, the MM faced real difficulties 
in growing. Jean Besant commented two months after the conference that the "Brisbane 
centre is not yet strong enough to put a full-time MM organiser in the field at 
present".2^2 
Despite their activism, support and influence in many disputes of employed and 
2^ 5 i b i d . , p . 4 . 
2^° Workers Weekly, no. 480 (9 December 1932), p. 5. 
2^^ ibid. , no. 3 95 (17 April 1931) , p. 5. James Elder was CPA 
delegate to the Fifth RILU Congress and was Queensland secretary 
of the MMM in 1931. 
2" ibid., (no. 398) 8 May 1931, p. 4. 
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unemployed workers, the CPA found it was easier to recruit members than to hold them. 
The leadership admitted in January 1932 that while around 900 people joined the CPA 
in June-July 1931, a large number "were no sooner won than lost for the Party".2" It 
was concluded that work in the unions and amongst the unemployed was directionless, 
badly organised, inefficient and sectarian. The Workers Weekly claimed: 
Instances can be given where the Party fraction has antagonised and 
driven out of U.W.M. branches the great majority of the non-party and 
Labor Party workers, leaving the Party members isolated or with only a 
very small group of supporters.'^ 
Clearly there was a problem. On the one hand the party's influence was growing. 
CPA membership in 1930 increased four-fold in twelve months.2" In Brisbane during 
1930, die party held weekly public meetings in the Domain, near the City Botanic 
Gardens, which were regularly attracted audiences of between 50 and 100 people.'^* 
In Melbourne Ralph Gibson claimed diat at one stage "unemployed workers were 
actually queuing up at the Party's headquarters at 217 Russell Street to sign their 
application forms".'" In the Adelaide beef riots in January 1931 where the 
unemployed were protesting against beef being substituted for mutton on ration tickets, 
the CPA was influential.'^* They even took over a rightist Citizens League meeting, 
drowning out pad-iotic singers with renditions of the Red Flag. According to Ray 
2" Workers Weekly, no. 433 (15 January 1932), p. 2. 
2^ ^ ibid. , p. 2. 
2" Gibson, op.cit., p. 10 
2^ ^ See series of reports to Commissioner of Police Pre/A, 
In-Letter 7953 of 1928. QSA. 
2B7 Gibson, op.cit., p. 10. 
2^ ^ Ray Broomhill, Unemployed Workers: A Social History of 
the Great Depression in Adelaide (University of Queensland Press: 
St. Lucia, 1978), pp. 176-178. 
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Broomhill: 
When the official speakers attempted to make themselves heard they were 
drowned out with interjections and "boo-hoos". Another young man, 
"gesticulating excitedly", shouted "Communism is leading the world and 
don't you make any mistake". The meeting closed with the audience 
again singing the "Red Flag" before leaving.2^ ** 
Yet on the other hand, the party was unable to retain its new membership. The 
cause of this dilemma may be found in the exaggerated analysis of the period and the 
overblown expectations from the leadership as to what the party could accomplish. 
This was somewhat remedied after the CPA came under considerable criticism 
from Moscow in 1930. 
2S9 i b i d . , p . 177 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BUILDING AMONGST WORKERS AND UNEMPLOYED 1932-1933 
CPA ACCUSED OF "ANARCHO-SYNDICAUSM" BY MOSCOW 
At the Fifth Congress of the Red International of Trade Unions [RILU or 
Profintern] in Moscow in August 1930, CPA delegates Lance Sharkey and Bill Orr were 
admonished for activities they proudly viewed as proof of their commitment to the Third 
Period line. A bewildered Sharkey reported: "we got over there and presented our 
reports to Moscow and in detail gave them all of these episodes, romantic things we had 
been engaged in in the firm believe (sic) that we were worthy of praise".' Instead he 
and Ort were astounded to find they were "entirely out of line" with Comintern 
thought2 The Soviet leadership of the RILU ridiculed the CPA's activities during the 
Sdike on the northern NSW coal fields (1929-1930), especially die Ausu-alian 
Communist Party's the call to arm miners. The Soviets called this as an "anarcho-
syndicalist" stunt Orr recalled: 
...in relation to the Defence Array when it was discussed, we stated that 
there were over 2,000 in the Northern coalfields, and that they were in 
a position to arm most of them. Vassiloff? (sic) just laughed and said 
what do you think they were going to do with them...We were thrashed 
very severly (sic) on these questions...' 
Initially, Sharkey defended the extreme actions of the party. He argued that "in England 
they could have peaceful demonstrations and so on, but if we participated in a strike or 
^ Closed Session Central Committee Plenum, 2 January 1932, 
PP-cit. , p. 7. 
2 ibid., p. 7. 
^ ibid., pp. 9-10 
195 
demonstration in Australia, we were batoned and even shot"."* While it was true that the 
police had used weapons against waterside workers, miners, shearers and the 
unemployed, Moscow dismissed these rationalisations and reprimanded the CPA. 
That this derived from concern for the viability of the small Australian party is 
questionable given Moscow's previous record. As E.H. Carr states, Stalin's "lack of 
enthusiasm for Comintern and for foreign communists was notorious".^ What is more 
persuasive is Frank Farrell's contention that the Soviet bureaucracy "had come to regard 
the C.P.A. as relatively unimportant in the Australian context, and tended to place much 
greater store on the role of the Profintern", whose affiliate was the NSW Labor 
Council.^ 
The RILU's criticisms may have reflected a desire to mollify the NSW Labour 
Council which was being alienated by the extremism of the CPA's Third Period line. 
Through the Labour Council, Australian unions maintained links with Asian unions by 
way of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat [PPTUS]. As numerous articles in the 
Workers Weekly confirm, Stalin speculated that the western powers would invade the 
USSR from the east, using China as their launching pad. At a time when die USSR was 
surrounded by hostile imperialist powers and had not yet sufficientiy built up its defence 
forces, security lay in its ability to mobilise workers internationally against an invasion. 
Given this, links between trade unions in Asia, Australia and the USSR became vital. 
This would explain why Garden was elected to the world executive of the RILU 
in 1928 - long after he had left the CPA. That the majority of Moscow's emissaries up 
•^  i b i d . , p . 7 . 
^ Carr, Twilight of the Comintern, op.cit., p. 403. 
^ Frank Farrell, "Explaining Comimunist History", Labour 
History, no. 32, May 1977, p. 6. 
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to 1931 were connected with the RILU or trade union affairs, rather than with the 
Comintern, further indicates the importance Moscow placed on the Labor Council over 
the CPA. The Soviet's treatment of Kavanagh's friend and political ally. Jack Ryan, 
tends to confirm this as well.^ 
Ryan played an important role in editing, along with Garden, die PPTUS paper, 
the Pan-Pacific Worker. In 1928 Ryan was the ACTU's delegate to the PPTUS meeting 
in Shanghai. He was also, along with Norman Jeffery, the NSW delegate to the Fourth 
Congress of die RILU diat same year. When, in February 1930, the Sharkey-Moxon-
Miles leadership expelled Ryan for "attempting to raise die status of the counter-
revolutionary Garden",^ the Comintern showed its displeasure by directing the new 
leadership to admit Ryan back into the party. This did not eventuate as the criteria for 
readmission set by the CPA leadership was too high for Ryan to meet^ and even Ryan's 
application to rejoin the party in 1932 was rejected.'° 
Overriding Sharkey, Moxon, and Miles' inclinations to submit to Moscow was 
their need to sever all contacts with previous reformist allies. To acknowledge they had 
miscalculated in their crusade against the "right deviationists" would undermine the 
authority of the new leadership and would give sustenance to the defeated faction. As 
the leadership admitted later in 1932, in their "endeavours to avoid many of the mistakes 
of our former Right-Wing leadership", they showed "tendencies to veer to the opposite 
^ ibid., pp. 6-7 . 
® Quoted in Farrell, International Socialism, op.cit., p 
181. 
^ Blake, op.cit., p. 45 
10 Workers Weekly, no. 466 (2 September 1932), p. 2. 
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exd-eme"." 
That the new party leadership was determined to achieve its own ends through 
manipulative tactics was evident over the nominations for delegates to die Fifth RILU 
Congress. When this was raised at the NSW Labor Council meeting in May 1930, the 
CPA nominated Sharkey and Comrade Docker, while, to their consternation, a non-
communist nominated Kavanagh. Aldiough Kavanagh received more votes than Sharkey, 
he was ordered by the party executive to withdraw, or, as Kavanagh claimed, he would 
be "caUed to account".'2 On his refusal to withdraw he found himself before the 
Central Conu:ol Commission, who resolved the controversy in the new leadership's 
favour. As it turned out the NSW Labor Council failed to send a delegate to the RILU 
and Sharkey went as the representative of the Vigilance Committee. Kavanagh, disgusted 
with this behaviour, commented in his diary: 
The nomination of Sharkey and Docker for delegates to the 
R.I.L.U. is indicative of their lack of contact with the workers and of 
their lack of seriousness in the matter of the delegation... 
As it is not one Party member has been elected. 
Jeffries (sic) statement after the elections was another piece of 
stupidity. It conveyed the impression diat we were not concerned with the 
R.I.L.U. if our nominees were not elected.'^ 
In January 1931, over two years after the Third Period Line was adopted by the 
Comintern, the NSW Labor Council was officially expelled from the RILU, ending a 
nine year link between the two organisations. By this time the Labor Council's 
association with the PPTUS had also been severed, making its alliance with the RILU 
inconsequential from Moscow's point of view. On its expulsion the CPA's Minority 
"ibid., no. 473 (21 October 1932), p. 4 
2^ Kavanagh's diary, op.cit., 22 May 1930 
13 i b i d . , 23 May 1930 . 
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Movement became the RILU's new affiliate in Australia.''' 
Terminating all connections with reformists took priority over everything else, 
as the episode with the League Against Imperialism [LAI] shows. To raise awareness 
of the war danger and to organise against it the CPA established the LAI in August 
1930.'^  Esmonde Higgins, a friend and supporter of Kavanagh, was made its national 
secretary.'^ A month after it was founded LAI had branches in the Sydney suburbs of 
Balmain, Woolloomooloo, Surry Hills, Paddington and North Sydney and "active 
groups" functioned in three Sydney factories.'^ By October 1930 disu-ict committees 
of the League operated in Brisbane, Adelaide, Cessnock, Kurri, Hobart and Melbourne. 
In Brisbane and Adelaide the party also made progress with its anti-war work amongst 
workers on the waterfront and ships.'^ 
LAI was a broad front involving such high profile non-communists as Senator 
Arthur Rae, Rev C.W. Chandler, Labor Alderman E.J. Ward, and long time ALP 
member, J.B. Steel.'^ Don Cameron, President of the Melbourne Trades Hall Council, 
addressed a LAI meeting in Sydney in September 1930 while Rae was joined on the 
" For a short period of time the ARU was affiliated to the 
RILU but threats by the federal Lyons government against the 
union led it to cut ties with the RILU. 
^^  This was the Australian section of the LAI founded in 
Brussels (February 1927). During the Third Period non-Communists 
such as Indian nationalist, Nehru, were forced out. Then, at 
LAI'S international congress in May 1931 all non-Communists were 
formerly expelled. Carr, Twilight of the Comintern, op.cit . , p. 
385. 
^^  J. Normington-Rawling, "Reflections in Tranquillity", 
Quadrant. vol. 5, no. 4 (Spring 1961), p. 26. 
^^  Workers Weekly, no. 367 (19 Septemiber 1930) , p. 6 and no. 
369 (10 October 1930), p. 2 . 
^^ ibid., no. 369 (3 October 1930), p. 2. 
^^  ibid., no. 448 (29 April 1932), p. 4. 
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speakers' platform by Bishop Arundale at the League's meeting at Darlinghurst a few 
days later, on the issue of British domination in lndia.2'' 
In its eariy days LAI claimed to have established relations with the Indian 
organisations in Fiji - the Indian Labor Union and the Indian National Congress - and 
efforts were made "to link up with the popular movement against planters and mining 
companies and their government in New Guinea".2' The CPA credited LAI with 
forcing the Minister for Defence to announce that Australia would not "recruit 
unemployed ex-soldiers for service as Black-and-Tans in India".22 It went on to claim: 
At least eighteen organisations have carried resolutions of solidarity with 
the Indian revolution. The N.S.W. executive of the A.L.P., at the instance 
of the League, called on the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party "to 
oppose all proposals for sending foodstuffs, munitions, or troops from 
Australia for imperialist service in India" and "to cable the British Labor 
Party demanding the withdrawal of British U-oops from India and the 
cessation of acts of violence against the Indian masses".2' 
But the new CPA leadership would not abide Higgins' attempts to work with 
non-communist anti-war activists, as this was suggestive of the CPA's previous policies 
under Kavanagh. Therefore, the leadership continually intervened in LAI "whenever it 
was felt necessary to safeguard third period purity".2^* Higgins came under pressure 
from the CPA leaders to curb Jack Ryan's role in the League. However, Higgins was 
unable to convince LAI non-party members of the need to do this. At LAI's conference 
2° ibid. , no. 336 (12 September 1930), p. 6 and no. 367 (19 
September 1930), p. 6. 
21 ibid., no. 369 (3 October 1930), p. 2, and no. 371 (17 
October 1930), p. 6. 
22 ibid, no. 369 (3 October 1930), p. 2. 
" ibid, p. 2. 
2^  Farrell, International Socialism, op.cit., p. 212. 
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in February 1931 Ryan complained of the ban on his work to the eighty delegates 
assembled. The Workers Weekly defended itself by saying: 
It was explained that there was no ban, that the League was master of its 
own affairs, but that the Communist Party members of the national 
committee (a small minority) opposed the use of Ryan as a speaker for 
the League on account of his u-eachery to the Red International of Labor 
Unions and the P.P.T.U.S. Conference...2^ 
More worrying to the new CPA leadership was a motion from LAI members to 
desist from describing the Lang Plan as a "social fascist gesture".^^ In effect this was 
a rebuff of die Third Period hne. Although this motion was defeated, nonetheless the 
fact that it was raised at all indicates that non-party members had some influence over 
the direction of the organisation. 
Subsequent to the conference, "almost every vestige of 'left social fascism' was 
forced out of the League's activities", although the Workers Weekly maintained that Rev. 
Chandler and Eddie Ward "withdrew under pressure from the A.L.P.".2^ Even Higgins 
was forced out of LAI.2^ At its April 1932 national conference, he did not accept re-
nomination for his position of National Secretary "through pressure of other work in the 
movement", the Workers Weekly claimed.2'^  A week later Higgins was expelled from 
the party; refused entry into any halls, rooms, or offices belonging to the CPA or any 
organisation affiliated to it; and members were warned not to associate with him.^ ° 
2^  Workers Weekly, no. 393 (3 April 1931), p. 6. 
2^  The Lang Plan proposed that governments cut expenditure 
by reducing interest payments to the banks. Workers Weekly, no 
393 (3 April 1931), p. 6. 
2^  ibid., no. 448 (29 April 1932), p. 4. 
2^  Farrell, International Socialism, 00.cit, p. 212. 
25 ibid. , p. 4. 
°^ ibid., no. 449 (6 May 1932), p. 3. 
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In this period it was commonplace for non-party members to be removed from 
official positions of CPA-inspircd organisations. Jean Devanny, communist novelist, 
recounts a similar tale of an effective non-communist assistant of die Workers 
International Relief who was dismissed with no explanation by the party leadership.'' 
That the CPA executive was consumed with distancing itself completely from 
the policies of the previous leadership may explain why, after returning from the USSR, 
the party's exd-eme activities continued until mid-1931. Sharkey admitted he had 
"special instructions that all such deviations had to be combated in the Ausd-alian 
Party".'2 yet the Bankstown eviction occurred in June 1931 and on May Day die same 
year the Cend-al Committee decreed diat communists must hold their own rally on 1 
May, separate from the official rally called for 4 May. When communists C. Nelson and 
J. Shelley (NSW) also attended the official rally, Shelley was expelled while Nelson, 
candidate for the Political Bureau, had his endorsement for the position of General 
Secretary of the Miners Federation withdrawn by the party." 
The turn away from exd-emism came in late 1931. This was due to a combination 
of internal factors, such as loss of party merabership, as well as external factors, mainly, 
a shift in die Comintern policy toward moderation. 
^^ Jean Devanny, Point of Departure: The Autobiography of 
Jean Devanny (ed. Carole Ferrier) (University of Queensland 
Press: St. Lucia, 1986), pp. 152-153. 
2^ Closed Session Central Committee Plenum, 2 January 1932. 
PP-cit. , p. 7. 
" Report of Plenary Session No. 1 District Committee, p. 2. 
Series C320 PI, Item CIB 631. AA (Sydney). 
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MOXON DEPOSED 
In April 1931 the French government proposed a non-aggression pact between 
France and the USSR which was finalised on 10 August The next month Japan 
occupied Manchuria, fuelling Moscow's fears of imminent war. With an uncertain ally 
in France and an openly hostile adversary occupying Manchuria, Moscow was wary of 
frightening the French government with extreme activity from the Communist Party of 
France. Restraint became the watchword from Moscow.^ This, claims E.H. Carr: 
...was a far cry from the days when the Bolsheviks looked to European 
revolution as the deus ex machina which would dehver them from the 
nightmare of isolation in a hostile capitalist world...Now a revolutionary 
outbreak in cend-al Europe would provoke French intervention, fan 
hostihty to the USSR, and strengthen the hold of the imperialist Powers 
over the German bourgeois regime. The world had become too dangerous 
a place for rash revolutionary adventures.^^ 
But a moderation of tactics in the CPA would bring into question the previous 
extieme policies of the new leadership - something they were anxious to avoid. As 
Devanny explained, "the sanctity of leaders was an obsession. The most common-place 
individuals, on being elevated to leadership, were supposed to become magically 
invested with an immunity to mistakes and therefore to stand above criticism".'^ 
In a face-saving exercise, one of the leaders of the struggle against Kavanagh, 
Herbert Moxon, was singled out and made the scapegoat for the mistakes of the entire 
leadership. A closed session of the Central Committee on 2 January 1932 saw one leader 
after another blame Moxon for many of the adventurous activities cartied out by the 
"^^  Carr, Twilight of the Comintern, op. cit. , pp. 43-44 
^^  ibid. , p. 44. 
36 Devanny, o p . c i t . , p . 159 
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entire party. Some even presented gossip as evidence against him." As Moxon 
admitted, there had to be "a scapegoat for die errors committed". He further stated that: 
"On other matters you will find right through the piece, that any errors committed, 
always someone else is blamed for them".'^ 
Of most interest in the Moxon affair is die degree to which communists had 
come to believe that democratic debate within the party was destructive. Sharkey 
insisted that anybody who raised objections within the ranks of the party "should be 
immediately squashed".^ "^ Even Moxon explained he would defend myself if criticised, 
but would "not raise it anywhere else but here on the P.B. [Political Bureau] and with 
Moscow".•*" The party had moved a long way since the days when, under Kavanagh, 
open debate took place in the pages of the Workers Weekly. 
However, even appeahng to the Comintern was prohibited by the new leadership 
as Moxon found out when he attempted this. Sharkey stated bluntly: "Individuals cannot 
communicate with individuals anywhere outside of Australia, to Moscow or anywhere 
else except through official organs".'" The dilemma was that if members of the CPA's 
leadership had a quartel with you, you could not raise this with the rank and file of the 
party nor even with the Comintern, but only with your accusers. 
" For example: "It was Comrade [censored] told me that your 
brother. Comrade Moxon, had told her that he had seen the letter 
to the committee of this Party asking to be relieved. Moreover, 
Comrade [censored] . . .said that your wife told her that she would 
not rest until she got you out of the Party" . Closed Session 
Central Committee Plenum, 2 January 1932, op.cit., p. 13. 
^^  ibid. , p. 6. 
25 ibid. , p. 9. 
°^ ibid. , p. 23. 
'' ibid. . p. 23. 
204 
After being a leading member of the party almost from its foundation, it was 
suddenly discovered that Moxon was incompetent Members of the Central Committee 
denounced him as "one of the most irresponsible individuals that I have met in my 
life''2...absolutely incapable of consistent effort for any given time^'l..unable to be an 
organiser of the Communist Party - an organiser for the revolution, he lacks hard, 
persistent effort..".'" 
Despite Moxon's defence against accusations of misleadership, it was 
unanimously resolved to remove him from the Cend-al Committee.'*^ 
MOVE AWAY FROM EXTREMISM 
Having purged Moxon from the leadership Sharkey and the party's new General 
Secretary, J.B. Miles, directed the membership toward more sober work amongst the 
employed and unemployed. Following this the tone of meetings altered. Jack Kavanagh 
commented that an election meeting "was much improved as compared with previous 
similar meetings. The Moxon style, which is also the Jeffrey (sic) style, is no longer in 
order"."^ ^ The change was to prove successful. Perhaps less exciting than planning the 
seizure of power stations, nonetheless the moderated party work allowed members to 
methodicaUy build support for the CPA which, in the late 1930s, was to catapult 
communist militants into important positions within the trade union bureaucracy. 
'2 ibid. , p. 12. 
'^ ibid. , p. 18. 
'' ibid. , p. 26. 
'^ ibid. , p. 26. 
46 Kavanagh's diary, op.cit., 5 December 1931 
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For an organisation which was not only hostile to the system but offered an 
alternative vision of a society free from poverty, hunger and exploitation, the climate in 
which the CPA undertook its more restrained work was certainly fertile ground. 
The effects of the economic crisis on workers' quality of life was profound. 
Admission to mental healdi institutions in Queensland increased during die depression, 
peaking in 1933-34. Statistics for the Goodna hospital showed that the percentage of 
male patients who had been labourers before admission rose from 25% in 1928 to 38% 
in 1935, while the percentage of female patients who had been domestic servants rose 
from 18% in 1928 to 49% in 1935.'' 
Venereal diseases spread. The years in which reports of these diseases were 
greatest coincided with the worst years of the depression.''^ At the same time the birth 
rate in Queensland fell by one-third from 1921 to 1933"^ despite the federal 
government having banned the importation of cond-aceptives in 1923.^ ° Illegal abortions 
flourished, as legal ones, which cost fifty guineas in Melbourne in 1936, were far 
'^ See Oueensland Parliamentary Papers, 1928-1936. Yet when 
the medical officer at Goodna requested time off for further 
study into mental illness in the mid-1930s the government refused 
his request. Also, from 1920 to 1940 despite the growing 
admissions, nursing staff levels remained static. P.K. Jordan, 
"Mental Health Services of the Queensland Government; 1920-1962: 
A Historical Study", Bachelor of Social Work (Hons), University 
of Queensland, 1973, pp. 44 and 53. 
®^ Queensland Parliamentary Papers, 1928-1936. 
49 
50 
ibid., vol. 1, 1936, p. 851 
In 1935 Dr Frances Harding brought in a sample 
contraceptive diaphragm from America. He got it past customs 
officials by telling them that it "was used to restore a lady's 
figure much as a brassiere would"! Quoted in Stefania Siedlecky 
and Diana Wyndham, Populate and Perish: Australian Women's Fight 
lor Birth Control (Allen & Unwin: Sydney, 1990), p. 37. 
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beyond the reach of working class women.^' In Queensland the number of reported 
deaths from abortions rose between 1931 and 1934," while in Victoria the Melbourne 
Women's Hospital reported sixty-five cases of gas gangrene following illegal abortions 
in 1937." 
A survey of nearly 500 rural children from Charleville, Cunnamulla, Mitchell and 
Quilpie in late 1933 revealed a shockingly high percentage were below normal weight 
for their age. Almost 24% of older girls, 20.4% of all younger children and 18.4% of 
older boys were under weight.^ Queensland Government pathologist, Dr James Duhig, 
confirmed that the "outlook for the health of young chddren receiving food relief in 
Queensland is very serious". He also observed that daily milk consumption per head in 
the capital was "only about one-eighth of a pint",^ ^ while consumption of bread, a 
dietary staple, fell 12V2% by early 1934.^ * 
It was the working class which suffered most during the depression. Employers' 
quality of life, although altered, did not deteriorate to the same degree. Income Tax 
figures revealed that five Queenslanders earned almost £295,000 for the year 1 July 
1931-30 June 1932, the equivalent of five times die income of 1,000 relief workers." 
The Queensland Club, it was reported, "seems to have managed extremely well during 
^^  ibid. , p. 72. 
2^ Queensland Parliamentary Papers, vol. 1, 1936, p. 851 
^^  Siedlecky and Wyndham, op.cit., p. 73. 
^^  Workers Weekly, no. 534 (5 January 1934), p. 3. 
^^  ibid. , p. 3. 
" Daily Standard, 14 April 1934, p. 4. 
" Workers Weekly, no. 569 (7 September 1934), p. 2. 
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those difficult times" aldiough they did reduce staff.^ ** According to membership 
figures, one-third of the Club's new members from 1928-1936 were graziers.-^ ^ 
During these years, governments at opposite ends of the polidcal spectrum 
appeared to have very similar policies when handling the question of unemployment 
From 1929-1932 Queensland was governed by conservatives headed by Arthur Moore, 
who inu-oduced the relief work scheme. On coming to office in 1932, the Labor 
government led by William Forgan-Smith, extended Moore's unemployment policies. 
Labor also reduced the burial allowance by £1 for adults and 10/- for children;*^ gaoled 
over 3,000 unemployed in 1933 for "jumping the rattler", even though the jobless were 
compelled to tiavel to collect dieir rations;* '^ and revoked tram passes for rehef workers 
- a concession the unemployed had wrung from Moore.^ 2 Under Labor the CPA 
claimed: 
Undernourished children are refused special ration allowances. State-aided 
children are cut off long before their prescribed time; widows are denied 
full rations; single girls are robbed of 1/- per week from their ration 
tickets because they are living at home; single unemployed are refused 
the 10/- bonus that was provided for married relief workers for 
Christmas." 
®^ Joshua Peter Bell, Oueensland Club, 1859-1959 (Simpson 
Halligan: Brisbane, 1966), p. 45. 
'' ibid. 
°^ Red Leader, 10 January 1934, p. 5. 
"ibid., 4 April 1934, p. 12. 
" Workers Weekly, no. 490 (24 February 1933), p. 1. The Red 
Leader, 25 March 1932, p. 2, reported that single unemployed men 
boarded trams en masse, refused to pay the fare and stayed on the 
trams until they reached the vicinity of their relief job. 
" Red Leader, 10 January 1934, p. 5. The AWU on the other 
hand hailed Forgan-Smith as a "sound statesman and a true 
Laborite". Worker, 3 January 1934, p. 6. 
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In 1933 Forgan-Smith U-ied to introduce regulations requiring unemployed men 
to prove they had been Queensland residents for the previous six months in order to 
draw rations or relief work.*^ The UWM reported that South Brisbane police took 
advantage of this by striking from the register all those who had not been on the roll for 
three months. The few who protested were given half-week rations and u-avelling cards 
for Beenleigh only to find that on arrival they were deported to NSW. For those bom 
overseas things were worse. Non-naturalised migrants were struck off the register, even 
though many had worked in previous years and therefore paid taxes. This, however, was 
not enough to make them eligible for government assistance during hard times.*^^ 
The unemployed faced consistent harassment from the authorities. The Red 
Leader reported in 1933 that books and property of the Moorooka UWM were seized 
by police on instructions from Minister Edward Hanlon.^ Officials of the Central 
Brisbane UWM "were artested and framed for collecting dues outside Roma St. police 
station" while A. Haverfield, delegate to the NSW Anti-War congress, "was refused 
rations and driven out of the State on his return from Sydney".*^ ^ In December 1933 
fourteen unemployed were arrested and fined for putting up posters in the Brisbane 
64 Red Leader, 3 May 193 3, p. 6 
^^  The Call To Unity, Organ of the Vigilance Committee of 
the Relief Workers Organisation. Brisbane, March 23 1933. In the 
campaign to have the regulations revoked or amended the CPA-
inspired United Front Comimittee of Action called a meeting of 
around 500 in Innisfail in June 1933. Red Leader, 28 June 1933, 
p. 8. 
^^ Red Leader, 15 November 1933, p. 5. Edward Hanlon later 
became Queensland Premier. Although he had been on the strike 
committee of the 1912 tramway's dispute, by the 1930s he was not 
known for his radicalism. Hanlon even supported the sterilisation 
of the mentally ill. Daily Standard, 11 January 1934, p.2. 
67 Red Leader, 15 November 1933, p. 5 
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Botanic Gardens demanding more relief work at Christmas.*^^ 
The pettiness of the authorities in issuing rations was astounding. The ARU 
reported that the sons of one of their rank and file members were denied rations because 
their fathers earned one shilling over the basic wage. Forty-one sons of Ipswich railway 
workshop employees who received extra time at Christmas were also denied rations or 
relief work because of their fathers' extra earnings.^^ The Toowoomba UWM took up 
the case of a family of nine forced to live under a bag-fly in Jubilee Park in the winter 
of 1931. Later, in 1933, with the husband earning £2/14/- per week (£1 of which went 
toward their weekly rent), the wife began setiing bags of manure to supplement their 
income. Because of her extia income from this the authorities cut her off relief.™ 
The stiict implementation of regulations governing ration allowances compared 
starkly to the Labor government's subsidies to employers. The CPA noted that Forgan-
Smith continued Moore's policies of aiding graziers by granting pastoral companies a 
rebate on wool freights amounting to £53,500, and Mt Isa Mines was given a freight 
rebate of £55,000. At the same time relief workers and their families were "denied on 
the pleas of financial stringency, even such a request as a full fortnight's work prior to 
Christmas"." 
The actions of Labor in office, which was littie different from the conservatives' 
programme, reinforced the communists' belief that the ALP was "social fascist", "the 
^^  Daily Standard, 31 January 1934, p. 1. 
""^  Advocate, 15 January 1934, p. 6. 
°^ Red Leader, 5 July 1933, p. 8. 
^^  ibid., 10 January 1934, p. 5. 
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chief social support of the bourgeoisie".^2 [y y^ .^^  J^Q f^^ as to say that the Labor Party 
was "carrying on the same class policy as the whole of the bourgeoisie - including the 
Fascist 'New Guard' - but with other methods"." 
BUILDING THE UNEMPLOYED WORKERS MOVEMENT (1932-33) 
With unemployment growing daily, the CPA successfully increased its efforts to 
build die Unemployed Workers Movement. By January 1932 a district meeting of the 
UWM attiacted 200 people who decided to publish dieir own fortnightiy bulletin, the 
UWM Organiser.^'* Later, the party established a State Council of Action to coordinate 
unemployed bodies throughout Queensland. By August 1933 fifteen unemployed and 
relief workers' organisations, as well as unemployed camps and hostels, were affiliated 
to the Council of Action. It was reported that many of the "narrow sectarian errors" 
committed by communists in the past were being overcome.^^ 
The success in building the UWM came, not from spectacular stunts organised 
by die party, like armed resistance to evictions, but by members involving themselves 
in the day to day struggles and concerns of the unemployed. As many Queensland 
communists were jobless - in January 1932 only 28% of die state's membership was 
employed - this type of work was well within the party's capabilities.^'' 
The CPA's major concern was to organise relief workers who, they believed. 
2^ Workers Weekly, no. 484 (13 January 1933), p. 3. 
" ibid., p. 3. 
'"^ Red Leader, 22 January 1932, p. 8. 
"ibid., 16 August 1933, p. 8. 
'^ Workers Weekly, no. 433 (15 January, 1932), p. 2. 
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could be used by employers to undercut the already lowered wages and conditions of 
those in employment Their fears were not unfounded. The Railway Department often 
used relief workers at die expense of their own track maintenance men. In Rockhampton 
in October 1932 the Forgan-Smith government cancelled the award of workers on the 
harbour, allowing the Harbour Board to introduce a relief scheme." 
The prospect of organising these workers seemed formidable. Militants were 
victimised by being refused further relief work, as leaders of the unemployed at 
Rockhampton and Innisfail discovered.™ The Workers Weekly reported that the 
Rockhampton City Council dismissed relief workers because they were CPA members. 
The Mayor told them: "Your work is all that can be desired, but you are 
Communists".^^ Despite the threat of victimisation, conditions under which relief 
workers laboured were often so abominable they were compelled to strike whether 
communist agitators were present or not. 
In Brisbane in March 1932, for instance, about 120 men on intermittent relief 
work in Balmoral stopped work. The communist leader of the UWM in Brisbane, Albert 
Hurworth, atu-ibuted the sd-ike to the "slave driving tactics" of the ganger.^" Sd-iking 
relief worker, George Simpson, confirmed that the ganger was responsible for "the 
" Red Leader, 12 October 1932, p. 3. Four hundred single 
men, to get one day's work at the quarry for 13/6, had to travel 
four miles by train then one mile on foot. As many of these 
workers were already in a state of semi-starvation and few had 
decent boots, their money was well earned. 
^^  ibid., 15 November 193 3, p. 5. 
" Quoted in ibid., p. 6. 
°^ PRE/A, In-Letter 6621 of 1933, Inspector of Police (Roma 
Street) to Commissioner of Police, 14 March 1932. QSA. 
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speeding up methods which were being introduced on die relief works".*' Another 
suiker, Edward James, added to the list of complaints "the starvation rates of pay the 
Intermittent Relief Workers were receiving in Queensland".*2 
The strike spread. On 6 March another gang of around twenty men in the 
Hawthorne area ceased work and the following day mass meetings were held at Red Hill 
and Spring Hill.*^ By this time about 240 men from nine of the nineteen intermittent 
relief work gangs in Balmoral were on stiike.^ Communist involvement focused on 
issuing leaflets and speaking at strike meetings. Keith Richards, a leading communist 
and Secretary of the UWM, spoke at and chaired a meeting of around 120 men at Moore 
Park, Hawthorne, on 9 March where, by a vote of 108 to 8, it was decided to continue 
the strike. The same day men on relief work at Teneriffe and New Farm met to discuss 
the strike, as did gangs in the western suburbs on 11 March.*^ 
However, by this date many of the Balmoral men were starting to return to work, 
although the police reported about fifty men were still on strike.^ *^  Two days later at 
a meeting in Memorial Park, Bulimba, the rest of the men decided to end officially their 
^^  PRE/A, In-Letter 6621 of 1933, Inspector of Police (Roma 
Street) to Commissioner of Police, 7 March 1932. QSA. 
2^ PRE/A, In-Letter 6621 of 1933, Inspector of Police (Roma 
Street) to Commissioner of Police, 24 February 1932. QSA. 
" PRE/A, In-Letter 1410 of 1932, Acting Sergeant McDonald 
to Commissioner of Police, 9 March 1932. QSA. 
®^  PRE/A, In-Letter 1410 of 1932, Constable Patch to 
Commissioner of Police, 8 March 1932. QSA. 
^^  PRE/A, In-Letter 1410 of 1932, Acting Sergeant McDonald 
to Commissioner of Police, 11 March 1932. QSA. 
^^  PRE/A, In-Letter 1410 of 1932, Constable Patch to 
Commissioner of Police, 11 March 1932. QSA. 
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strike.**^  While the outcome of the strike was not recorded, the CPA had established 
itself as an organisation concerned with the plight of relief workers. 
In the years diat followed, communists influenced relief workers at Wynnum who 
established the Wynnum Relief Workers' Organisation. Amongst the issues they took 
up was the case of a relief worker who was compelled to miss three days' work while 
his child was in hospital. On the day the child died, he found the government had 
deducted from his rations these three days as well as the dead child's allowance.^ 
Industrial action in September 1933 won Wynnum relief workers employed on the 
Lytton sea wall a wage rise of I/- per day, free tiansport to and from the job, a first-aid 
kit, sanitary facilities, supplies of drinking water and a shelter.*^ These workers were 
not always successful. Later that same year Wynnum relief workers employed by the 
railway department went on sd-ike for the same pay rate as railway workers. They 
believed this would stop the government using relief workers to undercut railway 
workers' jobs, wages and conditions.^ Nine were dismissed and were refused re-
instatement on intermittent relief work again - all nine were communists.^' 
Outside of the capital communists established UWM branches in Ipswich, 
Toowoomba, Maryborough, Mackay, Charters Towers, Cairns, Tully, Home Hill, 
Innisfail and Townsville. 
In Mackay the UWM was initiated by Ted Roach who later became a leading 
'^'' PRE/A, In-Letter 1410 of 1932, Acting Sergeant McDonald 
to Commissioner of Police, 15 March 1932. QSA. 
®^  Red Leader, 7 February 1934, p. 5. 
'^ ibid., 27 September 1933. 
°^ Workers Weekly, no. 525 (3 November 1933), p. 6. 
^' ibid., no. 536 (19 January 1934), p. 6. 
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communist official in the WWF.*^ 2 j^^ j ^ Brisbane, it was struggles over very small 
issues which enabled the UWM to win support from the unemployed. One dispute was 
with the local police over bread rations. These rations could only be collected from one 
particular baker, yet at the same time, anodier baker was offering to supply it to the 
unemployed for a halfpenny cheaper. Under UWM leadership, the unemployed 
succeeded in getting an open order for the bread, that is, one not contracted to a 
particular baker." '^ 
Later, in September 1932, relief workers receiving 14/6 for one day's work per 
formight were astonished to find the police had deducted from their wages four pence 
for Relief Tax. Roach addressed the workers from the police station steps and told them 
that the four pence reduction reflected the uncaring attitude of the Labor government 
toward the unemployed. After telegramming the Minister for Labour, Maurice Hynes, 
the government retieated.^ The issue did not end there, however. The police began 
arresting the unemployed. The CPA claimed this was to provoke a confrontation and 
engender ill feelings between the local residents and the unemployed who were 
compelled to move from town to town to collect their dole.''^  
It was also in Mackay that communist Jim Healy, who was to be elected leader 
of the WWF in 1937, was very active amongst the unemployed. One communist recalled 
that the Mackay shelter shed for unemployed "was built as a result of the initiatives of 
the Railway men and the wharfies, Jim Healy was on the wharf at Mackay at the time. 
2^ Ted Roach interviewed by Beris Penrose, 19 March 1992. 
" Red Leader, 17 August 1932, p. 8. 
^^  Roach interviewed by Penrose, 19 March 1992. 
^^  Red Leader, 14 September 1932, p. 8. 
215 
And if they pushed anything on to the unemployed the local advanced unionists would 
arrange for their defence".*^ The shelter replaced the camp for the unemployed which, 
in December 1931, was very unpleasant as it was located at the "local sale yard; 
alongside of which is a rubbish dump with huge pyramids of old petrol and jam tins, old 
water tanks, rusty galvanised iron, old sanitary pans, in fact, rubbish of every 
description".^^ 
Securing shelter for the unemployed was only the preliminary to an on-going 
struggle against the Mackay City Council. Attempting to break up any organisation 
amongst the unemployed, the Council decreed that no-one could stay in the shelter for 
more than fourteen days in each half of the year. A second stay could not be longer than 
twenty-four hours. No meetings were allowed in the shed, no communist literature was 
to be sold or distributed in or near the shed, police had unrestricted access to it and any 
"disruptors" could be barred from the shelter for twelve months.^^ In response, in 
January 1933, 1,000-1500 people attended a meeting to defend the unemployed against 
eviction from the shelter. Speakers included members of the ARU, SUA, and WWF.^ 
The CPA found themselves in constant struggle with city councils because they 
carried out the majority of the relief work programmes. In Maryborough 340 relief 
workers struck when the Labor City Council refused to pay them the award wages they 
^^  Lowenstein, op. cit. , p. 410. Also see Red Leader, 5 
February 1932, p. 4. Roach, who was secretary of the Shelter Shed 
and the UWM in Mackay, disputed that Jim Healy was active in the 
UWM. Roach interviewed by Penrose, 19 March 1992. 
" Workers Weekly, no. 428 (4 December 1931), p. 4. 
^^  ibid., no. 484 (13 January 1933), p. 6. 
99 Red Leader, 15 March 1933, p. 
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were promised.'*^ The new Labor Mayor, William Demaine, dismissed them for 
inefficiency. This was the same man who, in 1931, was editor of the Alert. Then, 
Demaine had been sympathetic to the plight of the unemployed. For instance, he had 
criticised the notion that half starved relief workers should be expected to perform as 
well as employed workers. By the time Demaine was Mayor of Maryborough he had 
had a change of heart. The ARU's paper, the Advocate, claimed this was because, as 
Mayor of Maryborough, Demaine was now "the guardian of the Council's funds" and 
a balanced budget was his main priority."" Under the guidance of Comrade 
McElligott the relief workers, while combating the Labor City Councd's use of sd-ike-
breakers and police, sent delegations to communist-influenced miners at nearby 
Torbanlea and Howard.'°2 
In Innisfail die CPA influenced dispute amongst forty relief workers in 1933. The 
Nerada stiike was in response to the dismissal of one relief worker whose horse ate 
some of the ganger's bread. The Labor government responded to the su-ike by locking 
them out, shutting down the job and denying these men further rehef work. Communist 
sugar worker in north Queensland, Carl King, claimed that the unemployed men 
involved in the dispute had stamped on their ration cards: "Man from Nerada". 
Therefore, when police saw this, they would "run them out of town".'°' When the 
Innisfail branch of the ALP criticised Deputy Premier Percy Pease for his u-eatment of 
°^° Workers Weekly, no. 525 (3 November 1933), p. 1. In 
January 1932 the CPA organised a picnic for the unemployed to 
which 800 turned up. ibid., no. 484 (13 January 1933), p. 6. 
°^^  Advocate. 15 January 1934, p. 7. 
°^2 Workers Weekly, no. 525 (3 November 1933), p. 1. 
°^2 Carl King interviewed by Phillip Griffiths and Beris 
Penrose, 15 October 1982. 
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the men, the entire branch was expelled from the Labor party.'^ The Nerada men 
approached the Innisfail UWM to lead their dispute. When their case was heard in the 
Indusd-ial Court they chose communist, Les Lock, rather than their AWU organiser, to 
represent them.'^ ^ 
In Tully the UWM successfully stopped die ration day being moved from 
Tuesday to Friday in April 1933. At Cardwell they won the right for the unemployed 
to be put on the electoral roll, therefore entitiing them to relief work and resident 
rations."^ 
The most spectacular incident with the unemployed in north Queensland occurred 
in Cairns in mid-1932 when they were forcibly evicted from their temporary camp in 
the local show grounds at Parramatta Park. Denied an unemployed shelter by the 
government the men had sought refuge in the fowl-houses and horse stalls at the show 
grounds."'^ On the day of the incident 2,000 locals and police went to the grounds for 
a "working bee" on die pretext of cleaning it up in preparation for the local show. As 
one communist George Bliss, who was in the camp at the time, recalled: 
They drew the police in from outer areas and a big bus came in through 
the gates. There were forty-eight police. They formed up six to eight 
abreast and walked towards us. They were the vanguard. And there were 
about seventy of us, but maybe only fifty combatants.'"^ 
The police claimed the unemployed were armed "with all kinds of weapons such 
as cane knives, sticks, iron bars" and even two home-made bombs made of gelignite. 
°^^  Workers Weekly, no. 544 (16 March 1934), p. 2. 
°^^  Red Leader, 2 8 June 1933, p. 8. 
'°^  ibid. , 14 and 19 April 1933, p. 8. 
°^'' Communist Review, vol. 1, no 3 (June 1934), p. 11 
lOE Lowenstein, o p . c i t . , p . 175 
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Yet despite this weaponry, the citizens' "working bee" successfully "chased the 
unemployed out of the grounds and down one of the Cairns streets".'*^ 
Arrests of unemployed took place - no-one from the "working bee" was arrested 
- and police from Townsville to Herberton stopped the unemployed from attending the 
court case of those arrested. Sarcastically, the Workers Weekly commented that the 
government which could not afford to build a shelter for the unemployed could find 
£700 to take them to trial at Herberton.'"' Alfred Paull, John Edward Reynolds, 
Stanley Harold Keen and Roderick McLean each received two months hard labour at 
Stewart Creek Gaol.'" James McCormack, Badden Benned and James Hill stood trial 
at the Criminal Sittings of die Circuit Court as McCormack was charged with throwing 
a bomb. His defence lawyer was communist, Fred Paterson, who recalled: 
We went up there and the Crown Prosecutor put up a very vigorous 
prosecution but the case was broken down, when I was able to establish 
by cross-examination that it would have been physicaUy impossible for 
McCormack to have thrown the bomb in the manner described by the 
police. "2 
The CPA not only sent Fred Paterson to defend those arrested, they collected 
money for their court case"^ and publicly defended the unemployed. At a meeting in 
°^^  PRE/A, In-Letter 5599 of 1932, Telephone Message from 
Inspector of Police (Cairns) to Commissioner of Police, 18 July 
1932. QSA. 
"° Red Leader, 16 Novemiber 1932, p. 3. 
'" Alfred Herman Paull, born in SA, was described by police 
as a "thorough painstaking type and of likeable personality. Very 
bitter against anti-Communist forces. Well read and highly 
regarded by the C.P.". CIB 536, CRSC320. AA (Sydney). 
112 Lowenstein, op.cit, p. 181. 
^^^ The police reported that Herbert Moxon was "endeavouring 
to collect funds for the purpose of obtaining Legal assistance 
for John McCormack - Badden Bennett and James Hill". PRE/A, In-
Letter 5599 of 1932, Inspector of Police (Cairns) to Commissioner 
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the Brisbane Domain CPA member, Keith Richards, noted that the Crimes Act was not 
used against the Mayor of Cairns "when he incited the fascist element at Cairns"."'* 
The Rockhampton sub-branch of the ARU also complained "that while a number of half-
starved unemployed are to be persecuted by prosecution in the courts, no action is to be 
taken against the 'Fascist' instigators of the trouble"."^ Up and down the state workers 
protested at the d-eatment of the unemployed. A meeting of 600 workers in Tully on 23 
July addressed by CPA cane cutters. Jack Henry and John Dalgleish (or Douglas), 
condemned the attack on the unemployed.'"^ 
The attack on the unemployed took place under die Labor government whose 
Minister for PoUce, Ned Hanlon, was clearly supported by the ousted CPNP. In a 
telegram to Forgan-Smith they said: 
COUNTRY PROGRESSIVE NATIONAL PARTY URGE 
GOVERNMENT TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION REMOVE 
COMMUNIST ELEMENT FROM PARRAMATTA PARK WHO ARE 
DEFYING CONSTITUTED AUTHORITY THREATENING ACTIVE 
RESISTANCE TO PREVENT CITIZENS HOLDING THEIR ANNUAL 
SHOW STOP THIS MATTER IS NOT POLITICAL IT REPRESENTS 
ORGANISED EFFORT BY ENEMIES OF SOCIETY TO FOMENT 
STRIFE WHICH IF UNCHECKED WILL HAVE SERIOUS 
CONSEQUENCES HERE AND EMBARRASS GOVERNMENT STOP 
AM WIRING MOORE COOPERATE WITH YOU TO PRESERVE 
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS.'" 
of P o l i c e , 22 Augus t 1932 . QSA. 
"^ PRE/A, I n - L e t t e r 6621 of 1933 , S e n i o r S e r g e a n t Dav i s t o 
Commissioner of P o l i c e , 15 August 1932 . QSA. 
"^ PRE/A, I n - L e t t e r 5599 of 1932, ARU Sub-Branch (Rock-
hampton) t o P r e m i e r , 18 Augus t 1932 . QSA. 
^^ ^ PRE/A, I n - L e t t e r 5599 of 1932, I n s p e c t o r of P o l i c e 
(Cai rns) t o Commiss ione r of P o l i c e , 1 Augus t 1932 . QSA. The 
p o l i c e were u n s u r e i f t h e c u t t e r ' s su rname was D a l g l e i s h o r 
Douglas . 
^" PRE/A, I n - L e t t e r 5599 of 1932 , McDonald t o P r e m i e r , 13 
Ju ly 1932 . QSA. 
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The CPA continued its work amongst the unemployed in the north. In November 
1932 they were involved in a strike of six intermittent relief workers in Cairns employed 
to drain a swamp. After a struggle, the men won rubber boots, free disinfectant sprays, 
a seven hour working day and a pay rise of II- per day."** In December 1932, 
following on the heels of this small victory, the Cairns UWM was able to hold a 
meeting of almost 400 people."'* 
Through taking up everyday issues which seemed quite remote from the CPA's 
ultimate goal of proletarian revolution, the party was able to build a sizeable following 
in Queensland amongst the unemployed. Jack Henry, communist sugar worker, recalled 
there "were thousands and thousands associated with the Unemployed Movement in 
North Queensland".'^" This aided their work in the unions in later years as 
unemployed communists were drawn into industry when the depression began to lift 
slighdy. Their skills in organising meetings, demonstrations and strikes of the 
unemployed and publishing and distributing literature in these years were put to use 
when they entered indusd-y.'^' 
BUILDING THE MINORITY MOVEMENT (1932-33) 
Dobbyn and Mt Oxide Dispute 
One of the party's more important successes amongst workers was with metal 
^^^ Workers Weekly, no. 480 (9 Decemiber 1932), p. 1. 
'1' ibid. , p. 1. 
^^° Lowenstein, op.cit., p. 410. Henry, an AWU delegate in 
the Tully sugar mill, led strikes of sugar cane workers in 1934 
and 1935 against Weils disease. When Miles left Brisbane^ Henry 
became the leader of the Queensland branch. 
121 Edgar Ross interviewed by Beris Penrose, 9 October 1991. 
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miners at Orphan Mine, Dobbyn, and the mine at Mt Oxide in far north-west 
Queensland. Following an Order-in-Council by the Moore government metal miners 
were removed from die ambit of the Industrial Court in September 1931. Mine-owners 
took this opportunity to announce, in October, a reduction in their workers' wages from 
18/- per day to 16/-. This provoked a dispute of sixty miners which lasted six months 
and ended in a victory for the workers. The AWU, the union covering the workers, 
unsuccessfully lobbied Moore to revoke the Order-in-Council so that the dispute could 
be heard by the Industrial Court'^^ 
Their grievances were not only about their pay but also about the appalHng 
working conditions. William Dorman, head of the Dobbyn strike committee, said: 
There is no decent drinking water at the Orphan Mine, and only one 
shower bath for 30 men. The drinking water is mine water...We work at 
the Orphan Mine every Saturday for ordinary pay. We do 48 hours a 
week. Practically all men work on Sundays at die same rate...We contend 
the Dobbyn store was making 45 per cent profit and the Mt. Oxide store 
55%...The underground sanitary conditions at Dobbyn should be rectified. 
The underground travelling ways at Dobbyn should be made safer.'" 
Dorman went on to demand such things as covers for water tanks and taps at Mt Oxide; 
a shower bath and change room for Mt Oxide workers; sufficient wood and water for 
the workers; as well as higher wages.'^^ Carriers also joined the strike and demanded 
improved wages and conditions. J. Troy, representing the sd-iking carriers, pointed out 
that the road conditions in the area were appalling, that trips were as long as eighty 
miles, that the return tiip took twenty-four hours and fuel costs were enormous. Troy 
^^^ Brian Costar, "Two Depression Strikes, 1931", in Murphy, 
Big Strikes, op.cit . , p. 192. 
^" PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, S. Wilson (Warden) to 
Premier Moore, 1 December, 1931. QSA. 
^^^ PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, S. Wilson (Warden) to 
Premier Moore, 1 December 1931. QSA. 
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also said that the six horse teams, which use up to thirty-three horses, took two weeks 
to do a trip from Gunpowder Creek and six weeks from Mt Oxide yet on the 
Gunpowder Creek-Mt Oxide road there was littie grass or water for the animals.'" 
Leading the strike were John McCormack, Secretary of the strike committee who 
was described by police as being "a dangerous Criminal"; William Dorman; R.J. Dodd 
and Michael Johansen, a Norwegian born worker who, according to the police, was "of 
Bolshevic (sic) convictions".'^* The CPA played a big role in collecting strike support 
money and pubhshing information about the dispute in the Red Leader. Six months into 
the sdike McCormack wrote: 
Our position is very precarious; some of the strikers' families are sadly 
in need of clothing; in fact, the entire camp is in need of same. Our first 
consideration is, naturally, for die women and children, but we find it 
hard to supply even the barest possible minimum of food relief, the 
matter of clothing being entirely out of the question.'" 
When police arrested McCormack and ten other strikers for trying to stop the 
tiansport of ore to the railway station, the Premiers Department received demands from 
CPA-influenced organisations and workers such as Collinsville miners,'^^ the 
Townsville branch of the MM,'^ ^ the United Labourers Union (NSW) Wyangala Dam 
^" Gunpowder Creek is about half way between Dobbyn and Mt. 
Oxide. PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, S. Wilson (Warden) to 
Premier Moore, 1 Decemiber 1931. QSA. 
^^^ PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, T. Cahalone, Sub-
Inspector of Police (Cloncurry) to Commissioner of Police, 18 
November 1931. QSA. 
127 Red Leader, 25 March 1932, p. 4. 
^^^ PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, Mr Price (Chairman 
Collinsville mass meeting) to Premier Moore, 28 Novemiber 1931. 
QSA. 
2^' PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, R. Hills to Premier 
Moore, 1 December 1931. QSA. 
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Branch,'^" and the Darwin branch of the UWM'-' for the release of the strikers, 
particularly McCormack who was gaoled in Stewart Creek for two months. On his return 
to Dobbyn McCormack was anesied for a second offence, this time for allegedly 
blowing up a railway bridge on 20 March 1932. The police also "strongly suspected" 
William Dorman and James Blatt "of being implicated in this offence" but were unable 
to find any proof.'^ ^ 
The strike brought solidarity action from other workers. At the Chillagoe Smelter 
they voted unanimously not to handle ore from Dobbyn or Mt Oxide while the sdike 
was in progress.''' The mine managers tried to recruit labour from the Townsville 
Labour Bureau but a picket of the bureau prevented them from doing so.'^ Then, on 
19 November, railway workers in Townsville placed a black-ban on ore from the mines, 
prompting the Railway Department, the next day, to stand down anyone who upheld the 
ban.'" When a d-ainload of ore arrived in Townsville from Cloncurry a scuffle broke 
out between shunters prepared to hand the U-ain and those who believed, since the ore 
was declared "black", no unionist should touch it. As a result of the scuffle three ARU 
"° PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, SA Workman to Premier 
Moore, 2 December 1931. QSA. 
^^^ PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, W. Maher to Premier 
Moore, 8 December 1932. QSA. 
"2 PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, Constable Dv^ yer 
(Dobbyn) to Sub-Inspector of Police (Cloncurry), 1 April 1932. 
QSA. 
"^  PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, Chillagoe Police to 
Inspector of Police (Cairns), 4 Decemiber 1931. QSA. 
^^^ PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, T. Cahalane, Sub-
Inspector of Police (Cloncurry) to Commissioner of Police, 18 
November 1931. QSA. 
"^ Workers Weekly, no. 427 (27 November 1931), p. 1. 
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members were dismissed for intimidating fellow railway workers. The government's 
actions precipitated a strike and by the end of November out of a work force of 1,000 
only 125 were working in the Townsville railways.'^ *^ Other north Queensland areas 
came out on strike as well, including eighty-four rail workers in Cloncurry, thirteen in 
Mt Isa, four at Kuridala, one at Dobbyn, ten at Kajabbi and ten at Duchess. At Julia 
Creek a guard also came out on strike but soon returned to work.'" 
Feelings ran high in Townsville over the railway dispute. At a meeting of around 
600 su-ikers in late November a motion was put which declared the White Cab Co. 
"black until Hell freezes" because the company carried strike-breakers to work."^ 
Even intermittent relief workers in Townsville came out on strike.'^^ At a meeting of 
600-700 in Townsville's Olympia Theatre on 24 November, along with speakers from 
the ARU and the strike committee was Patrick McLaughlin, an IRW worker from 
Townsville, and a Mr Henry, representing the jobless."*° Three days a large number 
of strikers intercepted a tiain attempting to leave Townsvdle for Hughenden, and 
assaulted the crew. 
^^^ PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, Senior Sergeant 
Driscoll Townsville CIB to Inspector of Police (Townsville), 30 
November 1931. QSA. 
"•^  PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, Sub-Inspector of Police 
(Cloncurry) to Commissioner of Police, 1 December 1931. QSA. 
"'^  PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, Constables Raety and 
Good to Townsville CIB, 20 November 1931. QSA. 
^^ ' A letter from the District Secretary (Townsville) of the 
AMIEU to Queensland Branch Secretary on 27 May 1931 advised that 
two AMIEU members who were on relief work and kept working during 
the rail dispute should be expelled from the union. Letter in 
file marked "Arbitration Proceedings 1931-32", held in AMIEU Head 
Office, Astor Tee, Brisbane. 
^^° PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, Senior Sergeant 
Driscoll (Townsville CIB) to Inspector of Police (Townsville), 
30 November 1931. QSA. 
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The policy of the MM was to spread the strike to involve all Queensland rail 
workers, and party members were very active trying to get the Brisbane and Ipswich 
railway employees to strike in support of their Townsville colleagues. The communist 
Rank and File Committee in the railways issued a leaflet calling on workers to strike 
under rank and file leadership.''*' This tactic, though, was not supported by all MM 
members. Frank Nolan, Secretary of the Left Wing Rank and File Committee in 
Rockhampton, phoned die MM in Brisbane in an unsuccessful attempt to get them to 
change their position. 
Within the bureaucracy of the rail unions, few supported an all-out strike. A mass 
meeting of around 2,000 rail workers met in Roma Street and officials of the AFULE 
and the Railway Transport Council convinced workers not to take industrial action. 
Instead, raUway workers were urged to adopt "sane methods" in dealing with the 
dispute. That is, they were asked to support immediate negotiations between all 
parties.'''^ The cautious attitude of the officials influenced workers who were wavering. 
At Rockhampton Nolan had persuaded some of his fellow rail workers to support their 
fellow unionists in Townsville with stiike action. But, after the meeting at Roma Street, 
Brisbane, Rockhampton workers agreed to remain at work.'"*' 
Interestingly, the ARU officials shared die sentiments of the MM. Tim Moroney 
and CPA member, Charles Wallbank, argued at the Roma Sd-eet mass meeting for a 
^^^ PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, Senior Sergeant of 
Police to Inspector of Police (Roma Street), 26 November 1931. 
QSA. 
^^^ PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, Senior Sergeant of 
Police to Inspector of Police (Roma Street), 26 November 1931. 
QSA. 
'^'•^  Nolan, op. cit. , p. 61. 
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state-wide strike on 27 Novembet'**^ Nolan later claimed that Moroney's motives for 
supporting a call for wider industrial action were cynical. Moroney insisted that the 
strike call "was Militant Minority policy and to oppose it would only cause confusion". 
However, Nolan concluded that had the state-wide su-ike occurred, and then failed, this 
would reflect badly on the MM. Nolan claimed: "Moroney was more concerned with 
discrediting the Minority Movement and those associated with it than anything 
else"."*^ Nolan claimed that Moroney worked behind the scenes to end the strike, 
while publicly calling for a state-wide stoppage. 
During the dispute police surveillance of the CPA continued. At an ARU meeting 
in Brisbane on 26 November police reported that Wallbank, "a Communistic member 
of the A.R.U.", and "a man named Collins, an ex-Railway employee and a devout 
Communist" spoke. The meeting ended with the singing of the Red Flag but, they 
recounted: "No other disorderliness occurted".''*^ 
In December 1931 Moore introduced the Railway Strike and Public Preservation 
Act. This empowered the Governor-in-Council to proclaim a state of emergency 
whenever and wherever public order was disrupted. The Act also proclaimed that any 
employee who joined a railway strike would automatically be dismissed and would 
forfeit any service credits due.'"*^  Supporting the government was the media. 4BC 
offered Premier Moore air time to "appeal for sane action and constitutional methods 
"^•^  PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, Inspector of Police to 
Commissioner of Police, 26 November 1931. QSA. 
145 Nolan, op.cit., p. 60. 
^^^ PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, Constable Bischof to 
Inspector of Police (Roma Street), 27 Novemiber 1931. QSA. 
147 Costar, "Two Depression Strikes", op.cit., p. 195. 
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in the settlement of the present dispute". It also advised that the Premier's message 
could be relayed to the Townsville radio station 4T0.''''^ The Railway Transport 
Council, which comprised all railway unions except the ARU, appealed to the 
government to allow the dispute to be heard by the Indusu-ial Court. But Hke the AWU, 
its appeals were rejected.''*^ 
The rail dispute collapsed soon after the ind-oduction of the Act and a number 
of sd-ikers were victimised. By 7 December only 680 of the 740 railway workers 
involved in the dispute in Townsville were re-employed.'^° Those who had been on 
strike and were re-employed had their work cards stamped with the word "Striker".'^' 
Although the railway dispute collapsed, the miners at Dobbyn and Mt Oxide 
cartied on and by April 1932 the mine-owners conceded to the workers. Amongst the 
gains the workers won was a reduction in their hours from 48 to 44 per week with time 
and half for ordinary overtime, double time for Sunday and a wage rise for miners, 
carriers, and wood cutters.'^^ 
At the end of the stiike in April 1932, John McCormack, leader of the strike 
committee at Dobbyn, thanked the Workers Weekly. He acknowledged the invaluable 
help the miners had received from the CPA. William Dorman also stated that: "Apart 
from your cond-ibutions we have received no direct amounts from any organisation to 
^^® PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, R. Roberts to Premier 
Moore, 25 November 1931. QSA. 
149 Costar, "Two Depression Strikes", op.cit., p. 196. 
^^° PRE/A1089, In-Letter 345 of 1934, Inspector of Police 
(Townsville) to Commissioner of Police, 6 January 1932. QSA. 
^^^ PRE/A1089,-In-letter 345 of 1934, Tim Moroney (ARU) to 
Premier, 27 July 1933. QSA. 
152 Workers Weekly, no. 448 (29 April 1932), p. 4. 
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date excepting the Labor Council".'" 
Building MM Groups 
The Dobbyn-Townsville dispute was the biggest indusdial action for some time 
in Queensland. Even though there were not mass sd-uggles to relate to, die CPA 
continued their d-ade union work. Support for the party was built in these years through 
addressing the grievances in the workplaces throughout Queensland. Conditions in many 
places were poor. Workers at a tobacco factory in Fortitude Valley claimed a "spying 
system" was encouraged. "The special manager or manageress received from those 
'encouraged' all information as to how others work, what they say, etc.". Youths at this 
factory earned only 10/- per week with nine pence for overtime.'^ Woulfe and Sons 
crammed one hundred women into their dilapidated Brisbane workshop. These women 
had to share three toilets - which could not be locked from the inside - with die male 
staff. The workshop floor was reported to be littered with debris and the air was "thick 
with noxious smells that associate themselves with suiting materials".'" 
At Mt Isa mines lead poisoning was a hazard for smelter and mine workers alike. 
From mid-1931 to mid-1933 there were 220 claims for workers' compensation for lead 
poisoning.'^ *' In 1933, of the 1,892 workers examined at Mt Isa mines, 27% showed 
some degree of lead poisoning - forty cases were "serious".'" Between 1 July 1932 
and 1 March 1933, 18.5% of claims for workers' compensation for lead poisoning in 
^" Workers Weekly, no. 448 (29 April 1932), p. 4. 
^^^ Red Leader, no. 61 (19 October 1932), p. 5. 
^" ibid., 11 October 1933, p. 5. 
^^^ Queensland Government Mining Journal, vol. 34, 1933, p 
241. 
^" ibid., p. 241. 
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Queensland came from employees from Mt Isa Mines.'^ ** In May 1933 the Forgan-
Smith government conducted an inquiry into lead poisoning which resulted in the 
introduction of the Mt Isa Lead Act. This Act established a Medical Board to investigate 
the validity of workers' claims for compensation due to lead poisoning. Claims from Mt 
Isa employees for compensation dropped from thirty-four in 1934 to only fourteen by 
1935, following the intioduction of the new Act'^'' In 1935 the Workers Weekly 
reported Queensland Attorney-General, John Mullins, as saying: 
The new Medical Board had been successful in reducing the number of 
new lead cases occurring at Mt Isa from 11 new cases per month to one 
new case per month. And the Board are hopeful in reducing the number 
of new cases occurting still further.'*^ 
The CPA asserted that the reduction in lead poisoning did not reflect an improved work 
environment. Rather, the lower number of cases of cases reflected the fact that the 
Medical Board refused to give poisoned workers compensation. Under the Act the 
Medical Board was the only body authorised to determine the existence of lead 
poisoning in the mine's employees. There was no appeal if the Board declared a worker 
free from the effects of this metal. The CPA claimed: 
No doctor in Townsville or elsewhere in Queensland will now give a 
leaded worker a certificate stating that he is suffering from lead, because 
it would be useless for him to do so in the face of the clauses of the Act. 
The new Medical Board practically give Mount Isa Mines Ltd. 
full control in die issuing of certificates for Workers' Compensation."^' 
In the state's coal mines, too, conditions were appalling. The accident rate rose 
from 117 in 1931 to 197 in 1935 while, correspondingly, the annual output of saleable 
^^^ ibid. , vol. 34, 1933, p. 241. 
^^^ ibid. , vol. 34, 1935, p. 339. 
*^^° Workers Weekly, no. 602 (3 many 1935), p. 5 
^" ibid., p. 5. 
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coal rose from 840,000 tons to 1,051,000 tons.'^^ Militant miners from Ipswich 
reported that many of the pits were "Just hell holes". In some places a hose had to be 
turned on workers "when they collapsed from the effects of the poisonous atmosphere 
caused by bad ventilation". 
Sanitary and bathing facilities just don't exist in most pits. Men have 
been known to take a wash tub to the pit carry water, and wash out in 
the open.'" 
Living conditions at the state owned mine in Collinsville reflected the government's 
disregard for the comfort of its employees. Workers' houses were built of galvanised 
iron, had no electric lights, and a poor water supply.'^ 
However, while the poor conditions of employment allowed the CPA to establish 
some support amongst workers, it did not grow as rapidly as the leadership had hoped. 
In January 1932 conferences of the national Minority Movement and its Queensland 
branch discussed the organisation's shortcomings. National Secretary of the MM, Bid 
Orr, observed that communists had failed to make use of the trade union apparatus to 
address the rank and file, instructing them to copy NSW communists: 
By making application to be allowed to address the membership or by 
sending an invitation to the rank and file to elect delegates to our 
conference we opened up possibdities for our supporters to stage a 
discussion on the programme and policy of the R.I.L.U. as against the 
bankruptcy of the existing leadership.'" 
After having conducted a fierce campaign against "social fascist" union officials 
throughout 1931, Orr now admonished communists for failing to conduct united front 
^^^ Queensland Annual Report, Department of Mines, 1935, pp 
157 and 165. 
^" Red Leader, 28 March 1934, p. 2. 
^^^ Workers Weekly, 28 September 1928, p. 3. 
165 Red Leader, 15 January 1932, p. 3 
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work with union officials who were sympathetic to communists. A dismissive attitude 
towards officials, not only hampered the workers' su-uggles, Orr said, but it also 
"resulted in lending weight to the propaganda that the M.M. was merely anti-union and 
anti-official"."^ 
Albert Hulme noted that in Queensland the MM "must get down to organising 
the workers in the industiies". The rail rank and file job committees had to "become 
activised" and work in the PWIU, which had been neglected by the MM, needed to be 
improved.""^ On a more positive note two branches of the Queensland Colhery 
Employees Union - Collinsville and Scotiville - had affiliated with the MM, prompting 
Hulme to conclude that the party's goal was to get every branch of the QCEU to 
affiliate, "to build the Mining Section of the M.M."."^^ 
Nationally, Ort claimed that many of the MM's weaknesses could be attributed 
to organisational failings. He maintained: 
"Work in the unions and how to do it" is not a subject for discussion at 
our meetings. New members are not instructed on how to raise 
discussions at union meetings, when to raise them, the way in which to 
appeal to the workers at such a meeting, how to draft a resolution, and 
how to consistentiy cultivate personal contact where possible with those 
who give support to our line when it is presented.'^^ 
MM members were given no instructions on how to organise job groups, how to 
publish, write for and distribute a job sheet or on how to initiate discussions about 
articles in the job sheet in order "to find out in this way who are the mititants".'™ Orr 
' " i b i d . , p . 3 . 
^" ibid., 8 January 1932, p. 2. 
'^^ ibid. , p. 2. 
^^^ ibid. , 22 January 1932, p. 5 
170 ibid., p. 5 
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insisted that it was these mistakes which had led to the isolation of the MM and 
"prevented us coming to the fore as leaders in the su-uggles and demonstrations of the 
workers".'" 
To cortect these shortcomings the Red Leader, throughout 1932, carried articles 
detaUing in full such things as how to build an MM group, how to popularise the Red 
Leader, the role of rank and file strike committees and how to publish factory bulletins. 
The Red Leader explained that the MM was to be divided into two sections. One 
was the trade union group based on members of the same union whose goal was to win 
the rank and file "away from the influence of reactionary u-ade union officials".'^^ The 
other was the industry group comprised of workers in the same enterprise regardless of 
the union to which they belonged. Membership was open to any worker who 
acknowledged the need for "rank and file control by the workers in any of their disputes, 
whedier against abuses in the factory or in the fight against wage-cuts and worsening 
conditions".'" 
Communist workers were advised to locate other militants in the workplace "by 
raising discussions on matters such as wage-cuts, rationahsation, dismissals or the 
general political situation". Also worth discussing was the union officials' policy on 
these matters.'^" The CPA leadership cautioned that above all, "an M.M. group cannot 
be built by attempting to force our ideas on die workers. It can only be done in a tactful. 
"1 ibid., p. 5. 
"2 ibid., 22 June 1932, p. 2 
'" ibid., p. 2. 
'^^ ibid. , p. 2. 
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convincing manner 
« 175 
Agitation around day to day issues was to be the foundation stone of MM 
groups. As the Red Leader conjectured, workers were "more interested in an 
organisation which can show them how to fight against a reduction in wages than in a 
sect which merely indulges in abstract revolutionary propaganda".'''^ 
Once an MM group was established - as littie as three interested workers was 
enough to set one up'" - issuing a bulletin became a priority as this could be used to 
involve fellow workers in MM discussions and activity. Articles, communists were 
advised, should "deal with job conditions and anti-working-class actions of reformist 
d-ade union officials" and "must reach the majority of the workers in the factory".'^^ 
Bulletins issued in the previous period were criticised for being too abstract and crude. 
Some bulletins, instead of being utilised as propaganda mediums for 
rallying die workers for struggle against abuses in the factory, devoted 
themselves to attacks on individuals and indulged in long pohtical 
arguments. 
While it is correct to expose the anti-working-class acts of the 
reformist d-ade union officials, tact must be used, specific instances cited, 
and correct dates given.'™ 
To ensure accuracy an Editorial Board, "whose duty it should be to check ad matter sent 
in, so as to avoid incortect and exaggerated statements being published", was to be 
established.'^° This would avoid repetition of past instances where union officials had 
175 i b i d 
"^ i b i d 
177 i b i d . 
''' ibid. 
"^  ibid. 
''" Ibid. 
p. 2. 
20 July 1932, p. 2 
22 June 1933, p. 2 
15 June 1932, p. 2 
8 June 1932, p. 2. 
p. 2. 
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used inaccurate statements in bulletins to discredit the MM. The Editorial Board was 
also empowered with making sure the bulletin was produced "in an attractive manner 
and free from grammatical ertors".'**' 
Work was painstakingly done amongst industrial militants to rebuild the shop 
floor organisation which had suffered so badly from the employers' offensive against 
job control and working conditions in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In the central 
Queensland mining town of Collinsville Jim Henderson, first communist to be elected 
to a shtie council, helped establish an MM branch. Out of a workforce of around 200, 
over fifty became members. By 1944 the CPA branch there was over eighty strong. 
Henderson quipped that "it became respectable to be in the MM" in Collinsville. The 
group published a regular fortnightiy job bulletin which was circulated at the pit top and 
the railways. They met to discuss trade union issues, what members should raise at 
upcoming union meetings and any concerns miners had about the job.'^^ 
It was this fairly unglamorous day to day work carried out wherever communists 
worked that helped them budd MM and CPA influence. Les Sullivan, a communist who 
worked seasonally in the timber and sugar areas in north Queensland, was able to lead 
disputes in both sectors in the 1930s.'^ ^ As the Red Leader explained, it was only by 
members' ability "to prove our capabilities of leadership on the minor issues that we 
1982 
^^^ ibid. , p. 2. 
®^^  Jim Henderson interviewed by Philip Griffiths, 21 October 
^^-^  Les Sullivan joined the party around 1931 and became 
Chair of the Membership Rights Committee in the AWU in Innisfail. 
When the two^districts of the Queensland CPA amalgamated in 1937, 
Sullivan was on the Queensland State Committee, prior to that he 
was on the north Queensland District Comimittee. During WWII he 
joined the AIF and served in New Guinea. 
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will obtain die confidence of the workers to lead them in the bigger struggles which lie 
ahead".'^ 
At Cardwell, Sullivan was involved in a strike which held up the supply of 
railway sleepers to the Townsville Railway Department for seven months. Timber 
getters, members of the AWU, demanded a 37'/2% increase in the price of the sleepers. 
The Railway Department refused to pay and attempted to get sleepers from Bloomsbury 
and Tortcn's Creek. The Department was unsuccessful as the workers in these places 
supported the Cardwell strikers. Finally, the government conceded, meeting the men's 
demands and also abolishing the tender system ind-oduced by McCormack in 1928.'^ ^ 
In the wake of the Cardwell victory, timber getters at Ravenshoe met in August 1932 
and proposed that sleeper-cutters in their area receive not less than 2/6 per hewn sleeper 
while sleeper-carters receive no less than £4 per 100 sleepers hauled.'^^ 
Communist work in north Queensland produced some impressive results with 
party membership rising 150% over ten months from December 1932 to September 
1933. This was especially so amongst small farmers, rail and sugar workers.'^^ 
Amongst the miners die MM campaigned relentlessly over poor working 
conditions, unemployment, wage cuts, and the Forgan-Smith Coal Industry Bill which, 
they claimed, would led to further job losses. Grievances amongst Queensland miners 
stemmed from the fact that more than half those miners who retained their jobs worked 
only intermittentiy. Jim Henderson claimed Collinsville miners worked a day or a day 
184 Red Leader, 8 June 1932, p. 2 
'^^ See ibid. , 18 May 1932, p. 3, 15 July 1932, p. 3, and 10 
August 1932, p. 3. 
^^^ ibid. , 21 September 1932, p. 6. 
'^^ Workers Weekly, no. 518 (8 September 1933), p. 2. 
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and a half per fortnight"*** QCEU membership declined 40% in this period and the 
officials had to borrow money to keep the union going. Safety conditions deteriorated, 
cond-ibuting to the death of eighty-one miners in die six years from 1928 to 1934.'^ '^  
The CPA sent Geordi Burns to Ipswich to establish an MM and publish a job 
sheet. Pit Light, which was to become a four page state bulletin for the miners. Tom 
Madders was also brought down from Torbanlea to Ipswich.'*^ Ted Hughes and Bob 
Clarke built communist support at Mt Mulligan and as a result of communist agitation 
party influence in the coal mines grew. MM branches at Collinsville, Scottville, Howard 
and Torbanlea were consolidated and influence in the Ipswich coal mines grew until, in 
the 1934 parliamentary elections, the CPA received two out of five votes in some 
Ipswich areas and a total of one in eight votes in the Bremer electorate.'^' In the 1935 
miners unions' elections. Madders and Reynolds almost won the positions as President 
and Secretary.'''^ 79% of Ipswich miners voted for communist Charlie Nelson for 
General President (compared with his national vote of 75%) and 73% of Ipswich miners 
voted for William Orr whose national vote was 67%.'^' 
In Rockhampton communists, under Comrade McBryde, built MM support widiin 
the carpenters union.'^ Communist tramway workers organised in Brisbane and an 
MM group was established in the SUA by Andy Anderson. With 52% of seamen and 
^^^ Henderson interviewed by Griffiths, 21 October 1983. 
^^^ Bailey, op.cit. , p. 18. 
'^° Surplus and Healy, op. cit. , p. 3. 
^^^ Workers Weekly, no. 605 (24 May 1935), p. 2. 
^^^ Red Leader, 20 February 1935, p. 4. 
^^^ Bailey, op. cit. , p. 18. 
^^' Red Leader, 6 July 1932, p. 5. 
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59% of firemen unemployed nationally, communist agitation found fertile ground.'^^ 
Sales of the Red Leader increased in 1933 from 1,004 to 1,582.'^ The number 
of job sheets published rose from only one in 1931 - the Rail Committee of Action's 
Red Signal - to seven by 1933.'^^ These included Meatworkers' News, Sugar Worker, 
Miners' Right, Red Express, Tramway Organiser, Railway Lines, and The Wool 
Shed.^'^^ As well, the party issued five or six papers for the unemployed. Despite the 
leadership's criticism of the Queensland MM's work, by the end of 1933 the party had 
built a small base for itself amongst the rank and file of a number of unions. 
The Second National MM Congress in Christmas 1933 u-aced the shifts in the 
behaviour of the union officials from 1928 to 1933. As the Minority Movement 
leadership saw it die officials were able to maintain their cond-ol over the rank and file 
during the intense stiuggles of 1928-1930 "by paying lipservice to the need for sdruggle" 
while they "helped to break the strikes by advocating sectional stoppages, by preventing 
the extension of the struggles and by back-door conferences with the employers".'^ 
As well, the ACTU refused to support a general strike advocated by the CPA against 
the 10% wage cut In fact the 1931 ACTU Congress, the MM claimed, "was used to 
marshall the forces of the reformists against the militants and beu-ay 300,000 
^^^ ibid. , 1 November 193 3, p. 5. 
"^ ibid., 6 September 1933, p. 2. 
^" ibid., 13 December 1933, p. 4. 
^^® ibid. , p. 4. See Appendix A for list of some CPA rank and 
file bulletins published in this period. 
^^^ Lessons of the Economic Struggles and Tasks of the 
Militant T.U. Movement: Resolution of the 2nd National M.M. 
Congress, Christmas 1933, p. 1. 
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workers".^ *" In the light of this, the urgency for die CPA to gain the leadership of the 
working class could not be greater. It was the party's deeply held belief that if socialism 
were to be achieved, it could not come from continued retreat and surrender of the 
working class, 
...but only from the united front struggles of the working class in defence 
of all that they now have and by struggle for improvements...and the need 
for sustained class struggle to overthrow the power of the capitalists as 
the only way of the crisis.^"' 
In this period union officials openly opposed every struggle against wage cuts, 
counterposing instead reliance on the Arbid-ation Courts and upon Labor pohticians.^"^ 
Yet Labor Premiers "continued the drive against wages, hours, pensions and against the 
unemployed". As for the Arbid-ation Court, it would not restore the 10% wage cut, and 
instead, claimed the CPA, it "imposed worsened conditions on new sections of the 
workers".^ "^ 
The conservative AWU officials, whose influence within the ALP increased 
during die depression years as more and more unions disaffiliated from die party, 
remained one of the greatest obstacles to industrial action. In January 1933 they lent 
support to the Forgan-Smith Labor government's Arbitration and Conciliation 
Amendment Act. This made it more difficult from a legal aspect, for only a section of 
the union membership to strike. Under the new Act a strike would only become 
"authorised" once all members of a union agreed to this by secret ballot. The Act 
claimed the CPA, was "purposely designed to prevent mass strike action against further 
2°° ibid., p. 1. 
^°' ibid. , p. 5. 
°^2 ibid. , p. 1. 
'°' ibid. , p. 2. 
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wage cuts".^ *^ Since the onset of the depression various, sections of the AWU 
membership from shearers, cotton pickers, sugar workers, timber getters and miners, had 
gone on suike often against the wishes of the officials. However, if the AWU leaders 
were hoping this legislation would prevent a recurrence of such behaviour, they were 
mistaken as future CPA-led strikes were to show. 
The party firmly believed that workers, when away from the influence of 
reformist union officials, were able to win their disputes. They pointed out that disputes 
which won often took place amongst workers with an established reputation for 
militancy, such as the Collinsville miners, or in places like Dobbyn, Mt Oxide and 
Cardwell which were isolated from major urban centres and union headquarters. These 
conditions enhanced rank and file control. The MM concluded, it is "where the reformist 
influence is isolated and correct united front work is recorded that the workers secure 
victory ".^ °^  
The success of these sd-uggles invalidated union officials' arguments that partial 
sdTjggles would fail or that su-uggles were impossible in a period of crisis and high 
unemployment^*^ As die party observed in 1933, these su-uggles also laid the basis 
for MM development. 
The growing support of the Militant Trade Union Movement (Minority 
Movement) is reflected in the steady growdi of organised M.M. work on 
the railways, tiamways, in the mining fields and metal industiies etc; the 
past period has found the M.M. as the only job organisers, the only 
propagandists who defend the workers' conditions. Our cend-al press has 
been enlarged by 50% and sales have nearly doubled in the past twelve 
^°' Workers Weekly, no. 453 (6 January 1933), p. 1. 
°^^  Resolution of the 2nd national M.M. Congress, op.cit., 
p. 2. 
°^^  ibid. , p. 2. 
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months...^°^ 
As rank and file discontent grew, the MM declared, union officials and the 
ACTU began to use "all their resources to fight the M.M. in the hope of preventing the 
M.M. from capturing the leadership of the masses for the struggle against wage cuts and 
longer hours".^ °^ The conflict between the "militant workers and die discredited 
bureaucracy" was sharpening.^*^ 
This, however, did not automatically lead to communists supplanting union 
officials as had been presumed at the beginning of the Third Period. Instead, reformists 
retained a tight hold over the union apparatus. As the MM admitted: 
The main shortcoming at the present time lies in an underestimation of 
the power and influence and the cortuption of the machine of the 
reformists which now plays the role of sd-ike-breaker, which holds the 
workers back from struggle and which performs the dirty work of the 
capitalists in attempting to discredit the workers' militant leaders, which 
tries to prevent the militants from contesting elections (Food, A.E.U., 
Boilermakers, Miners) and from being elected to leading positions in the 
210 
unions. 
The leadership recognised that more intensive work needed to be done in the 
union branches and in the workplaces. In particular, MM groups were to intensify their 
campaigns for union democracy and "put forward and organise support for their own 
nominees pledged to support a policy of militant unionism and sd-uggle against wage 
cuts".^" 
Special attention was to be given to mining, tiamways, railways, the waterfront 
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textile mills, rural work and the unemployed. The primary issues MM groups were to 
take up were:- in mining, agitation around Coal Bills and Coal Boards; in the tramways, 
depot committees were advised to organise "against rationing, death planks, longer 
hours, espionage, etc. and to fight for more democracy for the membership in the affairs 
of the Tramway Union (A.T.E.A.)"; in the railways, it was industrial unionism and job 
organisation; on the waterfront, a rank and file conference to "throw overboard the old 
officials" was needed as was the establishment of ship and port committees "for the 
closest collaboration and united action with the wharfies against the shipowners"; 
amongst rural workers - shearers, fruit pickers, station and dairy farm hands, wheat 
stackers and lumpers, timber getters, cane-cutters - Bushworkers' Committees needed 
to be established by the PWIU to link together all these various groups of workers; 
amongst the unemployed, the major issue was raising the dole and more work at award 
wages while opposing "further extension of rationing and forced labor conditions into 
indusuies".^'^ 
In general the MM adopted as their immediate demands the thirty-hour working 
week, a £5 guaranteed weekly wage, double the dole for the unemployed and award 
wages and more work for relief workers. The congress concluded: 
...the Minority Movement can and must supply the alternative leadership 
to that of the treacherous reformists; this Congress must hammer out a 
program and policy which will unite the masses against capitalism in the 
struggle to defend their wages and conditions and the conditions of the 
unemployed and develop that class unity and experience of struggle 
which is the workers' guarantee for the final victory of the working class 
over capitalism - the only road by which the masses can travel towards 
emancipation, towards making the idle industries active and productive 
towards socialism and a new world.^" 
2^ 2 i b i d . , p . 6 . 
^'^ i b i d . , p . 7 . 
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After painstaking work amongst the employed and unemployed, the CPA was to 
begin to realise its goal of replacing reformist union officials with militant communists. 
However, dieir successes were to be overshadowed by yet another change in the 
Comintern line in mid-1935. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
COMMUNIST TRADE UNION WORK ALTERS 1934-1935 
SLIGHT SHIFT AWAY FROM THE THIRD PERIOD 
Overseas Factors 
From January 1934 the Communist Party's theory and practice again shifted 
marginally from the extremes of the Third Period politics. The catalyst for change 
was the tragic events in Europe - particularly in Germany. Since the theory of "social 
fascism" decreed that reformism and fascism were "twins", aUiances with the German 
Social Democratic Party [SPD] were prohibited. Petty squabbles and name calling 
kept the two largest working class parties divided. Against this background the 
National Socialists increased their parliamentary votes from 2.5% in 1928 to 36.8% 
by 1932. 
The absurdity of the theory of "social fascism" was such that the Comintern 
described fascism as a necessary condition for the victory of the working class. 
When, in September 1930, the National Socialists won 107 seats in the Reichstag, 
KPD's leader, Ernst Thaelmann, claimed it was "Hitier's best day". Thaelmann went 
on to say that Hitler "cannot expect to do better, only worse...Today the fascists have 
no reason to be pleased".' Even a month after the National Socialists took power in 
January 1933 the Executive Committee of the Comintern claimed that an open fascist 
dictatorship "which destioys all democratic illusions among the masses, and frees 
them from the influence of die social-democrats, will hasten Germany's progress 
^ Quoted in Leon Trotsky, Writings of Leon Trotsky: 1932 
11 (Pathfinder: New York, 1978), p. 135. 
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towards the proletarian revolution".' 
On the contrary, after Hitler's triumph unions were smashed, left wing 
literature desu-oyed and militant workers - both communist and reformist - were 
either murdered or imprisoned in concentration camps. The German working class 
was thoroughly suppressed. The KPD - the biggest communist party outside of the 
USSR, once described by the Comintern as "the vanguard army of revolutionary 
Marxism-Leninism in die capitalist world"^ - was crushed, and Thaelmann was later 
executed at Buchenwald concentration camp in 1945. 
Not even this jolted Moscow out of its self-interested position. The USSR 
refused to jeopardise the fragile tiading relations between itself and Germany. When, 
in December 1932, German Chancellor K. von Schleicher hinted to the Soviet 
diplomat Pavel Litvinov that he was considering outiawing the KPD, Litvinov 
"responded by declaring that measures taken by the German Government against 
German communists were no concern of the Soviet Government and would not 
affect Soviet-German relations"."* Only days after the mass arrests of thousands of 
communists in the wake of the Reichstag fire on 27 February 1933, Litvinov met 
with German Foreign Minister, A. Neurath. Neither mentioned the fires, arrests or 
suspension of civil hberties.^ Then on 23 March Hitler 
...delivered a speech in which he expressed the will of his government 
to maintain friendly relations with die USSR, and added that the 
struggle against Bolshevism in Germany had no bearing on these 
"state-political" relations, Litvinov expressed his gratification to the 
^ Quoted in ibid., p. 90. 
^ Carr, Twilight of the Comintern, op.cit., p. 90 
ibid., pp 
^ ibid., p 
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Gemian Ambassador in Moscow.'' 
Despite the courteous exchange between the two governments, Stalin, unwilling to 
completely trust Nazi Germany, continued to seek allies amongst other western 
nations. In November 1933 the US officially recognised the USSR for the first time 
and proclaimed Japan dieir common enemy in the east^ In an agreement between 
the two counU-ies, Litvinov promised not to allow any organisation which wished to 
overthrow the US government to operate on USSR soil.^ Equivocating on these 
events, die CPA stated that only the American Communist Party wished to depose 
the US government and as it did not operate in the USSR, Litvinov's pledge was not 
a retreat for the international communist movement. It was left to the Australian 
Trotskyist group, the Workers Party, to remind Sharkey and Miles that the 
Comintern's aim "was the overthrow of ALL capitalist governments, including that 
of the U.S.A."."^ The Trotskyists asked: 
How low have the Stalinists sunk? In the days of Marx and Lenin the 
overthrow of ALL capitalist governments was the aim of ALL 
Communist parties, but today, according to the Stalinists none of them 
are concerned with matters outside their own countries, with the 
exception of "building up Socialism in the U.S.S.R." Such is the 
outcome of the bourgeois policy of "Socialism in One Country".'*' 
More creative explanations were required of the CPA when, in May 1934, the 
USSR joined die League of Nations - a body which had been criticised by Lenin as a 
^ ibid., p. 95. 
^ ibid., p. 102. 
^ Militant, no. 6 (March 1934), p. 11 
^ ibid., p. 11. 
^° ibid. , p. 11. 
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"den of thieves"." The CPA rationalised: 
The League of Nations, in its earlier period, was used as a weapon to 
organise the anti-Soviet bloc. The wididrawal of Japan and Germany 
from the League...meant, however, that the League came under the 
domination of those Powers, which for the time being, at least were 
not desirous of war. To some extent it could be used as a factor in the 
cause of peace.'^ 
During the Third Period, fascism continued to grow. A month after Hitier 
came to power in Germany, die Austrian regime under Engelbert Dollfuss and the 
Heimwehr, a fascist military organisation, dismissed parliament and began to rule by 
decree. Over the next months the Communist Party and the reformists' military 
organisation, the Schutzbund, were outiawed and the reformists' paper, 
Arbeiterzeitung, was banned. Continued repression led to an armed confrontation 
between the Heimwehr and the Schutzbund in the working class suburbs of Vienna 
in February 1934. The fascists won, then consolidated their victory by artesting and 
imprisoning in concentration camps thousands of communist and reformist militants. 
In France, an attempted fascist coup in Paris on 6 February 1934, where 
fighting in the streets left 100 wounded and twenty dead, was the rock on which 
Third Period politics were dashed.'^ A spontaneous cry for unity against fascism 
came from both communist and reformist workers who had witnessed the victory of 
fascism in neighbouring Germany and Austria. On 12 February four and a half 
million workers heeded a general strike call by both reformist and communist unions 
^^  Jacques Danes and Marcel Gibelin, June ' 36: Class 
Struggle and the Popular Front in France (trans. Peter Fysh 
and Christine Bourry) (Bookmarks: London, 1986), p. 36. 
^^  Workers Weekly, supplement (10 January 1936), no page. 
"The League can be used to postpone the outbreak of war.", 
said the Workers Weekly, no. 664 (24 January 1936), p. 2. 
^^  Danos, op. cit. , p. 29. 
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and one million took part in the anti-fascist rallies on the same day.'^ At the rally in 
Paris communist and reformist workers sUirted their marches from different points in 
the city but as the two columns converged to form one demonstration spontaneous 
cries of "Unity! Unity!" sprang up. The rally "then proceeded in tightiy-packed rows 
along the whole width of the Cours de Vincennes. For the first time for years 
Socialist and Communist workers were marching side by side".'^ 
The French Communist Party, after expelling one of its leaders in May for 
criticising the Third Period line,'* was forced from below by workers and from 
above by the growing compact between the Soviet and French governments to adopt 
the notion of an all-class People's Front against fascism. This was the forerunner to 
the Popular Front which replaced the Third Period line in mid-1935. 
Australian Factors 
While events overseas were fracturing the Third Period politics, in Australia 
different pressures were brewing which would compel the CPA to re-evaluate its 
work. 
Austraha was one of the few countries in which the Third Period line did not 
lead to disaster. In fact both party membership and electoral support for the CPA 
increased. In the Brisbane, in the seat of Bulimba alone, the party vote rose from 162 
in June 1932 to 1,000 by September 1934, while communists in Colhnsville and 
Tully came close to winning a majority.'^ Other states reported a similar trend. In 
'' ibid. , p. 34 
'^  ibid. , p. 34 
16 ibid., p. 36. 
^^  CPA Election - State Election Campaign. Summary of 
•Speech by F.W. Paterson, Communist Candidate for Bowen, p. 2 . 
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SA, election support increased 200% from 1930-1933 while in Victoria the 
communist vote increased from 0.14% in 1932 to 4.51% in 1943. Nationally, 
membership rose from around 300 in 1929 to about 3,000 by 1935 and continued to 
increase to 23,000 by 1945."* While this is impressive, it fell far short of die party's 
aim at the beginning of the Third Period, which was to become the unchallenged 
leader of the Australian working class. This never eventuated. 
Some factors which assisted the CPA to increase its influence amongst the 
working class were high unemployment, refusal of union officials to fight wages cuts 
and the harsh austerity measures of right wing Labor governments both federally and 
in the states. Consequentiy, the CPA's condemnation of die system found a small but 
significant audience. It was in fact this success which became the catalyst for change 
in the party's work, in particular it led to the party's conquest of important positions 
in the union bureaucracy as the economic crisis eased slightiy. 
From 1934 the Australian economy began to drag itself out of the depression, 
although it was not until just prior to the outbreak of World War II that production 
was back to pre-depression levels. Economic News in December 1933 claimed that 
Queensland's situation was the healthiest it had been since June 1930.'^ Reporting 
the changing fortunes of the capitalist class, the AWU's paper, the Worker, 
announced: 
The value of shares in 159 companies covering eight groups of 
industi7 increased from £92,486,704 in 1931 to £158,886,771 in 
December, 1933, an increase of 71 per cent..An examination of the 
balance sheets of 85 companies showed that whereas in 1931 they 
®^ B.J. Costar, "Australian Politics During the Great 
Depression", The History Teacher, no. 8, October 1971, pp. 9-
10. 
19 Economic News, Decemiber 1933, p. 2 
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made profits aggregating £3,336,000 in 1933, their profits aggregated 
£5,617,000.'" 
The CPA warned workers against being too optimistic. The rise in global 
production, they said, was produced by growing imperialist antagonisms which were 
leading to war, coupled with an increase in the exploitation of the working class. In 
1933 alone Britain's military expenditure rose by £4 million; the US government 
spent $238 million building thirty-two new warships; Japan spent £50 million also 
building warships; while the same trend could be seen in Germany, France and other 
developed nations.^' To the Communist Party these statistics showed that the 
capitalists, "faced by their inability to emerge from the crisis in the ordinary 
economic ways, are turning their countries into armed camps", and they warned: "We 
are on the eve of a new world war".'' 
Within the labour movement the accumulated bitterness about wage cuts, 
longer working hours and poor conditions found a focus as the economy began to 
revive. A new spirit of militancy developed with workers demanding their share of 
the renewed prosperity. A general indication of rising militancy can be seen in the 
strike figures which continued to climb until the outbreak of World War 11.'^  
Mounting pressure to restore lost wages and conditions forced the Federal 
Arbid-ation Court in February 1934 to restore die 1931 basic wage cut. This, 
°^ Worker, 28 February 1934, p. 16. 
'^  Red Leader, 20 June 1934, p. 8. 
22 ibid. , 27 June 1934, p. 8. This contrasted with the 
Worker's analysis of the economic revival which they 
attributed to "the sensible and humane' policy of Labor". 
Worker. 3 January 1934, p. 6. 
23 Murray and White, op.cit., p. 99 
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however, failed to appease the more militant trade unionists. The ARU officials 
insisted that the 600,000 workers affected by the decision were victims of a judicial 
"swindle".''* By abolishing the 3/- Powers loading - which had been added to the 
weekly basic wage since 1921 - and replacing the method of calculating the cost of 
living from the 1907 Harvester method with the "all-items" index meant die entire 
10% wage cut was not restored. The ARU officials claimed it was the "all-items" 
index which was the major "swindle" on the workers. Quoting the 1935 Acting 
Commonwealth Statistician, the Advocate claimed the "all-items" index was "much 
inferior to the food-and-rent index in accuracy", and could not be recommended "for 
practical use in the determination of wages and other payments".'^ 
The basic wage decision produced, according to the CPA, a "tremendous 
wave of mass resentment".'^ In May 1934 Queensland members of the Austialian 
Leather, Canvas and Allied Trades Federation, as well as the Maryborough branch of 
the Australian Engineers Union, threatened strike action to get the full restoration.'^ 
Yet union officials on the whole remained timid. Despite the steady economic 
recovery from 1934-36, diey did not seek a further rise in the basic wage until 
1937.'^  In fact, many of the gains won by officials in the Arbitration Courts were 
pyrthic victories as they were often acquired by d-ading off other conditions of 
workers. In January 1934, the AMIEU was granted one week's annual holiday for its 
'^  Advocate, 15 May 1934, p. 12. 
'^  ibid. , p. 5. 
'^  R. Dixon, "Problems of Militant Trade Unionism", 
Communist Review, August 1934, pp. 14-15. 
" Red Leader, 9 May 1934, p. 1. 
'® Reddaway, op.cit., p. 32 6. 
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members only after promising no smkes or stop-work meetings would take place at 
the abattoirs.'^ 
In the unions much of the resentment over the distress suffered by workers 
and unemployed during the worst years of the depression was directed toward the 
end-enched officialdom. From the onset of the economic crisis they had abided by 
arbitiation court decisions to reduce wages, lengthen working hours and increase 
workers' productivity. The only organised resistance came from the Communist 
Party. Seeing the Arbiuration Court as a "bosses' instrument", they insisted that if 
workers accepted its decision they accepted the employers' decision. "If we don't 
fight the court's decisions", the CPA insisted, "we let the boss...rob us without a 
protest".^° Because of their commitment to direct action, the CPA posed the only 
credible alternative to die conservative union officials. 
In this atmosphere communists found themselves being elected by the rank 
and file into official positions within the u-ade unions. During the 1930s Queensland 
CPA members won lower level positions in the QCEU, WWF, SUA and some local 
Trades and Labour Councils.^' This was seen as important in the struggle to weaken 
the hold of reformists. As the party's Central Committee stressed, the lower level 
positions in the union bureaucracy were "the very positions on which the reformists 
depend to maintain their influence and leadership".^' Higher positions were also 
'^  Red Leader, 31 January 1934, p. 4. As it turned out the 
AMIEU went on strike in February 1935 for a pay rise. 
^° Red Leader, 4 April 1934, p. 5. 
^^  Henderson interviewed by Penrose, 10 October 1991. " 
^^  Dixon, "Problems of Militant Trade Unionism", op.cit. , 
p. 19. 
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captured by party candidates. In the eariy 1930s CPA member, Tom "Bluey" Millar, 
became Secretary of the Collinsville branch of the QCEU," and in 1934 fellow 
communist Isidor "Andy" Anderson was elected Secretary of the Brisbane branch of 
the SUA, although he died not long after taking office.^ J. McBryde built a small 
base in the Rockhampton branch of the AEU and in early 1934 MM members had 
positions in the lower levels of this union branch." Jim Healy built support for the 
MM in die Mackay WWF, which enabled him to be elected leader of the union in 
1937. 
In other states support for the CPA in union elections was more spectacular. 
Victorian members of the Australian Tramway Employees Association re-elected 
MM candidate Jim Bergin as President of the union in December 1933. At the same 
time they voted in as Vice-President minority movement candidate W. Smith, while a 
number of other communists were elected as depot delegates.'^ MM member, Ernie 
Thornton, became temporary Organiser of the Federated Ironworkers Association 
[FIA] and a Melbourne Trades Hall Councd delegate in late 1934. Just over a year 
later Thornton became General Secretary and by 1936 "communists controlled 
several branches and federal positions in the FIA"." In December 1935, Joe Keenen 
was elected General Secretary of the SUA. However, their biggest success was the 
election of William Ort, member of die Central Committee of the CPA and head of 
33 Henderson interviewed by Penrose, 10 October 1991 
•'^  Andy Anderson had been a memiber of the MM from its 
inception. Red Leader, 21 February 1934, p. 9. 
^^  ibid., 14 February 1934, p. 3 
*^ ibid., 6 December 1933, p. 1. 
37 Murray and White, op.cit., p. 84 
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the MM, as General Secretary of the Miners Federation at the end of 1933. This 
victory was soon followed by the election of fellow communist, Charles Nelson, as 
General President of die union in September 1934. 
Winning these positions raised questions amongst the leadership as to the 
viability of their trade union policies to date, and to the role of die MM. Over the 
months from January 1934-July 1935, as the leadership began to struggle with diese 
questions, the party membership continued the difficult task of building the MM as a 
base for getting communist militants elected into trade union positions. 
CPA TRADE UNION WORK 
Queensland Coal Employees Union 
In Queensland communists waged a long and exhausting struggle to organise 
coal miners as the state branch had always been the most conservative in the union -
even refusing to be levied to help fellow miners in the 1929 northern NSW lockout. 
Because of die union's moderation, miners suffered badly in the depression. There 
were barely two areas where miners worked at the same rates and conditions. In fact, 
at Mt MuUigan workers were on a collective contract system which left them with 
less than award rates.'^ In 1931 miners' wages were reduced by 10%. Over the next 
four years award rates in the majority of the mines were ignored and working 
conditions deteriorated.'^ At Harts Aberdare colliery some of the places in the pit 
were so hot men were forced to alternate their time at the coal face.'*° At Nobelvale 
^^  Trade Union Leader, no. 5 (December 1935), p. 107. 
'^  Red Leader, 5 June 1935, p. 9. 
40 i b i d . , 21 November 1934, p . 4 
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No. 1 a fire in 1934 closed the mine for four days. On resumption of work miners 
complained of the terrific heat yet no inspector or a union official came to the job to 
investigate the workers' case."' 
This contrasted starkly to those areas where the CPA had established MM 
groups. At Torbanlea, Howard, Collinsville and Scottville communists led three 
successful sdikes in 1934,"*' confirming in their minds that where the influence of 
established (X^EU leaders was weakened, miners could improve theu- conditions 
through du-ect action. 
Intensive work was carried out particularly in the Ipswich area where a MM 
group was established in March 1934. The Red Leader explained this was possible 
only after laborious work had been carried out in the area: 
A systematic canvass was made among the miners' homes, on the 
workmen's train, and on the job where this was possible. Their 
grievances and demands were taken up in a concrete manner, and our 
line of organisation explained."' 
This effort resulted in MM candidates almost unseating the QCEU leaders, Kilpatrick 
(District President) and Phillips (Secretary), in die 1935 union elections. Communist 
miner, Tom Madders, who had been brought down from Torbanlea, received 867 
votes against Kilpatrick's 923, while Bill Reynolds received 826 votes against 
PhUlips' 986."" 
...Kilpatiick, had his majority reduced from three to four hundred in 
the Ipswich disd-ict in previous elections to 70...and from seven to 
eight hundred throughout the Queensland district in previous elections 
' ' i b i d . , p . 4 . 
'^ Workers Weekly, no. 563 (27 June 1934), p. 1. 
^^  Red Leader, 27 February 1935, p. 4. 
^^  Workers Weekly, no. 591 (15 February 1935), p. 5 
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to 56 in this election."^ 
By June 1935 die CPA had a branch in Ipswich of thirty members, admitting 
they had a "big influence" in the mines despite the small party membership."^ By 
the late 1930s-early 1940s communists Jack Pocock, Tom Madders, Tom Millar, and 
Wdliam Reynolds had all been elected to positions within the QCEU."^ In the 
federal miners' union election in 1936, Orr received 76% of the Queensland vote 
while his national vote was 61%."^ 
AWU: Cotton Pickers 
Communist seasonal workers, on the whole members of the AWU, also 
worked tirelessly amongst the rank and file, agitating around smaU and large issues 
affecting the everyday life of themselves and their fellow workers. Despite the union 
being dominated by an entrenched conservative bureaucracy, the CPA's influence 
amongst the rank and file grew, allowing them to lead strikes amongst cotton pickers, 
timber workers, metal miners and sugar workers. 
Queensland's cotton belt was situated in the Callide Valley and Upper Burnett 
regions. A highly protected industry with 90,000 acres under crop, these regions 
produced about two-thirds of the state's cotton in 1938."^ The AWU officials 
supported protection of the indusd-y. They argued this would "enable the industry to 
45 Red Leader, 27 February 1935, p. 4. 
"^  Workers Weekly, no. 609 (28 June 1935) 
^^  Bailey, op.cit., pp. 18-20. 
'^ ibid. , p. 19. 
^^  C.B. Christesen, Oueensland Journey: Official Guide of 
the Queensland Government Tourist Bureau (PA Mechan Publicity 
Service: Brisbane, 1938), p. 162. 
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employ white labor at ruminative employment in accord widi Ausd-alian 
standards".^" However, as with most protected industries, wage rates were very low. 
Even the AWU admitted the decline in the minimum picking rates from 1922-1932 
far outstiipped the decline in the price of cotton.^' In 1931 a federal uibunal 
reduced ordinary picking rates by 17.7%. This compared to the basic wage reduction 
which, in Queensland, never exceeded 12.9%." 
Again, as in most protected industries, working conditions were harsh. 
Describing "snap picking" which was picking the last of the cotton that had "been 
frosted for several weeks", one person wrote: 
The husks become razor sharp, cutting one's clothes to ribbons and 
inflicting severe cuts on the hands which, in many cases, becomes 
septic, necessitating cessation of work. No compensation is paid." 
The Hut Accommodation Act was often disregarded by the growers and workers were 
"compelled to live in bag humpies, with leaking roofs and open sides. Many are 
without cooking apparatus, and their food is dried by the sun or soaked by the rain. 
Queensland's numerous pests, including myriads of mice, have a breakfast at the 
expense of the workers".^ 
During the 1933 picking season, a communist-led strike had forced 
Arbitiation to review wage rates. Although the AWU officials had actively opposed 
°^ Worker, 21 March 1934, p. 10. 
'^ ibid. , p. 10. 
'^ ibid., p. 10. Because the cotton crop did not ripen all 
at once, there were rounds of picking. "The first and second 
picks would mostly be classed as ordinary picks, the third 
pick as the clean up, and the remainder of the crop would be 
snap picked.", ibid., p. 11. 
" Red Leader, 26 August 1934, p. 12. 
"^ ibid. , 23 May 1934, p. 11. 
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this strike, they recognised that the existing "starvation rales", as they themselves 
described them, were fuelling discontent and unrest in the industry.^ '* The outcome 
of the Arbid-ation hearing was that pickers were awarded 10/6 per lOOlbs of cotton 
picked. 
However, a significant minority of pickers believed this was stiU too low, 
particularly since the indusd-y's profits were improving. Early in 1934, communist 
seasonal workers, Alfred Paull and another communist named Webster,^ *^  argued at 
a Biloela meeting of 100 pickers for a sd-ike for higher wages from 2 April." They 
found support amongst workers who insisted that 14/6 per lOOlbs - 10/6 "was not a 
hving wage, as the majority of the pickers could not pick on an average more than 
801bs per day".^ ^ The strike was run from a camp set up on the local sports ground 
in defiance of the Council and police.^^ 
Ranged against the strikers were the state's cotion growers, the Labor 
government and their own union officials. Forgan-Smith sent police into the area who 
to establish their camp in the railway goods' shed. However, as it had no water or 
electricity, and since "the Railway pig d-ucking yards being right against the shed". 
" Worker, 21 March 1934, p. 11. 
" Webster, whom the local police described as an avowed 
communist, was "in close association with the recognised 
Communists of the district". PRE/A1093, In-Letter 2128 of 
1934, Inspector of Police (Rockhampton) to Comimissioner of 
Police, 6 April 1934. QSA. 
57 Workers Weekly, no. 547 (6 April 1934), p. 1 
^^  PRE/A1093, In-Letter 2128 of 1934, Sergeant Langusch to 
Inspector of Police (Rockhampton), 13 April 1934. QSA. 
" PRE/A1093, In-Letter 2128 of 1934, Inspector of Police 
(Rockhampton) to Commissioner of Police, 6 April 1934. QSA. 
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the police found it unsuitable.^ They kept the strikers under surveillance and, at 
Goovigen, batoned four workers.^' The Labor government also widiheld rations 
from the su-ikers,* '^ while the AWU officials accused a "few half baked Communists 
aided and abetted by a few noisy irresponsibles" of jeopardising the "welfare" of the 
cotton industry.^' George Crooks, Bundaberg's AWU representative, Crook, was 
sent to the region encourage the men to return to work. However, he was not well 
received by the strikers. At a meeting on 8 April, the men voted 185 to 40 to stay on 
strike despite Crooks' appeals for a return to work.^ 
Resorting to intimidation. Crooks promised union protection to anyone wilting 
to break the stiike.''^ As the police reported, an AWU organiser was left in the 
district "who will visit all farms and instruct all men who are working to continue 
working, as far as the A.W.U. is concerned diere is no strike".*^ As the strike 
dwindled, the communists called for a return to work without having won higher 
wages. On 12 April a meeting of about ninety strikers reluctantiy decided to resume 
°^ PRE/A 1093, In-Letter 2128 of 1934, Sergeant Langusch 
to Inspector of Police (Rockhampton), 10 April 1934. QSA. 
61 Red Leader, 11 April 1934, p. 4. 
'^ PRE/A1093, In-Letter 2128 of 1934, Inspector Blackmore 
(Rockhampton) to Commissioner of Police, 6 and 7 April 1934. 
QSA. The police reported that on 6 April 1934 nineteen 
strikers were refused rations. 
63 Worker, 28 February 1934, p. 3 
" PRE/A1093, In-Letter 2128 of 1934, Inspector Blackmore 
(Rockhampton) to Commissioner of Police, 9 April 1934. QSA. 
65 Red Leader, 20 June 1934, p. 10 
" PRE/A1093, In-Letter 2128 of 1934, Sergeant Langusch to 
Inspector of Police (Rockhampton), 13 April 1934. QSA. 
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work.''' 
One interesting incident in the dispute was the way a number of non-English 
speaking workers were won to the strike. At a meeting on 5 April of about 200 
striking and non-striking cotton pickers, one non-sd-iker took the floor to accuse 
migrant workers of taking over the state, claiming nordi Queensland was "run by 
Dagoes". When this was translated into Italian by one of the Italian-speaking strikers, 
the police reported "about 40 of the foreigners then walked over to the Strikers Side 
and this ended the meeting with a majority of about 40 men on the Sd-ikers side".*^ 
When the picking season opened in 1935, communists attempted to organise a 
further sdrike demanding an increase in the picking rate to 14/7 per lOOlbs for 
general picking and II- per lOOlbs for snap picking. They pointed out that growers 
were being paid more per bale than they were in 1934. "In the face of this 
information the growers will be hard pressed to prove that they are not in a position 
to give us an increase in wages".*^ ^ 
A WU: Metal Miners 
Another section of AWU workers which the CPA organised were the metal 
miners of Mt Coolan and Mt Isa. Over the years from 1928 to 1932 the number of 
miners injured in this sector rose from 24 to 102, the fatalities rising from one to 
six.™ 
" PRE/A1093, In-Letter 2128 of 1934, Sergeant Langusch to 
Inspector of Police (Rockhampton), 12 April 1934. QSA. 
^^ PRE/A1093, In-Letter 2128 of 1934, Sergeant Langusch to 
Inspector of Police (Rockhampton), 11 April 1934. QSA. 
^^  Red Leader, 17 April 1935, p. 8. 
'° Queensland Annual Report Department of Mines, vol. 8, 
1932, p. 120. 
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Lead mining and smelting at Mt Isa was exd-emely hazardous. Yet despite the 
poor working conditions at the mine and smelter, industrial disputes had been fairly 
infrequent In the seven years leading up to the end of 1933, only forty-four days had 
been lost in sd-ikes.^' Labor Minister for Mines, J. Stopford, attributed this to the 
leadership of the AWU, claiming: 
The indusdial organisation of die mining industry in this State is under 
the control and guidance of the A.W.U., whose history shows they 
stand firmly for arbitration.^^ 
This did not mean the AWU officials always had control over their membership at 
the mine. In 1933 Mt Isa miners staged two su-ikes, both against the advice of the 
officials. One was in April demanding the dismissal of a shift boss whose dangerous 
habits were "endangering the lives of every man near him"." In his book on the 
history of Mt Isa Mines, Geoffrey Blainey writes that the company "suspended this 
tough old miner for two weeks for infringing safety rules by crimping the caps onto 
fuses with his teeth" I^"* Yet, while this reckless shift boss faced suspension, the five 
miners who gave evidence against him to the Industrial Magisu-ate were subsequendy 
dismissed." 
The second strike, in October, was again over safety issues. This time it was 
over the dismissal of two workers for intermittent fuing - that is, firing "at times 
71 
48 . 
Queensland Government Mining Journal, vol. 37, 1936, p 
^^  Quoted in ibid., p. 48. 
" Red Leader, 20 December 1933, p. 3. 
'^' Geoffrey Blainey, Mines in the Spinifex: The Story of 
Mount Isa Mines (Angus and Robertson: Sydney, 1960), p. 170. 
75 Red Leader, 21 March 1934, p. 4. 
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other than crib and knock-off time".^^' The miners themselves objected to 
intermittent firing and had approached management in April that year to have the 
practice abolished. They were told this was not possible as "the abolition of 
intermittent firing would seriously hamper" the company's operations." Therefore it 
seemed perverse that only six months later miners were dismissed for carrying out 
company policy. When workers announced their intention to strike for the 
reinstatement of the two men, the company locked-out the entire workforce, 
prompting the CPA to conclude that management "want a reduction of wages, and/or 
a subsidy from the government and it therefore engineered a lock-out".^* 
Management was intransigent. General Manager, Julius Kruttschnitt said: "If 
we compromise or surrender on this issue working conditions here will become 
intolerable". '^* The Chair of Mt Isa Mines, J.P. Blaikie Webster, said diat he, 
Kruttschnitt and members of the government were "convinced that outcome of the 
strike will have dominating influence on our future labour position".^" Supporting 
die employers was the Forgan-Smith Labor government which refused to issue 
rations to the locked-out workers, claiming they were on strike. The AWU officials 
also worked against the men by withholding a letter of support from Bowen coke 
workers who had been stood down because of the Mt Isa dispute.^' 
'^  ibid., 20 December 1933, p. 3. 
^^  Quoted in ibid. , p. 3. 
'' ibid. , p. 3. 
" Quoted in Blainey, op.cit., p. 171 
°^ Quoted in ibid., p. 172. 
" Red Leader, 20 Decemiber 1933, p. 3 
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As it happened, management won. Although the mines reopened in December 
1933 only 350 of die 1,200 regular employees were re-employed by January 1934. 
None of these were known militants. Blaikie Webster admitted he would not employ 
men who were "unfit physically or politically".**^ Those not reinstated were evicted 
from company houses, which led the Red Leader to conclude: 
The workers have been paying rent on these buildings for years, and 
now, because they dared fight for a decent standard of living, or 
because they may be suffering from the effects of lead poising 
contracted in the Mt Isa mines, they are to be flung out to camp on the 
bed of the creek.^ ^ 
The unemployed were pressured to leave town by police who refused to issue them 
rations.^ In particular, the Red Leader reported the case of J. McLean, Secretary of 
the local unemployed group, who was ordered by police to leave Mt Isa.^ ^ By 
March 1934 a serious health problem arose. Mt Isa's water supply came from the 
company owned Rifle Creek Dam which then sold the water to consumers. 
Unemployed workers who could not afford to buy the water got theirs from the 
Leichhardt River which never runs more than twenty days each year. When it was 
discovered that the river carried typhoid germs, the use of river water was prohibited, 
but out of sheer necessity many unemployed had to defy this ban.^ ^ 
The mine's management pressed home its victory by bringing in a large 
®^  Quoted in ibid., 14 February 1934, p. 5. 
" ibid., 17 January 1934, p. 3. 
84 ibid., 14 February 1934, p. 5 
®^  ibid. , 23 May 1934, p. 4. Two months later Red Leader 
noted that McLean was still in Mt Isa distributing, along with 
J. Stephen, the MM mine workers' bulletin, the Plod. 
86 ibid., 21 March 1934, p. 5 
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number of Finnish migrants in an attempt to divide workers.^^ They also inu-oduced 
the roster system underground which would ensure continuity of production over the 
week-ends.^' The CPA stated: 
The roster system has been successfully resisted by miners throughout 
Australia, and now the court, under a Labor government, has ordered 
the miners of Mt Isa to submit within three weeks an alternative roster 
satisfactory to the court; failing that the company's roster comes into 
force at die end of that time.^^ 
It is interesting that on the bench of the Industrial Court which included the roster 
system in the workers' award was ex-AWU leader, Riordan, who suggested that 
when metal prices rose, the AWU could apply for cancellation of the roster.^ 
The company also won from the court concessions on the issue of closing the 
mine after a fatality. Prior to the lockout, it had been standard practice to close the 
mine to allow all workers to attend a funeral, now the court ruled that only those 
miners working in the level where the fatality occurred could go to the funeral 
"provided that they notify the company". The CPA commented: 
In proportion to the number of workers employed, the number of 
fatalities (eleven) at Mt Isa was greater than that of any other mining 
field in the Commonwealth. Eleven stoppages may cost Mt. Isa Mines 
Ltd. a lot of money, but instead of preventing accidents, fatal and 
otherwise, they are attempting to prevent die stoppages.'" 
Despite the Industiial Court ruling, when another fatal accident occurted in October 
1934, die workers decided unanimously to stop work on all shifts - the afternoon. 
^^ ibid., 14 February 1934, p. 5. 
^^  ibid., 17 January 1934, p. 3. 
^^  ibid., 14 February 1934, p. 5. 
°^ Worker, 14 November 1934, p. 14. 
^^  Red Leader, 14 February 1934, p. 5. 
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night and the morning shift the next day - out of respect for those killed.'^ ^ 
Although communists exerted a great deal of effort at Mt Isa, it was 
enormously difficult to maintain an MM group in the mines. It was reported in the 
Red Leader that an MM group had been formed after the lockout in October 1933. 
The MM branch established in July 1931 with eleven members, who were "very 
active in attempting to mobilise the miners for struggle against further wage cuts",^^ 
had obviously collapsed. 
At Mt Coolon gold mines, an ex-IWW and ex-CPA member, Phil Bossone, 
led a dispute for higher wages and better working conditions. At the mine, travelhng 
ways were dangerous; levels were dusty and the health and safety of the workers was 
ignored by management** Receiving support from Codinsville miners, Merinda 
meatworkers, Brisbane unionists and the CPA, the miners won their dispute despite 
opposition from the AWU leaders.^^ The CPA noted that the last published balance 
sheet of the AWU showed it had £168,022 in assets and £67,702 in bonds and in the 
bank, yet the officials refused to offer strike funds to the workers and offered to find 
strike-breakers for the management.^ 
AWU: Membership Rights Committee 
Around 1934-1935 the CPA established Membership Rights Committees in 
the AWU as only a thorough democratisation of the union structure would enable left 
'2 ibid., 24 October 1934, p. 5. 
" Workers Weekly, no. 406 (3 July 1931), p. 4. 
^^  Trade Union Leader, vol. 2 (September 1935), p. 46. 
'' See Red Leader, 8 May 1935, p. 1; 22 May 1935, p. 10; 
and 2 6 June 193 5, p. 1. 
96 Trade Union Leader, vol. 2 (September 1935), p. 4i 
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wing militants to unseat the entrenched officials. As the Trade Union Leader pointed 
out the Queensland branch of the AWU was the strongest in the union, having seven 
disuicts. They said in February 1936 that: 
With an organised effort these positions on die District Committees 
can be won by the militants, who in the leadership of the rank and 
file, will be in a strong position to overthrow the power of the 
bureaucracy.''^ 
Militants in the Membership Rights Committees published regular bulletins 
and studied the union constitution and rules to "organise for democracy within the 
union".^ ^ The Brisbane branch developed a base amongst sewerage workers who 
had previously been relief workers: 
There was strong militancy among these workers, an active Party 
branch and strong Party influence, the AWU section chairman and 
secretary being Party Members. The Secretary of the Brisbane 
Membership Rights was a sewerage worker...^ 
The CPA also got the municipal workers and timber workers' sections of the 
AWU functioning again after years of inactivity. In north Queensland they stood Jack 
Lane, a non-communist cane cutter, for Queensland Branch Secretary against Clarrie 
Fallon. In the south-east district communist, Dave Surplus, stood for Organiser. As 
Lane's name did not appear on the ballot paper, he was unsuccessful. Surplus, 
however, received 948 votes. In the next two years, although Surplus continued to be 
nominated as a candidate the ballot papers failed to carry his name, despite many 
protest meetings and resolutions supporting him.'^ 
"ibid.., no. 7 (February 1936), p. 154 
®^ Surplus and Healy, op.cit., p. 4. 
99 ibid., p. 4. 
'°° ibid. , p. 4. 
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Unfortunately for the CPA, the Membership Rights Committees disintegrated 
after about two and a half years. This was mainly due to the closing down of the 
sewerage works in Brisbane. All the men were dismissed and when the works were 
reopened no former employee was re-hired.'°' Party members, though, were able to 
write afterwards: 
We gave the union leadership a lot of worry for a few years; caused 
the union officials to break rules in order to defeat us, and through 
Jack Lane's cases in the High Court, forced alterations to the 
rules.'°' 
THE PARTY QUESTIONS ITS TRADE UNION WORK 
Despite the many successes of the MM, the party leadership re-evaluated the 
need to maintain a rank and file organisation in a period when communists were 
capturing leading positions in the trade union bureaucracy. Communist R. Dixon 
believed the election of Bill Orr as General Secretary of the miners union marked a 
turning point in the party's u-ade union policy. The vote, he said, reflected "a general 
tendency m the working class...to sever connections with the Labor Party and 
reformism and to turn finally and decisively to revolutionary leadership".'°^ This 
was further reinforced in September 1934 with the election of Charles Nelson. 
From then on the swing to the Left was rapid. Seamen, waterside 
workers, iron workers, railway workers, sheet metal, building workers 
and various groups of unionists elected Communists and other 
militants to d-ade union positions. By the beginning of 1937 there were 
more than 20 Communist trade union officials and upwards of 1,000 
Communists holding executive or local union positions throughout 
^°' i b i d . , p . 4 . 
i°2 i b i d . , p . 4 . 
103 R. Dixon, S o c i a l i s m and t h e A u s t r a l i a n Labor Movement 
(Modern P u b l i s h e r s : Sydney, 1935), p . 13 . 
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Australia.'**^ 
The mundane work done in the unions and workplaces in the previous years had paid 
off. The MM "was primarily responsible for the arrival of communists to the 
leadership of d-ade unions".'"^ 
Over this period the working class membership of the party increased. In 
1932, 28% of die Queensland branch's membership was employed. By 1935, 50% of 
Brisbane-based District 3's membership and 62% of Innisfail-based District 9's 
membership was employed.'^ By the beginning of 1934, communist militants had 
established job committees in the meat works, the sugar industry, radways, mines 
and tramways'"^ and MM branches were active in around thirty-three unions in the 
state.'"^ 
However, winning official positions created a dilemma. The CPA had defined 
its aim as building an alternate revolutionary movement within the unions' rank and 
file which would lead struggles without any assistance from the "social fascist" 
officials. Now that they themselves had become union officials, what was the role of 
the MM? Was "the objective of the Left simply a minority movement?", the 
leadership asked.^^ At the Central Committee's Fourth Plenum at Easter 1934, it 
was stated that the "whole future development of the party is bound up with the 
24 
°^^  Dixon, "Industrial Policy in the 30s", op.cit., p. 23. 
°^^  Ross interviewed by Penrose, 9 October 1991. 
°^^  Communist Review, April 1935, p. 47. 
°^' Red Leader, 13 December 1933, p. 4. 
i°8 Murray and White, op. cit. , p. 80. 
"^•^  Dixon, "Industrial Policy in the 1930s", op.cit. , p 
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solution" to this question."" 
In the factional struggles against both Jock Garden (1924-25) and Jack 
Kavanagh (1928-29), the tiade union question was cend-al. As Kavanagh's successors 
said, "the question of the trade union policy of the CP. at the present time, and of 
the activities and immediate concrete tasks of die Communists in the u-ades union, 
assumes first-class importance".'" After Kavanagh, the leadership changed its 
emphasis from one of working with left wing union officials around indusdial and 
political issues of the day, to one of shunning these officials as "social fascists" and 
building the MM as an alternative centre of authority within die unions. 
Now the leadership was compelled to balance out the advantages of having 
communists within the established union apparatus where they would remain for a 
designated period of time, compared to the difficulties and uncertainties of 
maintaining rank and file groups through the ups and downs of the class struggle and 
the ever-present threat of dismissal from the employer. There was no guarantee that 
MM groups would be created. In Gladstone in 1933 a party member led a successful 
dispute on the wharves against increasing the number of bales workers were expected 
to handle. Yet, communists in Gladstone "completely failed to gain any new contacts 
or to build a wharfies' committee out of this struggle". In fact the Red Leader 
reported, there was no MM organisation at Gladstone."' Nor was there any 
guarantee that those MM groups which were created would survive despite the 
energies of communist workers. The fate of the two Mt Isa MM branches confirms 
^^ ° R. Dixon, "Problems of Militant Trade Unionism", 
Communist Review, August 1934, p. 16. 
"^ Workers Weekly, no. 281 (11 January 1929), p. 3. 
"2 Red Leader, 13 December 1933, p. 4. 
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that In preparation for the national MM Conference in December 1933 the 
Queensland Secretary bemoaned the "loss of the Mackay group, the failure of the 
Toowoomba group to do anything but make promises, and the capitulation of the 
Townsville group..."."^ 
Clearly, MM groups were very fragile organs in conurast with the permanent 
structure of the union officialdom. The groups were held together through the tireless 
work of communist militants. Usually they were small - fifteen to twenty members -
who met fortnightiy and produced and distributed leaflets and bulletins focusing on 
local union issues."'* The constancy of an official position could not be equated to 
the fluctuating fortunes of die MM groups. 
Another question posed by winning official positions was over die centre of 
power within the unions: should it be the rank and file or the bureaucracy? If the 
revolutionary rank and file were going to lead the struggles against the system 
without the help of the union officials, what would be the role of the communist 
union officials? On the other hand, if Communists controlled the union bureaucracy, 
could they use this position to call the entire membership of the union out on strike, 
and not just the small number of MM supporters within unions? What then would be 
the role of the MM if the struggle could be led more productively from above? 
The Cenu-al Committee resolved these questions in favour of capturing 
official positions. As R. Dixon wrote in April 1935, this was: 
...the most vital and pressing task to-day. It is of historical importance. 
113 i b i d . , p . 4 
^^^ Henderson, interviewed by Penrose, 10 October 1991. 
Doug Olive interviewed by Philip Griffiths and Bens Penrose, 
10 October 1982. Carl King interviewed by Philip Griffiths and 
Beris Penrose, 15 October 1982. 
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for on the outcome of this struggle depends largely the future 
development of the Australian labour movement its victories and 
defeats."^ 
At the same time the MM was to be transformed from a minority movement 
into a mass d-ade union movement"*' The Central Committee resolved that 
emphasis be placed on the importance of obtaining mass affiliation to the MM of 
shop committees, trade union branches and whole trade unions."^ The ultimate 
goal was to supplant the ACTU. As the party leadership said, the MM "is the centre 
for militant trade unionism, just as the A.C.T.U. is the cenu-e for reformist d-ade 
unionism"."^ In reality, this was never achieved, although, branches of the miners' 
union at Collinsville (Qld), Scottville (Qld) and Wonthaggi (Vic) did affiliate with 
the MM at various times. 
To shift the party's position, the leadership had to argue first with its own 
rank and file against the established attitude of viewing union officials as "social 
fascists". Because of the party's previous emphasis on organising, almost exclusively, 
the militants on the job and viewing the unions as "an extension of the bourgeois 
state apparatus within the working class","^ there had developed a reluctance 
amongst some members to involve themselves in day to day union affairs. By 1935 
the party leadership was admitting that from 1930, with the adoption of the Third 
Period hne, communists began to drop out of trade unions. "There was a marked 
^^•^  Trade Union Leader, vol. 2, no. 4 (April 1935), p. 3: 
''^ ibid. , p. 16. 
"' Workers Weekly, no. 549 (20 April 1934), p. 4. 
"*^  Red Leader, 7 March 1934, p. 5. 
^^^ Carr, Twilight of the Comintern, op.cit., p. 200. 
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tendency to seize upon the rank and file movements as alternative forms of 
organisation to the trade unions instead of as supplementary forms".''° 
Dropping out of d-ade unions was never the stated policy of die party. In fact 
when the Third Period Line was adopted, the leadership insisted that members: 
...attempt wherever possible, to have themselves elected to leading and 
strategic executive positions in the trade unions. All sectarian and 
ultra-leftist tendencies which would isolate us from the d-ade unions 
are to be condemned. The party has never yet suffered from "too much 
work in the tiade unions" or in the various Labor Councils.'^' 
However, the emphasis on rank and file work - building job committees, 
workshop groups and MM branches - and the belief that the union bureaucrats were 
"social fascists" - led many members out of the unions, away from day to day union 
work, while simultaneously striving to organise their fellow workers into die MM 
and industrial activity. As pointed out in the Red Leader in February 1934, neglect of 
union work in the Labor Councils meant that "the Minority Movement fractions have 
grown weaker" while paradoxically the organisation "generally has been 
sd-engthened".^^' The Workers Weekly stated that only 25% of CPA worker 
members were in tiade unions, which indicated the party "greatiy underestimates" 
union work.'" The Central Committee insisted that communists must: 
...work not only in the factories, but also inside trade unions... Every 
Party member who is a member of or is ehgible to join a trade union, 
must be convinced of the necessity of becoming active in a union as 
quickly as possible...'^'' 
^^ ° Communist Review, April 1935, p. 44. 
121 Workers Weekly, no. 281 (11 January 1929), p. 3. 
122 Red Leader, 14 February 1934, p. 2. 
12^  ibid. , 5 January 1935, p. 2. 
12^  ibid. , p. 6. 
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Those members who were not up-to-date with their union dues were berated for 
being "anti-union". The Central Committee also noted some resistance toward 
standing for lower level positions in the union bureaucracy, claiming that such an 
attitude was purely "left sectarianism".''^ 
Throughout the seventeen months from January 1934 to May 1935, the party 
debated the trade union question. It was suggested that the name. Militant Minority, 
was unsuitable, reflecting as it did an "anarcho-syndicalist tendency" which 
exaggerated the role of the minority of revolutionary workers.'^ ** By June 1935 
leading communist in north Queensland, Les Lock, even suggested dropping the 
word "Red" from the tide of Red Leader since this was "pandering somewhat to our 
enemies, who class our activities as 'Red' in order to disparage them and us, and 
isolate us".'" 
The National Committee of the MM, headed by Ort, queried past practices of 
recruiting only "those workers who were prepared to attend all meetings, sell papers, 
etc. - this is, play an active organising role".'^^ Instead, they proposed diat to be a 
member of the MM it was "sufficient for a worker to support its policy, read its 
Press, and make regular contributions".'^'' 
This was much more like union membership rather than membership of a 
revolutionary rank and file group. From the beginning of 1935 the debate turned 
12^  Dixon, "Problems of Militant Trade Unionism", op.cit., 
pp. 20-24. 
126 
127 
Red Leader, 7 March 1934, p. 5. 
ibid., 5 June 1935, p. 5. 
2^8 ibid. , 7 March 1934, p. 5 
125 ibid. , p . 5. 
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towards abolishing the Red Leader in favour of job sheets which had flourished since 
1933. Tom Wright believed that job bulletins were more effective than the Red 
Leader, saying: 
...the developments of the last three years in the sphere of militant 
trade union journalism, shop papers, unemployed newspapers, special 
industrial organs, etc., made it possible to cover the work originally 
meant for "the Red Leader".'"" 
Another contributor continued this theme when he insisted: 
The Red Leader goes into the homes mainly on Sunday 
mornings, and is looked upon as being a review of militant indusdial 
activities. Also there is definitely no sign of growing demand. 
The other publication, the Marine Worker, goes directiy to the 
men on the job, creates keen discussion, is readily looked for and can 
deal more fully with matters of immediate vital interest to its 
readers.'^' 
It was actually untrue that there was "definitely no sign of growing demand" 
for the Red Leader. In June 1934 sales had increased by 50% at Collinsville as 
members sold twelve dozen per month. In Ayr, Mt Isa and Gladstone sales showed a 
"steady improvement", while Bowen members requested an increased order.'^^ 
Generally in Queensland sales rose from 1,004 to 1,584 in just the eight months from 
January to August 1933.'" 
Job sheets were perhaps more popular in the work place than the Red Leader 
as they pertained directiy to the conditions of work that the particular mine, factory, 
office, wharf or workshop for which they were published. However, this did not 
mean, as was argued at the time, that the Red Leader had no role to play. As a 
'^ ° ibid. , 5 June 1935, p. 5. 
"1 ibid., 26 June 1935, p. 2. 
1^2 ibid. , 6 June 1934, p. 1. 
'" ibid., 6 September 1933, p. 2 
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national newspaper, it linked up seemingly isolated, sectional su-uggles of workers in 
different industries and put them into the context of a generalised assault by capital 
on labour. 
Some evidence exists that not all party members were happy with the new 
turn. The Central Committee remarked in 1934: 
Carping criticism of comrades who occupy official positions in the 
Labor movement, especially in the unions, is being indulged in...The 
C.C. will deal with leading comrades who show signs of adapting 
themselves to Social-Fascism, and it will defend those who follow the 
line of the Party against the snipers and provocateurs, and calls upon 
the whole membership to assist to expose them to our class.'^ 
According to communist meat worker, Claude Jones, a number of ex-IWW members 
who had remained in the CPA were critical of the new emphasis on unity with the 
ALP and capturing official positions in the unions.'^^ Edgar Ross also said that 
there was a "sharp division of opinion" on the change in line.'^^ 
Criticism, however, was stifled. No publications reflected any position 
different from that of die leadership. All the letters to the Red Leader agreed that the 
MM had to change and the paper was of little value. Yet when Jim Henderson, who 
established the MM in Collinsville, wrote a letter in favour of keeping the paper, his 
letter was not published.'" Soon after the Minority Movement and the Red Leader 
were abolished and a new era began for die party. 
134 Workers Weekly, no. 548 (13 April 1934), p. 5. 
'•'^  Discussion with Claude Jones, Novemiber 1991. Jones 
joined the Toowoomiba CPA when he was sixteen. He was active in 
the Foodstuffs Union until he was dismissed from the flour 
mill on turning twenty-one and was a member of the local TLC. 
In 1938 Jones was elected to the State Comimittee of the CPA. 
'" Ross interviewed by Penrose, 9 October 1991. 
'" Henderson interviewed by Penrose, 10 October 1991. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
MILITANT MINORITY'S MODEL STRIKE 1934 
SUGAR INDUSTRY IN NORTH QUEENSLAND 
Although Queensland communists worked to build support in the ARU,' WWF, 
SUA, bricklayers union, tramways, AEU and QCEU, the union in which they had the 
most success in leading rank and file struggles was the AWU. However, as it was one 
of the most conservative and bureaucratic in the state, to capture leading positions 
militants had to overcome the active obstruction and opposition of the already 
entrenched officials. 
The AWU was closely tied to the Forgan-Smidi Labor government and the state 
apparatus. Almost aU the Queensland Cabinet were past officials of the AWU. In the 
government were Jack Dash (Transport), past Vice President of the AWU;^ Maurice 
"Mossy" Hynes (Labour and Industry), Senior Vice President of the AWU; Harry Bruce 
(Public Works), AWU Organiser; and Frank Cooper (Public Instruction), AWU 
member.^ There were also ex-AWU officials on various state boards and commissions 
but their biggest success was the promotion of J. Riordan to die bench of the 
Queensland Arbitration Court. Sarcastically, the CPA remarked that the preface to the 
^ In the 1934 ARU elections CPA nominations were J. Elder 
and C. Wallbank for state executive member; J. Elder for district 
president; and Mrs R. McGrorty (leader of the MM within the 
Queensland ARU) for sub-branch secretary and district treasurer. 
Advocate, 16 July 1934, p. 5. 
2 Jack Dash, around 1909, stated approvingly that Cloncurry 
copper workers "passed a resolution that no memiber of our union 
patronise any Chinaman starting in business as we want this town 
for white men"! Quoted in Hunt, "History of the Labor Movement 
in North Queensland", op.cit., p. 101. 
^ Carroll, op.cit., p. 407. 
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AWU Rules and Constitution should be altered from: "we must attack the system and 
change it", to: "Every A.W.U. official carries a Judge's wig in his motor car"." 
Communist militants were a thorn in the side of the officials as they organised 
strikes and opposition groups amongst a variety of workers covered by the AWU, in 
particular sugar cane cutters and mill hands. 
The sugar industry epitomised Queensland's class stiucture with the wealth of 
the sugar barons contrasting starkly to the poverty of the workers. The industry was 
dominated by the multi-national Colonial Sugar Refining Company [CSR] which, in 
1934, had a capital of £11,700,000 and from September 1929 to May 1934, the worst 
years of the depression, accrued a net profit of £4,021,671.^ CSR produced almost 96% 
of the nation's refined sugar and under an agreement with the Queensland government 
had "a complete monopoly of the handling, selling, and financing of Australia's total 
output".* 
Prime Minister Lyons acknowledged the enormous power CSR had in 1934. On 
hearing of the death of E.W. Knox, whose father founded CSR in 1855, he admitted: 
The more I have inspected the great business organisations of the 
country, the more I appreciate the fact that they mean so much more to 
Austraha's progress than Parliaments. It is concerns like the CSR 
Company and men like Mr Knox who create wealth and employment... 
Governments can do little by comparison.^ 
In 1934 CSR was controlled by a number of people, one of whom was E.R. 
Knox who was also Director of the Commercial Bank of Sydney and the United 
" James Slater, The A.W.U. Officials Exposed (Sugar Workers 
Section, MM) (Wright and Barker: Sydney, 1934), p. 12. 
^ Red Leader, 10 April 1935, p. 6. 
^ ibid., p. 6. 
•^  Copy of speech by Lyons. J.2.0/5/20. (ABL) ANU. 
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Insurance Company. The Knox family held shares worth over £4,000,000.** Another 
Director was E.W. Fairfax, also Director of his family's company, the Sydney Morning 
Herald, and who held about a half a million pounds in shares in CSR.'' Major-General 
J.W.M. Onslow, Director of the Commercial Bank of Sydney and Commercial Union 
Assurance Company, held around £250,000 worth of CSR shares, was on CSR's Board 
of Directors.'" Other Directors included Sir Norman Kater, President of the NSW 
Graziers' Association from 1922 to 1924, held about £300,000 worth of shares in CSR, 
and R.W. Gillespie, who was also Director of the Bank of NSW." 
Queensland's sugar industry was established through the super-exploitation of 
indentured Melanesians. Forced to work from dawn to dusk on scant wages and an 
inadequate diet, many died. In 1884, the death rate for whites was 17.49 per 1000 but 
for Melanesians it was a phenomenal 147.77 per 1000.'^ In 1904, however, after 
establishing a profitable and viable sugar industry, Melanesian workers were deported 
and replaced by "white" labour.'' 
The first union formed after the deportation of the Melanesians, the Australian 
Bert Hurworth, Douglas Credit and Labour Party: 
Nationalisation of Banking Fallacies Exposed, August 1934. 
' ibid., p. 1. 
'° ibid. , p.l. 
^^  Red Leader, 10 April 1935, p. 6. 
^^  Raymond Evans, Kay Saunders and Kathryn Cronin, 
Exclusion, Exploitation and Extermination: Race Relations in 
Colonial Oueensland (Australia and New Zealand Book Company: 
Sydney, 1975), p. 189. 
'^ Robert Philp (Premier from 1899-1903 and 1907-1908) owned 
the Cedra and the Hopeful which were used for kidnapping 
Melanesians. In 1907 the Federal government used his ships the 
Titus, the Moresby and the Induana to deport Melanesians on a 
mass scale, ibid., p. 167. 
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Sugar Workers' Union which amalgamated with the Australian Workers Association 
[AWA] in 1911, was open to white workers only. It specifically stated: "No Asiatics, 
South Sea Islanders, Kaffirs, Chinese or other coloured aliens shall be admitted to 
membership". William McCormack, AWA secretary, led a successful sdike of sugar 
workers in 1911 which forced CSR to finally recognise and negotiate with the union.'" 
This was the same McCormack, who, as Labor Premier of Queensland, defeated the 
South Johnstone sugar mill workers and the railway workers in 1927. 
The AWA, in turn, amalgamated with the AWU whose officials wholeheartedly 
favoured the White Australia Policy. This underpinned their support for protection of 
Queensland's sugar industry which, they said: 
...is operating under an agreement which in the first instance, guarantees 
that it shall be carried on by white labor, and that it shall not be 
prejudiced by the importation of sugar produced by black labor in 
countries contiguous to our shores and under conditions repugnant to the 
white man's standard of living.'^ 
While the AWU officials argued that protection of the industry was beneficial to 
workers, the CPA maintained that protection of CSR's monopoly was only beneficial 
to CSR as it allowed the company to "charge consumers £6 million a year more than 
would be paid if sugar was sold here at free trade world parity price".'^ 
While wealthy businessmen made profits from the company, workers suffered 
wage cuts and speed-ups. From 1931-35 wages fell 15% for cane cutters and 20% for 
" See John Armstrong, "The Sugar Strike, 1911", in Murphy 
led.). The Big Strikes, op.cit. 
15 Worker, 28 February 1934, p. 6. 
'^ Red Leader, 30 May 1934, p. 5. In 1928-29 £5 million 
worth of sugar was exported but this was based on a fixed price 
paid to Australian growers. The English value of the exports was 
only £2,390,814. Ronald E. Walker, Australia in the World 
Depression (P.S. King & Son: London, 1933), p. 21. 
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field workers - well below the basic wage cuts.'^ Jean Devanny recorded her 
impressions of the cane growing area of the Burdckin in 1935: 
Throughout the north the housing conditions of the workers are terrible, 
suitable neither for summer nor winter, but in this richest district of all, 
the Burdekin - iron shacks, windowless, stuck on fiat mud, with earth 
floors!" 
One temporary AWU organiser remarked on the living conditions of Tully sugar 
workers: 
Many of the workers live in shacks...There is more poverty in that disuict 
than any other disd-ict 1 have been in. I have known of children who 
could not go to school for want of clothes. One family, the father a cane-
cutter, were forced to eat pollard, being too poor to buy flour.'^ 
The CPA claimed that the Hut Accommodation Act "is generally ignored, and often the 
accommodation is vile... Lavatories are like pigstys. Some mills have no decent place 
for the workers to have their meals. Barracks are falling into disrepair".^° 
Working conditions were harsh. Afternoon loading was practised in some areas, 
forcing workers to load cane in the hottest part of the day. Les Sullivan, CPA sugar 
worker, contrasted this to the treatment of farmers' horses who were "unable to work 
in the intense heat, and even in the cooler part of the day they are spelled every few 
minutes".^' The party maintained that any attempt "on the part of the members to rally 
in defence of their conditions is met with bitter hostility from the A.W.U. officials. 
Militants are expelled and persecuted...and the struggles of the workers are betrayed 
'^  Red Leader, 14 March 1934, p 5. 
®^ Trade Union Leader, January 1936, p. 131. 
^^  Red Leader, 20 June 1934, p. 5. 
°^ ibid. , 27 March 1935, p. 6. 
2' ibid., 24 April 1935, p. 8. 
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wherever possible".^^ 
The CPA believed that the union's commitment to the White Australia Policy 
worsened the position of workers in the sugar industry. Communists saw it as a vehicle 
by which the capitalist class could divide workers and weaken any united resistance to 
wage cuts. They insisted: 
Victory or defeat in the coming struggles in the sugar industry will 
depend to an enormous degree on our ability to carry through the fight 
on a class basis, freed from the racial and national prejudices that have 
hindered us in all past struggles in this industry.^^ 
In the sugar industry in the 1930s the victims of the White Ausu-aha Policy were 
Italians and other non-English speaking migrants. Interestingly, this included Maltese. 
As Malta was actually a part of the British Empire, the Maltese government complained 
that the u-eatment of its compatriots was "out of tune with the Imperial principle of 
equatity of u-eatment to all Britishers without distinction".^'' 
Between 1921 and 1930 around 24,000 Italians arrived, most of whom settled 
in north Queensland." The AWU officials body opposed Italian migration. They wrote, 
rather hysterically, in the Worker in 1925 that the federal government had "betrayed 
Austiahan workers by encouraging Mediterranean scum to overtun the country". The 
22 ibid. , p. 8. 
" ibid., 1 May 1935, p. 8. 
2^  Office of the Head of the Ministry, Malta to Premier 
Gillies, 5 October 1935, p. 7. PRE/A, 7750 of 1925. QSA. 
" Menghetti, op.cit., p. 53. As far back as 1891 the North 
Queensland Herald proclaimed their objection to: 
...a horde of Italians...being brought here in a 
democratic country at the people's expense to please 
the banking and monopolistic syndicate who are living 
on interest and care little by what means their bank 
balances increase. 
Quoted in Geoff Burrows and Clive Morton, The Canecutters 
(Melbourne University Press: Melbourne, 1986), p. 26. 
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government they said, was "responsible for this dago invasion...and influx of this 
breed".'^ That same year the AWU officials appealed to the state Labor government 
to have all southern Europeans "excluded from the sugar industry".^^ 
In 1925 the Gillies Labor government commissioned T.A. Ferry to inquire into 
aspects of immigration to Queensland. Ferry's impartiality on diis issue can be gauged 
from his comment on Greek migrants that: "I am convinced that this country would be 
better off without them".^ ^ 
The AWU officials' hostility led them to discriminate against members of their 
own rank and file. Communist sugar workers maintained that the officials sold union 
tickets to Italians and Yugoslavs well above the usual fee.^ ^ Another common 
accusation against the officials was that they removed ballot papers from the 
membership tickets of migrant workers to prevent them from participating in union 
elections.'" 
2^  ibid., p. 75. Lyn Henderson has pointed out that from 
1788, when the first Italian came over on the First Fleet, 
Italians have been very much a part of the Australian comimunity. 
"Italians in the Hinchinbrook Shire, 1921-1939: Motives for 
Migration", Lecture Notes on North Oueensland History (James Cook 
University: Townsville, 1978). 
" District Secretary AWU (Cairns) to P. Pease MLA, 5 
October 1925. PRE/A 7750 of 1925. QSA. Other unions, too, opposed 
Italian migration. The WWF claimed they were "undesirable, as 
according to the experience of America they do not make good 
Citizens...". State Secretary WWF (A. Brown) to Premier of 
Queensland, 7 May 1925. PRE/A 7750 of 1925. QSA. 
®^ T.A. Ferry to F.C. Hodel, Cairns, 16 June 1925. PRE/A 
7750 of 1925. QSA. 
^^  This was stated by George Bliss, interviewed by Philip 
Griffiths and Beris Penrose, 24 November 1982 and Carl King, 
interviewed by Griffiths and Penrose, 15 October 1982. 
°^ Doug Olive, "Struggles in the Canefields and for Control 
of the AWU", paper given at Third Marxist Summer School, Sydney 
1980, p. 20. 
282 
As well, a "gentiemen's agreement" was made between the AWU and the sugar 
employers to ensure 75% of their workers were British.'" The 75% did not include 
Maltese or naturalised Australians, both of whom were designated by the union officials 
as "foreigners".'^ The communist press denounced the British preference pact as racist 
and pointed out that at no time "have the union officials been given a mandate by the 
workers to be party to any 'gentlemen's agreement'"." 
Racial prejudice, aggravated by the union officials, created "all sorts of 
dissension" amongst workers. The communists claimed that migrant workers were 
"blamed for the capitalists' attacks, but our 'leaders' make no attempt to organise us for 
stiuggle against our common enemy - the capitalists".^ The CPA cited strikes in Ayr's 
Kalamia Mid in the 1932 and 1933 crushing seasons where the officials created racial 
animosity by telling canecutters "it was the foreign-born comrades who were responsible 
for the worsening conditions". The Red Leader noted: 
Whilst our ranks were divided by racial prejudice, the Arbitration court 
was sitting, and in one of their customary bursts of fair play reduced the 
wages of all sections of the workers, British and foreign-born alike.^ ^ 
Communist influence amongst Italian workers was boosted by the fact that the 
CPA was the most ardent anti-fascist organisation in the country. Many Italian 
immigrants, the fascist-controlled Italian newspaper, Italo-Australian, admitted, were 
31 Menghetti, op.cit., p. 56 
^^  Conference Minutes, AWU, Cairns, 30 April 1925, p. 2 
PRE/A 7750 of 1925. QSA. 
" Red Leader, 14 March 1934, p. 5 
'^ ibid. , 21 March 1934, p. 7. 
35 ibid., 3 April 1935, p. 5. 
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"bitter and irreconcilable enemies of fascism".'^ The most prominent were Mario, Lou 
and Lino Cazzolino, Ernie Barratto," and Francesco Camiagnola.'** That these men 
maintained their anti-fascist activity was admirable given the government's backing of 
the racist White Australia policy and its vigorous suppression of anti-fascist Italians. The 
Federal government "delayed the naturalisation of anti-fascists, raided their clubs, 
banned their newspapers, and supplied their names to the Italian authorities to facilitate 
'investigation' of their families in Italy".'^ The CPA claimed that on James ScuUin's 
visit to Ingham in 1933 he 
...was met by all Fascisti elements here, chief among them being 
Craurelli and Contemessi, two Italian Fascisti leaders who were "Storm 
Troopers" and took part in the murders and atrocities against the Italian 
workers.'*" 
As early as 1926 north Queensland Italians established the anti-fascist 
organisation, Comitato Antifascista delVHerbert River. The year before, Carmagnola and 
others forced three north Queensland fascists to drink castor oil.'*' In 1932 Italians 
invaded a reception in Ingham in honour of Mussolini's Italian Consul to Brisbane, 
Count Gabrio di San Marzano. 
36 Quoted in Menghetti, op.cit., p. 82. 
" Barratto joined the CPA during the 1935 Weil's Disease 
strike. In 1936 he went to Spain to fight for the republicans in 
the Dimitrov, Lincoln, British, Passionaria and Stakanov 
battalions as sergeant, captain then political commissar, ibid., 
p. 90. 
^^  George Bliss described Carmagnola as a "great orator" and 
a "very courageous bloke". Bliss interviewed by Griffiths and 
Penrose. 
^^  Menghetti, op. cit. , p. 82. 
°^ Workers Weekly, no. 518 (8 September 1933), p. 3. 
'^ Gianfranco Cresciani, Fascism, Anti-Fascism and Italians 
in Australia (ANU press: Canberra, 1980), p. 100. 
284 
The Count's Fascist Party badge was ripped from his coat and die band 
was persuaded to play the Internationale. During his tour the consul was 
attacked at Babinda and Cairns, and forced to visit Innisfail under police 
protection.'*^ 
Carmagnola, Mario Melane, and Mario Tardiani^' were tried for assault and 
stealing a fascist badge worth 2/6. They were defended in court by F.W. Paterson who 
argued that if these men were deported to Italy they would most likely be killed by the 
Mussolini government.^ The jury, made up of waterside workers, found the men not 
guilty.''^  
In 1934 the Italian Consul-general, Marquis Agostino Ferrante, needed 
police protection during his stay in Ingham, and a year later, Bruno 
Rossi, entering an Ingham hotel wearing his Fascist Party badge, was 
beaten up with his own crutches. During these years the Ingham anti-
fascists built their clubhouse, as the group grew too large to meet at 
Cazzolino's house.'*'' 
Although Carmagnola was an anarchist, he worked closely with the CPA as it 
was the only actively anti-fascist party in Queensland and the one which led workers' 
struggles against Weil's Disease and British preference in the sugar industry where he 
and other Italians worked. Even in 1937 Carmagnola also worked with the CPA on F.W. 
Paterson's electoral campaign in Bowen."*^  Born in Leguzzano, Italy, in 1900, 
Carmagnola artived in Australia on the San Rossore in 1922 and in 1930, after his third 
42 Menghetti, op.cit., p. 83 
^^  Tardiani was described by police as the leader of the 
anti-fascists in and around Halifax, North Queensland. Sergeant 
A. MacDonald, Ingham, to Inspector of Police, Townsville, 16 
February 1932. BP242/1 Q37502. AA (Brisbane). 
^^  Bliss interviewed by Griffiths and Penrose. 
''^  Menghetti, op . cit. , p. 84. 
46 ibid., p. 85 . 
'^'^ Acting Inspector F.G. Galleghan to Inspector-in-Charge, 
CIB, Brisbane, 21 October 1937. BP242/1 Q37502. AA (Brisbane). 
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application, was granted a Naturalisation Certificate. As a militant cane cutter, 
Carmagnola was not liked by the Queensland Cane Growers Council [QCGC] who 
appealed to the Federal government to deport him, claiming he was running an illegal 
stiU, distributing tobacco and liquor to Italian workers and "generally interfering widi 
people who were not of his own opinion"."*^ The police were unable to find evidence 
of any of this.'*^ 
Nonedieless, they asserted that his writings against fascism "certainly go to show 
that Carmagnola's activities are not in keeping with those of a British subject".^° The 
police used as an example an extract from an anti-fascist newspaper La Riscossa, which 
Carmagnola previously had published in Melbourne with Isidoro Bertazzon. In this paper 
Carmagnola stated that he went to north Queensland "to organise and to incite the anti-
fascists to persevere in the struggle against the bloody regime which starves and 
enslaves the Italian workers".^' Like the QCGC, the police also wanted Carmagnola 
deported and recommended his Certificate of Naturalisation be revoked.^^ The Federal 
Attorney-General's Department also believed that his deportation would mean "the end 
®^ W. Doherty, Secretary Queensland Cane Growers Council to 
Senator G. Pearce, 14 December 1934, Canberra. BP242/1 Q37592. 
AA (Brisbane). 
^^  Acting Sergeant J. Morris, Ingham, to Inspector of 
Police, Townsville, 30 January 1935, p. 1. BP242/1 Q37502. AA 
(Brisbane). 
°^ Inspector D. Mackiehan to Director CIB, Canberra, 26, 
April, 1933. BP242/1 Q37502. AA (Brisbane). 
^^  Quoted in ibid. 
" ibid. 
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of all political agitation amongst Italians in the North"." Despite the unanimity of 
Carmagnola's formidable opponents, he was not deported, although he remained under 
police surveillance.^ 
BUILDING THE MM IN THE SUGAR AREAS 
The anti-racism of the CPA enhanced the party's credibility and standing 
amongst Italian and Australian workers alike. In 1933 the CPA's Ingham branch was re-
established with mainly Italian membership and Italians were amongst the leading 
members of the CPA in the north.^ ^ 
The Ayr branch of the MM met fortnightly and published regular leaflets on 
issues as they arose. Although the membership was small, Doug Olive commented that 
the organisation had a "hell of a lot of supporters" who distributed MM leaflets.^^ One 
of the achievements of the Ayr MM was to get the AWU functioning again. Previously 
the union only caUed meetings at the start of the season to sign up the cutters. However, 
communists in the MM took advantage of a union rule which stated that if enough 
signatures were collected on a petition a union meeting could be convened. Therefore, 
the MM was able to convene a number of union meetings. Their support was such that 
" Attorney-General's Department, Investigating Branch, 
Canberra, to Inspector-in-Charge, CIB, Brisbane. 28 January 1932. 
BP242/1 Q37502. AA (Brisbane). 
^^  During WWII anti-fascist Italians were interned. Phil 
Bossone was beaten in the Hay internment camp for making pro-
democracy speeches. Memo to Secretary, Attorney-General's 
Department, Canberra, from Deputy Crown Solicitor, 7 April 1941. 
AA (Canberra), A367/1 C18000/696. Anti-fascist Francesco Fantm 
was killed in Loveday camp. Menghetti, op.cit., p. 162. 
55 ibid., p. 20. 
" Doug Olive interviewed by Philip Griffiths and Beris 
Penrose. 
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after a while, the MM dispensed with the formality of collecting signatures and simply 
called meetings without petitioning first The reason they gave was that as the AWU 
officials always opposed the rank and file, there was no point in having them attend." 
One of the issues the Ayr branch addressed was the move by farmers to get 
workers to cut cane on a day labour basis, rather than on through the contract system. 
This amounted to a pay cut Before the 1935 season, the MM organised a meeting of 
around 1,000 workers who supported their resolution to suike for one week. Despite 
AWU opposition, the sd-ike not only went ahead, it succeeded.^^ 
The MM branch at Mourilyan mill was established by Carl King who worked 
there as a mill hand. He wrote in the Red Leader under the pen name "Brown Sugar" 
because, he said, it was "sweet but unrefined". King estabhshed the first MM group in 
north Queensland and through his persistent work revived job control in the mill. The 
MM group was established in 1933 after King talked to his "gambling and room mates". 
Initially, King claimed, he could not disuibute the MM bulletin openly but had to sneak 
into the mill at night and pin it up on notice boards. Although the MM branch started 
with only six members, it was soon big enough to produce a monthly bulletin in English 
and Italian. King's activities included holding meetings of workers in their mid-supplied 
barracks and running classes in Mourilyan on Marxist economics. While he was a 
member of the ALP, before he joined the Communist Party, King had asked Labor 
politician, Percy Pease, to give a lecture on socialism. According to King, Pease asked: 
"Socialism! What is that?".^' 
" Olive interviewed by Griffiths and Penrose. 
®^ Olive Interviewed by Griffiths and Penrose. 
59 King interviewed by Griffiths and Penrose. 
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One of the first strikes King led was over the demand that management supply 
soap for the workers to wash their hands. This issue may seem trivial, but it was through 
disputes over these small issues that support for the MM was built at the mill. As well, 
the CPA developed influence in the wider community. At one time a Mourilyan widow, 
threatened with eviction by the Labor-controlled local council, sought King's support 
After tearing down the notice on her house, which stated it would be sold for back rates, 
he called a public meeting over the issue. Local support for the woman was so great that 
the council was forced to grant the woman free rates for the rest of her life.*^ 
By April 1934 the Party reported having established several MM branches in the 
sugar areas, including "in one unit a number of poor farmers".^' At one mill an MM 
branch was established even though no communists worked there. This was done when 
the "Party paper seller found the contact, who later took up organisation of the M.M. 
inside the mill". This worker subsequendy joined the party.^ ^ 
In 1934 the Innisfail Minority Movement had about fifteen members, mostly cane 
cutters, who met fortnightiy. Only half of these people were party members. According 
to George Bliss, who joined the Innisfail MM in 1934, the branch was largely budt 
through die Weil's Disease sd-ikes at Innisfail and Mourilyan.^' 
Since there was no Disdict Committee of the MM, it was decided to hold yearly 
conferences of sugar workers to co-ordinate and direct their work. The first was held in 
May 1934 at Innisfail. There were thirty-four delegates "from practically every sugar 
°^ King interviewed by Griffiths and Penrose. 
1^ Workers Weekly, no. 547 (6 April 1934), p. 4. 
^^  ibid. , p. 4. 
" Bliss interviewed by Griffiths and Penrose. 
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area in North Queensland, including representatives of an Italian and two Yugoslav 
workers' clubs".^ This meeting "rejected the policy of arbiu-ation, declared for 
democratic rank and file organisation, and for the setting up of the rank and file 
committee movement".'^ ^ Only by building a sd-ong rank and file movement which 
could force dirough democratic changes in the AWU, could left wing militants hope to 
unseat the existing officials.*^ 
During 1934 communists influenced a number of work stoppages throughout the 
sugar areas. The issues involved ranged from protesting breaches in the award at 
Inkerman Mdl, to stopping mill management increasing working hours at Tully and 
South Johnstone mills, to demanding a better work agreement at Home Hill mill.*^ ^ 
From oral history sources it appears that the direction of MM work was left to 
the discretion of individual MM leaders in the north. This did not mean that work was 
chaotic. The basis of all communist work was to organise worker-resistance to the 
employers in the industiy. Carl King said: 
Always die Minority Movement was taught that what we should do was 
listen to the rank and file; find out what their problems were, what were 
the things that were stiiking to the heart of the worker daily.^ ^ 
However, it appears that MM work was not thoroughly co-ordinated and directed from 
the leadership in Brisbane. Doug Olive, leader of the MM in Ayr, stated that while 
"every sugar town had its Minority Movement at that time", there was "no real unity or 
^^  Red Leader, 30 May 1934, p. 8. 
" ibid., 13 March 1935, p. 8. 
" ibid., 28 March 1934, p. 4. 
" See Red Leader March-July 1934 
King interviewed by Griffiths and Penrose 
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direction" to the MM's activity, apart from establishing a base amongst the militants in 
the rank and file of the AWU.'''' The MM remained uncoordinated in the sugar areas 
because, Olive believed, different areas had different problems. So, for instance, 
while the Weil's Disease sd-ike was underway in 1935, the Ayr MM led dieir own 
dispute over the issue of day labour. Olive also stated that the Ayr MM did not discuss 
"political" issues. By this he meant the branch only discussed issues relating to the 
wages and conditions of workers in the area, such as, enforcing the Hut Accommodation 
Act, resisting increases to working hours, defending established pay scales and so 
forth.™ 
Carl King, on the other hand, ran a different MM branch in Mourilyan. He stated 
that workers in his branch discussed strikes at Mt Morgan and other places and raised 
money to support these struggles.^' 
It is certainly true, that there was no district co-ordination of the various branches. 
Jim Henderson, who worked in Colhnsville, stated that communist work in die north 
was less rigid and less cond-olled by headquarters than work in Brisbane. This, he 
believed, explained why communists had more success in recruiting in the north than 
in the south. He stated diat in Brisbane no leaflet was published without the prior 
authorisation of the District Committee. This resu-ained members. Whereas, in die north, 
the atmosphere more relaxed, with members taking die initiative in their work, radier 
than waiting to be told what to do by the leadership. Henderson commented that way 
communist work was organised in die north aided die party's recruitment particularly 
^^  Olive interviewed by Griffiths and Penrose 
•'° Olive interviewed by Griffiths and Penrose 
^^  King interviewed by Griffiths and Penrose. 
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of women.''^  
One of the most common responses by AWU officials to any opposition from 
the rank and file was expulsion from the union - and as union preference existed in 
Queensland this also meant expulsion from the industry. In 1933 Mulgrave mill hand 
and communist, James Slater, was expelled for "misconduct" when he accused the AWU 
officials of being corrupt" Slater had established a MM branch in the mill, at 
Gordonvale, around 1932. As his expulsion excluded him from the industry, he went on 
to relief work, then eventually became a CPA organiser.^" In the following years, 
communist leaders Jack Henry (Tully), Les Sullivan (Goondi) and Doug Olive (Ayr) 
would face expulsion,^^ while Carl King (Mourilyan), Con O'Clerkin (Ayr)'*^ and Pat 
Clancy (Ingham) were heavily fined for their activity amongst the rank and file." 
George "Bluey" Bliss, another communist sugar worker, claimed the AWU conspired 
to have him "sacked many times".^^ Olive commented that both he and O'Clerkin 
worked without an AWU ticket until 1941 as workers threatened to sd-ike if these men 
^^  Henderson interviewed by Penrose. 
" Slater, op.cit., p. 3. 
^^  Bliss interviewed by Griffiths and Penrose. Bliss 
described Slater ad "very studious...very quiet". 
75 Olive, "Struggles in the Canefields", op.cit., p. 24. 
^^  Olive described O'Clerkin, an Irishman, as a good 
spontaneous speaker but found prepared speeches difficult. 
Interview by Griffiths and Penrose. 
77 Trade Union Leader, no. 5 (Decerober 1935), p. 110 
'^^ Lowenstein, op. cit. , p. 383. Bliss was in Parramatta 
Park, Cairns, in 1932 when the unemployed were evicted by the 
police and also took part in the Biloela cotton pickers' strike 
in 1934 when he had a gun pulled on him by anti-strikers. 
Interviewed by Griffiths and Penrose. 
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did not get employment™ 
The 1934 sugar workers' conference, with its emphasis on a rank and file 
movement paved the way for communist militants to lead some of Queensland's most 
successful rank and file indusu-ial disputes - in particular the strikes over Weil's Disease. 
WEIL'S DISEASE STRIKES 1934 AND 1935 
During the 1933 cutting season an epidemic of Weil's Disease broke out in the 
Ingham district. By the end of the season forty cutters had contracted the disease - four 
of whom died.^° 
The patients complained of fever, muscular pains, intense headache and 
exd-eme mental depression. Sixteen of them became jaundiced, and in the 
worst cases the symptoms included internal haemorthages and black 
vomiting. Four cases developed acute mania and died at the end of the 
second week.*' 
Soon after the start of the 1934 season in June, nearly 130 field workers out of 
around 800 had contracted the disease. This time six of the victims died.*^ Post 
mortems revealed "haemorthages of the kidney, lungs and bowel wall, and the spleens 
were found to have disintegrated".*^ The virus was spread by rats and entered die cane 
cutters body through small cuts inflicted while handling the cane trash on which the 
infected rats had urinated.*^ The local medical officer, Dr Morrissey, and Tim Cotter 
^^  Olive interviewed Griffiths and Penrose. 
°^ Menghetti, op.cit., p. 29. 
'^ ibid. , p. 29. 
2^ Worker, 19 August 1934, p. 10. 
^•^ Menghetti, op . cit. , pp. 29--30. 
•^^  Diane Menghetti, "The Weil's Disease Strike, 1935", in 
Murphy (ed.). The Big Strikes, op.cit., p. 2 04. 
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from Townsville's Commonwealth Health Laboratory, believed that if the cane was 
burnt before harvesting, die disease could be controlled.*^ 
However, the cane growers were reluctant to do this as burning the cane reduced 
the sugar content**' On 20 August CSR head office in Sydney telegrammed Macknade 
mill management to resist burning to the "uunost".*^ The following day Macknade 
received a further telegram advising them to argue in the Arbitration Court that burning 
would not minimise Weil's Disease.** 
After eighteen years without any union meetings being held, Ingham communists 
initiated a meeting around the issue. At first they attracted only a dozen people although 
around 600 cutters were in the district. A week later, however, a second meeting of 
between 300-400 was held, which was described by George Bliss as "a very enthusiastic 
meeting. Nothing like that had happened before in Ingham".*^ The result was that in 
August 1934 communists, Pat Clancy and Mario Cazzolino, along with anarchist 
Francesco Carmagnola, led a strike in the Ingham canefields of 1500 men who 
demanded burning of the cane. 
The Labor government reacted immediately by sending armed police to the cane 
fields to force the men back to work. During the strike workers were arrested and 
pickets fired on and at Halifax, 12 miles from Ingham. Police admitted to using their 
Menghetti, Red North, op.cit., p. 20 
®^  Menghetti, "Weil's Disease Strike", in Murphy, op.cit., 
p. 204. 
^' Macknade Letter Book no. 29, p. 399. 142/1535. (ABL) ANU. 
'^ ibid. , p. 299. 
®^  Bliss interviewed by Griffiths and Penrose. 
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batons freely to disperse the strikers.^ The CPA said: 
That no workers were shot is probably due to the bad aim of the police. 
That the police were endeavouring to overcome this weakness was 
evident by seeing them at target practice in the Ingham police station 
yards.'" 
Forgan-Smith, who had emigrated to Mackay from Scodand in 1912, took a keen 
interest in the welfare of the sugar indusd-y. In die T.J. Ryan Labor government he 
"became one of the Government's spokesmen whenever sugar matters were being 
discussed".^^ In 1942 he took up the post of Chair of the Cenu-al Sugar Cane Prices 
Board.^ ^ An avid supporter of the White Australia Policy, Forgan-Smith in 1924 
opposed affiliation of die Amalgamated Foodstuffs Union to the ALP while they had 
Chinese cooks as members.^ EquaUy opposed to strikes, he opened the International 
Sugar Technologists' Conference in Brisbane by asking the Society "to produce a 
technician to devise ways and means of preventing industrial strife".^^ 
From the beginning of the Weil's Disease dispute, the AWU officials tried to end 
the sd-ike. As a lever to get the cane cutters back on the job, the officials used a return 
to work motion passed by a meeting of forty cutters. This carried no weight with the 
sdikers, however. At a meeting 700 strong the cutters voted to continue dieir sd-ike.^ 
The dispute was cond-olled by rank and file committees which had been 
°^ Red Leader, 29 August 1934, p. 2. 
^' ibid. , 5 September 1934, p. 4. 
^^  Carroll, op.cit., p. 399. 
" ibid., p. 431. 
^' ibid. , p. 404. 
^^  Quoted in Burrows and Morton, op.cit., p. 82 
'^  Red Leader, 5 September 1934, p. 4. 
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established in different areas. They forced the Arbitration Court to sit while the sdike 
was in progress and the court proceeded to order cane in CSR's Victoria and Macknade 
mill areas of Ingham to be burnt with a reduction in the price of 1/- per ton. This 
became known as the "Ingham rate".'''' Hailing this as a victory for the rank and file, 
the CPA said: 
Six weeks the C.S.R. and their agents let the workers suffer and die and 
did nothing to relieve the position, but the rank and file committee, 
composed of all nationals working in the Ingham district - Finns, 
Maltese, Jugoslavs, Italians, Spaniards, Sicilians, and British - fought 
both the C.S.R. and A.W.U. bureaucrats, and won.^ * 
Then followed an outbreak of Weil's Disease in the Mourilyan district which 
took one worker's life. Carl King led a strike in this district for burning of the cane. The 
court, despite farmers' protests, ruled that cane should be burnt in this area and paid for 
at "Ingham rates".^ 
But application for burning cane at South Johnstone "was adjourned for lack of 
evidence of the existence of Weil's Disease",'^ while at Goondi the application "was 
dismissed altogether"."" Yet, both regions adjoined the Mourilyan area where the 
disease had broken out. The CPA concluded that "it was not evidence of Weil's Disease 
which was required but evidence of the workers' determination to struggle" that 
influenced the court's decisions.'*'^ After meetings in both places where workers 
" Worker, 2 November 1934, p. 6. The price of burnt cane 
was usually 20% less than that of green cane. 
®^ Red Leader, 1 May 1935, p. 9 
^^  ibid., 13 March 1935, p. 8. 
°^° ibid. , p. 8. 
'°' ibid. , p. 5. 
102 ibid., p 
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expressed their determination to strike, the court granted burning at "Ingham rates".'°^ 
Despite die AWU officials congratulating themselves on their efforts to protect 
their membership from the disease, the credit for winning the right to burn cane before 
harvesting went to the CPA-led rank and file movement This was confirmed by CSR's 
Goondi mill management in a letter to head office. The AWU, they said, "were 
completely flouted in this strike and were altogether incapable of controlling their 
members even if they wished to do so as they declared they did".'^ 
The White Austraha Policy, the CPA believed, was one of the casualties of the 
sdike which marked a step forward "in the building of the united front between the 
Austrahan and foreign-bom workers, and the field and miU workers". During all 
meetings there were two chairmen, one English and one Italian. "This sdike welded the 
different nationalities into a whole".'°^ At Mourilyan 97% of the cane cutters were 
non-English speaking migrants while the majority of mill hands were Anglo-Saxon yet, 
as the CPA pointed out "the mill workers immediately ceased work in support" of the 
cutters' strike."^ 
The success of the strike put the AWU officials under constant pressure to 
explain why they took so long to act on the issue. Branch Secretary, Clarrie Fallon, 
explained that "unfortunately it was impossible to take any definite action until the 
source of infection had been discovered; and as soon as diat information was available 
103 ibid., p 
°^^  Goondi Private Letter Book, (P.no. 494), p. 243. ZZ29, 
Box 0330, llA. (ABL) ANU. 
°^^  Red Leader, 7 Novemiber 1934, p. 11. 
'°^  ibid. , 13 March 1935, p. 8. 
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I took it up with the members of the Cabinet"."" 
Following the order to burn cane, CSR produced a petition at Macknade, Victoria 
and Goondi mills demanding cane be cut green. Management approached each individual 
cutter and mill hand, encouraging them to sign it If a substantial number of workers 
supported cutting green cane, CSR would, according to Head Office, "have to consider 
the question of taking the matter to the Court again ourselves and asking for a 
modification of the Court's ruling...".'"* Effectively, CSR was manoeuvring to overturn 
the Arbitiation Court's decision. 
AWU organisers, frightened of the growing communist influence in the union, 
advised workers not to sign the petition. Macknade mill management claimed the AWU 
officials feared that the communists would cad a furdier sd-ike if the petition was 
successful. Militants could claim that CSR was dying to force the cutting of green cane 
against the Health Authorities recommendations."^ 
To undermine CPA support in the rank and file, the Far Northern Executive of 
the AWU attempted to expel from the union Carl King, CPA leader of die Mourilyan 
strike. The basis for his expulsion was that King had ceased work without executive 
sanction."" "Protests poured in from all directions and the expulsion was not carried 
out". King was eventually fined £10, and declared unfinancial until this sum was 
'°' Worker, 29 August 1934, p. 10. 
°^^  Macknade Letter Book, no. 29, p. 416. 142/1535. (ABL) 
ANU. 
'°^  ibid., p. 433. This is also confirmed by Victoria Letter 
Book, no. 37, p. 499. 142/1581. (ABL) ANU. 
no Red Leader, 5 Decemiber 1934, p. 4. 
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paid.'" Communists were able to get 6,000 signatures on a petition protesting the fine 
against King."^ Because of union preference, being unfinancial meant you could not 
be hired. But Goondi mill management was reluctant to dismiss King for not having a 
union ticket. They complained that as soon as they terminated his employment "the mill 
hands are almost certain to strike" in protest. King said that in 1935 he was voted by 
workers as the AWU representative at the mill even though he did not hold a union 
ticket Although the AWU officials and the CSR management objected, support for King 
was so widespread that they had to accept him as the official workers' 
representative."^ 
The AWU also tried to undermine communist influence at Innisfail. Following 
the strike there, all Yugoslavs who had taken part in it were dismissed by CSR and the 
AWU recruited 200 cutters from northern NSW to replace them. Militants like George 
Bliss were victimised. He claimed he "couldn't get a cut" in 1935 and the next season 
Bliss came down with Weil's Disease. Despite the setback of losing their base amongst 
those who had taken part in die strike, the CPA continued its work amongst die cutters 
and was able eventually to win influence amongst those workers who had been brought 
up from NSW."' 
Growth of the MM in the sugar area was impressive. Doug Olive stated diat in 
1931 there were about forty CPA members in north Queensland. By 1934-35 there were 
branches in three sugar mills in Ayr, one branch in the town and one branch in Home 
"^ ibid., 13 March 1935, p. 8. 
^^^ King interviewed by Griffiths and Penrose. 
"^  King interviewed by Griffiths and Penrose. 
^^^ Bliss interviewed by Griffiths and Penrose 
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Hill. In the sixteen months to December 1934 membership in the north rose 88.4% -
over a quarter of the membership were .sugar workers."^ Olive claimed to have sold 
165 copies of Red Leader and 120 copies of Workers Weekly outside the Ayr Labour 
Exchange at the height of CPA influence in this region."*' By 1938 the CPA had 600 
members in north Queensland with a branch in almost every town from Mackay to 
Cooktown to Mt Isa. In that year 7,500 copies of the Workers Weekly were sold and the 
North Queensland Guardian was going into one in every eight homes."^ 
During the slack season after the 1934 sd-ikes, the CPA worked to consolidate 
its support under difficult circumstances as the AWU officialdom continued to hamper 
the organisation of the rank and file. At Kalamia mill the officials dismissed die elected 
mill representative when he said the rank and file were dissatisfied with the officials' 
performance. The rank and file, however, refused to recognise his dismissal."* 
Sugar workers in the Ayr district requested the union hold fortnightiy meetings. 
However, the AWU Disd-ict Secretary's response was to direct the Organiser that "on 
no account to call any requisitioned meeting"."'* On learning this, workers established 
their own committee to handle their affairs. The AWU refused to recognise the 
committee and hindered its efforts to call union meetings. The officials also notified 
union members that no-one from die workers' committees "would be allowed to attend 
"^  Workers Weekly, no. 589 (1 February 1935), p. 3. 
'^^ Doug Olive, op. cit. , p. 23. 
"'' Olive interviewed by Griffiths and Penrose. 
^^^ Red Leader, 6 February 1935, p. 8. 
'''^ ibid. , p. 8. 
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the sign-on of cane-cutters".'^° For the first time ever police attended the signing on 
at Ayr and Home Hill "and remained throughout the day while workers' representatives 
were excluded".'^' 
The AWU placed a notice in the Ayr paper stating diat the local AWU organiser 
was the only one authorised to call union meetings.'-^^ Again, this hampered the efforts 
of the workers' committee. Unable to get free use of a hall any longer, the CPA 
complained that: 
...the committee is now faced with the expense of hiring a hall and 
together with cost of advertising, the expense will have to be borne by 
the workers' committees in doing work which we pay huge salaries to 
officials to perform.'^' 
Notwithstanding the efforts of the AWU officials to undermine communist influence, the 
workers' committee continued to hold meetings. One meeting of 300 drew a number of 
migrant workers into the committee and passed a motion of no confidence in the AWU 
officials.'^" 
Meetings were held in almost all the centres north of Mackay to organise a 
furdier rank and file sugar workers' conference in May 1935 at Innisfail.'" This 
conference decided to establish rank and file committees in all the sugar centres and to 
print a sugar workers' paper in English and Italian. The conference was chaired by Les 
Sullivan, CPA President of the 1934 Goondi su-ike committee, and was addressed by 
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communist sugar workers Cari King, J. Jessup and Lino Cazzolino (Mourilyan), and 
Angelo Biletta, Con Doyle and Jack Henry (Tully).'"'^ The CPA argued that the rank 
and file committees would be a bulwark which would "put an end to the bureaucratic 
cond-ol of die union by a handful of officials and political job hunters".'^^ The issue 
of a separate sugar workers' union was also canvassed at this conference. 
Before the next cutting season started, the order to burn cane at Macknade and 
Victoria mills was rescinded. The employers maintained that burning the cane increased 
the difficulty of "producing saleable sugar".'^* They also feared that since cutters 
"have had a taste of general burning of cane there is likely to be a demand for increased 
burning in the coming season".'^' The Arbitration Court's new order was that cane 
would be burned only if the health inspector felt it was warranted. 
On 28 July 1935 Carl King called a meeting over the Weil's Disease issue. It 
was addressed by him in English and by Emie Barratto in Italian.'^ '^  The meeting of 
300 people established a committee to approach die AWU to demand the cane be 
burnt''' The officials' refusal to disobey die Arbitration Court led to die rank and file 
organising their own strike in the Mourilyan and Tully mill areas. Jack Henry, leader 
of the sd-ike, was described by the police as "the leading Communist in the Tully Mill 
^^^ Menghetti, Red North, op. cit. , p. 34 
^^^ Red Leader, 20 March 1935, p. 4. 
128 Letter from Goondi Mill to Head Office, 15 August 1935 
P. 510), p. 329. Z329 (Box 0330), llA. (ABL) ANU. 
129 ibid. , p. 282. 
^^° Menghetti, Red North, op. cit. , p. 33. 
131 Menghetti, "Weil's Disease Strike", op.cit., p. 207 
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Area".'" By mid-August cutters in the Goondi and South Johnstone areas were also 
on strike. Forgan-Smidi's office was inundated with telegrams and letters from the 
Chambers of Commerce in Townsville, Tully, Innisfail, Cairns and Brisbane urging the 
government to intervene to secure a speedy end to the dispute.'" 
When the sd-ike began, few workers had done more than two weeks' work that 
season, after the seven-month slack season. Many families were in debt to local 
storekeepers, single men were evicted from the barracks provided by the sugar growers 
and strikers and non-strikers alike - that is mill hands stood down because of the dispute 
- were refused sustenance by the Labor government Soon die northern sugar towns were 
inundated with poverty-stricken and homeless people. 
The AWU officials' stance cost them the support of many workers who looked 
instead to the leadership of the CPA-run rank and file movement Goondi mill 
management confirmed this. On 8 August they informed head office: "What is known 
as the "Rank and File Movement" is running the whole business and the usual AWU 
officials are just ignored".'^ On 15 August die AWU officials, "while disclaiming any 
connection with the s\iike are dying to curry favour with the men. Otherwise they are 
just ignored".'^^ On 22 August the Goondi mill management wrote: 
1^2 PRE/A1096, In-Letter 3360 of 1934, Inspector of Police 
(Cairns) to Commission of Police, 22 June 1934. QSA. 
^" PRE/A1128, In-Letter 5831 of 1935, Telegram from 
Townsville Chamber of Commerce to Premier, 22 August 1935. 
Telegram from Tully Chamber of Commerce to Premier, 24 August 
1935. Telegram from Cairns Chamber of Commerce to Premier, 26 
August 1935. Letter from Brisbane Chamber of Commerce to Premier, 
28 August 1935. QSA. 
'^ ' Letter to Head Office, 8 August 1935, (P. 518), p. 237. 
Goondi Private Letter Book. Z329, Box 0330, llA. (ABL) ANU. 
13S ibid., p. 329 
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To put the matter briefly the extremists were much too smart for the 
AWU organisers and completely outmanoeuvred them. The AWU are 
out of touch with their men. The Innisfail organiser told me that he did 
not know half-a-dozen of die Goondi men even by sight and this is his 
second year here.'^^ 
During the strike communists encouraged the participation of workers and their 
supporters in the running of the dispute. Strike committees called a public meeting in 
Innisfail which elected a relief committee whose function was to raise funds for the 
sdikers - the AWU refused to supply strike relief as it was not an authorised stoppage. 
Miners at Colhnsville sent £100, Mossman cane cutters donated £75 per fortnight during 
the dispute and the Ingham CPA collected money from Herbert River cane cutters.'" 
At Mourilyan and Tully the relief committees established kitchens to serve meals to 
sdiking workers. They were staffed by Italian gang cooks and some supplies came from 
Italian farmers who had family or social connections widi many of the striking workers. 
Women were also drawn into supporting the sd-dce. In particular, they organised 
entertainments which included "concerts, card parties, cricket football, picnics, 
swimming, all forms of sport debates, community singing, dancing, wheelbarrow races, 
etc.". Dance classes were also held at the Mourilyan School of Arts.'^^ The novel by 
Jean Devanny, Sugar Heaven, is a moving account of this sd-ike and through her female 
characters, she ouUines many of the social and political issues diese women had to come 
to grips with during the dispute.''' 
AWU officials' became alarmed when support for the sdike grew. CSR mill 
'^ ^ i b i d . , p . 3 3 2 . 
^^^ Menghetti, Red North, op.cit. , p. 48. 
^^ ' ibid. , pp. 51-52. 
^" Jean Devanny, Sugar Heaven Melbourne, 1982. 
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management noted in late August that the "feeling in favour of the strike is undoubtedly 
growing". Initially, cutters at Goondi and South Johnstone, according to management 
were lukewarm toward the dispute. But by late August they were "strongly in favour of 
the strike".'"^ On 24 August Clarrie Fallon "hurried north to take charge of the 
campaign".'"*' He was particularly concerned that the strike could spread. Already, 
AWU members who crewed the sugar lighters Time, Ullooloo, Manoora, Kypara and 
Wortana had passed resolutions supporting the striking sugar workers. 
As die AWU officials had lost a lot of credibility with their rank and file, they 
were unable simply to declare the strike off. Instead, they had to manoeuvre to secure 
a return to work. Their tactic was to divide the workers into small units and impose a 
secret ballot on each simultaneously. This was not an easy task for the officials. As 
management said, "the extremists will stop at nothing to prevent" a secret ballot being 
held.'^ ^ 
An indication of the strength of feeling against a secret ballot came from a 
meeting of Goondi mill hands and cane cutter. The manager had been approached by 
the AWU organisers and asked to "allow the men to go to the meeting as they were 
confident that they could swing the meeting against a strike".'''^ Management obliged 
by closing the mill so workers could attend the meeting. But the men supported 
communist Jack Henry, rather than the union officials - voting 190 to 70 in favour of 
''° Letter to Head Office, 29 August 1935, (P. 518), p. 335. 
Goondi Private Letter Book. Z329, Box 0330, llA. (ABL) ANU. 
141 Menghetti, "Weil's Disease Strike", op.cit.. p. 210. 
'^'^  Goondi Letter to Head Office 29 August 1935. Private 
letter book op.cit., p. 335. 
143 ibid., Letter to Head Office 22 August 1935, p. 331 
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going on strike. The mood of the meeting was such that the secret ballot promised by 
the AWU was never held. As management said, it was "doubtful whether it could have 
been done" given the influence of the CPA."'^ 
Fallon called a meeting of the Hambledon mill area in Cairns on 4 September 
but when he put the resolution for a secret ballot chaos broke out. According to the 
police, the meeting became "very rowdy several addressing the meeting at the same 
time".'"*^ Led by the communists, 300 sdikers walked out. With the militants gone 
Fallon succeeded in getting a return to work vote passed.""* The police reported diat 
about 50% of the cutters refused to start work, and CSR proposed to cancel all conu-acts 
of those who remained on strike.''*^ 
With the return of the Hambledon mill, only four other mdls remained on strike -
Mourilyan, Goondi, Tully and South Johnstone. On 7 September Forgan-Smith made 
artangements for extra police to be sent to the area and enacted an Order-in-Council to 
force all strikers into participating in a secret ballot. The ballots were held 
simultaneously to keep the workers divided into small groups. A boycott organised by 
the CPA, however, allowed the union officials to get their desired vote for an end to the 
dispute. From that time the stiike slowly disintegrated as more and more workers drifted 
back to work. 
Carl King later maintained the 1935 strike had been premature. Coming as it did 
144 i b i d . , p . 332 
'^^ PRE/A1128, In-Letter 5831 of 1935, Inspector Lipp 
(Cairns) telephone message to Inspector of Police, 5 September 
1935. QSA. 
^^^ Menghetti, "Weil's Disease Strike", op.cit., p. 210. 
"^ PRE/A1128, In-Letter 5831 of 1935, Inspector Lipp 
(Cairns) to Inspector of Police, 5 September 1935. QSA. 
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in the first week of the season, workers had no time to accumulate any money to see 
them through a period where they had littie or no income.'"**^  Yet, as Diane Menghetti 
points out, although the strike was defeated, in the long run it succeeded in getting cane 
burnt before harvesting. In June 1936 ten cases of Weil's Disease were reported in 
Daintree, Mossman, Gordonvale and Innisfail. "On 21 July, a general order for the 
burning of the cane before harvesting was handed down by the industrial court".'"''^  
The Weil's Disease strikes showed that the MM was capable of building 
influence amongst workers. The disputes broke down some of the prevailing racism 
amongst workers, showed that the rank and file were certainly capable of organising and 
running their own disputes without assistance from their officials, involved the wives 
and female companions of the strikers and helped to re-establish a degree of workers' 
control within the industry. 
However, just as the 1935 Weil's Disease strike was underway, the CPA 
disbanded the MM and ceased publication of the Red Leader as it abandoned the Third 
Period Line with its emphasis on rank and file organisations. 
"^^  King interviewed by Griffiths and Penrose. 
^^^ Menghetti, "Weil's Disease Strike", op.cit., pp. 214-215 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE THIRD PERIOD ABANDONED FOR THE POPULAR FRONT 
THE SEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMINTERN 
By mid-1935, while the CPA was still a long way from replacing the ALP as 
the leading party of the working class, its influence in the work place and tiade 
unions was increasing. The party had won the respect of many unionists and 
unemployed for its consistent efforts to improve workers living standards. Then, 
abruptiy, the party dropped Third Period policies of "class against class" and adopted 
a completely different sd-ategy of "class alliances". This was known as the Popular 
Front strategy. 
Since the Sixth Comintern Congress (1928) many momentous events had 
reshaped world politics. Japan had invaded Manchuria (1931), fascism had come to 
power in Germany (1933) and Ausfia (1933), an attempted fascist coup had been 
repelled in France (1934) and Italy had invaded Abyssinia [Ethiopia] (1935). Fear of 
an invasion occupied the minds of Soviet Russia's ruling bureaucracy. Their 
immediate priority was to rapidly industrialise and mditarise the USSR through the 
five year plan which was implemented at the same time as the Comintern adopted 
the Third Period analysis. 
Going by figures on industrial output, the plan was successful. The gross 
industrial production rose. The USSR's share of world production increased from 4% 
in 1929 to 12% by 1939. However, the human cost of this hasty indusdialisation was 
enormous. At the same time as machine and armaments' production rose, production 
of goods for consumption fell. According to one source production of consumer 
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goods in 1927-28 represented 67.2% of the USSR's output. By 1940 this figure had 
fallen to 39%.' Moshe Lewin, a critic of the Stalinist regime, claimed that a high 
"price in human lives was paid for Soviet development policies" in these years.^ He 
noted that with the turn to heavy indusu-y the Soviet labour force u-ebled between 
1928 and 1941.^ Yet real wages declined. By 1938 they were "well below the level 
of 1928 and 1913, and stayed approximately on the same low level till sometime in 
the early 1950s".'' During the 1930s, labour laws were rewritten "until the whole 
labour force became a conscripted labour army". Workers could not change dieir 
place of employment and were compelled to work overtime and on their days off. 
Failing to "volunteer" for this work led to dismissal for "sabotaging" die plan. Then, 
in November 1932 it became law that dismissal from employment meant automatic 
eviction from your home.^ 
Industiialisation at home coincided with attempts to forge aUiances with 
western nations abroad. After Hitler's victory in 1933, the USSR continued to trade 
with Germany. The Comintern also continued, for almost a year, with the charade 
that fascism was a prelude to the proletarian revolution. In 1931 the CPA stated that 
fascism "paves the way for its own doom, and that of the whole capitalist system". It 
did so by destioying the influence of reformism, a the pillar of capitalism. Once this 
^ Chris Harman, Explaining the Crisis: a Marxist Re-
Appraisal (Bookmarks: London, 1984), p. 69. 
^ Moshe Lewin, The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in 
the Social History of Interwar Russia (Pantheon Books: New 
York, 1985), p. 219. 
^ ibid., pp. 241-243 . 
' ibid., p. 243. 
^ Chanie Rosenberg, Women and Perestroika (Bookmarks: 
London, 1989), pp. 88-89. 
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had occurred workers would be more receptive to revolutionary ideology, it was 
argued.^ 
Boris Souvarine, a founder of the French Communist Party who was expelled 
in 1924 for "Trotskyism", claimed that Stalin had hoped to come to an agreement 
with Hitler, as he had done with Mussolini. In May 1933 Italy and the USSR had 
concluded a commercial agreement, to be followed five months later with a non-
aggression pact. Souvarine, in his biography of Stalin, stated that: 
Mussolini flattered himself that he had established a model entente 
with the Bolsheviks, suppressing communism at home whilst 
negotiating advantageously with the so-called Soviet State. Thus Stahn 
thought that he would conclude a similar pact with Hitler, on the ruins 
of the communist movement in Germany.^ 
When this failed. Statin sought alliances with non-fascist nations. 
In 1934 the USSR was admitted to the League of Nations. In May 1935 the 
Franco-Soviet mutual security pact was signed. The official communique, which 
Trotsky described as the Comintern's "death warrant",^ stated that it was the duty of 
both the USSR and France "to see that their national defensive capability was in no 
way weakened". Further, Stalin understood and fully approved the French national 
defence policy "which requires a level of armed force sufficient to meet the needs of 
her security".*' After spending years denouncing French imperialism and militarism, 
communists were now obliged to support their government's rearmament programme. 
^ Workers Weekly, no. 211 (7 August 1931), p. 2. 
^ Boris Souvarine, Stalin: A Critical Survey of Bolshevism 
(Angus and Robertson: Sydney, 1940), p. 551. 
® Trotsky, Writings (1935-36) (Pathfinder: New York, 
1977), p. 22. 
^ Quoted in Danos and Gibelin, op.cit., p. 39. 
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It was in France, under these circumstances, that the Popular Front strategy 
evolved. After the attempted fascist coup in Paris in February 1934, reformist and 
communist workers demanded unity between the parties. By July French communists 
had negotiated an alliance, the People's Front, with die reformist party, the SFIO. 
Later, the alliance was to extend to the petty bourgeoisie Radical Party. One of the 
conditions of the People's Front was that both the communists and the SFIO would 
refrain from attacking and criticising each other. 
This differed from the tactic of a united front which Trotsky advocated as 
essential in the struggle against fascism. The united front did not include parties 
which represented classes other than the proletariat. It was a means by which 
working class parties could organise a joint struggle over a specific issue, in this case 
fascism. Freedom to criticise each other was not restricted, nor was the united front 
to be the totality of die communist party's work. Rather, it represented was one 
sphere of activity, otherwise, die party "continued its independent activity". The 
Popular Front on the other hand "involved common electoral programmes and 
support for bourgeois governments...abandonment of Communist criticism of other 
parties in the alliance" and "became the total su-ategy of the Comintern".'° 
Three months after the Franco-Soviet Pact the Comintern held its Seventh 
and final congress in July-August 1935, which opened in the House of Trade Unions 
in Moscow. The exterior of the building, decorated with red banners, was illuminated 
with the slogan: "Workers of the World, Unite!". Stairways were adorned with 
flowers and "a special exhibition of paintings of outstanding revolutionary leaders 
°^ John Molyneux, Leon Trotsky's Theory of Revolution 
[Harvester Press: Brighton, 1981) p. 156. 
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and significant events in the revolutionary history of numerous countries" hung from 
the walls. Behind the speakers were four large portraits of Marx, Engels, Lenin and 
Stalin, with the slogan - "Long live the Invincible Banner of Marxism-Leninism!" -
on the walls." 
The "cult of leadership" dominated the congress. The mention of Stalin's 
name incited a ten minute ovation from die international delegates.'^ The Japanese 
delegation, with most of its party membership imprisoned by the military 
dictatorship, showed its admiration by shouting "Stalin banzai!" (long tive Stalin)." 
Reports on the Comintern congress, while littered with such accounts, lacked any 
analysis of the trends in the international labour movement Trotsky commented that 
on going through the conference documents he was unable to assess "what the 
working class movement in Japan amounts to, under the conditions of the present-day 
Far East crisis, and the role played in it by the Communist Party of Japan". 
Sarcastically, Trotsky said that he "was able to establish conclusively only one fact, 
namely, that in Japanese the impassioned love for the Leader is expressed by the 
word, "Banzai!"."''' 
The CPA, too, inadvertentiy, confirmed that sterile debate dominated the 
" Workers Weekly, no. 623 (30 August 1935), p. 3. 
'^ ibid., no. 615 (2 August 1935), p. 1. 
^^  ibid. , no. 623 (30 August 1935), p. 3. Believing a 
revolution was imminent, Japanese communists in the Third 
Period organised armed bands to engage the police in gun 
battles. In 1931 and 1932 their May Day demonstrations were 
decimated by mass arrests. Nonetheless they claimed, "May Day 
proved a great advance in every sense". Quoted in George 
Beckmann and Okubo Genji, The Japanese Communist Party, 1922-
1945 (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1969), p. 226. 
14 Trotsky, Writings of (1935-36) op.cit.,, p. 126. 
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congress. Describing the deliberation on the first point of the agenda, the Workers 
Weekly said: 
Sixty speakers from 46 countries participated in this discussion. All 
speeches showed complete unanimity of the Communist Parties of the 
whole world regarding the estimation of the world situation, likewise 
complete agreement with the pohtical line of the Communist 
International.'^ 
This discussion on the first agenda item lasted for seventy hours even though every 
delegate agreed unanimously with one another. 
The central report of the congress was on the rise of fascism and the struggle 
for a Popular Front It was presented by Georgi Dimitrov who argued that the world 
was entering a period of wars and revolutions, and that a "process of differentiation" 
was taking place in all reformist parties whereby revolutionary factions were forming 
and the working class was turning toward communism."^ To frusu-ate this process a 
new world war, more bloody than the previous one, was being prepared by the 
fascist governments of Germany, Italy and Japan. This war was going to be directed 
against the USSR and Germany was seen as the chief instigator of the "crusade 
against the Soviet Union, the great fatherland of die toilers of the whole world".'' 
Only die USSR was trying to "maintain peace in all parts of the world", it was 
claimed.'^ 
Pertinent to the discussion on fascism and war was the announcement that 
socialism had finally been achieved in the Soviet Union. To CLR James, a West 
•^^  Workers Weekly, no. 671 (9 September 1935), p. 1. 
^^  ibid., no. 638 (22 October 1935), p. 2. 
" ibid., supplement (10 January 1936), no page number 
'^ ibid. 
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Indian member of the Trotskyist Fourth International,'*' believing that the USSR was 
now socialist made it easier for communists to accept a new and-war policy. He 
wrote :-
For while previously a Communist had to fight to turn imperialist war 
into civil war, now the circumstances had changed. Socialism was 
achieved in Russia, it was a Communist duty to save diis curious 
Socialism, even at the cost of sacrificing his own revolution.^° 
The defence of the USSR was imperative and could be achieved by the 
"mobitisation of all forces for peace, even temporary and unstable forces".^' 
Communists were urged to participate in non-communist governments, although a 
distinction was made between diese forms of government and reformist ones. The 
latter were "tools of collaboration for the preservation of die capitalist system", while 
the former were "governments of sd-uggle of all the anti-Fascist forces against 
Fascism and reaction".^^ Communists had to concern themselves with the type of 
government running their counuy. They were urged wholeheartedly to support and 
defend parliamentary institutions under threat from fascism. This was because, the 
CPA explained: 
Where parliamentarism and remnants of democratic freedom 
exist..where open fighting organisations of the proletariat are possible, 
there we defend parliamentarism and democracy against Fascism, and 
continue to struggle for the proletarian dictatorship.^^ 
'^  After Hitler came to power in Germany Trotsky called 
for the establishment of a Fourth International in 1933, as he 
believed that the disastrous events in Germany confirmed that 
the communist parties were no longer revolutionary. 
20 James, op.cit., p. 3 86. 
^^  Workers Weekly, supplement (10 January 1936), no page 
number. 
2^ ibid., no. 629 (20 September 1935), p. 3. 
" ibid., no. 623 (30 August 1935), p. 3. 
314 
A new trade union strategy was also adopted by international communists 
since unions were seen as the "main line of struggle against this twin danger" of war 
and fascism.^ "* Unity was crucial to preventing the triumph of fascism. The Comintern 
recommended that small red unions unite with larger reformist ones, and where red 
u-ade union federations parallelled reformist federations a unity congress was to be 
convened. Lozovsky, instigator of the Third Period line with its emphasis on rank 
and file movements in opposition to "social fascist" bureaucrats, now stated these 
movements "cannot today serve as a model for the organisation of our forces in the 
reformist tiade unions".^^ 
Remarkably, the underlying premise of the Popular Front was identical to that 
of the Third Period line. At both the Sixth and Seventh Congresses of the Comintern 
(1928 and 1935) it was stated that the world was on the verge of crises, wars and 
revolutions, that the working class was moving toward communism, reformist parties 
were splitting and their influence over workers was weakening.^^ 
Yet whde the premise of the two sd-ategies was identical, die conclusions 
drawn were not. In 1928 the Comintern insisted the period called for "the sharpest 
struggle against the poticy of Social Democracy and its social-Fascist role which was 
responsible for the victory of Fascism in a number of cound-ies".^^ In September 
1932 Thaelmann, leader of the German party, launched a bitter attack on Leon 
^^  ibid., supplement (10 January 1936), no page. 
" Quoted in Carr, Twilight of the Comintern, op.cit., p. 
412. 
^^  Workers Weekly, no 647 (22 November 1935), p. 1 and p 
4. 
"^^  ibid. , no. 647 (22 November 1935), p. 4. 
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Trotsky for proposing struggle against fascism through a united front of communists 
and reformists. Thaelmann declared that unity with reformists was "the theory of an 
utterly bankrupt Fascist and counter-revolutionary. This is indeed the worst, the most 
dangerous, and the most criminal theory that Trotsky has construed in these last 
years of his counter-revolutionary propaganda".'^ 
Since, in die Third Period, Stalin claimed fascism and reformism were 
"twins". Communists were not even to give electoral support to reformist parties. At 
the CPA's Tenth Congress in December 1931 it was unanimously resolved that 
The various social democratic and labor parties throughout the world 
have become the worst enemies of the working class, the most 
effective weapon in the hands of the bourgeoisie for crushing the 
working class...Lang and the Left Social fascists constitute the most 
dangerous enemies of the working class. 
Disdict Committees were urged "to carry on die most relentless fight against the 
pseudo lefts in the camp of Social Fascism as the worst enemies of the working 
class".^^ There could be no unity between communists and reformists. The Workers 
Weekly stated forthrightiy in 1934: "Unity with Social Chauvinists is Treachery to the 
Revolution".'*^ 
When, in the Queensland state elections of 1932, F.W. Paterson proposed that 
the CPA give conditional support to the ALP he was severely reprimanded and 
subjected to an extensive four-month internal debate over the issue. At the time, the 
state was governed by Arthur Moore [CPNP] who had reduced the wages of public 
®^ Quoted in Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast: 
Trotsky. 1929-1940 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1987), p, 
143. 
^^  Quoted in Militant, vol. 2, no. 15 (February 1936), p 
15. 
'° Workers Weekly, no. 549 (20 April 1934), p. 4. 
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servants, removed many workers from the ambit of the Industrial Court, sent police 
in against suiking shearers and had dismissed ARU members for supporting the 
miners' strike at Dobbyn and Mt Oxide. Paterson was reprimanded for saying: "We 
must get rid of Moore, and all he stands for".'' Giving qualified support to Labor 
was, according to Paterson, part of this sd-ategy. However, to the party leadership this 
revealed Paterson's support for the "lesser evil" dieory, that is, that reformists were a 
"lesser evil" than conservative parties. When asked if he believed workers had a 
greater opportunity to organise under a Labor government, Paterson replied that, had 
the party not made "Leftist" ertors in NSW, it may have been more successful under 
the Lang Labor government The District Committee replied that: 
...this was a subtle attempt on the part of Comrade Paterson to defend 
his viewpoint before the workers, and that his talk about the Party 
being able to make better progress under the "Left" social-fascist 
"Lang" Labor Government in N.S.W. had it adopted the correct tactics 
and not made so many mistakes, is merely the trick of a lawyer (which 
Paterson is by profession) to rationalise and bolster up his false 
theory.'^ 
While fascists were enemies of the communists, during the early years of the 
Third Period, reformists were seen as a greater danger to the working class. When 
the German National Socialists gained neariy six million votes in the September 1930 
elections, Herman Remmele, a leading communist parliamentarian, remarked: "Let 
Hitier take office - he will soon go bankrupt, and then it will be our day"." 
Likewise, the Comintern congratulated the KPD for not allowing itself "to be misled 
by the mood of panic which showed itself...in the working class" following the 
^^  Quoted in ibid., no. 466 (2 September 1932), p. 2. 
'^ ibid. , p. 2. 
" Quoted in Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast op.cit. , p 
138. 
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elections.^ The Comintern: 
...confirmed its Third Period policy which committed the Communist 
party to reject the idea of any Socialist-Communist coalition against 
Nazism and obliged it to "concentrate fire on the Social-Fascists".^"* 
During the Third Period, German communists insisted there could be "no victory 
over fascism without a prior victory over social fascism"."^ 
In contiast, the Popular Front strategy held that fascism had to be crushed and 
bourgeois democracy stabilised before the working class could think of overthrowing 
capitalism. This was the main communist slogan of the Spanish Revolution in the 
1930s. E.H. Carr explained that the Popular Front: 
...implied the postponement of the pursuit of proletarian revolution in 
favour of an aim - die defeat of Fascism - which, though perhaps a 
necessary prelude to proletarian revolution, was not in itself 
revolutionary, and could be pursued in alliance with declared enemies 
of revolution. The logical outcome of this unconfessed dilemma was 
the silent relegation of the proletarian revolution to as inconspicuous a 
place as was decendy possible in the proceedings and resolutions of 
the seventh congress.'^ 
Victorian communist, Ralph Gibson, recalled diat the party saw the Popular Front as 
a strategy "directed to winning peace, progress, democratic liberties, not to winning 
socialism".'^ J. Normington-Rawling reported that during the Popular Front period 
the "revolution was to be laid aside". He claimed that one of Stalin's emissaries told 
the French socialist youth: "If in this period you make your revolution in France you 
^^  Quoted in ibid. , p. 131. 
^^  ibid. , p. 131. 
^^  Quoted in ibid., p. 142. 
" Carr, Twilight of the Comintern op.cit., pp; 425-426. 
^'^ Quoted in O'Lincoln, Into the Mainstream, op.cit. , p 
134. 
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are traitors".''^ Esmonde Higgins, by now out of the CPA, was quick to realise that 
Moscow's new line was a step away from proletarian revolution. In 1937 Higgins 
wrote to the Jack and Edna Kavanagh and Jack and Edna Ryan: 
...it is with no pride or satisfaction that I state my conclusion that in 
face of the immediate menace of the Fascist war-makers, revolutionary 
tactics are temporarily out of date...So I'm prepared at the moment to 
ditch Lenin for the People's Front.'*^ 
During the Third Period Soviet communist, Vyacheslav Molotov, insisted that 
there could be "no fourth period for the third ends in revolution".'" Now apparently 
there was a fourth period, one in which fascism had grown so strong as to be a threat 
to world peace. Prior to die Seventh Congress, the Comintern asserted that the anti-
fascist policies of the German party, "before and at the time of the Hitler coup", had 
been "quite cortect".'*^ Yet, if this was so, no explanation was given as lo why iV\e 
"quite correct" policies of 1928-1935 had failed to prevent the rise of fascism in 
Germany, nor why the victory of fascism in Germany did not lead to the 
stiengthening of communism, as the Comintern had previously predicted. Instead, a 
completely contrary anti-fascist policy was adopted by the international parties in 
1935. 
If we accept that the Comintern analysis was correct in both 1928 and 1935 
then the change in policy did not flow from an alteration in the world situation. 
" Normington-Rawling, "Recollections in Tranquillity", 
op.c i t., p. 34. 
" Quoted in Michael Roe, "E.M. Higgins: A Marxist in 
Tasmania, 1936-1938", Labour History, no. 32 (May 1977), p. 
19. 
^^  Quoted in Militant, vol. 2, no. 15 (February 1936), p. 
15. 
^^  Quoted in Carr, Twilight of the Comintern, op.cit., p. 
90. 
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Rather, Stalin's foreign policy considerations sealed the fate of the Third Period line. 
As E.H. Carr pointed out the Seventh Congress "brought into the open the deep-
seated trend, long apparent to the discerning critic, to identify the aims of Comintern 
with the policies of the USSR"."^ Carr argued that Stahn now recognised that the 
defence of the USSR "could be assured through the support, not of foreign 
communist parties too weak to overthrow, or seriously embarrass, their national 
governments, but of the governments of capitalist cound-ies exposed to the same 
external menace as the USSR, and that the best service which parties could render 
would be to encourage governments to provide that support".'*^ 
THE CPA ADOPTS THE POPULAR FRONT 
At the CPA's Eleventh Congress in December 1935, the party adopted the 
theory of the Popular Front. They agreed that a second world war, more brutal than 
the first was being prepared against the world's workers and against the USSR, "the 
country that has put an end to all exploitation and oppression".'*^ Like the Great 
War of 1914-1918, its aim would be to insure "the system of exploitation and 
oppression shall be perpetuated at the cost of rivers of blood". Japan's invasion of 
China, Italy's invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia), Germany's introduction of 
conscription and its announced intentions to seize colonies and expand eastwards, as 
well as capitalist governments' resort to "Fascist methods to suppress the mass revolt 
'^  ibid. , p. 427 
'' ibid. , p. 152 
^^  Workers Weekly, supplement (10 January 1936), no page 
number. 
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against hunger, oppression and war", demonsu-ated this.'*^ ' In fact the CPA argued, 
the very nature of capitalism, gave rise to wars: 
Tariff barriers, high internal prices, costiy schemes to become 
independent of foreign sources of food and war supplies are at once 
war preparation and war causes. Currency chaos, restrictions on 
imports and dumping, the fight for markets, is the economic war, the 
prelude to the war of force and bloodshed for a new division of the 
markets."^ 
Ausu-aha, too, was engaged in war preparations. Military expenditure was 
growing and the government was increasing its restrictions on the working class, 
unemployed and the left through the Crimes Act, the Arbitration Act, the Consorting 
Act and the Transport Workers Act which aimed at depriving workers of their rights, 
destroying their organisations, taking away their right to suike and driving the 
unemployed into "slave camps".''^ 
The party had direct experience of state and federal governments' repressive 
measures. In Brisbane in 1931 the police "savagely attacked" a CPA-called anti-war 
demonstration. Comrade Jordon was arrested for speaking from a verandah in Queen 
Street Later, he claimed that both he and Comrade Kinealty were assaulted by police 
while handcuffed in the lock-up. CPA leader, Bert Hulmes, was also assaulted and 
left unconscious in a Brisbane lane."*^  Federally, Joseph Lyons, UAP Prime Minister, 
used the Crimes Act in late-1931/1932 to impose a postal ban on the Workers Weekly 
and publications from CPA united front groups. In late-1932 Francis Devanny, 
publisher of die Workers Weekly, was tried and sentenced for soliciting funds and 
46 ibid. 
'^  ibid. 
'^  ibid. 
'^  ibid., no. 41 (7 August 1931), p. 1 
321 
CPA anti-war groups were subject to police harassment.-"^ " From July 1932 the 
Department of Trades and Customs imposed censorship on communist and left wing 
hterature by prohibiting the importation of "seditious literature". In 1935 the CPA 
and its front group, die Friends of the Soviet Union, were asked to show cause why 
they should not be declared unlawful under the Crimes Act^' Under the Attorney 
General, Robert Menzies', circulation of the Queensland CPA's anti-war journal. 
War! What For?, was restricted. At the same time pro-fascist material like the 
Queensland Herald and the Nord-Australische Zeitung und Australische Zeitung were 
allowed registration for transmission by post." Anti-fascists were put under police 
surveUlance and those born overseas were recommended for deportation. Even the 
anti-fascist play by Clifford Oddets, Til the Day I Die, was banned by the Federal 
government after the German Consul-General protested." Gianfranco Cresciani said 
of Italian anti-fascists: 
The cause of Italian anti-Fascism was regarded adversely by the 
Commonwealth government, which looked instead more favourably on 
the Fascists as representatives of law and order, of stability, of the 
Establishment.^ 
A second world war could be averted, the party believed, by organised mass 
resistance, provided there was unity within the working class. Unity between the 
CPA and the ALP and unity in the trade union movement would attract the support 
°^ Louis, op. cit. Also see Workers Weekly, no 467 (9 
September 1932), p. 1. 
^^  Watson, op. cit. , p. 63. 
2^ War! What For?, vol. 1, no. 9, p. 176. 
^^  Watson, op • cit. , p. 82. 
^^  Cresciani, op . cit. , p. 102. 
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of "unorganised workers and the middle classes, forming a mass movement of the 
people which will drive back the Fascists and halt the war plans".^^ The CPA 
asserted that fascism came to power in Germany and Austria because reformists had 
refused to organise a united front with Communists.^^ However, diis statement was 
rather dishonest. As has been explained earlier, to unite with the reformists was seen 
by leaders of the Comintern as "an utterly bankrupt Fascist and counter-
revolutionary" notion. 
The party went on to state that a growing section of workers desired a united 
front against fascism. It was certainly true that there was a sdrong anti-fascist mood 
amongst Ausd-alians. In the early 1920s Francesco Carmagnola established the first 
anti-fascist political organisation in Sydney, the Lega Antifascista [Anti-Fascist 
League]. It soon atd-acted the support of 300 Italians in Sydney and 100 at Corrimal 
and Lithgow. Its publication, // RisvegUo, was banned by the Bruce government after 
requests from Mussolini's Consul-General to Ausu-alia." Later, in 1927 Carmagnola 
established the Matteotti Club in Melbourne.^^ Within a year the membership of this 
anti-fascist organisation had risen to 600. Again, its newspaper. La Riscossa, was 
suppressed by the Federal government in 1932.^ ^ 
Likewise, CPA-initiated anti-war work was successful. In September 1933 the 
" Workers Weekly, supplement (10 January 1936), no page 
number. 
" ibid. 
" Cresciani, OP. cit., p. 101. 
®^ Giacomo Matteotti was an Italian Socialist Party 
parliamentarian who denounced Mussolini' terrorism. As a 
result he was murdered in June 1924 by fascists. 
^^  Cresciani, op.cit., p. 103. 
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CPA held a National Congress Against War which attracted an audience of over 
2,000. Even diough the ALP imposed a ban on its members' attending, delegates 
"from more than forty trade unions affiliated to the A.L.P. were present. A large 
number of A.L.P. leagues defied die ban and elected delegates".^" In Queensland an 
anti-war congress in Brisbane in April 1933 atu-acted 300 people - which did not 
include all those who were turned away when the room became full. Leading 
Brisbane communist, J. Elder, chaired the meeting while speakers included non-
communists like Tim Moroney (ARU) and J. Roach (SPU).^' Innisfail's Anti-War 
League convened a meeting of 600,*'^  and the Queensland branch of the party felt 
confident to issue, its own newspaper, Queensland Anti-War News, in early 1934. Of 
the first issue 240 copies were sold by Brisbane and Cairns members alone." 
The most successful CPA-initiated anti-war organisation was the Movement 
Against War and Fascism (MAWF) established in late 1933 in place of the League 
Against Imperialism.^ MAWF gained an unexpected boost when, in 1934, the 
Federal Lyons government refused to allow its guest speakers - Czech writer, Egon 
Kisch, and New Zealand unionist, Gerald Griffin - end-y into Australia. The 
immigration department subjected Kisch and Griffin to dictation tests. As Kisch's 
language test was in Gaelic, and Griffin's in Dutch, they both failed. Although 
deported. Griffin returned under an assumed name and conducted a speaking tour of 
°^ Workers Weekly, no. 522 (6 October 1933), p. 3. 
" ibid., no. 489 (21 April 1933), p. 4. 
" ibid., no. 501 (12 May 1933), p. 3. 
" War! What For?, vol. 1, no. 1 (February 1934), p. 10. 
'^' MAWF was initially called the Movement Against War, but 
"Against Fascism" was soon added to its title. 
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Austraha. Kisch was detained on a ship in Sydney and in an attempt to free himself 
jumped ashore, breaking his leg. The CPA cond-asted the treatment of these anti-war 
activists to that of pro-war speakers Field-Marshal Lord Milne, former Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, and Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence. Rather than being denied entrance into Australia, they were invited 
by the government to celebrate Melbourne's centenary." 
Throughout Australia meetings were held to support Kisch and Griffin and 
motions were passed which criticised the Federal government's actions, in particular 
the Attorney General, Menzies. In Queensland anti-government resolutions were 
passed by unions such as the Builders' Labourers, the Carpenters and Joiners, the 
Brisbane TLC, the ARU, the AWU, as well as the Innisfail UWM, and a series of 
public meetings were held in different towns.^ The ARU and AWU also donated to 
the Kisch-Griffin Legal Defence Fund, while the TLC Executive protested against the 
"autocratic powers vested in the Customs Department in regard to the language test" 
and called on the Federal ALP to hmit these powers should they get elected.^^ 
When Griffin arrived in Brisbane in January 1935 2,500 came to his meeting, 
while another 3,000 heard both Griffin and Kisch speak in Brisbane's Bohemia 
Theatre in February. Amongst the non-communist speakers at the February meeting 
were H. Harvey (TLC), H. Boulten (AMIEU), Dr J. Sfeeter (Douglas Credit 
Society), T. Moroney (ARU), J. Roche (SPU) and J. Foreman (Building Trades 
65 Workers Weekly, no. 574 (12 October 1934), p. 2. 
" See ibid. November 1934-February 1935. Also, TLC 
Council Minutes, UQFL118/A2, 7 November 1934. (Fryer Library). 
^^ TLC Executive Minutes, UQFL118/A2, 19 November 1934. 
(Fryer Library). 
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Group).*^ In other Queensland centres public meetings attracted crowds of over 200 
in Ingham, 600 in Cairns, 800 in Innisfail, 600 in Mackay, 300 in Rockhampton, 400 
in Maryborough, 500 in Toowoomba and many in Cardwell, Gordonvale and 
Gladstone.'' 
In 1935, Brisbane CPA's anti-war front the August 1st Committee, which had 
organised yeariy protests on the anniversary of the start of the Great War, had a 
much broader representation than previous years, with fifteen unions represented and 
many non-communists speaking at the August 1st rally. Similar rallies in northern 
cities were deemed successful by the CPA. In Cairns 350 people participated. In 
Townsville local ALP Branch President, M. Dwyer, spoke on the platform, although 
not as a representative of the ALP. In the small town of Mareeba Jean Devanny 
addressed the audience on the Defence Act, pointing out that one of its clauses 
allowed the government to conscript men for war. Following the rally, Mareeba 
established an anti-war group with non-communists like the Anglican Reverend 
Torlach as Secretary and Mr Claxton from the Butchers Union as President.™ The 
success of the party's anti-war work was indicated by the growth of MAWF which, 
from May to September 1935, doubled its membership.^' By October MAWF and 
other CPA anti-war groups operated in Brisbane, Mareeba, Townsville, Bowen, 
Colhnsville and Mt Mulligan.^^ It was litde wonder that the CPA claimed at their 
^^ Workers Weekly, 585 (4 January 1934), p. 6 and no. 590 
(8 February 1935), p. 6. 
^^  ibid., no. 590 (8 February 1935), p. 4. 
'° ibid., no. 617 (9 August 1935), p. 4. 
1^ ibid., no. 627 (13 September 1935), p. 1. 
'2 ibid., no. 635 (11 October 1935), p. 2. 
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Eleventh Congress (December 1935), that 
Evidence is not wanting that among the leaders, especially the u-ade 
union and A.L.P. branch leaders, there are supporters of the united 
front against war and Fascism." 
The CPA argued diat unity with reformists had to revolve around sd-uggles 
over partial demands, such as shorter hours, rationalisation, wage increases and 
defence of civil hberties. These partial struggles would "halt die war preparations, 
beat back the Fascists and prepare the masses for the struggle to overthrow 
capitalism and organise Socialism, the only sure guarantee of peace, bread, freedom 
and culture".^'' Trade union work, therefore, remained cenu-al to the party's anti-war 
work. In 1933 they explained that building a stiong communist influence in the d-ade 
unions, factories, mines and transport system would stop the impending war." This 
would hamsd-ing any attempts by union officials to duplicate the pad-iotic fervour of 
1914 when they convinced workers of the righteousness of the war and pledged their 
assistance to the government by ensuring "indusU-ial peace" in Australia.^' In 1935 
CPA leader, T. Wright wrote: 
In connection with a new world war, the trade union movement must 
offer not a class truce but intensified struggle for improvement of 
wages and conditions and against the fulfilment of the war plans. 
Instead of co-operation with the Austrahan ruling class in war 
preparations, the trade unions must prepare intensively to prevent 
" ibid., supplement (10 January 1936), no page number. 
'' ibid. 
" ibid., no. 6 (1 March 1933), p. 5. 
'^^  Trade Union Leader, vol. 1, no. 1 (August 1935), p. 3. 
The CPA insisted that the ALP's policy of class collaboration 
in the years leading up to WWI "were but stepping-stones to 
that greater betrayal, the support of the robber imperialist 
world war". Dixon, Socialism and the Labor Movement, op.cit. , 
p. 7. 
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imperialist war by militant actions in the industries..." 
The CPA congratulated the Brisbane TLC for its anti-war resolution passed 
unanimously in late-1935. The motion, sponsored by the AWU, declared that if war 
broke out a general strike of all TLC affiliates should be called.™ The Brisbane 
TLC had also, in August 1935, established an Anti-War Committee. It was initially 
smaU, under Jack Roche (SPU), D. Bevan, T. Moroney (ARU) and J. Hanson, but it 
soon increased to fifteen representatives. The political limitations of the committee 
became evident however, when N. Origlasso's motion calling on the TLC to impose 
workers' sanctions on Italy for its invasion of Abyssinia was ruled out of order.^ *' 
Although the CPA supported a general sd-ike in the event of war, they 
remained sceptical of the Brisbane TLC's ability to sustain such action. The party 
insisted that a call for a general strike would only be successful if, in the preceding 
period, there had been "a consistent policy of struggle against every form of the 
capitalist offensive". In Queensland that demanded a struggle against the conservative 
officials like those in the AWU, who, in the sugar workers' sd-ike "engaged in 
deliberate sd-ike-breaking, and who consistentiy follow a policy of class 
collaboration".^'' 
However, a major bartier existed to the CPA's implementation of the Popular 
77 Trade Union Leader, vol. 1 (August 1935), p.4. 
''^ TLC Council and Executive Minutes, UQFL118/A2, 28 
August 1935 and 7 October 1935. (Fryer Library). 
^^  TLC Council Minutes, UQFL118/A2, 23 October 1935. 
(Fryer Library). N. Origlasso is probably Nick Origlass, a 
Sydney Trotskyist who came to Queensland in search of work 
during the Depression. 
°^ Workers Weekly, supplement (10 January 1936), no page 
number. 
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Front strategy. The ALP hierarchy resisted communists' efforts to establish an 
alliance with it Its politicians also pursued policies which, the CPA believed, 
encouraged pro-war elements inside the ALP. Labor's call for neutrality on Italy's 
war with Abyssinia, its support for increased military spending and its commiunent 
to national defence would "drag the masses into an imperialist war", it was 
claimed.^' 
The Labor Party's position derived from its support for isolationism and home 
defence. Isolationism, communists argued, was a negation of proletarian international 
solidarity. The Brisbane TLC, for instance, would mount no opposition to Japan's 
invasion of China, stating it was "emphatically of the opinion that Australia should 
observe strict neutrality in the Chinese Japanese war" and called on the ALP and 
unions to actively work to prevent the Australian government chastising Japan.^ ^ 
Uld:a-conservatives had a similar position. Robert Menzies said of the war, it was 
"not our concern. Australia must not only keep out of it but must not do anything 
which will be regarded as in any way interfering".^^ 
Similarly, on Italy's invasion of Abyssinia, the Federal Labor Caucus claimed 
"contiol of Abyssinia by any cound-y is not worth the loss of a single Austialian 
life".^ The ALP even asserted that the war was between two rival imperiahst 
powers, even though Abyssinia was one of the poorest and most economically 
^^  ibid., supplement (10 January 1936), no page number. 
2^ TLC Executive minutes, 29 February 1932. UQF1118/A2. 
(Fryer Library)• 
^^  Quoted in R. Lockwood, War on the Waterfront: Menzies, 
Japan and the Pig-iron Dispute (Hale and Iremonger: Sydney, 
1987), pp. 108-109. 
84 Quoted in Louis, op.cit., pp. 48-49. 
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backward of African nations at the tinie.^^ 
It was not that union officials or the ALP were pacifists; on the contrary, they 
were the champions of home defence. As ACTU Secretary, Charles Crofts said: 
"There is only one justification for the workers in Ausu-alia to participate in war, and 
that is in the defence of their own country against an aggressor imperialist nation".^* 
For communists, who saw Australia not as a homogeneous nation, but one rent by 
irresolvable class divisions, home defence was intolerable. They claimed it would 
lead 
...inevitably to the betrayal of the working class, to support for a 
reactionary imperialist war. It means to defend the Ausd-alian 
capitalists and the unlimited exploitation of the masses, it means to 
defend the riches, debauchery, the idleness of the ruling classes, the 
unemployment poverty, and misery of toil of the masses. Is it the duty 
of the workers to defend this, or must we not destroy it?*'^  
Incorporated into reformists' political philosophy of isolationism and home 
defence was the infamous White Australia Policy, decried by the CPA for promoting 
white racial superiority and aiding imperialist oppression and war plans.^ As far 
back as 1921 die CPA condemned the White Australia Policy for feeding 
chauvinistic and xenophobic notions "that workers in odier cound-ies, especiaUy 
Asiatic workers are absolutely ignorant have no organisations, hold no meetings, and 
in short are simply slaves".^ '^  The party impressed upon its audience that Ausd-ahan 
and Asian workers were brothers and sisters - victims of exploitation by their 
^^  i b i d . , p . 49 . 
^^ Quoted in Trade Union Leader, January 1936, p. 55 
s^  Workers Weekly, no. 647 (22 November 1935), p. 2. 
^^ Trade Union Leader, vol. 1, no. 1 (August 1935), p. 4 
85 Communist, vol. 1, no. 31 (22 July 1921). 
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respective ruling classes and allies in the struggle for an international working class 
revolution. Even as Japanese militarists were invading China - a war the CPA 
wholeheartedly opposed - CPA publications carried articles on die resistance of 
Japanese workers and communists to the expansionism of their own ruling class.*^ 
CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN THE THIRD PERIOD AND POPULAR FRONT 
LINES 
However, the adoption of the Popular Front required a significant revision of 
many of the previously held beliefs of the CPA. An honest examination of the 
party's past practices was lacking. The Communist Review warned: 
Tendencies exist in the minds of some comrades towards contrasting 
decisions of the Sixth World Congress with those of the Seventh, and 
to adopt a view that the Sixth Congress decisions were "wrong". Such 
tendencies must be resisted.^' 
Lance Sharkey mentioned that "sectarian stupidity" had hindered the growth of the 
CPA. during the Third Period^^ and the Workers Weekly quoted Dimitrov as saying 
that sectarianism was not an "infantile disorder" but "a deeply rooted vice" within the 
international parties.^^ Yet the cause of this deeply rooted vice was never explained, 
nor was any reason given for why and how such a vice could have developed in all 
the parties. 
J.B. Miles defended the Third Period politics, saying that the slogan of "Class 
5° See for example Workers Weekly, no. 522 (6 October 
1933), p. 3. 
" Communist Review, February 1936, p. 5. 
52 Workers Weekly, no. 645 (15 November 1935), p. 1. 
" ibid., no. 646 (26 November 1935), p. 2. 
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against Class" was necessary from 1928-1935 because of the communist parties 
weakness. The Third Period policies, he claimed, "strengthened" the parties and 
"enabled the Communist Parties to appear as an independent force in the leadership 
of the class struggle. While it is true that we did not win die majority, we saved the 
honour of the working-class movement and of Socialism".*^ 
Yet according to the documents which came from the Sixth Comintern 
Congress (1928), saving the honour of the working class movement was not the goal 
of the Third Period Line. It was to lead proletarian revolutions in a final assault 
against a crisis-ridden capitalism. 
There were many contradictions between the theories of the Third Period and 
of the Popular Front which were never addressed by the party's leadership. The anti-
war struggle prior to the Popular Front was not simply one of resisting war 
preparations of the capitalists, as has been stated previously. Its ultimate goal was the 
overthrow of the system which constantiy gave rise to wars. The coming war could 
not be avoided "unless capitalism is killed first", warned the Workers Weekly in 
1929 95 puithei", if war should break out 
...the correct revolutionary policy is that of endeavouring to bring 
about the defeat of the capitalist government under which we live. 
Austiatian workers must prepare to smash the Australian war machine 
at the earliest possible moment after a declaration of war.^ 
The CPA's slogan was to turn "the imperialist war into the class war against the 
system of Capitalism".''^ 
'' ibid., no. 664 (24 January 1936), p. 2 
5^  ibid., no. 295 (26 April 1929), p. 2. 
^^  ibid., no. 378 (5 December 1930), p. 2 
" ibid., no. 407 (10 July 1931), p. 1. 
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Although the policy adopted at the CPA's Eleventh Congress (December 
1935) was not apparendy different from this policy, during the period of the Popular 
Front the content of die CPA's anti-war work altered. As the party attempted to form 
an alliance with the ALP, it began to put more emphasis on national defence rather 
proletarian revolution as the best means to prevent war. Their anti-war journal War! 
What For - named after the IWW's slogan of the Great War - was given the more 
conservative name of World Peace. This journal, unlike War! What For, "focused 
upon the benefits Ausd-alia offered to its workers, and claimed diat these benefits 
must be defended against fascism...".^^ During a dispute in Port Kembla in 
November 1938, which held up the export of pig iron to Japan, communist Secretary 
of the Port Kembla branch of the WWF, Ted Roach, argued that the metal should be 
kept in Austratia. Not only would this prevent the Japanese mihtary regime from 
making weapons to be used in its occupation of China, but also because Australian 
munitions factories could use the pig iron for their own production needs.^ 
This contrasted greatly to the CPA's previous declarations that Ausd-alian 
armaments factories should be converted to produce "useful articles and not 
implements of desduction".'^ In 1933 the party launched a bitter attack on left 
wing union leader, Jock Garden, over his criticisms that die conservative government 
had compromised national defence by reducing production at a small arms factory in 
Lithgow and by allowing private capitalists to take over aspects of the Cockatoo 
naval dockyard and workshops production. The party further criticised Garden's 
^^  Rose D.J., "MAWF", Labour History, May 1980, p. 86. 
^'^ Lockwood, OP. cit. , p. 164. 
°^° Workers Weekly, no. 528 (17 November 1933), p. 2. 
333 
argument that the weapons produced at Lithgow could one day be used by the 
workers during their revolution. The CPA replied: 
So, the Japanese workers, for example, should support the armaments 
proposed by the imperialists so that some day they could use them 
against the capitalists. 
Such an argument would place workers in the position of being 
supporters of every imperialist war preparations' programme in the 
world. 
This is a prostitution of revolutionary ideas."" 
Yet during the Popular Front, the party adopted a strategy identical to Garden's 1933 
proposals. 
In the CPA's attempt to form an alliance with the ALP there could be no 
repeat of the party's previous indifference toward the political composition of the 
government In the 1929 Queensland state elections some communists declared they 
would rather see Labor in opposition than in government. The editorial of Workers 
Weekly confirmed that Labor's defeat in Queensland was "of no account to the 
working class".'°^ In the same year Jack Kavanagh was removed from leadership 
because he called for a vote for Labor in both the federal elections and the NSW 
state elections. 
Yet after the adoption of the Popular Front, the Communist Review 
announced that the party was "prepared to call for definite support for the Labor 
Party candidates".'"' The ALP was no longer characterised as "social fascist". On 
the contrary, the CPA leadership insisted that Labor was capable of becoming a 
genuine working class party. In 1937 R. Dixon held up the French Popular Front 
1°^  ibid. 
°^2 ibid. , no. 299 (17 May 1929), p. 2 
103 Communist Review, February 1936, p. 24 
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government of Leon Blum, elected in April/May 1936, as an example of what Labor 
could achieve in office. He said: 
In France, in little more than a mondi, the Blum Government 
introduced a 40-hour week, increased wages from 10 to 20 per cent, 
granted annual holidays with full pay, and brought down legislation to 
provide credits and far reaching assistance to the peasants."" 
Dixon concluded that the ALP could achieve similar successes if communists 
cleansed it of the conservatism of the leadership by increasing the voice of the rank 
and file. Only then would "a new Labor Party emerge, more mititant, commanding 
the active support of the workers - an organisation worthy of its name".'°^ 
Dixon failed to mention that in France, the reforms introduced by Blum, were 
concessions to end a massive wave of factory occupations which spread throughout 
the country. More than six million workers were involved in the occupations of May-
June 1936, from the traditionally militant elements to the previously conservative 
ones like insurance workers and bank clerks."^ 
These events in France are of interest because they took place under the 
world's first Popular Front government The French Communist Party, tied as it was 
to upholding the Franco-Soviet Pact, was feart'ul that the French government Stalin's 
newest ally, would be frightened off by this massive indusu-ial upheaval. Therefore, 
the communist party actively pursued a course to end die factory occupations.'*'^ 
"^^  Dixon R., Labour In Oueensland, (Queensland District 
Committee of the CPA: Brisbane, 1937), no page number. 
1°^  ibid. 
°^^  Hallas, op.cit. , pp. 145-146. For an account of these 
struggles see Danos and Gibelin, op.cit. 
°^^  See Danos and Gibelin, op.cit. Also see Leon Trotsky, 
Leon Trotsky on France (Monad Press: New York, 1979) . 
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The party's newspaper, L'Humanite, lectured workers: 
In certain cases it is even possible that we run the risk of alienating 
ourselves from sections of the petty-bourgeoisie and the peasantry...So, 
we must know how to end a strike...We must even know how to 
accept a compromise when all demands have not yet been niet...'"*^ 
The French right wing congratulated the Communist Party for not wanting to 
provoke "panic among the middle classes" and declared it would help Blum "in every 
way to ensure that the strikes do not spread and diat the factories and workshops are 
freed from occupation"."^ 
In Australia the party was eager to form a similar alliance with the ALP, 
similar to the PCF-SFIO alliance in France. However, being a numerically smaller 
party dian their French counterpart, there was little reason for the ALP to form a 
Popular Front alliance with the CPA. This did not deter the communists. During the 
1937 federal elections, despite constant rebuffs from the ALP, it issued three midion 
leaflets and put up 150,000 posters calling for support for Labor."** Gil Roper, 
CPA leader until 1937, said: 
Party members were directed to lend full and unconditional support to 
the Labor potiticians. In the electorate of Beasley, a bitter anti-
Communist, the Party members even posted up a record number of 
posters supporting him!'" 
Roper then asked if the "line of the Kavanagh leadership was 'crass right 
opportunism', what must we say of die 1937 Federal Election policy and tactic of the 
°^^  Quoted in Danos and Gibelin, op.cit., p. 108. 
'°^  Quoted in ibid. , p. 109. 
^^° Davidson, op. cit. , p. 76. 
^^' Gil Roper, What is Happening In the Communist Party? 
(no publisher, no date), p. 2. 
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Miles leadership?"."^ At the CPA's plenum in 1937, a motion to merge the party 
into die ALP was raised but defeated, although the leadership did advise members to 
join the ALP while keeping their CPA membership secret"^ 
The party's analysis of the ALP prior to the Popular Front contrasted with its 
post-Popular Front analysis. In 1929 the CPA explained that the spectacle of 
consecutive Labor governments in Queensland which attacked their own working 
class base was "no mere accident" and could not be remedied by electing "honest" 
Labor politicians. Rather, it stemmed from the fact that the capitalist class maintained 
control over the means of production - the factories and fields - as well as the banks 
and media. This enormous economic and social power allowed them to "bend" 
parliament "to their will"."'* Compounding this, important state institutions - die 
military, police, courts, public service - functioned "continuously in the interests of 
capitalism, irrespective of the changing of parliamentary majorities which come and 
go"."^ Therefore, the CPA maintained, not only were Labor governments: 
...incapable of utilising the State apparatus on behalf of the workers, 
but they find themselves at the mercy of die finance capitalists 
whenever money is required to be raised for administrative 
purposes."^ 
Yet after December 1935 the CPA leadership claimed the Labor Party could 
112 i b i d . , p . 2 . 
1^2 Davidson, op.cit., p. 77. Interestingly, in the 
factional dispute between Jock Garden and Jack Kavanagh in 
1925 this proposal was solidly defeated by Kavanagh. 
iM Towards a Workers' Government: The Communist Party and 
the Labor Party, (CPA: Sydney, 1929), p. 5. 
''^ ibid. , p. 5. 
^^^ ibid., p. 6. Theodore's inability to raise British 
loans in the 1920s was often raised by the CPA as an example 
of this. 
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become a genuine working class party, and previous claims that "any Government 
functioning under the Capitalist Suite cannot act in the interests of the workers" were 
discarded."^ The party leadership offered no explanation as to why the Labor Pa.rty 
could now genuinely represent the interests of the working class. After all, the social 
and economic power of the capitalist class and state institutions had not altered. 
In a similar way, the trade union question was revised during the Popular 
Front The most obvious change was the elimination of the rank and file Minority 
Movement and the winding up of the Red Leader in July 1935. The PWIU, too, was 
wound up. It was decided at die union's sixth annual conference in December 1935 -
and confirmed in 1937 by a ballot of the membership - that the PWIU should 
amalgamate with the AWU. The communist leadership believed the influx of ex-
PWIU members would enhance the struggle for democracy within the AWU. 
However, diey did not reckon on the shrewdness of the AWU leadership. As Andrew 
Moore noted: 
As soon as the amalgamation was affected the AWU leadership made 
sweeping changes to die union's rules, the major effect of which was 
to deny executive office from anyone who did not have five years 
continuous membership. Thus it was not untd 1943 that any militants 
were able to exert influence from within the union's power 
sdncture."^ 
Preparations for a breakaway Sugar Workers Union in north Queensland also fed 
victim to the Popular Front The 1935 MM-organised sugar workers' conference in 
Innisfail had laid the basis for the establishment of a separate sugar workers' union. 
^^'^ Solidarity, Official Strike Bulletin of the Townsville 
Group CPA, no. 3 (10 September 1927), p. 2. 
^^® Andrew Moore, "The Pastoral Workers Industrial Union, 
1930-37", Labour History, no. 49 (November 1985), p. 73. 
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Communist militants believed this was popular in the area because the AWU 
"stunk"."'' However, after the Eleventh CPA Congress (December 1935) this 
proposal was no longer raised. 
Instead of building rank and file opposition groups and establishing red d-ade 
unions, the CPA successfully concentrated on capturing positions in the trade union 
bureaucracy. By 1937 the party held twenty top level posts and "a thousand lower 
trade-union positions, a threefold increase since 1935". One in four communists were 
union officials and the CPA led 41,000 trade unionists in Victoria and NSW 
alone."' 
Much of the success of communists in union elections came from the 
reputation they had developed through leading militant sduggles in most industries 
where they were employed. However, on gaining office, their "class against class" 
poUtics were toned down. Union officials were no longer "social fascists". In 1934 
the MM in the Seamens Union denounced their union officials for appointing, rather 
than electing, a member to fill an executive position for two and a half days. The 
MM claimed: 
Whether it be for 2V2 days or IVi years, die fact remains, that the 
democratic rights of the members are swept aside and officials are 
elected from above. This is a step in the direction of fascisation of 
Trade Unions, a step towards the Fascist Trade Unions of Germany 
and other Fascist countries, unions that we do not want placed on our 
"^ King interviewed by Griffiths and Penrose, 15 October 
1982. 
^^° Davidson, op.cit., pp. 88-90. The election of 
communists to office coincided with a revival in rank and file 
interest in unions. During the depression, the Clothing and 
Allied Trades Union had difficulty functioning as membership 
declined. However from 1938 there was a reawakening of 
interest which saw more delegates at union meetings and more 
factories become closed shops. Tsokhas, op.cit., pp. 3-4. 
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shoulders.'^' 
Statements like these were absent in the Popular Front period, as union officials were 
no longer seen as "social fascists", but as important allies in the struggle against war 
and fascism. 
At its 1935 Congress, the CPA stated, in regard to the increasing government 
restrictions on democratic rights, that: 
The right to strike, picket and collect rehef must be inviolate. Any 
interference with these rights, any attempt to suppress, limit or 
intimidate striking workers or to interfere with their organisations 
should meet widi resolute resistance from all sections of the labor 
movement'^^ 
Amongst the Acts which restricted democratic rights, the party cited the 
Transport Workers Act which had been used against waterside workers in 1928. 
However, when communist union officials in the WWF were threatened with the 
Transport Workers Act during the Port Kembla pig iron dispute, they succumbed to 
government pressure. Once the Lyons government threatened to introduce licensing at 
the port, communist General Secretary of the WWF, Jim Healy, ordered a return to 
work.'^ ^ When the return to work proposal was put to striking workers in Port 
Kembla in January 1939, however, the rank and file rejected it by 130 votes to 
32.'^ '^  It took another four days of pressure from communist union officials for the 
^^^ The Seaman (Issued by the Seamen's MM Group, For 
Seamen in the Interests of Seamen), 26 June 1934, p. 2. 
^^^ Workers Weekly, supplement (10 January 1936), no page 
number. 
^^^ Ted Roach said Jim Healy was frightened of the "dog 
collar act" so he sent the waterside workers back to work. 
Interviewed by Beris Penrose, 19 March 1992. Also see Jon 
White, "The Port Kembla Pig Iron Strike of 1938", Labour 
History, no. 37 (November 1979). 
124 Lockwood, op.cit., p. 2 09. 
340 
waterside workers to agree to a return to work.'" 
At die party's Eleventh Congress, the CPA also adopted as part of its trade 
union work a strategy of strike action rather than reliance on arbitration. The 
Workers Weekly claimed: 
The very concept of arbitration is foreign to working class principles. 
It denies die irreconcilable nature of the class struggle. It implies that 
the State, instead of being the organised violence of the ruling classes 
to keep in subjection the oppressed masses, is an impartial body 
standing above classes and capable of regulating the relationship 
between classes. The function of arbitration is to maintain peace in 
indusuy to the advantage of the exploiters...Unions have nothing to 
lose and everything to gain by repudiating compulsory arbitration.'^ ** 
As part of their union strategy the CPA leadership recommended the careful 
preparation for stiikes which included, firstiy, involving the rank and file in 
discussions, demonstrations, protests; getting guarantees of support from other 
unions; and establishing a sd-ike fund and collecting for relief. Secondly, once a 
stiike was called, it was necessary to inform workers of every development, involve 
them in mass pickets, relief collection and a publicity campaign. Thirdly, it was 
crucial "to pursue an aggressive fighting policy, winning immediately the support of 
all unions, and not hesitating to draw in new forces by extending the dispute where 
this is necessary".'^^ 
However, much of this policy was not put into practice by communist 
officials during the seamen's strike of 1935-36. The seamen objected to an award 
handed down by Chief Judge Dediridge which was to come into force on I 
125 i b i d . , p . 210 
2^6 Workers Weekly, supplement (10 January 1936), no page 
number. 
1" ibid. 
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December 1935. Deleted from the new award was the provision diat in the event of 
the original sailing time being altered seamen were to be paid waiting time. 
Dediridge's award also insisted on compulsory medical examinations for all ratings. 
As the examiner was to be a government appointee, the CPA believed this would 
open the way for victimisation of militants. Other award changes included a 
reduction in overtime rates by 3d. per hour and night-watchmen's pay by 4d. per 
hour. As well, any member of a ship's crew who took industrial action could be 
fined £10. Any union official who supported the action was liable to a fine of 
£100.'^' 
General Secretary of the SUA, Jacob Johnson, proposed a plebiscite amongst 
members on the award. This was opposed by communists on the basis that the 
"seamen would be working under this award for approximately three months before a 
decision could be arrived at' via the plebiscite.'^^ Instead, on 3 December, seamen 
in all states resolved to su-ike even though they knew littie support would be 
forthcoming from union bodies like the ACTU. Following a seamen's dispute in 
August 1935, led by communist Joe Keenan, the ACTU called a conference of union 
officials to stop unauthorised strikes by SUA members. During the Dethridge dispute 
the ACTU urged the men to return to work and apply for a variation of the 
award.'^° 
On 27 December 1935, while the strike was in progress, rank and file seamen 
2^® ibid, no 648 (26 November 1935), p. 2. 
2^9 ibid. , p. 2. 
^^° L.J. Louis, "Recovery From the Depression and the 
Seamen's Strike 1935-36", Labour History, no. 41, November 
1981, pp. 80-81. 
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Stunned die officials by voting Johnson, the incumbent lefl wing General Secretary, 
out of office. The rank and file replaced Johnson, who was calling for a return to 
work, with Joe Keenan, a communist who had led the seamen's MM before it was 
would up in mid-1935. Keenan maintained that die strike was necessary and that 
workers could win if they were given support.'^' By this time the strike committee 
was under intense pressure. Ships were being manned by strike-breakers and the 
licensing of seamen under Transport Workers Act had been imposed by Federal 
Attorney-General Menzies. During the strike communist seaman E.V. Elliot 
represented by F.W. Paterson, launched a court case claiming licensing was against 
Section 99 of the Commonwealth Constitution. This was dismissed by the High 
Court whose judges included Justice Starke who had shares in Huddart Parker, one of 
the shipping lines involved in the dispute; and Chief Justice Sir John Latham who, as 
Federal Attorney-General under Bruce, prepared the licensing system for the WWF 
and, in 1925, introduced into the House of Representatives the Immigration Act 
which sought to deport striking seamen.''^ 
On 8 January, with coal stocks low. Bill Orr and Charlie Nelson, communist 
leaders of the Miners Federation, recommended that a general strike be called in the 
coal fields untd the licensing of seamen was ended. This, however, was 
overwhelmingly rejected by the rank and file, with the exception of Wonthaggi and a 
handful of the smaller fields.'" Like Ort and Nelson, communist Ernie Thornton, 
^^^ ibid., p. 77. 1935 Strike Committee Meetings' minutes, 
Queensland branch of the SUA, 7 January 1936, p. 22 and 11 
January 1936, p. 24. E183/8. (ABL) ANU. 
^^2 Cahill and Fitzpatrick, op.cit., pp. 80-86. 
^" Louis, "Seamen's Strike", op.cit., p. 83. 
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who in late 1935 was elected General Secretary of the FIA, had been campaigning in 
his union for support for the seamen but had failed to win a commitment for 
substantial industrial action. Nor could the communist officials pressure the ACTU 
into calling industrial action. An ACTU convened conference of union officials on 17 
February 1936 rejected a motion by Orr and Keenan that unions "refuse to move or 
repair ships manned by volunteers".'^ 
The SUA lost the dispute, militants were victimised, many lost their jobs to 
strike-breakers and the fight between Keenan and Johnson, who refused to vacate his 
position, continued to divide the union.'^^ Criticisms of communist strategy came 
from all sides with reformist officials raising their standard accusation that the CPA 
was attempting to smash the trade unions. On the far left, Trotskyists also criticised 
Keenan. They admitted he "held the confidence of the vast majority of the 
membership" and his ability as an influential speaker was not in question. However, 
the Trotskyists claimed that Keenan ignored the rank and file and, instead, 
concend-ated his efforts on constant conferences and meetings with other union 
officials.'^ *^ They claimed that the sd-ike committee led by Keenan failed to 
organise picketing of the wharves to prevent ships being manned by sd-ike-breakers. 
Further, they accused die Strike Committee of assuming "plenary powers": 
It met the membership at its own sweet wdl (three weeks elapsing 
between the January stop-work meeting and die "Go-back-to-work-
meeting" of February 19th). It accomplished the decentralisation of 
activities without seeking the endorsement of the membership, and, by 
134 i b i d . , p . 84 
^^^ In the 1936 elections Keenan lost the position to 
Johnson. 
136 Militant, vol. 3, no. 1 (March 1936), p. 8 
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control of the chair, prevented the question being debated.'" 
Ex-CPA leader. Jack Kavanagh, also criticised the conduct of the strike. He 
believed the question of picketing had "not been taken up seriously". In particular, he 
reproached Ort for his handling of the miners' ballot, describing it as one of the most 
"serious tactical errors". Kavanagh wrote: 
The taking of a Ballot on the question of a general strike in the coal 
industry in support of the seamen widiout first having prepared the 
ground in the lodges, and without feeling out the lodge officials, was 
very illjudged...if the statements of Orr on the connections between the 
shipowners and coalowners, and on the depleted stocks of coal, are 
correct, if the officers of the Miners believe that the boot will be put 
to them next, then the correct thing to do was to force a crisis if 
possible. True Orr and Nelson may have lost their jobs, but what are 
these jobs for if not to be taken advantage of when the occasion 
1 "Mi 
warrants. 
Kavanagh's criticism that communist miners' officials had not sufficientiy 
prepared their rank and fde prior to the ballot may be valid. Booval miners from 
Ipswich notified the Brisbane strike committee on 14 December they wished to hear 
SUA delegates speak on the strike. Although Mr Taylor from the strike committee 
did so. Nelson's trip to address Queensland miners was on the day of die ballot - 8 
January 1936 - when he and Mr Limerick from the SUA went to Ipswich.'^^ 
Whether the criticisms of Kavanagh and the Trotskyists were valid or not the CPA's 
ftist attempt to use their official positions in the union bureaucracy to organise 
support for stiiking seamen failed. 
'" Militant, vol. 1, no. 1 (March 1936), p. 8. 
^^® Letter from Jack Kavanagh to E. Higgins, 27 January 
1936, p. 1. P12/4/27. (ABL) ANU. 
^^^ 1935 Strike Committee Meetings' Minutes. Queensland 
Branch SUA. 14 December 1935, p. 5, and 8 January 1936, p. 23. 
E183/8. (ABL) ANU. 
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The problem was not lack of militancy on the part of SUA members, in fact 
the union contained many militants. For example, in May 1933 the Brisbane branch 
meeting rejected the concept of rationing work where SUA members would stand 
down for a month at a time to allow other members to work. As a Mr Monsen 
explained, if rationing was adopted: 
...we would be accepting a responsibility which belonged to the 
capitalist class, every man and woman was entitled to live in comfort 
and while today we have half the people on the dole if rationing were 
adopted we would have all the people on the dole, we should demand 
a 30 hour week on fuU wages and two months holiday a year on full 
pay.'^ « 
Then, in 1934, communist MM candidate, Isidor "Andy" Anderson, was 
elected Secretary of the Brisbane branch of the SUA. In 1935 500 seamen in Sydney 
supported a communist-inspired censure motion against Johnson for attacking the 
USSR in the union's journal.''" The fact that so many members were prepared to 
remain on strike in 1935-36 despite Johnson's opposition, and dien to replace him 
with a mititant communist in the midst of the dispute indicates a high level of 
combativity of die rank and file. However, this was not enough. With other unions 
refusing to support the SUA and sd-ike-breakers manning the ships, it was inevitable 
the strike would fad unless it was spread to other unions. 
Although the party attempted to do this through their union leaders, they 
failed. Communist officials were elected out of the vibrant MM groups established 
over the previous years. In these areas the CPA had developed workers' self-reliance 
'^'° Stop Work Meeting Minutes, Brisbane SUA 1932-35. 16 
May 1933. E183/3/13. (ABL) ZVNU. Despite the rejection of 
rationing by the rank and file the officials agreed to its 
introduction. 
1^1 Workers Weekly, no. 601 (3 May 1935), p. 5. 
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and militancy through struggles over small issues. Union-wide, though, rank and file 
confidence was patchy. Not all members felt certain that industrial action would 
succeed. Factors which tempered their militancy were the still high unemployment 
figures, the unrestrained confidence of the employing class and die considerable body 
of anti-strike legislation the government had on its books. 
Impressive MM-led strikes of Wonthaggi (1934), Collinsville (1934) and the 
sugar areas of north Queensland (1934-35) exhibit the close contact which existed 
between the communists and other workers involved. It is also significant that these 
disputes were not spread by the CPA but were kept isolated, solid and therefore 
easier to control. Perhaps the contrast between the successful 1934 strikes and the 
unsuccessful 1935-36 SUA strike indicated that the party needed to maintain the rank 
and file movement to extend their base within a union-wide context while workers' 
confidence was still uneven. As the CPA had once explained, the MM was to be a 
transmission belt for communist ideas into the work places. Without that transmission 
belt and a solid rank and file base, communist officials floundered. 
Whatever lessons the party drew from the defeat, they did not challenge the 
ideas of the Popular Front Since the beginning of the Third Period with the 
"Bolshevisation" of the party, loyalty to the Kremlin's dictates was the first priority 
of communist leaders. Even diough the party had completely reversed its major 
potitical positions following the Sevendi Comintern Congress, J.B. Miles asserted: 
"No fundamental changes had been made in the line of the Party on any 
question".'^^ 
Interconnected factors explain the ease with which the party performed its 
i''^  Workers Weekly, no. 662 (17 January 1936), p. 3 
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political somersaults at its Eleventh Congress. One was the membership's absolute 
loyalty to the USSR, to the belief diat Stalin was building socialism, and therefore 
this regime had to be defended at all costs. The CPA said of the USSR in 1934 that 
"One counU-y has not betrayed the hopes that it gave rise to, or falsified the promises 
that it made. One cound^ does not know exploitation, and it is the only country 
which is making progress".''*^ Very few people at the time, apart from Trotsky and 
a handful of his supporters, questioned the notion that socialism had been achieved in 
the USSR. J.B. King, an ex-IWW member who had been, for a short time, a member 
of the early CPA believed in the IWW slogan: "Fast Workers Die Young". However, 
when he was in the USSR in 1931 he became manager of a mine in the southern 
Urals. Under his direction Soviet workers' production rose considerably as he 
attempted to implement the Five Year Plan. He commented that: "1 have employed 
50 per cent less men than called for by die plan, which has resulted in 80 per cent. 
economy for the mine".'"*^ For this he was rewarded with a pay rise from Soviet 
authorities. No doubt King believed he was helping to establish socialism. Yet, from 
the point of view of Soviet miners, the break-neck pace of the Five Year Plan was 
only increasing their misery, not relieving it. 
Trotsky commented that while Stalin celebrated the final victory of socialism 
in a single country, Soviet newspapers were: 
...full of news about hooliganism among the youth, barbarous family 
customs, desertion and neglect of children. Near the end of the second 
five year plan the government passed and put into effect a law 
allowing juvenile criminals to be shot At the slightest show of critical 
thought the uncond-olled bureaucracy of the "socialist society" (!) 
"^3 War! What For, vol. 1, no. 1 (February 1934), p. 5. 
"^^  Quoted in Workers Weekly, no. 586 (11 January 1935), 
p. 3. 
348 
replies with rabid tertorism.''*"' 
Another factor which assisted the transition from the Third Period Line to the 
Popular Front was that many of the party members were recruited in the 1930s to a 
party which had already been bureaucratised. They had not experienced the freer 
debate and discussion which had been a feature of the party up until Jack Kavanagh 
was removed from leadership. The methods of party building which these members 
learnt were those of Miles and Sharkey whose response to criticism was expulsion 
and whose political theories were handed down from Moscow rather than being 
based on an independent assessment of the class su-uggle in Ausu-alia. 
No disagreement with the Comintern and the CPA leadership was tolerated, as 
Kavanagh found out when he was expelled for a second time in 1934 for saying he 
was not convinced Trotsky was an irredeemable counter-revolutionary. Kavanagh 
maintained he was not prepared to brand as counter-revolutionary everyone who 
disagreed with him. "It is quite possible to take issue with their dieories and policies 
without putting them in the same category as the Kolchaks, Denikins, Churchill and 
Kautsky" - rightist politicians from Czarist Russia, Britain, and Germany - he 
said.'''*' Kavanagh concluded: 
We are indeed coming to a peculiar pass in the development of the 
revolutionary movement when it becomes a crime to think differently 
than the leadership. This surely brings us to the position of the concept 
of infallibility, which in turn leads to god. This is in total opposition to 
anything that Marx or Lenin ever enunciated.'"^ 
Outside the CPA there were mihtants who despaired that the party could ever 
"•^^ Trotsky, Writings 1935-36, op.cit. , p. 105. 
1"^  Workers Weekly, no. 559 (29 June 1934), p. 4 
'^^ ibid. , p. 4. 
349 
lead a proletarian revolution following the Seventh Comintern Congress. Founding 
members who had been expelled by the Miles-Sharkey leadership, in particular, 
expressed these sentiments. Edna Ryan speculated that "from among all the brands of 
revolutionary movements, surely a clear Leninist policy can be evolved and for the 
past few years it has had more of a chance of being evolved outside the C.P.".''*^ 
Esmonde Higgins wrote in December 1937: 
...like so many others, I feel at a loose end because the outfit I'd 
identified myself with has become the Moscow bureaucracy, and is 
incurably set on a course which has no relation at all with die aims of 
the Marxist movement of the last two generations.'"*^ 
E.H. Carr argued that the deadi kneU for proletarian revolution was sounded 
when Stalin's theory of "Socialism in One Counu-y" was officially adopted by the 
Comintern parties in the late-1920s. Although world revolution "continued to figure 
in the perorations of Comintern pronouncements on every solemn occasion", Carr 
claimed, "it was no longer thought of as the primary condition of the survival of the 
Soviet regime. 'Socialism in one country' had taken its place".'^° 
Ultimately, the Popular Front line led the CPA away from promoting 
proletarian revolution. By 1945 J.C. Henry, who led the Weils Disease sirike. in the 
late 1930s, even claimed "the possibility of the peaceful existence of the democratic 
nations can be made a reatity" in the post-war period. This could be achieved by "a 
broadening and deepening of democracy and an expanding economy with improved 
"^'^  Letter Edna (no name) to Jack Kavanagh, P12/4/9, p. 1 
Kavanagh Collection. (ABL) ANU. 
^^^ Quoted in Roe, op.cit . , p. 23. 
^^° Carr, Twilight of the Comintern op. cit., p. 4. 
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living standards for the Austrahan people".'"" This was a far cry from the pre-
Popular Front days when the CPA believed that workers' lives could only be 
improved once capitalism was overthrown. 
151 Queensland Guardian, 8 June 1945, p. 1 
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CONCLUSrON 
This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that the Communist Party's 
subordination to the Comintern hampered its intellectual development. As the regime 
under Stalin became more self-serving and "Socialism in One CounU-y" became its 
primary doctrine, the Comintern was transformed into an organisation that was little 
more than a tool of Soviet foreign policy. As a result, the line emerging from 
Moscow was a product of either internal factional struggles amongst leaders of the 
CPSU - for example, the adoption of the Third Period Line - or it was a product of 
changes in international alliances - for example, the Popular Front. 
The "Bolshevisation" of the Comintern, in turn, affected the CPA. As the 
Stalinist influence spread, die party's internal regime became more bureaucratic; 
genuine democracy was replaced with monolithic congresses, conferences and 
meetings; an unelected Control Commission was appointed by the Cenu-al Committee 
to defend the poUtical line of the leadership and, in the interests of working class 
unity, dissent was stifled and critics isolated. Consequentiy, the analytical abilities of 
the CPA's leadership were dulled. Each zig-zag in Comintern policies was accepted 
uncritically. Not even the complete about-face of the Popular Front line stimulated an 
intellectual awakening. 
Superficially, the Third Period Line appeared to be an accurate analysis of the 
world in 1928. The essence of the theory was that die capitalist world was 
descending into an irresolvable crisis. With no possibility of being able to "buy off" 
workers with reforms, every conflict, no matter how minor, contained widiin it the 
possibility of becoming a revolutionary stiuggle against the system. In diis period of 
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revolutions and wars, the working class was moving rapidly toward communist 
policies, breaking with reformists Vv/ho had shown themselves to be irredeemable 
"social fascists". Therefore, it was no longer possible to form a united front with 
reformists. The era of capitalism was drawing to a close - the Third Period would be 
capitalism's last phase and the precursor lo rcvoludonai7 communism around the 
world. 
With the Wall Street crash in 1929, markets contracted, bankruptcies soared 
and crises gripped one national economy after another; communists did not doubt the 
Third Period analysis. When class anuigonisms iniensified in Australia from 1927-
1931 with major assaults by die employing class and governments on sugar and 
railway workers in Queensland, limber workers in NSW and Victoria, waterside 
workers nationally, miners in northern NSW, and shearers in one slate after another, 
the Comintern's prediction of a working class upsurge seemed confirmed, as did the 
argument that workers were breaking with reformism. The role of Labor's 
parliamentary wing in ihese disputes bred disenchantment amongst the ALP 
membership. In Queensland this could be seen in the declining membership of the 
ALP, the party's disastrous showing in ihc 1929 slate elections and suggestions by 
left union officials to establish an Induslrial Labor Party lo replace the ALP. During 
the strikes at the beginning of ihc Third Period, workers showed signs of breaking 
with their union officials. Alistair Davidson noied Ihat during the induslrial unrest in 
1929 a "significant contrast became apparent while the workers were becoming more 
mititant their union leaders were becoming more defeatist".' In many of the larger 
disputes in Queensland during Ihe Third Period, this irend continued - in particular. 
^ D a v i d s o n , o p . c i t . , p . 4 4 . 
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in the sdikes of shearers, cotton pickers and sugar workers. A degree of disaffection 
with the union leadership was also evident in some smaller disputes. For instance, in 
the Queensland branch of the AMIEU in 1931. Employers stopped getting their 
labour directiy through the union and, instead, they began to employ through the 
Labour Bureau. A mass meeting of 1,500-2,000 AMIEU members in Brisbane in 
April that year ended in uproar when the officials proposed the acceptance of the 
Labour Bureau. Communist butcher, Bert Hurworth, described how the meeting 
degenerated into complete disorder "with three or four members addressing the Chair 
at once, whilst impromptu meetings [were] being held all over the hall by workers".^ 
To many communists the reluctance of union officials to defend the working 
class and unemployed reinforced the Comintern's claim that officials were "social 
fascist". No doubt the behaviour of many officials in isolating the MM, accusing 
communists of splitting and weakening the labour movement, and actively opposing 
spontaneous sfikes of their rank and file, fed this idea. The AMIEU's expulsion of 
communists from their hall in Townsville and the Brisbane TLC's expulsion of the 
CPA from their offices reinforced, to communists, the Third Period line. 
As the depression deepened. Labor governments both federally and in the 
states reduced wages and spending. In Queensland the Forgan-Smith government 
ind-oduced extensive rationing of employment amongst its workers while 
simultaneously reducing wages, particularly in the d-amway and railway sectors. 
Following Forgan-Smith's support for the 1933 Premiers' Plan to curb government 
spending, a sustained campaign against the unemployed was waged. The Workers 
Weekly described how under the Forgan-Smith government 
Workers Weekly, no. 394 (10 April 1931), p. 4 
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The conditions for granting relief were rigorously interpreted, and the 
unemployed were hounded by police investigators to reduce the 
number of dole recipients. Instead of granting adequate sustenance, the 
government ruthlessly prosecuted in all cases of petty infringements, 
and in the case of nomadic workers conducted a reign of terror. 
"Jumping the rattier"...has become a dangerous practice under the 
Labor Government which sends disguised police among these workers 
to arrest them at gun point' 
Labor politicians not only "hounded" the unemployed, but used them to 
undermine the conditions of railway and U-amway employees. By hiring relief gangs 
to do repair work for less than the basic wage, die Forgan-Smidi government could 
dispense with employees who were legally entitled to award wages and conditions. 
Local councils followed suit The Calliope Shire Council dismissed regular Councd 
employees working under award conditions and replaced them with relief workers." 
When resistance broke out, such as strikes by relief workers or demonstrations by the 
unemployed, the Labor government and Labor dominated city councils were quick to 
suppress them - sometimes with considerable violence. Demonstrators in 
Maryborough in 1931 faced mass arrest as they protested against the Labor City 
Council's refusal to pay award wages to relief workers. Mass struggles of the 
unemployed against evictions from their camps in Cairns, Mackay, Brisbane and 
other cities were fought during Forgan-Smith's term in office. 
Sd-engthening the CPA's opinion on "social fascism" were the increasing 
restiictions the Labor government placed on freedom of speech and assembly. Under 
Forgan-Smith, for instance, it was necessary to obtain a police permit for stieet 
meetings. The CPA reported: 
^ ibid., no. 531 (8 December 1933), p. 3 
" ibid., no 597 (29 March 1935), p. 6. 
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...in many centres permission for such meedngs by the Communist 
Party, M.M., by unemployed organisadons, etc., are consistentiy 
refused; appeals to ihe government have been in vain, and a fight has 
to be conducted for the right lo hold meelings.'* 
WAS THE THIRD PERIOD ANALYSIS ACCURATE'^ 
Given this, it is understandable that communists believed that the Third Period 
Line to be an accurate analysis of weslern capitalism in the 1930s. However, a closer 
look at the Comintern policies as Uiey applied to Australia is useful. In particular, the 
Third Period Line claimed that the capitalist world was on the verge of proletarian 
revolutions, that workers were embracing communism and that the hold of reformism 
was weakening. 
While it is true thai large-scale strikes occurred in the early years of the Third 
Period, they were defensive struggles as workers tried U) maintain their existing 
conditions of employment against encroachments by employers and the government 
All the major strikes ended in defeat for the labour movement, leading not to 
revolutionai-y struggles and the mass conversion of workers to communism, but to a 
profound political apathy. Strikes declined during the Third Period, and the number 
of workers involved in those disputes which did occur were relatively small. 
Simultaneously, there was a decrease in the number of workers participating in union 
affairs to the extent that many unions could not get quorums for their branch 
meetings. 
One indication of this polidcal apathy was seen in the gap between the 
significant passive support for communist proposals and the party's inability to 
^ ibid., no. 531 (8 December 1933), p. 3 
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convert this support into political activity. For example, a meeting of Melbourne 
building workers in 1932 adopted radical CPA proposals for the establishment of a 
rank and file committee to implement vast changes to the union's internal structure, 
to democratise it and to make the union officials accountable to the rank and file. 
Tom O'Lincoln reports: 
But any illusion that die vote reflected a strong and organised base of 
support for die MM was immediately shattered, for as soon as the vote 
was taken "there was a general exit" and no rank and tile committee 
could be formed. Thus nothing came of the whole exercise except a 
superficial propaganda victory for die Communists.^ 
The CPA acknowledged at the MM's 1933 conference that its growing 
influence amongst workers was not accompanied by a cortesponding growth in 
recruitment. The conference concluded that the MM "organisationally lags behind its 
mass influence".^ A Central Committee meeting in June 1935 recognised that while 
the party had received 75,000 votes in the Federal election, party membership was 
still less than 3,000, indicating that communist "influence outsuips the organisation 
of the Party".^ Recruitment to the CPA between 1928 and 1935, although significant 
was quite small when compared widi the 1928 estimation that Australia was on the 
brink of a working class revolution and that there was a massive swing toward 
communist politics. 
The gains made by the CPA during die Third Period were the result not so 
much of workers flocking to embrace its ideas, but of its persistent daily agitation 
amongst workers over large and small issues. It was communists' attention to detail. 
^ O'Lincoln, Militant Minority, op.cit., p. 14. 
^ Red Leader, 7 March 1934, p. 4. 
^ Workers Weekly, no. 611 (5 July 1935), p. 3. 
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to the contents of dieir jobs sheets, the appearance of their bulletins, the tireless 
devotion to distributing these and other publications, and the organisation of 
countless meetings, campaigns and demonstrations which created an audience for 
their ideas. 
Through this work the CPA helped rebuild the network of mititant unionists 
which had been desd-oyed in the assaults on die labour movement from 1927-1931. It 
has been said: 
Wherever they were active, MM members called for shop committees; 
wherever these were formed, they sought to work within them and win 
leadership. Consequentiy, shop committees became and remained 
centres of Communist union strength for long periods to come...^ 
It was only communists who were prepared to resist the onslaught on 
workers' wages, hours and conditions. Only communists believed such sduggles were 
not impossible despite the high level of unemployment and the depth of the crisis. It 
was communists who argued consistently that the struggles of the unemployed could 
not be divorced from sd-uggles of the employed and that low wages for the 
unemployed on relief work undermined the jobs and conditions of those in work. 
THE EFFECT OF THE THIRD PERIOD LINE 
The positive aspects of the Third Period line - that sd-uggle was possible -
enabled the CPA to stand against the dominant current of resignation and passivity 
during the depths of the 1930s depression. But at what cost were these gains made? 
The theory of "social fascism" engendered in communists a disdainful attitude 
toward members of the ALP and union officials. Although the CPA leadership 
O'Lincoln, Militant Minority, op.cit., p. 11 
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objected to this attitude and tried to conect it, at the same time Third Period policies 
led the members to rejecting any united front work with Laborites. Asserting that the 
ALP was "carrying on the same class policy of the whole of the bourgeoisie -
including the Fascist 'New Guard'",'" hindered communists' attempts to open 
genuine dialogue with the rank and file of the ALP. In effect. Labor members were 
told to leave the ALP and join the CPA. There could be no half-way measures. ALP 
members and voters who were disgruntled with the actions of Forgan-Smith, and who 
expressed this by voting for more left wing reformist candidates, were also censured 
by the CPA for supporting "left social fascism" - a current even more dangerous than 
"social fascism". In a Fortitude Valley (Brisbane) by-election in the 1930s three 
independent-left candidates received a large vote against the official ALP candidate. 
Yet the CPA was hortified, claiming the vote "showed the basis and danger of Left 
Social Fascism"." When NSW Premier Lang was dismissed from office by 
Governor Game, the CPA claimed that he had "surrendered office at the request of 
the capitalists after he had played his part of holding the workers back from the fight 
against the capitalist attacks".'^ 
A further indication of the suspicion toward reformists was the CPA's 
reluctance to lose control of committees and campaigns they had established. The 
Red Leader admitted to a "fear to apply broad forms of proletarian democracy to the 
election of committees".'^ In fact, when the party changed to the Popular Front, this 
1° Workers Weekly, no. 484 (13 January 1933), p. 3. 
^^  ibid., no. 531 (8 December 1933), p. 3. 
^^  Red Leader, 3 January 1934, p. 6. 
13 ibid., 14 February 1934, p. 2. 
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was one practice the leadership had to combat In a 1935 pre-congress discussion in 
the Workers Weekly, it was noted that: 
Too often are we prone to look with suspicion on workers who are 
coming closer to us...Because they have been bitter opponents in the 
past we refuse to believe that a change is taking place. We see in their 
every action opportunist motives, instead of seeing diat which is 
sincere and honest and starting from here, ensure that we do not 
repulse them but by a comradely approach, proceed to get closer to 
such people...'"* 
In addition, the belief that the revolution was imminent led to a degree of 
rashness and impatience in the CPA. Most notable were calls for armed confrontation 
with the state, although this was soon cortected by Moscow. Impatience, however, 
could be detected in other aspects of CPA work, for instance, with the founding of 
the PWIU in 1931 as a breakaway union from the AWU. While it is true that many 
obstacles were placed in the way of communists organising fellow workers within the 
AWU, the fact that they were able to make such progress amongst north Queensland 
sugar workers in the 1930s indicates that it was not an impossible task. Establishing 
a red trade union implies that communist militants sought an instantaneous resolution 
to the problem of winning the majority of rank and file away from their conservative 
officials. By 1936, under the Popular Front, the party's position had altered to one of 
fighting for democracy within the AWU. Pat Clancy explained: 
It is vitally necessary that the A.W.U. membership, particularly of the 
Queensland Branch, realise that leaving the union in disgust will not 
assist in breaking the bureaucratic hold over the union that the present 
officials have. If die members are to successfully fight for democratic 
control of their organisation, then it is absolutely essential that they 
remain inside die union and carry on a vigorous campaign against the 
policy of class collaboration, victimisation, slander and tieachery that 
exists to-day...if we leave the union we are leaving the present officials 
14 Workers Weekly, no. 638 (22 October 1935), p. 2. 
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an open path to continue with their policy of class collaboration...'^ 
Similarly, party work was hamstrung by the Comintern declaration that union 
officials were the social prop of fascism. The Workers Weekly reproached union 
leaders for their "treachery and corruption" and for "betraying" workers' su-uggles 
"by preaching defeatism, by propagating reliance on the wage-smashing Arbitration 
Courts, by splitting the workers' ranks and sectionalising disputes, by back-door 
conferences with the employers, and by open strike-breaking".'^ 
Such a position led some members to abstain from necessary d-ade union 
work, seeing their rank and file committees as counterposed to the official structures 
of the union. This had not been anticipated, nor was it condoned, by the CPA 
leadership. From the mid-1930s they died to counter the d-end, insisting members 
join unions, pay their dues, work inside their unions and familiarise themselves with 
their union's rules.'^ Becoming conversant with elementary information on award 
entitlements and compensation matters was seen by the leadership as important In an 
article entitied "How is M.M. Leadership To Be Built?", the Red Leader answered, 
"Become Conversant with Awards". The paper provided anecdotal evidence of the 
perils of avoiding work in the unions: 
Recentiy, a worker went to a branch union secretary who was a known 
member of the M.M. to obtain information concerning payment that 
should be made to a worker reporting for work and being sent home. 
The M.M. comrade was unable to give him this information...It can 
only be assumed that diis worker, in his desire to elicit this 
1^  P. Clancy, "The Fight For Democracy in the A.W.U.", 
Trade Union Leader, January, 1936, p. 139. 
1^  Workers Weekly, no. 534 (5 January 1934), p. 2. 
^'^ See Red Leader throughout 1934. 
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information, would go to the higher union officials to obtain it'** 
The paper advised members that ignorance of award conditions led to a loss of 
prestige for communist militants: 
...workers consider that we are not interested in these things, and 
consequently in times of comparative peace diey go to the reformist 
union officials for advice on these matters.'^ 
Abstention from internal union affau-s caused other problems for die CPA. In 
the run up to the 1933 National MM Conference, a number of potential delegates 
failed to get ratified by their union branches. Often these votes lost by only a small 
margin. "Had MM members of these branches attended the meetings the results 
would have been different", the Red Leader concluded.^° Even in 1935 the South 
Queensland Communists Congress chided their members for missing an opportunity 
"to organise a militant union fraction at the recent Queensland Trade Union 
Conference".^' 
That this was an ongoing problem throughout the Third Period came from the 
contradictory nature of the party's theory and practice. The leadership caUed on 
members to involve themselves in union affairs while simultaneously building MM 
groups in opposition to "social fascist" union leaders and also in contraposition to the 
established unions. In 1933 the Red Leader insisted that workers must repudiate the 
ACTU congress and demand an alternative national rank and file one.^ ^ 
^^  ibid., 4 October 1933, p. 8. 
'^ ibid. , p. 8. 
°^ ibid., 6 December 1933, p. 4. 
2^  Workers Weekly, no. 653 (13 Decemiber 1935), p. 2. 
22 Red Leader. 11 October 1933, p. 4 
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However, the most importuil shortcoming was the CPA's inability to assess 
accurately its trade union work. During the Third Period the CPA believed the 
"social fascism" of the union (MTicials led to their moral degeneration. To 
communists, officials were merely well paid "bureaucrats who find capitalism so 
comfortable" they would not challenge it.-" Therefore, the party advocated mass 
participation of the rank and file within die unions. They called for: 
Election of job and area commiiiees responsible to the workers on the 
job and in the locality...all officials to be elected annually, and to be 
subject to recall at any lime by the rank and file, all officials' salaries 
to be no more than the average ruling rale received by the workers in 
the industry; the majorily o\' the executive positions to be held by the 
rank and file workers.""' 
During the Third Period their work amongst the rank and file, in particular the 
development of the MM, created a suhslanual base for communist ideas in the trade 
unions. From this base the party was able to gel their members elected into official 
union positions. The CPA believed thai replacing reformist officials with dedicated 
communists would convert the existing unions into revolutionary ones. Yet, as the 
Webbs had noted in earlier circumstances in Britain, the behaviour of union officials 
did not reflect their moi'al bankruptcy, rather it reflected their social position as 
brokers for labour power within capitalism. When the Third Period line was replaced 
with the Popular Front and the MM wound up, the party, inadvertentiy, removed a 
mechanism within the rank and file for democratic control over their union officials -
including communists. 
Ultimately, it seems, the price that the CPA had to pay for its direction by 
" ibid., 16 August 1933, p. 2. 
'^ ibid., 7 September 1932, p. 4 
363 
Moscow was that the men and women of good will who joined the CPA in the 1930s 
in the hope of creating a society free from hunger and poverty, despite their 
commitment and sacrifice, ultimately witnessed the squandering of their great talents 
as Stalinism transformed the party into an authoriuirian, dogmatic organisation. Under 
this influence the CPA became littie different in theory and practice from the 
reformist parties it had once scorned. Nowhere was diis more evident dian in the 
trade unions during WWII as communist officials became more and more elitist, 
divorced from their rank and file, and incorporated into the state structures." 
" See Daphne Gollan, op.cit.; Johnston, "The 'Leading War 
Party'", op.cit. and "The- Communist party and Labour Unity", 
op.cit.; Metcalfe, op.c i t.; Nick [Origlass], "The Second 
Imperialist War and the CPA", International, April 1971; 
O'Lincoln, Into the Mainstream, op.cit.; and Finch, op.cit. 
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APPENDIX 
JOB SHEETS ISSUED BY THE MILITANT MINORITY (Queensland) 
The Eye Opener, Lower Burdekin Rank and File Committee 
The Fuse, formerly the Tramway Organiser 
Lumpers' Voice, Townsville Militant Waterside Group (1935) 
The Marine Worker, Militant Transport Group (1935) 
The Mayne Line, Mayne Junction Militant Rail Group (1935) 
Meatworkers' News, Brisbane and Townsville meatworkers 
(1934) 
Militant Meatworker, Townsville meatworkers (1934) 
Militant Worker, Brisbane MMM publication (September-
December 1928) 
Mine Worker, Queensland miners (1932) 
Miners' Rights, Torbanlea miners 
The Organiser, Brisbane tramway workers (1934) 
Pillar Box, national postal workers bulletin (1933-35) 
Pit Light, Ipswich miners (1930s) 
The Plod, Mt Isa (1931-50) 
Rail News, Roma Stieet and Woolloongabba rati workers 
(1935) 
Railway Liners, Rockhampton rail workers (1934) 
Rank and File, AWU "Bushworkers' Committee" (eariy 1930) 
The Red Express, Maryborough rail workers (1934) 
Sewerage Workers' News, AWU sewerage workers (1934) 
Spark, Charters Towers CPA branch newsletter 
Sparks, Rockhampton (1930) 
Sugar Worker, north Queensland sugar workers (1932) 
United Bushworker, PWIU bulletin (1930s) 
Unity, Brisbane Watersiders' Provisional Unity Committee 
(1935) 
Unity, Townsville Militant Rail Group (1935) 
Vanguard, Collinsville miners 
Waterside News, (1934) 
The Wharfie, Mackay WWF (1934) 
The Woolshed, pastoral workers 
The Workshop News, Ipswich workshops (1934) 
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